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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and autobiography by focussing on 
contemporary manifestations of both. By reading a selection 
of contemporary memoirs in the context of the recovered 
memory debate and recent trauma theory, it demonstrates the 
ways in which psychoanalysis and autobiography implicated 
each other in unsuspected ways during the 1990s. 
Chapter One focuses on the figure of the detective or 
archaeologist in a selection of contemporary memoirs. 
concentrate on the recent auto/biographical emphasis on 
hidden histories and family secrets in relation to the 
recovered memory debate and to trauma theories informed by 
poststructuralism and psychoanalysis. The chapter goes on 
to explore the ways in which the revision of family 
narrative in detective memoirs' can be read as an implicit 
critique of autobiography as a truth-telling discourse, a 
confrontation with the impossibility of autobiography in 
the face of epistemological and narrative crises. 
Chapter Two focuses on the concept of 'possession' in Cathy 
Caruth's and Shoshana Felman's work on trauma and 
testimony. Their corresponding theories of historical 
transmission (in place of realist attempts at 
vi 
representation) is predicated, I argue, on the pathology of 
the witness and this chapter seeks to determine the 
implications of such a concept of 'privileged witnessing' 
for written accounts of trauma. By considering the 
'possession, model of trauma and transmission in the 
context of Nicholas Abraham's and Maria Torok's theories of 
transgenerational haunting, Chapter Two then discusses the 
ways in which theories of possession and haunting might 
provide an alternative angle from which to consider the 
ethical questions posed by relational auto/biography. 
Chapter Three examines the issues surrounding one of the 
most controversial memoirs of the 1990s, Binjamin 
Wilkomirski's Fragments: Memories of a Childhood 1939-1948 
(1995). Wilkomirski's memoir was widely thought to have 
been the result of recovered memory therapy, a practice 
that by the time of Fragments's publication was almost 
unanimously considered disreputable and unreliable. Yet 
this chapter problematises the recovered memory connection 
and demonstrates how a reading of the case based on 
contemporary trauma theory as opposed to recovered memory 
yields interestingly different results. Considering Stephan 
Maechler's suggestion that Wilkomirski's 'fake, memoir may 
be the veiled expression of unspeakable childhood traumas 
rather than a willing attempt to deceive, this chapter asks 
what the Wilkomirski case can reveal about the tensions 
,.. ii 
between psychoanalytic and historical approaches to 
narratives of trauma. How m4-gh-- these 1ý-ensions impac- on 
oth(ý-r life-narratives that, for different-- reasons, 
contravene the historical record? 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s broadsheet commentators in both the 
US and the UK were eager to announce the arrival of a new 
genre of life writing. The "confessional memoir' was not 
only, it was claimed, a new genre, but a 'new and troubling 
genre', functioning as a symptom of a perplexing 'culture 
of confession, that would characterise the 1990s in the way 
that the 'culture of complaint, had characterised the 
1980s. 1 We had become, as Michel Foucault anticipated in 
2 the 1970s, 'a singularly confessing society' . 
Often keen to pinpoint the exact moment of the genre's 
incipience, many broadsheet commentators were also eager to 
usher in the end of the movement along with the end of the 
Millennium. There was a suggestion that this genre was 
ephemeral, trivial, partaking of the Zeitgeist rather than 
being a legitimate literary development with both a past 
and a future. Andy Beckett, for example, wondered in 1998 
3 
whether the 'confessional industry' had 'gone too far,. He 
was referring to the then pending publication of Joyce 
Maynard's memoir about her relationship with J. D. Salinger 
1 Nicci Gerrard, 'Father, We Have Sinned -- -', rev. of The Kiss: A 
Secret Life by Kathryn Harrison, Observer 13 April 1997: 06, Michael 
Collins, 'Tears Irl Us', Guardian 19 January 1998, Media: 4. 
2 Michel Foucault, IScientia Sexualis', The Will to Knowledge: The 
History of Sexuality Volume I, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 
1990) 59. 
3 Andy Beckett, "This Woman Writes Books About Her Life. Now S-e's 
Writing One About Writing About Herself. Guardian 11 September 
1998, Arts: 6. 
At Home in the World (1998), a memoir which, BecketL 
bemoaned, is as much a memoir about writing memoirs, as it 
is an overly publicised confession about fumbled sex with 
the famous recluse'. 4 'It was probably inevitable that the 
modern memoir craze would come to this', wrote Beckett, 
centring on Maynard's supposed meta-memoir as evidence that 
the confessional era which he claims began in the early 
1990s, was now finally and blessedly in decline. 5 Likewise, 
he considered the rapidly increasing availability of life 
writing courses around the country as examples not of a 
growing interest in reading and writing lives, but rather 
as an indication that the memoir craze was reaching 
saturation point, that it had 'gone too far' and would 
surely soon be at an end. 
Certainly, many broadsheet commentators were quick to 
tire of the memoir 'boom' even though several British 
memoirs began life as serialisations in broadsheets such as 
7 
the independent and the Observer . Michael Collins even 
4 Beckett: 6. 
5 Beckett: 6. For memoirs which could much more accurately be defined 
as meta-memoirs, see Dave Eggers, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering 
Genius (London: Picador, 2000), Paul Morley, Nothing (London: Faber & 
Faber, 2000) and for a satirisation of the memoir genre see Bruno 
Maddox, My Little Blue Dress (London: Little Brown, 2001). 
6 And yet in a January 2001 Guardian article we find Claire Armitstead 
discussing the contemporary memoir once again as though it were new: 
Claire Armitstead, 'My Life As A Story', Guardian 27 January 2001,22 
February 2002 <http: //www. guardian. co. uk/Archive/Article/0,4273, 
4124528,00. html>. 
7 Ruth Picardie and John Diamond were all columnists who turned their 
%confessional, columns into miniature 'pathographies' when diagnosed 
with cancer as did Oscar Moore when diagnosed with Aids. All three 
columnists published memoirs as a result of the columns. Ruth 
Picardie, Befo-re I Say Goodbye (London: Penguin, 1998); John Diamond, 
C: Because cowards get cancer too... (London: Vermillion, '1999); and 
3 
went so far as to suggest that by printing an extract of 
Blake Morrison's And When Did You Last See Your FaLher? 
(1993), the Granta literary magazine was responsible not 
only for the burgeoning memoir genre but also for the mass 
public mourning that followed Princess Diana's death in 
1997 .8 More recently the Observer has run an extract of Don 
Boyd's account of childhood sexual abuse in an English 
public school as promotion for his film My Kingdom, an 
indication not only that the urge to "confess' continues 
across a variety of media and shows no signs of abating, 
but also that broadsheet previews continue to perform a 
crucial role in the circulation and publicity of 
'confessional, accounts. 
In her overview of what she refers to as 
"auto/biographical discourses', Laura Marcus writes that 
one of the constant theoretical problems of autobiography 
is the question of what constitutes autobiography proper, 
in opposition to popular ""confessional" literature or 
memoir'. 10 This seems to be the thrust behind many media 
accounts of the contemporary memoir. And yet in recent 
years, critics of autobiography have been concerned with 
Oscar Moore, PWA (London: Picador, 1996). And the Observer serialised 
the columnist Kathryn Flett's account of her divorce before the story 
became a memoir: The Heart-Shaped Bullet: (London: Macmillan, 1999) 
a Collins: 4. See Blake Morrison, 'And When Did You Last See Your 
Father?,, Granta 41 (1992). 
9 Don Boyd, 'A Suitable Boy', Observer 19 August 2001, Life Maga-zine: 
22-27. 
10 Laura Marcus, Autolbiographical Discourses: Theory, Criticism, 
Practice (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994) 3. 
4 
discovering and exploring the multiplicity of the genre 
rather than with policing the boundaries between the 
'literary, and the 'popular'. Georges Gusdorf and Phillipe 
Lejeune are more likely to be examined for their delimiting 
rather than for their paradigmatic effects and as 
autobiography appears to be more and more of an unbounded 
enterprise, critics have approached it from new and 
unsuspected angles. Augustine is no longer considered 'the 
founding father of the autobiographical form, and the 
androcentric 'great man' tradition of autobiography has 
long superseded in the face of vital research into 
previously unremarked auto/biographical territories. " 
In sharp contrast to such critical approaches to 
autobiography, however, the media response to the 
'confessional memoir, seemed to call for a renewed sense of 
the %conditions and limits, of autobiography, for a firm 
, distinction between those human beings who are capable of 
12 
self-reflection and those who are not'. Andy Beckett, for 
example, bemoaned the contemporary memoir, s relationship to 
the 1970s and 1980s feminist politicisation of the 
personal; discussing Jo Stanley's book Writing out Your 
Life (1997), he commented on the %stern references to 
"consciousness-raising" and ""the struggle"' and wondered 
11 Marcus 2. 
12 This phrase is from Marcus 21, and describes the ways in which the 
" autobiography/ memoirs distinction, which was %ostensibly formal and 
generic, has long been used to distinguish between those capable' of 
self-reflection and those incapable. 
5 
whether 'the self-assertions of middle-aged British 
' housewives, however worthy, were 'really likely to sell' . 
In a similar vein--and eerily echoing the view that 
"greatness' is a precondition for autobiographical writing- 
-Kirsty Gunn remarked that 'British readers are only going 
to put up with someone talking endlessly about themselves 
if they're old, venerable or, at the last resort, well- 
14 
connected'. And in a review of Tim Lott's The Scent of 
Dried Roses (1996), Jay Rayner complained about the ease 
with which unremarkable life-stories were beginning to find 
their way into print: 
People do get depressed. People's parents do 
commit suicide. The only extraordinary thing 
here is that, in keeping with the current vogue 
for the confessional, Tim Lott has decided to 
write about it and that is simply not enough. 
[. ] Out of desperation to find enough with 
which to fill a book, someone with no good 
cause to do so has written his life story. 15 
Kathryn Harrison and Tracey Emin have been the recipients 
of much of this kind of criticism, which is often marked by 
a lurking sense of class and gender discrimination. 
13 
Beckett: 6. 
14 Kirsty Gunn, "Swimming Was Her Life,, rev. of Crossing the Channel: 
A Memoir of Love and Loss by Sally Friedman, Observer 29 Julnie 1997: 
17. 
15 Jay Rayner, 'Tomb With A View', Observer 13 October 1-996: 16. 
6 
Harrison's memoir The Kiss: A Secret Life (1997) 
recounts the consensual sexual affair she had with her 
father while in her twenties. The Kiss elicited a 
vehemently negative response both in the US (where it was 
first published) and in the UK. In a positive review of The 
Kiss in 1997 Nicci Gerrard wrote: 
Harrison has been accused of extreme cynicism, 
of queasy bad taste, of jumping on the 
bandwagon of the confession-fest, of treating 
the world as her shrink, of being a bad wife, 
bad mother, bad woman, of even, she says, 
"almost having the affair so that I could write 
about it" [. ]. Even her looks have been 
turned against her. 16 
In an infamous review in the Washington Post, Jonathan 
Yardley opined that 'The Kiss is trash from first word to 
last, self-promotion masquerading as literature [) 
17 
slimy, repellent, meretricious, cynical' . And in an 
article titled 'Women Behaving Badly' Michael Schnayerson 
swiftly pathologises Harrison by citing a psychologist 
proposing that the memoir might be the result of unresolved 
traumatic experiences and that 'Harrison may be offering 
16 Nicci Gerrard, 'Father, We Have Sinned... 1: 06. 
17 Cited by Robert McCrum, 'Today's Private Wars', Observer 16 March 
1997: 24. 
7 
herself up to the world the way she offered herself to her 
father' 
. 
18 
Articles on the 'bad behaviour' of Harrison and others 
outnumber by far those such as 'Blaming the Victim' which 
appeared in the Women's Review of Books and which takes a 
more sympathetic approach. 19 The Kiss--along with Michael 
Ryan's Secret Life (1996)--is sometimes cited as an example 
of the excesses of the north American version of the 
contemporary memoir as opposed to the more temperate UK 
manifestation. 
20 
Young British artist Tracey Emin's controversial 
installation My Bed elicited an equally impassioned 
response in both UK broadsheets and tabloids when it was 
nominated for the 1999 Turner Prize. Her display of soiled 
bedsheets and underwear served only to fuel suspicions that 
confessional art is nothing more than the washing--or not-- 
of one's dirty linen in public, or of the indecent 
'exposure, of one's self before an unsuspecting public. The 
TV talk-show connection was evoked here, as in so many 
discussions of the ', confessional memoir, , with Matthew 
is Michael Schnayerson, 'Women Behaving Badly', Vanity Fair February 
1997: 54-61. 
19 Lisa Alther, 'Blaming The Victim,, Women's Review of Books 14 (, July 
1997): 33-4. See also Susan Cheever, 'Innocence Betrayed', New York 
Times Book Review 102 (30 March 1997): 11. 
20 Notably, the French author Christine Angot's memoir about consensual 
incest L'Inceste (2000) barely received media attention at all in the 
US and the UK (although to be fair it has not yet been translated into 
English). See also Gunn: 17, which observes the difference between US 
and UK receptions of The Kiss and Ed Vulliamy, 'Pen And Shrink', 
Guardian 13 February 1997: 02, which suggests that The Kiss e. -, erges 
8 
Collins commenting on the similarity between the titles of 
Emin's drawings Pfrom the early sketch My Boyfriend Fucked 
Me up The Arse And I Enjoyed It, to the appliqu6d tent with 
the names of Everyone I Have Ever Slept With--1963-1995') 
and the titles of Ricki Lake shows ('My Boyfriend Left Me 
21 To Date My Mother And Then Married My Sister') . 
Some criticism appears to be directed at the very 
notion of autobiography and certain memoirs have been 
pilloried on account of their distance from fiction. Thus 
Nick Hornby is lauded as one who at least presents a 
distance between himself and his subject for it to have the 
semblance of literature' and Andrea Ashworth's memoir Once 
in a House on Fire (1998) is described as 'faulty only in 
its repetitive (too many stepfathers, too much violence) 
plot I. 
22 
In her own 'confessional memoir' about her mother's 
Alzheimer's disease, Linda Grant wonders what critics might 
make of this genre in the years to come: 
will it be that, in twenty years, literary 
critics will recall that odd period in the 
closing years of the last century, when there 
was a fashion for what was called 
"confessional" literature, and how strange a 
from a 'successful, US literary tradition of 'babbling one's intimate 
innards, and that incest is more prevalent in the US. 
21 Collins: 4. 
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phenomenon it was, and why did it die out so 
quickly? Or will they think, how peculiar that 
when the literary memoir finally appeared, such 
a fuss was made of it, and how it was branded 
as "confessional" as though it was new and had 
more in common with The Oprah Winfrey Show 
than, say, the great work of St Augustine, 
which is called, of course, his Confession. 23 
By imagining how views on 1990s memoirs might have changed 
in twenty years time, Grant raises questions which are 
crucial to an approach to the subject now. Do contemporary 
memoirs merit serious critical attention? Are they 
, literary memoirs' or 'popular confessions'? Is the 
contemporary or the confessional memoir a genre or a 
"fashion'? Is it legitimate? Is it new? Does it belong with 
Augustine or Oprah> 
Grant suggests that we may have to wait twenty years 
before literary critics can begin to offer answers to these 
questions and yet the critical response to contemporary 
memoirs has in fact been swift. Nancy K. Miller, in her 
part-memoir, part critical work Bequest and Betrayal: 
Memoirs of a Parent's Death (1996), for example, draws on a 
corpus of memoirs from the early 1990s as well as several 
earlier models as do Paul John Eakin in How Our Lives 
22 Kate Kellaway, 'She Loved Her Mother More Than She Loved Mashed 
Potato,, rev. of Once in a House on Fire by Andrea Ashworth, Observer 
29 March 1998, Books: 17. 
23 Linda Grant, Remind Me Who I Am, Again (1998; London: Granta, i999) 
301. 
10 
Become Stories: Making Selves (1999), Susanna Egan in 
MI irror Talk: Genres of Crisis in Contemporary Autobiography 
(1999), and Nicola King in Memory, Narrative, identity: 
Remembering the Self (2000). Interestingly, none of these 
contemporary critical accounts refer to the memoirs as 
specifically 'confessionall. In their discussion of recent 
memoirs alongside earlier examples and sometimes alongside 
fiction, these critics also desist from categorising 
contemporary life writing as a genre to be distinguished 
from earlier models and focus instead on the way in which 
memory and narrative operate in the texts or on the 
changing 'models of identity' they perceive. 
As Grant's scare quotes around the word suggest, 
'confessional' might serve less as a descriPtive or generic 
term than as a means of distinguishing 'confessional 
memoirs' from 'literature' by conceiving of them as a 
simple adjunct to the confessional culture characterised 
most effectively by TV talk-shows such as Oprah and Kilroy. 
In a review of The Kiss Ed Vulliamy observed: 'The line 
between literature and the Oprah Winfrey show, on which 
people tell the cameras about their sexual and relationship 
problems, blurs; indeed, the self-obsessive authors are 
2, 
competing for airtime with Oprah's guests' ." Along with 
its followers Jerry Springer, Ricki Lake and others, Oprah 
is often regarded as an emblem of 'what Frederick Jameson 
11 
describes as "the whole 'degraded' landscape of schlock- of 
a country in decline,. 25 And their British coun'ý-erpar--s 
Esther, Kilroy, and Vanessa are implicated in the spread of 
cultural decline across the Atlanti c. 26 
As Grant says, 'confession' is not a word used to 
describe something, but to 'brand' it with. In certain 
cases it seems inimical to the activities it purports to 
describe. The 1990s might even be seen less as the decade 
in which the 'frenzy to confess' was evident everywhere one 
looked and more as the decade in which almost any 
autobiographical engagement was labelled 'confessional,. 27 
John Diamond raised this point in a response to Michael 
Collins's Guardian article 'Tears 'r' Us', in which Collins 
"accused confessional columnists of believing they have a 
monopoly on suffering'. Diamond questioned the parallels 
Collins drew between certain confessional practices and 
others: 
24 
Vulliamy: 02. 
25 Cited by Jane M. Shattuc in The Talking Cure: TV Talk Shows and 
Women (New York: Routledge, 1997) 14. 
26 Shattuc claims that in 1994 the emphasis of talk shows shifted away 
from identity politics and towards a more apolitical and ironic 
treatment of social issues' Shattuc, 9. 'From 1967 to 19931, she 
writes, 'TV produced some of the most radical populist moments in its 
history as women (and men) rarely seen on national television 
(lesbian, black, bisexual, working-class) stood up, spoke about, and 
even screamed for their beliefs about what is culturally signi, 
See also Janice Peck, 'The Mediated Talking Cure: Therapeutic Framing 
of Autobiography in TV Talk Shows', Getting a Life: Everyday Uses of 
Autobiography, Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, eds. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
27 Vulliamy: 02. 
12 
It wasn't just me, of course: we were all 
there. Here was Oscar Moore dying of Aids in 
the Guardian and Roth Picardie of cancer _ýn -%-he 
Observer; there is Linda Grant writing about 
her mother's Alzheimer's and Mark Honigsbaum 
contemplating his partner's abortion. (. I 
And in a cack-handed attempt to turn his sour 
complaint [. ] into a full-fledged thesis, 
[Collins] attached the disease-affected 
columnists to the domestically inconvenienced 
(Kathryn Flett writing about her divorce), and 
those in turn--although I still can't work out 
how--to dead Diana, fictional Bridget Jones and 
the participants in the Oprah show-28 
Diamond takes issue with the use of the word 'confessional' 
wondering whether 'Having cancer or Alzheimer's or Aids is 
a sin? Or perhaps a crime? ' .29 And yet confession in the 
1990s appeared to have little to do with its religious or 
juridical roots and, perhaps having more in common with 
Oprah than with Augustine, was more readily understood as 
an unprecedented degree of public self-exposure designed to 
elicit fame and profit rather than absolution or judgement. 
The link between the 'confessional memoir' and therapy 
was widely believed to be self-evident . 
30 This view was 
based on an ostensibly unproblematic conflation of 
confessional discourse and therapeutic discourse. As Leigh 
28 John Diamond, 'Sympathy Pains', Guardian 26 January 1998: 7. 
29 Diamond: 7. 
13 
Gilmore wrote in 2001 'In 1996 a New York Times Magaz-4ne 
special issue announced nothing less than the %%triumphv of 
literary memoir and linked its ascendancy to the therapy- 
driven "'culture of confession" with which it was a perfect 
, 31 fit 
The link between confession and therapy is not of 
course untenable, although it is problematic. The feminist 
consciousness-raising drive of the 1970s and 1980s which 
may well have been partly responsible for the massive 
popularity of the memoir form in the 1990s can itself be 
seen as a revision of 'an already existing theory of the 
personal and of the talking cure,, a revision and yet not a 
replica of classic Freudian psychoanalysis (because it 
coincided with an attack on Freud's theories of female 
sexuality). 32 There is of course a danger that an equation 
of contemporary memoirs with confession and that in turn 
with therapy might serve only to pathologise the authors of 
the memoirs or to pathologise the memoirs themselves, 
serving as another means of distinguishing this "new genre' 
from literature proper. Harrison, as we have seen, was 
accused of treating the world as her shrink' and the 
30 See, for example, Angela Neustatter, 'Voyage Round Our Parents', 
Gua. rdian 3 March 1998: 2 and Nicci Gerrard, 'Mothers Ruined', Obser-Ver 
3 November 1996, Review: 01. 
31 Leigh Gilmore, The Limits of Autobiography: Trauma and Testimony 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001) 1-2. The article she is 
referring to is James Atlas, 'The Age of Literary Memoir is Now', ',; ew 
York Times Magazine 12 May 1996- 25-27. 
32 Lisa Appignanesi and John Forrester, Freud's Women (1992; London: 
Penguin, 2000) 459. 
14 
memoir was read by some as a pathological symptom. The 
moralistic tone of some broadsheet commentaries is often 
accompanied by intimations of pathology as confession is 
figured as a rampant pestilence spreading uncontrollably 
from the US to the UK, oozing its way into every imaginable 
33 medium, and contaminating the culture . 
If some contemporary memoirs fall into what appears to 
be a new genre of writing as therapy, this might have more 
to do with what Elizabeth Bruss refers to as 'contextual' 
issues than with the aims of the author or the formal 
34 qualities of the text . Autobiography has traditionally 
35 fallen into a historical generic classification . Yet it 
is notable that many of the memoirs and critical texts used 
in this thesis were found not in the biography or the 
history sections of bookshops, but rather in the rapidly 
growing self-help section. 36 
33 See, for example, Richard Horton, 'Health: A Literary Footnote', 
Observer 2 March 1997, Life Magazine: 46; Andrew O'Hagan, 'The Breath 
Of A Speaking Voice', rev. of The Scent of Dried Roses, Guardian 19 
September 1996: 14; Gerrard, 'Mothers Ruined': 01; and Elaine 
Showalter, 'Ladies, Maladies: Nervous Switch', Observer 15 December 
1996, Review: 13. 
34 Elizabeth W. Bruss, Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation of 
a Literary Genre (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) 4- 
5. 
35 As Olney wryly observes: '(which is why librarians and 
bibliographers, being good, simple souls and devoted to systems of 
classification that go back far beyond the time when the study of 
autobiography came into vogue, like to view autobiography as nothing 
other than a subdivision of biography--which is itself classified as a 
variety of history)', James Olney, ed., On Autobiography: Essays 
Theoretical and Critical (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) 
20. 
36 Notably in stores of the US chain Borders where you are likely to 
find Kathryn Flett's memoir shelved under 'Divorce' and countless 
memoirs of family deaths under 'Bereavement'. Because Borders do not 
have a nonfiction or biography section, the way in which they 
catalogue books from those categories is often intereszing. While so7e 
15 
"We want confessions', Peter Brooks writes in 
Troubling Confessions (2000), 'yet we are suspicious of 
them ,. 37 This encapsulates some of the problems with the 
reception of the 'confessional memoir' during the 1990s, 
some of the anxiety over the cultural space confessional 
discourse was allowed to occupy, and some of the perplexed 
and confused distinctions between the "literary' and the 
'confessional,. 
In the case of the 'confessional memoir' the problem 
might simply have been one of terminology, or of emphasis. 
If we focus, for example, on the relationality of some 
contemporary memoirs, rather than on their supposed 
" conf essionality' , they emerge as part of a literary 
development with roots in feminist revisions of the 
'Gusdorfian, model of identity and life writing, and can be 
seen as pioneering not for their heightened candour but for 
the unprecedented scope of their generic blending. From 
this perspective, the contemporary memoir becomes more 
difficult to categorise as a genre in itself as so many 
memoirs imbricate several genres, such as sociology, 
psychoanalysis, history, autobiography, and biography. 
Moreover, it becomes increasingly difficult to conceive of 
the genre as 'contemporary'; examples of the relational 
model of identity and of auto/biography go as far back as 
find their way into 'Fiction', others end up in various departments 
around the store, such as 'Religion, (for some Holocaust --esti. -.. onies) 
16 
Edmund Gosse's Father and Son (1907), and similar exercises 
include Simone de Beauvoir's Une morte tr&s d6uce (1969), 
and perhaps more influentially Carolyn Steedman's Landscape 
38 for a Good Woman (1986) . 
The other problem is the ostensibly simple conflation 
of confessional discourse with therapeutic discourse. Not 
only is 'confession' not homogenous in itself--comprising 
notions of religious, literary, and juridical discourses- 
there are also important distinctions between 'confession' 
in a broad sense and what Brooks refers to as 'the 
confessional talk of psychoanalysis'. Although the 
connection between TV talk shows and therapy has provided 
fertile material for a Foucaldian analysis of confessional 
discourse in the 1990s, the complex relationship between 
confession, literature, and psychoanalysis may be at the 
root of the discomfort critics felt over the excessive 
'confessional, performance of, for example, Kathryn 
39 Harrison . 
Critics were not only dismayed by the content of 
Harrison's memoir, but also by its form--by the strangely 
somnambulant voice in which Harrison recounted her 
37 Peter Brooks, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and 
Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 3. 
38 Mary Mason traces the relational model of identity much further bac- 
to the very first known examples of women's life writing, see 'The 
other Voice: Autobiographies of Women Writers' in Olney. Others place 
the advent of a new focus on relationality in 1978 with Nancy 
Chodorow's work on mothering and psychoanalysis. See for example, 
Feminism and Autobiography: Texts, Theories, Methods, Tess Cosslett, 
Celia Lury, and Penny Summerfield, eds. (London: Routledge, 2000) 6. 
39 Shattuc engages with Foucault in her study of TV talk shows. 
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experiences with her father. There seemed here to be a 
confusion between what Brooks, drawing on J. L. Austin's 
important work on speech acts, refers to as between the 
%constative, and the 'performative' aspects of confessional 
discourse: 'One might want to say that confession, even if 
compelled, is always in some sense "true" as a 
performative, indeed as a performance, but this does not 
guarantee that it is not false as a constative, as a 
relevant "fact"' . 
40 In Harrison's case it seems that an 
excess of the performative aspect of her confession- 
characterised not only by the lliterariness' of the memoir 
but also by her appearances in Vogue and other high-profile 
magazines--led to a profound suspicion about the memoir's 
validity as a 'constativel act. 
Indeed Brooks seeks to trouble the ostensibly 
unproblematic relationship between confession and truth- 
telling that some commentators on the 'confessional memoir, 
appeared to take for granted. Freud provided perhaps the 
most succinct description of the difference between 
psychoanalytic discourse and other kinds of confession: 'In 
Confession the sinner tells what he knows; in analysis the 
neurotic has to tell more , . 
41 The 'confessional talk of 
psychoanalysis, has a complex relationship to truth-telling 
and while legal and religious forms of confession tend to 
40 Brooks 21-22. 
4' Cited in Brooks 113. 
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rest on the assumption that the past is knowable and 
narratable (and can be either disclosed or withheld) 
psychoanalysis is interested in 'more'--in a knowledge -, -hat 
is beyond the conscious reach of the analysand him or 
herself 
. 
This thesis explores the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and a selection of contemporary memoirs 
that, to greater or lesser degrees, engage with this 
question of 'more'. Despite the preoccupation of both 
autobiography and psychoanalysis with what Adam Phillips in 
his essay on the relationship between them calls 'the 
telling of selves' the two disciplines have, as Marcus 
explains, failed to connect historically in the way we 
might expect. '[Tlhere has been', she writes, 'a sense of 
missed opportunities and failed relationships' despite the 
"clear affinities' of autobiography and psychoanalysis. 42 
Psychoanalysis converged briefly with autobiography in the 
modern period, Marcus observes, when autobiographies tended 
to focus on formative childhood experience, the "family 
I romance, and revelatory fictions in place of facts. 43 
Briefly sketching out the points at which psychoanalysis 
and autobiography have been placed in conversation with 
each other throughout the twentieth century, Marcus alludes 
to 'Lacan's concepts of specularity and doubling' which was 
4-1 Marcus 214. 
43 Marcus 214. 
:9 
influential not only for deconstructionýst work on 
autobiography, but also to a feminist 'redefinition of ý'-e 
mother/mirror relationship, narcissism and specularity ,. 44 
While Susanna Egan's 2000 study of contemporary 
autobiography continues in this vein to stress the 
importance of the 'mirror, in autobiography, other recent 
studies such as Paul John Eakin's How our Lives Become 
Stories place the emphasis instead on Irelationality' which 
in Eakin's account is ungendered and approached from a 
markedly unpsychoanalytic angle. 
Like Marcus, Eakin also remarks on the failed 
connection between autobiography and psychoanalysis, 
despite the efforts of some 1970s and 1980s 
autobiographers, critics, and theorists who sought to bring 
45 them together . Critics and theorists, writes Eakin, 
sought 'to throw off the dead weight of convention', 
calling "for a %%new model autobiographer" who, 
psychoanalytically inspired, would discard the old- 
fashioned constraints of narrative linearity and embrace 
the freedom of free association proper to the 
psychoanalytic self , . 
46 Eakin regrets that 'Such a reform 
[) has been slow to take hold, for ten years later . -: e 
44 Marcus 217-18. 
45 Among the autobiographers Eakin considers to be particularly 
influenced by psychoanalysis are, notably, Michel Leiris (,: ý'Age 
d1homme 1939), Conrad Aiken (Ushant 1962) and Ronald Fraser (-n Search. 
of a Past 1984), Eakin, Touching the World 83. 
46 Eakin, Touching the World 83. Notably John Sýurrock, see -he New 
Model Autobiographer' , New 
Literary History 9 (19777-78): 51-63. 
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find Philip Dodd praising In Search of a Past: as "the mos-- 
important contemporary English autobiography", still in the 
Position of championing Fraser's use of psychoanalysis in 
47 autobiographical discourse as a novelty' . Eakin considers 
that "we could reasonably expect Freud's work on the 
unconscious (. I which involves a radical expansion of 
the received model of personality and postulates a "hiddenm 
part of the "hidden" self, to have had revolutionary 
implications for our understanding of the self and its 
48 story. Surprisingly, in fact it has not' . 
While the alliance of free-association and 
autobiography may always have been doomed to failure on the 
grounds that, as Phillips writes, free-association requires 
that the analysand 'become a very bad story-teller and make 
a nonsense of his life,, Eakin seems to underestimate the 
impact of psychoanalysis on life writing generally and on 
contemporary life writing in particular .49 As Phillips 
suggests in his essay on the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and autobiography, it is a mistake to 
assume--as the 'new model autobiographers' seemed to--that 
the differences between these two forms of self-telling are 
surmountable, that autobiography can perform the same 
function as psychoanalysis. Attempts to read autobiography 
47 Eakin, Touching the World 83. 
48 Eakin, Touching the World 83. 
49 Adam Phillips, 'The Telling of Selves', On Flirtation (London: Faber 
& Faber, 1994) 68. Eakin does not engage with psychoanalysis in h-, s 
study of contemporary life writing How Our Lives Become Stories. 
unproblematically as 'therapy' are perhaps as doomed as 
attempts to replicate the analytic encounter on -. -he page. 
50 
Shoshana Felman, in her introduction to Literature a, -. d 
Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise (1980) 0, 
maintains that many of the problems with psychoanalytic 
literary criticism are rooted in criticism's tendency to 
adopt the role of the analyst, to 'apply' theories to texts 
in the way that Freud applied his theories to his 
patients . 
51 Felman problematises the seemingly innocuous 
'-and' between literature and psychoanalysis and argues 
against the implied master-slave (or analyst -analysand) 
relationship between the two. 
52 
She endorses 'implication' 
(in its etymological sense of being folded within') 
between the two disciplines rather than the more banal 
"application, of one to the other. 53 In this way, the 
50 Two notable (and successful) attempts to do so are Philip Roth's 
Portnoy's Complaint (1995) and Marie Cardinal's The Words to Say It 
(1984), but even though Cardinal's book is an 'autobiographical 
novel', and Roth's might be close to autobiography, I think it is 
important that both are in the fiction category. Although, as Lejeune 
knew, there may be no formal difference between an autobiography and 
an autobiographical novel, there is a difference in terms of the act, 
of designating a book autobiography, which signals the way in whicn it 
is to be read. More recently, Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick's A Dialogue on 
Love (1999) is a non-fictional account of her therapy sessions, but 
this perhaps does not replicate, the analytic encounter as much as 
report (sometimes poetically, imaginatively) on it. 
51 Peter Brooks, for example, writes of how 'Psychoanalytic literary 
criticism has always been something of an embarrassment. One resists 
labelling as a "psychoanalytic criticm because the kind of crIlticism 
evoked by the term mostly deserves the bad name it largely has made 
for itself', 'The Idea of a Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism', The 
Trials of Psychoanalysis, Franqoise Meltzer (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988) 145. 
52 Shoshana Felman, ed., Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question 
of Reading: Otherwise (Baltimore: John's Hopkins University Press, 
1982) 6-7. 
53 Felman, Literature and Psychoanalysis 9. 
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master discourse proposed by psychoanalysis is broken down 
and opened up to potentially invigorating re-readings. 
This thesis explores the implications between 
autobiography and psychoanalysis by focussing on 
particularly contemporary manifestations of each: 
contemporary memoirs, the recovered memory debate, and 
contemporary trauma theory. 54 The chapters focus on three 
different figures: the detective, the ventriloquist, and 
the liar. These are not normally considered the 
conventional roles of the autobiographer but this thesis 
considers how each of them might highlight the ways in 
which autobiography and psychoanalysis implicated each 
other in unsuspected ways during the 1990s. 
Chapter One looks at what I refer to as the 'detective 
memoir, in relation to trauma theory and to the RMT debate. 
The RMT debate proves a particularly useful context in 
which to consider contemporary autobiography and its 
relationship to psychoanalysis. The debate saw the 
convergence of the political and therapeutic effects of 
life-stories which, although retrieved in a clinical 
setting, often became legal testimony once they entered the 
public arena. Psychoanalysis, once the agent only of 
narrative truth or psychical reality, was called upon to 
produce narratives that would hold up in a court of law. At 
54 T also refer to the recovered memory debate as the RMT (recovered 
memory therapy) debate and to the period of debate as 'the memory 
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the same time, historians were attempting to rescue their 
discipline from the damaging effects of postmodernism -... -hich 
threatened to throw history into what has been called an 
extended epistemological crisis ,. 55 
During the 'memory wars' that raged during the 1990s 
psychoanalysis was emerging out of the consulting room and 
entering the courtroom, shifting the boundaries not only 
between the public and the private but also between the 
different kinds of truth production which are admissible as 
evidence or as legal and historical truth. The true/false 
polemics of the RMT debate ('the mind either has the 
capacity to repress vast numbers of events [. I or it 
does not') filter directly into the paradoxes at the heart 
of the debate, reviving and problematising some of the 
original and unresolved impasses of psychoanalysis. 56 
In a recent article, Roger Luckhurst examined the ways 
in which the recovered memory model began to emerge in 
wars', a phrase coined by Frederick Crews in The Memory Wars: Freud's 
Legacy in Dispute (London: Granta, 1997). 
55 For an excellent overview of the effects of postmodernism on the 
discipline of history and on the future of history, see Richard J. 
Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta, 1997). David Harlan, 
cited in Evans 3-4. 
56 Richard Ofshe and Ethan Watters, Making Monsters: False Memories, 
Psychotherapy, and Sexual Hysteria (London: Andr6 Deutsch, 1995) 5. 
For a good discussion of the issues surrounding the RMT debate, see 
also Valerie Sinason, ed., Memory in Dispute (London: Karnac, 1998), 
Daniel Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the mind, and the 
Past (London: Basic Books, 1996), Joseph de Rivera and Theodore R. 
Sarbin, eds., Believed-in Imaginings: The Narrative Construction of 
Reality (Washington: The American Psychological Association, 1998), 
Elizabeth Loftus and Katherine Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memoz-y: 
Loftus and Katherine Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed memories: False 
Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse (New York: St Martin's Press, 
1994), and Frederick Crews, The Memory Wars. 
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fictional writing during the 1990S. 57 Although Luck1l. -ý; rst-'s 
focus is on the RMT motif in fiction, the prevalence of --he 
trauma-recovery model in 1990s literature indicates --hat 
the debate was more far-reaching than it might seem. Ann 
Scott writes that the recovered memory debate represented 
%a climate of thinking about the self, and Luckhurst goes 
further in suggesting that the fascination with RMT 'lies 
in the emergence of a new structure of subjectivity, 
oscillating between memory and forgetting, with the 
prospect that another self, attached to a wholly occluded 
memory-chain, might lurk in the interstices of a life 
story' . 
58 
I suggest that the plethora of 'hidden lives' 
autobiographies that appeared in the 1990s emerged as part 
of a similar preoccupation. Margaret Forster's novel The 
Memory Box (1999), for example, followed her 
autobiographical treatments of the same theme Hidden Lives 
(1995) and Precious Lives (1998). Lisa Appignanesi's Losing 
the Dead (1999), Tim Lott's The Scent of Dried Roses 
(1996), Louise Kehoe's In This Dark House (1995), Mary 
Gordon's The Shadow Man (1996), Dan Jacobson's Heshel Is 
Kingdom (1998), and Germaine Greer's Daddy, We Hardly Knew 
57 Luckhurst focuses on Kate Atkinson's Behind the Scenes at , --he Musez.: 7 
(1995; London: Black Swan, 1998) and Jane Smileys A Thousar-, J Acres 
(London: Flamingo, 1992). 
so Ann Scott, Real Events Revisited: Fantasy, Me: 7ory, and 
Psychoanalysis (London: Virago, 1996) 65 and Roger Luckhurs- 'Memo: -- ',. 
recovered/ recovered memory,, Literature and the Contemporary: Fictions 
2- 
You (1989) are all family memoirs in which the author plays 
the role of detective or archaeologist in order to uncover 
the buried secrets of their family histories. These memoirs 
each centre on the recovered memory dilemma par excellence: 
the possibility that 'In the instant of recovery (. . .1 we 
59 can become strangers to ourselves' .I resist the term 
'confessional, in this thesis in order to consider the 
difference, as Peter Brooks suggests we might, between 
Rousseau's 'tell all' and Freud's 'tell more'. 
Distinguishing religious or legal confession from 
psychoanalytic discourse, Brooks writes that 'the 
confessional talk of psychoanalysis suggests that 
confession can be less a definition of the truth than a 
search for it, a posing of the question: Who am 1)'. 60 
Recognising the centrality of trauma to contemporary 
understandings of psychoanalysis (and history), the 
contemporary memoirs discussed in this thesis might, I 
suggest, be more readily understood as testimony as opposed 
to confession: a mode of 'access to' the past rather than a 
'statement of' that past. 61 
and Theories of the Present, Roger Luckhurst and Peter Marks, eds. 
(London: Pearson Education Ltd., 1999) 86. 
59 Luckhurst 86. 
60 Brooks 141. 
61 Based on Shoshana Felman's distinction, as discussed in Chapter One. 
A note on terminology here: sometimes I refer to memoir, sometimes to 
autobiography, and sometimes to testimony. I do not think contemporary 
memoirs are to be distinguished from autobiography 'proper', W`ich is 
why I sometimes refer to them as such. When I refer to tes,, 
imony, this 
is to make clear this particular function of ýhe text. Because this 
thesis is so concerned with the RMT debate and with the Political need 
for the possibility of 'true stories-', I have found i-- useful to 
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Many contemporary memoirs are no, ý-able a'-so for --neir 
blurring of the boundaries between genres. !L is not-- 
unusual to find sections of memoirs which depart 
significantly from the auto /biographical mode. As many o-` 
them are also relational there is also a blend of 
autobiography and biography within them: the question 'who 
am I? ' in these cases takes a necessary detour through the 
biographical question 'who was s/he? '. This blurring of 
boundaries between purportedly subjective and objective 
modes was also characteristic of the memory wars, where the 
psychoanalytic and the juridical merged, often 
uncomfortably. 62 But it has also been a growing emphasis in 
life writing too, where we find a blurring of the lines 
between public and private and between the subjective and 
always keep in mind the possible function of autobiography as 
testimony, as legal or historical 'evidence'. 
62 Appignanesi and Forrester, for example, write of how 'The new 
therapies constructed to speak to the plight of rape victims and the 
adult consequences of childhood sexual abuse are continuous with 
forensic investigation, preparatory to a trial in court. As well as 
being helped by the therapist, that selfsame therapist is always 
grooming the patient or client for her appearance in court as a 
witness, 484. And in The New Informants: The Betrayal of 
Confidentiality in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy (1995), 
Christopher Bollas and David Sundelson describe the ways i: -. whic-. the 
1990s convergence of psychoanalysis and the law poses a grave threat 
to the practice of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. They detail the 
then recent (and predominantly north American) 'flood of i-sclosures 
from what was once a strictly private relationship': 'Nicole Simpson's 
therapist gives press interviews about her treatment; Anne Sexton's 
publishes transcripts of actual sessions; the Menendez brothers' 
appears in court as a prosecution witness against his former paýien-. sl 
x. Laudable developments in public policy such as the 
laws -, ý; hich exist 
in all 50 states which state that therapists have a legal duLy -, o 
report on any incidence of child abuse past, present, or :. -: -InenL, 
have led to a bizarre convergence of psychoanalytic and legal 
confession and to a climate in which 'what a patient says will now 
be 
used against them', Christopher Bollas and David S, -.. --. 
delson, The :;, -W 
Informants: The Betrayal of Confidentiality in Psychoanalysis a: -, - 
psychotherapy (London: Jason Aronson : nc-, 1905) ix. 
the objective in the personal Cý_iZýIC4SM Of, for examn-'e, 
Nicole Ward Jouve and Nancy K. Miller, in ýýhe 1ý-, 80s 
and early 1990s sought to merge autobiography and literary 
criticism while biographers such as Richard Holmes shif--ed 
the line between autobiography and biography in subtle but 
63 influential ways . Carolyn Steedman and Ronald Fraser 
incorporated biography, autobiography, history, politics, 
sociology and psychology into their memoirs, as did Anne 
Karpf and Annette Kuhn in the late 1990s. Here we see not 
just a blurring of generic boundaries, but a shaking of the 
very foundations upon which notions of objective and 
subjective authority have been constructed. Such 
manipulations of the form mount an effective challenge to 
what Patricia J. Williams refers to as 'The propagated mask 
of the imagined literary critic, the language club of 
hyperauthenticity, the myth of a purely objective 
perspective, the godlike image of generalized, legitimating 
others, which in law are 'reified' as '"impersonal" rules 
and "neutral,, principles, presumed to be inanimate, 
unemotional, un-biased, urimanipulated, and higher than 
ourselves'. 64 Just as personal histories were subject to 
(de) legitimation in courts of law during the R. ". 1717 debate, 
63 Nancy K. Miller, Getting Personal: Femi-ist occasions and Cýh-r 
Autobiographical Acts (London: Routledge, 19911), Nicole Ward 
White Woman Speaks with Forked Tongue: Criticis. m. as Aw-obiography 
(London: Routledge, 1991). See H. Avra: n veeser, ed., Co. --'essio. -'s of 
'For 7,, re examples of the Critics (London: Routledge, 1996) ý 
confessional criticism and an overview of the 
iss--; es involved. 
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Williams suggests here the ways in which life writing mignt 
be employed to unsettle the very authority of la-..; itself. 
My exploration of the relationship between 
autobiography and psychoanalysis departs from other 
attempts to put these two areas in conversation with each 
other. Instead of Lacanian specularity or late-Freudian 
free-association, the RMT debate involved an engagement 
with the very origins of psychoanalysis and its relation to 
objectively verifiable histories. 65 
Jeffrey Masson's influential and controversial book 
The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction 
Theor_y (1984) played an important early role in what was to 
become the recovered memory debate. It was credited with 
renewing an interest in Pierre Janet and Sandor Ferenczi 
but RMT is at its most beguiling in its simultaneous avowal 
66 
and disavowal of Freud . RMT detractors and supporters 
alike shared an ambivalence towards Freudian theory that 
suggested a desire to move from the unresolved ambiguities 
of Freud to the certainties of polemical positions. If 
64 Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a L, i-., - 
Professor (1991; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) 11. 
65 Beyond discussions of the mirror and specularity, there is of co-, -; rse 
a place for Lacan in discussions of trauma, testimony, and language. I 
chose to concentrate on Freud, however, because what I find intriguing 
is the way in which certain Freudian impasses have resurfaced in the 
1990s, and also because the two primary trauma theorists discussed in 
this thesis use Freudian psychoanalysis as the basis for their 
theories, as does recovered memory therapy, but with interesting 
differences of emphasis. 
66 For a very good overview of Janet's theories in relaýion to multiple 
personality disorder see Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Y-Ltiple 
Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
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psychoanalytic theory was founded on the r-ins of a buried 
truth, RMT purported to recover both the suppressed truth 
of childhood sexual abuse and the original therapy itself. 
Psychoanalysis, in this way, emerged as both the originator 
and the opponent of recovered memory therapy. Freud's model 
of trauma and recovery which was revived by the recovered 
memory therapists coincided with an attack on subsequent 
Freudian therapy and opened some of the unresolved impasses 
of psychoanalysis to further debate. 
During the 1990s, memory and recovery were emerging as 
fertile material for novelists and autobiographers alike, 
but their emergence was shrouded in doubt, uncertainty and 
debate. The memoirs I discuss in this thesis are already in 
conversation with the combatants of the 'memory wars'. As 
Mary Gordon wrote in her 1996 memoir, upon entering the 
'cave of memory' she found it was far from empty. Instead, 
the cave of memory in the 1990s was bustling 'like a 
67 
tourist trap in high season' . 
Although RMT and contemporary trauma theory were not 
usually discussed together during the 1990s, this thesis 
explores the parallels between them. Both are based on 
Freudian psychoanalysis, but on different aspects of it and 
with significantly different consequences. Trauma theorist 
Cathy Caruth centres on Freud's work on traumatic neuroses 
67 Mary Gordon, The Shadow Man: A Daughter's Search for her Fa,, her 
(1996; London: Bloomsbury, 1997) x. 
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and the returning traumatic dream' in order to illustra--e 
the ways in which traumatic memory is not subject to -1he 
usual distortions of memory, but her psychoanalytic and 
poststructuralist approach also problematises the 
transmission of traumatic 'literal' truths, as does 
Felman's very similar approach. RMT, on the other hand, is 
based on what some refer to as 'pre-psychoanalysis': the 
early work of Freud in 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' and 
"Preliminary Communication' (Studies on Hysteria) as a 
means of proving the thesis that memories can be repressed 
for many years before being recovered intact and that once 
recovered they are able to withstand legal or biographical 
verification. Both approaches are deeply concerned with the 
truth-status of recovered memories or testimonies of 
trauma. 
This thesis explores the ways in which both implicate- 
-sometimes problematically--autobiography both 
theoretically and practically. The trauma theories of 
Caruth and Felman focus on oral testimony and on the 
unwitting testimonial or autobiographical performances of 
fictional texts, but do not account for the problem of 
autobiographical writing and trauma. While their 
psychoanalytic approach allows for the possibility that 
testimony can be true even when it contravenes the 
normative discourse of truth-telling, the poststructuralist 
31 
aspect makes these theories less amenable to wri*-ýen 
accounts of trauma. 
Chapter Two begins with a discussion of 'possession, 
in contemporary trauma theory before exploring the 
implications of privileged witnessing, for testimony and 
for relational life writing. Drawing on Freud, Caruth and 
Felman suggest that the victim of trauma is not in 
possession of his or her life story, but is rather 
possessed by it. And yet this pathology of post-traumatic 
stress disorder enables the 'literal truth' of the trauma 
to be transmitted historically. By exploring the ways in 
which the idea of the 'privileged witness, is predicated on 
pathology, this chapter explores the implications of such 
theories for written testimony. I then identify the 
parallels between these theories of possession and Nicholas 
Abraham's and Maria Torok's theories of transgenerational 
haunting in the context of some second-generation Holocaust 
testimonies. Abraham's and Torok's relational 
symptomatologies provide a useful angle from which to 
approach the ethics of relational accounts more generally. 
By re-reading Philip Roth's Patrimony (1991) in the light 
of these psychoanalytic theories, I seek to unsettle the 
notion of relationality as a normative model of 
identification. In the context of theories like Abraham's 
and Torok's, metaphors of possession or haunting in 
relational autobiographies might serve to authorise what 
32 
could otherwise be seen as unethical biographical 
exposures. 
Chapter Three examines the issues surrounding one ol 
the most controversial memoirs of the 1990s, Binjamin 
Wilkomirski's Fragments: Memories of a Childhood 1939-1948 
(1995). Wilkomirski's memoir was widely thought to have 
been the result of recovered memory therapy, a practice 
that by the time of Fragments's publication was almost 
unanimously considered disreputable and unreliable. Yet 
this chapter problematises the recovered memory connection 
and demonstrates how a reading of the case based on 
contemporary trauma theory as opposed to recovered memory 
yields interestingly different results. Considering Stephan 
Maechler's suggestion that Wilkomirski's 'fake' memoir may 
be the veiled expression of unspeakable childhood traumas 
rather than a willing attempt to deceive, this chapter asks 
what the Wilkomirski case can reveal about the tensions 
between psychoanalytic and historical approaches to 
narratives of trauma. How might these tensions impact on 
other life-narratives that, for different reasons, 
contravene the historical record? Brooks writes that 'the 
use of psychoanalytic truth as putatively legal truth 
represents a dangerous category error, a confusion of 
realms' . 
68 But what happens, I ask here, when 
68 Brooks 129. 
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psychoanalytic truth is used as a putatively biographical 
truth? 
34 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Detective 
I'm the hunter, the detective. I'm here to find 
information. ' 
1. Introduction 
In Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting 
Life Narratives (2001) Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson 
include an appendix to demonstrate the ways in which 
'autobiography' might serve only as a loose umbrella term 
to cover the multiple and proliferating genres sheltering 
beneath it. They identify 'Fifty-two Genres of Life 
Narrative', from 'Apology' to 'Witnessing', but acknowledge 
that a "comprehensive survey' of autobiography's genres 
2 
would be impossible to produce . Several of the genres on 
Smith's and Watson's list have been emphasised in recent 
critical writing on autobiography: autothanatography, 
autopathography, and relational autobiography, for example, 
have all been identified as particularly contemporary 
manifestations of the genre. 3 For Smith and Watson the fact 
I Mary Gordon, The Shadow Man: A Daughter's Search for her Father 
(1996; London: Bloomsbury, 1997) 59. 
2 Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, Reading Autobiography: A Guide for 
Interpreting Life Narratives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2001) 183-207. 
3 See for example Nancy K. Miller, 'Representing others: Gender and the 
Subjects of Autobiography', Differences 6.1 (1994): 1-27 and Susanna 
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that autobiography requires such constant redefinitio. -L and 
subdivision is less an effect of the unsuitability of the 
very term 'autobiography' to cover such a wide variety of 
texts and more a sign of the tendency of autobiographical 
subjects to question 'their complicity with and resistance 
to, 'cultural modes of self-narrating, .; In this chapter I 
identify another autobiographical subgenre and seek to 
locate it between the poles of complicity with and 
resistance to contemporary discourses of truth-telling. I 
refer to this subgenre as the 'detective memoir'. 
I focus here on a relatively small selection of 
detective memoirs, all of which are family memoirs which 
centre on the revelation of family secrets and on the 
relationship between family narrative and individual and 
5 
cultural identity. The detective memoir is perhaps more 
accurately defined as a subgenre of certain other 
subgenres. Tim Lott's The Scent of Dried Roses (1996), for 
Egan, Mirror Talk: Genres of Crisis in Contemporary Autobiography 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999) for 
discussions of autothanatography; G. Thomas Couser, Recovering Bodies: 
Illness, Disability, and Life Writing (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1997) for a discussion of autopathography; Mary 
Mason, 'The Other Voice: Autobiographies of Women Writers', 
LifelLines: Theorizing Women's Autobiography, eds. Bella Brodski and 
Celeste Schenck (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) and Paul John 
Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999) for discussions of relationality. 
4 Smith and Watson 183. 
5 There are already too many contemporary detective memoirs to list 
here, but for a selection of memoirs not discussed in this chapter see 
Germaine Greer, Daddy, We Hardly Knew You (1989; London: Penguin, 
1990) ; Louise Kehoe, In This Dark House: A Memoir (1995; London: 
Penguin, 1997); and Helen Fremont, After Long Silence: A Woman's 
Search for her Family's Secret Identity (1999; London: Piatk,,.; s, ? 000) 
Rachel Lichtenstein and Iain Sinclair, Rodinsky's Room ('1995; London: 
Granta, 2000) is a detective memoir which i discuss in the following 
chapter. 
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example, is also an autopathography, as its focus is Lo--'ý's 
history of depression and his mother's hidden history of 
depression which led to her suicide. 6 Mary Gordon's The 
Shadow Man: A Daughter's Search for her Father (1996) could 
also be described as autothanatography; she is at once 'a 
mourner, a rememberer, a chronicler' as she attempts to 
uncover the secrets of her father who died when she was a 
child. 7 All the memoirs I discuss in this chapter are 
8 
allographies or relational autobiographies . Lisa 
Appignanesils Losing the Dead: A Family Memoir (1999) is a 
second-generation Holocaust testimony which seeks to 
explore not only the relationship of her own history to 
that of her parents, but also the relationship between her 
parents' wartime histories and the "official' record. 
9 
Appignanesi's, Lott, s and Gordon's memoirs are not 
detective memoirs in spite of their relationality, but 
rather because of it. It is precisely because the route 
into a personal past entails a detour through the lives of 
ultimately unknowable others that these autobiographers 
turn detective and hunt for "evidence, about the past. The 
biographical quest(ion) with which each memoir begins: 'who 
was s/he?, gradually in each case transmutes into one that 
6 Tim Lott, The Scent of Dried Roses (1996; London: Penguin, 1-997). 
7 Gordon 39-40. 
a Nancy K. Miller explains that lallography, is 'the biography of 
another. But when the biographical subject is a member of one's own 
family, the line between the genres blurs', Bequesr and Betrayal: 
Memoirs of a Parent's Death (1996; Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2000) 2. 
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seems more pressing: 'who am I? '. These autobiographers 
each take up the tools of the biographer, or even of the 
historian, in order to answer these questions. 
The autobiographical quest into what Gordon refers to 
as 'the cave of memory' is paralleled by the biographical 
or historical quest into the archive and both are 
problematised as sources of evidence for historical 
reconstruction. 10 1 refer to these memoirs as 'detective' 
memoirs, but they might equally be referred to as 
'archaeological, memoirs as they each share an emphasis on 
the recovery of buried histories, hidden truths, and 
"occluded memory-chains, . 
11 As Appignanesi writes: 'The 
journey is not a pleasure cruise, with its stopping points 
already marked out in good, linear fashion. In a sense it 
is more like an archaeological excavation I. 12 
The emphasis here is on finding rather than on telling 
a family story and this is one of the ways in which the 
detective family memoir challenges traditional concepts of 
autobiography. These memoirs are like autobiographies gone 
awry: the classic first chapter of forebears and origins 
does not give way to the tale of an individual's history; 
secrets and lies discovered at the outset instead throw the 
very identity of that individual into question. Paul John 
9 Lisa Appignanesi, Losing the Dead: A Family Memoir (1999; London: 
Vintage, 2000). 
10 Gordon xx. 
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Eakin identifies the emphasis in recent life writing on 
, the story of the story'. 13 This is a crucial element, 
perhaps even the identifying feature, of the detective 
memoir, which focuses more on the act of bringing secrets 
to light, than on the straightforward telling of a life 
story. 14 Annette Kuhn, for example, in Family Secrets: Acts 
of Memory and Imagination (1995), asks: 'Am I making public 
what I have consciously known but never before revealed, or 
am I seeking knowledge that is as new to me as it is to 
.?, 15 you. . Kuhn highlights here one of the major differences 
between so-called traditional, autobiography and the 
contemporary detective memoir, and identifies the problem 
with referring to these contemporary texts as 
"confessional,. Shoshana Felman in her work on oral 
Holocaust testimony distinguishes between testimony as a 
mode of 'access to, the truth about the past and testimony 
as a mode of 'statement of' a history that is presumed 
known and narratable; I suggest that these memoirs also 
enact a process of 'access to' as opposed to 'statement of' 
the past. 16 
11 Roger Luckhurst, 'Memory recovered/ recovered memory,, Literature 
and the Contemporary: Fictions and Theories of the Present, eds. Roger 
Luckhurst and Peter Marks (London: Pearson Education Ltd., 1999) 86. 
12 Appignanesi 8. 
13 Eakin 58. 
14 Annette Kuhn, Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and Imagination 
(London: Verso, 1995) 2. 
15 Kuhn 2. 
16 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in 
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1992) 
16. By detective memoir I also mean not just those memoirs which, like 
Lott's, adopt the structure of a detective story, nor even those by 
authors who explicitly state, like Lott, Gordon, and Appignanesi that 
n 
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The 1990s, as discussed in the Introduction, saw a 
revival of some of the most crucial unresolved impasses of 
Freudian psychoanalysis. The recovered memory debate and 
the attendant memory wars revolved around the concept of 
repression and specifically around the question of whether 
memories recovered in therapy could be recovered intact. 
This fed into a larger debate about the relationship 
between therapeutic narrative and historical narrative: is 
the purpose of therapy to "recover' a true story, as 
recovered memory proponents would argue, or can analysis 
only ever produce 'explanatory fictions', stories which 
serve therapeutic benefits but which remain unreferential, 
inadmissible as historical evidence? 
The tension in the RMT debate was thus between 
psychoanalytic and historical definitions of truth, turning 
on an equally fraught tension between two opposing models 
of memory and narrative: the recovery model and the 
reconstruction model. The recovery model, as Nicola King 
writes, 'assumes that the past still exists "somewhere", 
waiting to be rediscovered by the remembering subject, 
they are adopting the role of the detective or archaeologist. I intend 
the detective memoir label to be more flexible, potentially including 
all the autobiographies or memoirs which focus on the 'access to' of 
life history and problematise the statement of, mode. The memoirs I 
discuss in this chapter are all to some extent meta-memoirs, as much 
about the act of writing lives than performances of that act. I focus 
on this aspect of the memoirs, but by doing so, and by focussing on 
their similarities, I do not want to elide their important 
differences, but rather to use these similarities in order to come to 
some conclusions about the practise and difficulties of contemporary 
British and US autobiographical writing. 
17 Recovered memory therapy hereafter referred to as 'RMTI. 
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uncontaminated by subsequent experience and time's 
attritionp . 
11 The reconstruction model is based on a 
reworking of Freud's concept of 'Nachtrýiglichkeit' or 
lafterwardsness' and 'imagines the process of memory as one 
of continuous revision or "retranslation", reworking 
memory-traces in the light of later knowledge and 
experience' . 
19 
The tensions between these two models are not just 
confined to the RMT debate, but pertain equally to broader 
debates about the nature of history, narrative, and 
identity. There are parallels between these issues and 
recent writings on identity politics, specifically in 
discussions of essentialism and constructionism .20 Recent 
trauma theory has also honed in on the tensions between 
recovery and reconstruction in testimony, attempting to 
reconcile the literalness of returning traumatic memory 
with its belatedness .21 Refractions of the debate can also 
is Nicola King, Memory, Narrative, Identity: Remembering the Self 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 4. 
19 King 4. For more details on Freud's scattered references, to 
NachtrAglichkeit see Jean Laplanche and J. -B. Pontalis, The Language 
of Psychoanalysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Karnac, 
1988) 111-14. 
20 The debates in identity politics on essentialism and constructionism 
have mainly dealt with issues of race, gender, and sexuality but have 
clear implications for life writing. The recent emphasis on 
constructionism in contemporary autobiographical theory (the notion of 
'making selves') owes a great deal to such previous discussions. See 
Diana Fuss Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (New 
York: Routledge, 1989) for an overview of the debates. 
21 See, for example, Felman and Laub; Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed 
Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996); and Cathy Caruth, ed. Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). For an 
account of trauma theory which takes issue with Caruth's approach, 
specifically on the issue of the literalness of traumatic memory, see 
A 
be identified in discussions of history and postmodernism. 
Richard Evans, for example, challenges postmodern cr-, t-ýques 
of historical writing by pointing out that the recover, Y 
model of history--the notion that the past can, as in 
Leopold von Ranke's famous phrase, be recovered 'wie es 
eigentlich gewesen'--has long been superseded by a notion 
of history as process, taking into account the 'continuous 
22 revision' of the reconstructionist model . Recent studies 
of the 'archive, have identified parallels between the 
persistent and problematic quests for origins in both 
23 psychoanalysis and history . During the 1990s new 
developments in DNA led to heated debates about nature 
versus nurture and these memoirs can be understood as a 
24 
response also to these developments . 
Many of these debates are concerned with the 
referential and representational (im)possibilities of 
history in the face of epistemological crises' brought on 
Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2000) . 22 Richard Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta, 1997) 17. 
Evans points out that although Ranke's phrase 'wie es eigentlich 
gewesen, is usually translated into English as as it really was', 
this may be a mistranslation, as by leigentlich' Ranke could have been 
referring to an idea of essence rather than of referentiall--y. 
23 See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian 
Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996) and Carolyn Steedman, Dust (Manchester: Mancheszer 
University Press, 2001). 
24 See Matt Ridley, Genome: The Autobiography of a Species in Z3 
Chapters (London: Fourth Estate, 1999) for a good breakdown of *he 
issues surrounding the first publication of the human genome. And see 
Julia Watson, 'Ordering the Family: Genealogy as Autobiographical 
Pedigree,, Getting a Life: Everyday Uses of Aucobiography, Sidr,: ýie 
Smith and Julia Watson, eds. (Minneapolis: University of '. '-. nnesota 
Press, 1996) for a discussion of the similarities and differences 
between genealogical and autobiographical endeavours. 
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by the challenges of poststructuralism and postmoderni S, 1.25 11 
They are all, also, concerned with different types of 
"access to' the past and with the political, ethical, and 
historical implications of the impossibility of providing a 
definitive 'statement of' that past. Writing of post- 
Holocaust representation, Felman refers to the 'crisis of 
witnessing', the %crisis of truth', and the 'crisis of 
literature'. 26 These crises, like the debates they 
nourished, have spread beyond the specific concerns of 
Holocaust representation to implicate the very notion of 
historical representation itself. They also figured in the 
recovered memory debates of the 1990s where disputes over 
the referential possibilities of opposing models of memory 
recovery were forced to a conclusion in law courts across 
the United States. 
It is no accident that a fresh focus on family secrets 
and hidden histories in autobiography coincided with the 
memory wars and the related debates on historical 
narrative. 27 The legalistic emphasis on 'evidence' in these 
memoirs also points to a growing concern with the notion of 
autobiographical referentiality and verifiability. This 
chapter considers not only the ways in which the detective 
memoir problematises the relationship between personal 
25 The phrase epistemological crisis, is cited in Evans 3-4, but this 
has become a commonplace term. 
26 Felman, Felman and Laub xviii and 6. 
. -7 Ian Hacking, for example, writes that 'Memero-politics is above all 
a politics of the secret', Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality 
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history and history, but also pursues a connection between 
historical narratives and therapeutic ones. I suggest that 
the recent emphasis on autobiography as a mode of "access 
to' the past indicates a burgeoning new alliance between 
psychoanalysis and autobiography. 
And yet, as a theory, psychoanalysis suggests that the 
writing of a 'truthful' autobiography may well be 
impossible. As Adam Phillips writes in his essay on these 
two different forms of self telling: 'Without 
psychoanalytic interpretation there is no personal history, 
only its concealment'. 28 Autobiography, in this view, 
serves only as a cover story that keeps our most 
interesting memories out of sight. As Phillips maintains: 
'those who want to continue misleading themselves about the 
past write autobiographies; those who want to know 
themselves and their histories have psychoanalysis'. 29 
Freud famously cast himself in the figure of Holmesian 
archaeologist in order to legitimate his 'access to' 
restricted epistemological areas. What happens, the 
following section asks, when the autobiographer adopts 
these same roles and becomes the agent of his or her own 
epistemological discovery? When the autobiographer performs 
and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995) 214. 
28 Adam Phillips, 'The Telling of Selves', On Flirtation (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1994) 66. See also the essays in 'Panel Six, of Whose 
Freud? The Place of Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture, Peter 
Brooks and Alex Woloch, eds. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) 
for discussions of psychoanalysis and truth. 
29 Phillips 66. 
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the paradoxical roles of Oedipus: de, ýec-ý-ive and suspect, 
archaeologist and bearer of hidden relics? This chapter 
explores the ways in which a new focus on 'access to' the 
past in these memoirs both enriches and problematises -. he 
relationship between autobiography and psychoanalysis, and 
considers the ways in which by (un)covering some of the 
same ground as psychoanalysis, detective memoirists also 
end up confronting some of the same problems. 
This chapter focuses on the way in which the tension 
between recovery and reconstruction as models of memory, 
narrative, and identity are manifested in the contemporary 
detective memoir. In the following section I discuss the 
"missings' of a selection of contemporary memoirs in 
relation to Shoshana Felman's account of her own 
autobiography as 'missing'. Felman's poststructuralist and 
psychoanalytic approach to the 1missings' of autobiography 
reveals the ways in which both psychoanalysis and 
poststructuralism might problematise some detective 
memoirists' modes of 'access to' the past and unsettle the 
notion of 'recovery' or of direct representation. By 
foregrounding family history, or crucial aspects of it, as 
buried, missing, or hidden, detective memoirs problematise- 
-and are problematised by--the epistemological crises that 
were at the heart of other contemporary debates. I identify 
a parallel in these memoirs between family secrets and 
repression, a connection which is explicit in some memoirs 
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and implicit in others. Family secrets become me--aphor4ica'- 
relics or fragments of evidence, crucial to --he re-,, ision of 
family narrative and to the creation of a true story'. 
Section three focuses on this question of evidence and 
by reading these texts in the context of the RMT debate 
explores the problematic truth-status of recovered 
memories, or discovered secrets. In sections four and five 
of this chapter I explore the ways in which the revision of 
family narrative in detective memoirs can be read as an 
implicit critique of autobiography as a truth-telling 
discourse, a confrontation with the impossibility of 
autobiography in the face of epistemological and narrative 
crises. The disavowal of a dominant family narrative 
emblematises and parallels the disavowal of 'traditional' 
autobiographical forms .30 These memoirists all appear to 
argue that autobiography in what Kuhn calls the 
'conventional sense' fails to function as an adequate 
discourse of truth-telling for the autobiographer writing 
under the influence of postmodernism, and sections four and 
five of this chapter explore the ways in which old, 
30 1 highlight the word traditional, in order to question the noýAon 
that there is such a thing as a 'traditional' autobiography. Later I 
explore the ways in which certain contemporary memoirists, in 
disavowing their parents' style of autobiographical narration, 
implicitly suggest that they are also casting off something akin to a 
, traditional, style of life-narration. This may be less an asser-ýion 
that there is such a thing as a (unified) 'traditional' 
autobiographical style and more an example of the ways in w*. -lich 
autobiography tends to define itself against earlier 'models' in the 
way that much recent criticism of autobiography tends now to define 
the genre against the androcentric 'great man, tradition or the %myth, 
of a unified self. This is not a question of chronology, however, 
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'traditional, narrative models are cast aside as these 
detective memoirists go in search of a genre to accommodate 
their histories. 
2. Hissings: The Unknown Known and the Auto/biographical 
Quest 
I cannot confess to my autobiography as 
missing, but I can testify to it. 31 
Martin Amis's memoir Experience (2000) forges a 
connection between family secrets and repressions. He calls 
them "missings'. There are three 'missings' around which 
Amis organises his text, which is partly an elegy for his 
father. 'He is no longer here,, he explains, land it will 
never be the same. He is missing'. 32 He goes on to describe 
the photographs on his desk of a teenage girl, Lucy 
Partington, and of a child, Delilah Seale. He writes: 
'These photographs are kept together, and for almost twenty 
years their subjects lived together in the back of my mind. 
Because these are, or were, my missing'. 33 We discover 
later that Lucy Partington was Amis's maternal cousin, and 
because new theoretical stances may also be applicable to texts once 
considered ', traditional, themselves. 
31 Shoshana Felman, What Does A Woman Want? Reading and Sexual 
Difference (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1993) 17. 
32 Martin Amis, Experience (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000) 7. 
33 Amis 8. 
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that she was missing for twenty years before her remains 
were excavated from the serial killer Fred West's garden in 
Cromwell Street, Gloucester. Delilah Seale, we learn, is 
the daughter that for twenty years Amis did not know that 
he had fathered. Although these Imissings, are literal ones 
Amis suggests that these two relatives--one for years 
inexplicably missing and the other for years unknown of-- 
had somehow always been present: 'for nearly twenty years 
they have lived at the back of my mind'. Amis connects this 
presence to his reasons for writing the memoir: 
I do it because it has been forced on me. I 
have seen what perhaps no writer should ever 
see: the place in the unconscious where my 
novels come from. I couldn't have stumbled on 
it unassisted. Nor did I. I read about it in 
34 
the newspaper . 
It is not until 273 pages later that we discover the 
contents of the newspaper article to which Amis alludes 
here: 
In the Sunday Observer the novelist Maureen 
Freely staged a straightforward retrospective 
of my fiction and noted the punctual arrival- 
just in time for my third novel, Success 
(1978)--of a stream of lost or wandering 
daughters and putative or figurative fathers, 
34 Amis 
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and that these figures recurred, with 
variations, in every subsequent book. There was 
nothing I could do about this diagnosis. It 
chimed with something Patrick had said during 
our first talk on the telephone: "I expect it's 
been in the back of your mind-N Yes, exactly: 
35 in the back of my mind . 
'Missings, for Amis seem to represent the paradoxical 
position of knowing and not knowing around which 
psychoanalysis revolves . 
36 Amis's Imissings' are something 
which are at once absent and yet mysteriously present, both 
literal and, in unsuspected ways, also psychical or 
internal. He appears to suggest that they are analogous to 
repressed psychic traumas: they have been at the back of 
his mind, in 'the place in [his] unconscious where [his) 
novels come from'. The unknown known has inscribed itself 
upon the body of his text, expressing itself as symptom; 
Freely's article is not just literary criticism, but also a 
, diagnosis'. Amis's fictional writing (coming, as he says, 
from his "unconscious') has unsuspectedly functioned as a 
medium for something which he both did and did not know. 
'Missings', for Amis, are also something which he was 
unable to 'access, alone, without the help of literary 
'analysis'. 
35 
Amis 280. 
36 The concept of the unknown known pervades the whole of Freud's 
writings, but for a good example, see Freud and Breuer, 'Miss Lucy 
R. ', Studies on Hysteria, PFL 3, trans. James Strachey, ed. Angela 
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Amis's word 'missing' seems a particularly fitting 
term for the absences in other contemporary detective 
memoirs; distinguishing things that are missing from those 
that are simply lost, Amis emphasises the constitutive gap 
between losing and finding, between knowing and not 
knowing. So many contemporary memoirs are organised around- 
-indeed start out from--such a position of not knowing. 
Germaine Greer, for example, does not know that her 
father had concealed his true identity for the whole of her 
life. Mary Gordon is unaware that her father was both an 
anti-Semite and a Jewish immigrant with an entire extended 
family that he had taken pains to conceal throughout her 
(and most of his) life, nor does Louise Kehoe know that her 
father was Jewish and in exile from the Holocaust that 
claimed the lives of his parents. Paul Auster, too, finds 
his father "unknowable,, and begins his autobiographical 
quest with no inkling of his father's love affairs and the 
murder of his grandfather by his grandmother. Jenny Diski 
does not know whether her mother is dead or alive and 
prefers to maintain this state of not-knowing until she has 
undertaken her quest to the literal and metaphorical 
'Antarctica'. Tim Lott discovers, after his mother's 
suicide, her long history of depression and schizophrenia. 
Andrew O'Hagan's missing grandfather is emblematic of his 
father's family's past that is 'missing' too. Anne Karpf 
Richards (London: Penguin, 1991) 181n., where Freud remarks that he 
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and Lisa Appignanesi do not know the details of their 
parents' wartime experiences, which, nonetheless, they 
regard as the central, yet unlived, experiences of their 
37 
own lives. Appignanesi describes how, in part, her memoir 
is a means of restoring her mother's past through the 
writing of a family narrative 'with all its births and 
deaths and missing persons in place'. 38 
Sometimes missing autobiographical information is due 
to actual memory loss caused by illness and in some of 
these cases the detective autobiographer turns to external 
evidence in order to retrieve missing pieces of her life 
history. Fiona Shaw, for example, reads medical notes and 
the writings of friends in order to fill in the gaps in her 
history from a period of postnatal depression treated with 
electroconvulsive therapy. She explains that 'Having 
composed what was on my mind, with all its gaps and 
empties, I have occasionally interspersed my narrative with 
other people's voices'. 39 Travelling to London in order to 
speak to advisers on postnatal depression, Shaw describes 
the way in which she prepared 'as though embarking on a 
piece of investigative journalismI so disguising one 
has 'never managed to give a better description, of the phenomenon. 
37 Karpf, for example, writes 'It seemed [. I as if I hadn't lived 
the central experience of my life--at its heart, at mine, was an 
absence, 146. 
38 Greer; Gordon; Kehoe; Jenny Diski, Skating to Antarctica (1997; 
London: Granta, 1998) ; Lott; Andrew O'Hagan, The Missing (London: 
Picador, 1995); Anne Karpf, The War After: Living with the Holocaust 
(1996; London: Minerva, 1997); Appignanesi 8. 
39 Fiona Shaw, Out of Me: The Story of a Postnatal Breakdown (1997; 
London: Penguin, 1998) 37. 
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project to myself inside the uniform of another'. 42 Linda 
Grant's mother's memory loss due to Alzheimer's disease 
likewise provides the impetus for Grant's detective work on 
her family history. 'Missings, in other detective memoirs 
refer not only to actual memory loss, but also sometimes to 
secrets wilfully kept by family members which function as 
though they are missing memories. In his memoir The 
invention of Solitude (1982), for example, Paul Auster 
discovers the family secret of his grandmother's murder of 
his grandfather in old newspaper articles and explains that 
their double impact comes from the realisation that this 
knowledge has always been mysteriously present: 'I read 
these articles as history. But also as a cave drawing 
41 
discovered on the inner walls of my own skull'. 
The archaeological or detective quests are in these 
cases both internal and external, both literal and 
psychical. Family secrets, Imissings', can be discovered in 
the archives, through interviewing family members, and 
also, as Mary Gordon writes, through lenter(ing] the cave 
of memory'. 42 Annette Kuhn makes explicit the connection 
between family secrets and repression: 
Sometimes family secrets are so deeply buried 
that they elude the conscious awareness even of 
40 Shaw 167. 
41 Paul Auster, The Invention of Solitude (1982; London: Faber and 
Faber, 1989) 37. 
42 Gordon xx. 
A 
52 
those most closely involved. From the 
involuntary amnesias of repression to the 
wilful forgetting of matters it might be less 
than convenient to recall, secrets inhabit the 
borderlands of memory. (. ] narratives of 
identity are shaped as much by what is left out 
of the account--whether forgotten or repressed- 
-as by what is actually told. 
Kuhn does not merely shape' her account around 'what is 
left out', but emphasises that Imissings' are to be 
replaced by knowledge, whether this be something known and 
never before revealed or 'knowledge that is as new to me as 
it is to you'. 'Repression' and 'amnesia' may make possible 
a "sense of belonging', but, Kuhn adds: 
it is not, surely, to be concluded from this 
that the past is better left undisturbed. These 
"shadows" are a proper part of life, and must 
not--indeed they cannot--be split off from what 
is more agreeable or acceptable, and simply 
hidden from sight. For the repressed will 
always return, and more often than not in some 
infinitely more ugly guise. Bringing the 
secrets and the shadows into the open, allows 
the deeper meanings of the family drama's 
mythic aspects to be reflected upon, 
43 
confronted, understood . 
43 Kuhn 6. 
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For Appignanesi, who confronts her parents' wartime 
histories fully for the first time in writing her memo-Jr, 
secrets can haunt, and repression of memory can lead to a 
dangerous transgenerational repetition. Appignanesi 
explains how her parents' linternalised war' lingered 'Like 
some ghost, it haunted our lives and appeared in odd 
places I. 44 Her parents had no 'discourse of traumatic 
illness available to them, and Appignanesi doubts that, 
with its inappropriate emphasis on 'cure', it would have 
helped them, but she concludes that the writing of a memoir 
which takes into account these discourses has enabled her 
if not to lift the lid entirely on repression then at least 
to make the "hauntings clearer' to her. 45 
Kuhn wonders: 'If family secrets are to be disclosed, 
does this suggest some personal revelation, confession even 
(an alluring prospect, to be sure)? Or is it a question 
more of what goes into the act of bringing the secrets to 
light? ,. 46 The emphasis in Appignanesi's memoir is on 
buried memories of trauma and hers is not confession but a 
second-generation Holocaust testimony. And yet I would 
argue that with their emphasis on buried truths and missing 
pieces and on the act of bringing secrets to light' as 
well as in their knowing attempt to avoid the "return of 
the repressed', detective memoirs might all be read as 
44 Appignanesi 217. 
45 Appignanesi 217. 
46 Kuhn 2. 
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testimonies of sorts, partaking of a cultural discourse of 
trauma even when specific traumatic events are, as in 
Kuhn's memoir, sometimes difficult to locate in these 
texts. Mary Gordon even goes so far as to suggest that the 
passage of time may in itself be a kind of trauma: "What is 
unbearable is the world that went on before our births. 
, 47 Perhaps that is the crime we are on the trail of 
Detective memoirs share the concerns of contemporary trauma 
theory, asking 'how we in this era can have access to our 
own historical experience, to a history that is in its 
immediacy a crisis to whose truth there is no simple 
access'. 
48 
For trauma theorist Cathy Caruth, as I will show, the 
idea of history as crisis makes direct representation 
impossible. And whether Imissings, are to be understood as 
analogous to repression, or simply to refer to an 
irrecoverable past, then they are what ought to make direct 
autobiographical representation impossible. Phillips refers 
to the new kind of resolute suspicion that Freud's work 
creates about autobiographical narrative--the suggestion 
that we trust the untold tale, not the teller' .49 The 
untold tale--the 'missingsl--cannot, from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, be articulated through conscious speech, but 
only ever unwittingly, unconsciously, symptomatically. 
47 Gordon 163. See also King 12. 
Caruth, Trauma 6. 
49 Phillips 69. 
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Poststructuralism poses a similar challenge to 
autobiography, and this is something that Alice Kaplan 
explores in her memoir French Lessons (1993) where she 
reflects on the intellectual legacy of her former mentor 
Paul de Man: 'He was interested in autobiography', she 
writes, as an impossible genre, a kind of emblem of 
deconstruction, where the more you try to confess, the more 
you lie,. 50 'De Man had failed me,, she continues, alluding 
to her inability to ask de Man the questions she later 
wished she had asked about the relationship between his own 
life and work, and to the fact that she finds herself 
unable to find the answers to these questions in his 
writing which was always covered by a 'clean veil of 
disinterestedness'. 51 And yet attempts in the 1970s by some 
critics to announce the end or the impossibility of 
autobiography, based on poststructuralist critiques of the 
"subject', the 'death of the author', and deconstructionist 
efforts such as de Man's 'Autobiography as De-facement, 
seem only to have encouraged autobiographers and their 
critics to redouble their efforts. Since the revelation of 
de Man's wartime journalism in 1984, de Man has become the 
focus of substantial biographical interest, as even his 
most impersonal or de-personalising work is scrutinised for 
so Alice Kaplan, French Lessons: A Memoir (1993; Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1994) 173. See also Jeremy D. Popkin, 'Autobiography 
Versus Postmodernism: Alice Kaplan and Elisabeth Roudinescol, a,, b: 
Autolbiagraphy Studies 12.2 (1997): 225-42 for a discussion of 
Kaplan's autobiographical response to poststructuralism. 
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biographical traces and motivations. Likewise, as Eakin 
points out, there is irony in the fact that Roland Barthes 
followed his postmodern, anti-referential 'autobiography' 
ROLAND BARTHES par Roland Barthes (1975) with La Chambre 
Claire (Camera Lucida, 1980): 'a searching exploration of 
the supremely referential art', photography. 52 If the line 
between autobiography and fiction, or even between history 
and fiction, is as blurred as postructuralism and 
postmodernism propose this need not, as recent criticism 
reveals, signify the end of autobiography or other genres 
of truth-telling. It may even make them all the more 
interesting. 
Caruth seeks to negotiate a way around the ostensibly 
'paralysing' effects of poststructuralism and 
psychoanalysis on historical representation. And Felman in 
What Does A Woman Want? (1993) attempts to apply a similar 
theory to the impossibility of autobiographical 
representation from a psychoanalytic and poststructuralist 
perspective. Caruth suggests that history is always 
unavoidably connected to trauma and that to conceive of 
history in these terms is to approach a way out of the 
poststructuralist and psychoanalytic impasse which makes 
direct representation an impossibility. She writes: 
51 Kaplan 174. 
52 Eakin, Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992) 4. See also Roland Barthes, Camera 
Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (1980; 
London: Vintage, 1993). 
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The possibility that reference is indirect, and 
that consequently we may not have access to 
others', or even to our own, histories, seems 
to imply the impossibility of access to other 
cultures and hence of any means of making 
53 
political or ethical judgements . 
She counters this, however, with an appeal to the 
relationship between poststructuralism and 'the peculiar 
and paradoxical experience of trauma, which, she claims, 
may enable us to access not only our own histories but also 
54 those of other cultures . It is through a recognition of 
the increasingly 'widespread and bewildering encounter with 
trauma' in its multiple and proliferating forms 'that we 
can begin to recognize the possibility of a history that is 
55 
no longer straightforwardly referential'. For Caruth, as 
for Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, trauma is bewildering, 
peculiar, and paradoxical because of its belatedness, its 
lafterwardsness'. History, as understood via the workings 
of trauma, is referential insofar as the repressed returns 
in literal form; it is 'indirectly referential' because the 
literal return of the repressed is unassimilable, 
'precisely not known in the first instance'. 56 
53 Caruth, Unclaimed E; xperience 10. 
54 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience 11.1 do not discuss here Caruth's 
inclusive (and exclusive) pronouns, but they (and the assumptions 
attached to them) are in themselves problematic. 
5' Caruth, Unclaimed Experience 11. 
S6 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience 18 and 4. 
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Historical knowledge is reached, for Caruth, only 
belatedly, only indirectly, and she illustrates this 
through her readings of certain key figures of 
psychoanalytic and poststructuralist theory, notably Freud 
and de Man. Her readings each offer the possibility of a 
"belated' understanding of history and suggest meanings 
that were inaccessible, or unknown at the time of writing. 
It is through such reading, Caruth suggests, that 'we can 
understand that a rethinking of reference is aimed not at 
eliminating history but at resituating it in our 
understanding, that is, at precisely permitting histor_v to 
arise where immediate understanding may not'. 57 
In Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis, and History (1992) Felman 'accesses' 
history in a similarly indirect way. Her reading of de Man, 
for example, seeks to perform what Kaplan claimed was 
impossible: to make connections between life, history, and 
theory that were perhaps unintentionally inscribed in de 
Man's theoretical writing. Her reading of Duras, too, is 
concerned with 'a story present in the text but whose 
writing cannot coincide with a writer's consciousness'. 58 
This specific kind of reading enables 'history' to deliver 
its belated impact. And yet, strangely, it seems, Felman 
employs the same approach in her following study What Does 
a Woman Want? which takes as its focus not the indirect 
S7 Caruth, Unclaimed EXperience 11. 
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historical representation of the Holocaust, but her own 
59 autobiography, which she experiences as missing' . 
The poststructuralist, psychoanalytic discourse Felman 
employed in Testimony is also brought to bear on this 
exploration not just of her own but of the missing 
autobiographies of all women . 
60 This reading is supported 
by her suggestion, or conviction, that feminine existence' 
is a ', traumatized existence'. 61 Just as a knowledge of 
personal history is seen as 'unavailable, to the Holocaust 
witness, so too Felman finds that women's lives are 'not 
62 
entirely in their conscious possession' . And just as the 
Holocaust witness is 'possessed by' instead of being in 
"possession of, his or her own testimony, Felman maintains 
that women's autobiography--despite the emphasis in the 
1980s on women's 'confessional, writing--"has as yet 
63 
precisel. y to be owned' by women . 
In fact What Does A Woman Want? is a challenge to 
women's confessional writing, a self-conscious attempt: 
to unsettle the very notion of autobiography, 
precisely insofar as we have settled into it (I 
feel) a little too impatiently and self- 
complacently, as though we could be sure that 
so Felman, What Does a Woman Want? 16. 
59 Felman, What Does A Woman Want? 14-15. 
60 She does acknowledge that her 'generic "we- might pose problems 
61 Felman, What Does A Woman Want? 16. 
62 Felman, What Does A Woman Want? 13. 
63 Felman, Testimony 16 and Felman, What Does A Woman Want? 14-15. 
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we already have--in culture or in life---a room 
of our own,, . 
64 
Yet where there is a missing, autobiography or testimony, 
for Felman, there is always an 'access to' that missing 
information. In Testimony 'access to' the past was enabled 
by the listening other, the analyst figure. And in Felman's 
subsequent study 'access to' the missing autobiography is 
sought through the bond of reading, that is, through the 
story of the Other, . 
65 
Felman objects to the "stylistic trend, of 'getting 
personal,, claiming that: 
In spite of the contemporary literary fashion 
of feminine confessions, I will suggest that 
none of us, as women, has as _yet, precisely, an 
autobiograph_y. Trained to see ourselves as 
objects and to be positioned as the Other, 
estranged to ourselves, we have a story that by 
definition cannot be self-present to us, a 
story that, in other words, is not a story, but 
must become a story. (. I we might be able 
to engender, or to access, our story only 
indirectly--by conjugating literature, theory, 
and autobiography together through the act of 
reading and by reading, thus, into the texts of 
culture, at once our sexual difference and our 
66 
autobiography as missing . 
64 Felman, What Does A Woman Want? 14-15. 
65 Felman, What Does A Woman Want? 14. 
66 Felman, What Does A Woman Want? 14. 
61 
Autobiography is inaccessible to women, Felman argues, but 
she proposes a kind of autobiographical reading' that may 
function as a form of 'access to, these missing life 
stories. Women's autobiography is, in this view, always 
testimony rather than confession: it must be testified to, 
in a struggle shared between a speaker and a listener to 
recover something the subject is not--and cannot be--in 
possession of , . 
67 '1 cannot confess to my autobiography as 
missing', Felman concludes, 'but I can testify to it. I 
cannot write my story (I am not in possession of my own 
68 autobiography), but I can read it in the Other' . 
And yet although Felman's 'autobiographical reading' 
suggests a way around poststructuralist and psychoanalytic 
impasses, it is problematic insofar as it maintains the 
impossibility of autobiographical writing--of recovery'-- 
without the aid of some kind of analyst figure, whether 
literary analyst or psychoanalyst. 
Felman's reading maintains the impossibility of direct 
representation in autobiography and emphasises both the 
, inadvertency' of autobiographical performance and the fact 
that it takes analysis to locate the 'reference' that can 
only ever be written 'indirectly, . 
69 Although in What Does 
67 Felman, What Does A woman want? 16. 
68 Felman, What Does A Woman Want? 17. 
69 Felman writes that 'Unlike men, who write autobiographies from 
memory, women's autobiography is what their memory cannot contain--or 
62 
A Woman Want? she places the autobiographical reader in the 
privileged position of analyst, it is clear that the 
autobiographical writer can never perform this function in 
her own text. It seems that in both of Felman's accounts, 
what is missing for both the female autobiographer and the 
Holocaust witness is the possibility of functioning as 
agent of their own testimony. 
This approach is reminiscent of Phillips's 
psychoanalytic parody of the 'doubly disabled' 
autobiographer who is only ever able to mislead him or 
herself about the past, a position which not only betokens 
the impossibility of truthful autobiography but also 
pathologises that impossibility by making of psychoanalytic 
interpretation the only cure,. The 'doubly disabled, 
autobiographer can only be enabled through a transferential 
encounter with the other. Autobiography becomes, by 
extension of these arguments, if not quite impossible then 
at least something that it is impossible to perform 
knowingly, or alone. 
Felman argues for the possibility of indirect 
autobiography and attempts to reveal, like Caruth does, the 
ways in which history may arise belatedly, even when 
immediate understanding does not. This is seen as a way 
around the ethical and political 'paralysis' thought to be 
the result of poststructuralist and psychoanalytic ideas 
hold together as a whole--although their writing inadvertently 
63 
about the impossibility of autobiography. But it may well 
serve to perpetuate a different kind of paralysis by 
suggesting that the only possible autobiographical agency 
is one based on an analytic model. 
Although Felman hints at the possibility of recovery 
through testimony, and at the possibility of arriving at a 
subject-position through reading the Other, it is not clear 
what this destination might look like, what form it might 
take. Felman's approach to autobiography is, it seems, only 
an approach, and does not allow for the possibility of an 
arrival, or even of a destination: at the end of the 
reading she is still wondering whether she has missed yet 
more of her own 'implications', suggesting that this mode 
of indirect autobiography, like analysis itself, is 
potentially interminable . 
70 This is precisely the point of 
Felman's approach to autobiography, which is influenced by 
de Man's resistance to closure, to the 'totalizable 
account'. 
71 
And yet it is not clear--or perhaps it is all too 
clear--where this leaves the 'confessional autobiographers' 
whom Felman summarily dismisses at the beginning of her 
text, or those who continue to want, or need, to collude in 
inscribes it', What Does A Woman Want? 15. 
70 Felman, What Does A Woman Want? 122. 
71 See Felman Testimony 5, where she makes this explicit. See What Does 
A Woman Want? 156-57 where Felman speaks of her destination in terms 
of an address', and 131 where she wonders 'who can help us of enable 
us, to sux-vive our story? '. This question of address and enabling is 
specifically answered in Testimony by the psychoanalytic interviewer, 
the enabling listener'. 
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the "myth, of direct representation. Although Felman 
addresses only the issue of women's autobiography in What 
Does A Woman Want? her reading has clear implications for 
72 the practice of autobiography more generally . What are 
the implications of Felman's readings for the detective 
memoirists, I wonder, who not only have 'missings' of their 
own with which to contend, but who also, through their 
archaeological and detective metaphors, express a desire to 
'recover' the past? Felman suggests, in her swift dismissal 
of confessional autobiography, that a faith in 
autobiography's referential possibilities, the desire to 
'recover' the past, might be no more than critical naivete. 
The tension between direct representation and indirect 
representation appears to be yet another manifestation of 
the recovery/ reconstruction binary: recovery is what 
poststructuralism declares impossible, while reconstruction 
may be akin to the potentially interminable process of 
indirect representation that Felman endorses. Nancy K. 
Miller suggests that such tensions in autobiography can be 
characterised by the work of two of autobiography's major 
critical figures, de Man and Lejeune, and yet she 
illustrates the ways in which their relative positions may 
not be as diametrically opposed as they seem. Lejeune does 
72 Moreover, as I have demonstrated, Imissings, need not necessarily be 
gendered. The gendered nature of 'relationality, 
has also been 
challenged. Eakin, for example, challenges Mary Mason's earlier 
argument that relationality was the province of women, s 
65 
not agree with de Man's argument that %the figure 
determines the referent', nor with Barthes's insistence 
that autobiography's principal referent does not exist; or 
rather, Miller suggests, he agrees with these 
poststructuralist positions, but doesn't think it 
matters': 'In spite of the fact that autobiography is 
73 impossible, this in no way prevents it from existing' . 
"Thus', writes Miller, 'de Man and Lejeune in a way agree, 
even though each one thinks the other is wrong'. 
Drawing on Bruss as a kind of intermediary between 
Lejeune and de Man, Miller suggests that the 
autobiographer's stated desire to recover the past may be 
more a rhetorical trope than a genuinely (and naively) 
dreamed-of possibility. What makes authors 'engage in 
autobiographical acts is the desire to be read according to 
the expectations of autobiography as a ""true story"': 74 
In this sense, the truth claim of autobiography 
is no more (but no less) than its recorded 
desire (its pact or its "diacritical" intent) 
to be taken by others as a kind of truth, 
autobiographies by providing a wealth of contemporary examples to the 
contrary. See How Our Lives Become Stories 46-53. 
73 Nancy K. Miller, 'Facts, Pacts, Acts', Profession 92 (1992): 11. See 
also Phillipe Lejeune, 'The Autobiographical Pact', On Autobiography, 
Theory and History of Literature 52, trans. Katherine Leary, ed. Paul 
John Eakin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) 131-32. 
74 Miller, ', Facts, Pacts, Acts': 12. She gives Rousseau and Roth as 
examples, as well as Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick and Jane Tompkins, of 
autobiographers who recognise autobiography's necessary fictionality, 
but engage in the act nonetheless. See also Elizabeth W. Bruss, 
Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation of a Literary Genre 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
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within the conventions of autobiography's 
"institutionalff facts. The pull of 
autobiography as a cultural act for readers 
. .1 resides in the desire it figures to be 
read as autobiography, which we might also call 
autobiography's truth effec t: . 
75 
Thus, Miller's negotiation of autobiography's impossibility 
(which implicitly takes into account the Imissings' at the 
heart of this) allows for the coexistence of representation 
along with a recognition of its impossibility. Referring to 
the recent spate of memoirs dealing with parents' deaths, 
Miller notes an increasing focus on referentiality: 'In the 
face of postmodern indifference, these writers are 
passionately committed to the project of personal 
history, . 
76 
In her own part-memoir, part-critical account of 
others' memoirs, Bequest and Betrayal (1996), Miller 
illustrates the way in which this commitment might co-exist 
with an acknowledgement of the psychoanalytic and 
poststructuralist arguments which seem to make direct 
representation impossible. Here she accepts the 'indirect 
representation' position endorsed by Felman, admitting: 
This book reflects the preoccupations of a 
literary critic who rereads and rewrites 
herself in the writing of others. In so doing 
7S Miller, "Facts, Pacts, Acts': 12. 
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practice a mode of what Susan Suleiman has 
recently named "mediated autobiographyff. I can 
only, it sometimes seems, read 
77 
autobiographically . 
And yet her memoir also includes italicised passages of her 
own autobiographical writing, which she deliberately places 
in conversation with the other texts, but which is not 
entirely dependent on her readings of them. Thus she does 
not locate her autobiography in the unwitting 
autobiographical performances of the texts she implicates. 
She reads them as autobiographies and responds in turn. 
Amis's suggestion that his Imissings' had unwittingly 
articulated themselves across his fiction, and that it took 
somebody else to recognise them before he could acknowledge 
the %diagnosis', seems to confirm Felman's theory of an 
%unwitting' or 'inadvertent' autobiographical performance. 
Likewise, Philip Roth includes his own 'diagnosis' in his 
autobiography The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography (1989) 
in the form of correspondence with his fictional alter-ego 
Nathan Zuckerman, but here the situation is reversed as 
Roth claims in his letter to Zuckerman that it is the 
writing of nonfiction that 'can unlock meanings that 
fictionalizing has obscured'. 78 Roth also claims that his 
writing has functioned as a kind of therapy and that his 
76 Miller, Bequest and Betrayal xiii. 
77 Miller, Bequest and Betrayal 3. 
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autobiography entailed Idemythologising to induce 
depathologizing, 
. 
79 Via Zuckerman's response, however, Roth 
suggests that he is less than convinced by this professed 
faith in the autobiographical project to 'unlock meanings', 
to 'cure'. Zuckerman maintains that The Facts is a cover 
story, that what's on the page is like a code for 
something missing'. 80 '1 am (. I the key to disclosure, 
writes the fictional Zuckerman, suggesting that fiction, 
rather than autobiography, might prove the best 
(inadvertent) vehicle for 'the facts'. 81 
Amis and Roth both appear to confirm the impossibility 
of autobiography even from within their autobiographical 
texts, and yet this is not without some ambivalence. 
Although Zuckerman gets the last word in The Facts, his 
response stands as a counterpart to Roth's opening letter 
which argues for the possibilities of autobiographical 
discourse and these opposing standpoints frame the text 
which remains suspended between them. The reader is, 
arguably, free to agree with either Roth or Zuckerman on 
the status of the autobiography itself. 
Amis suggests that the realisation that he had been 
writing unwitting or inadvertent autobiography into his 
fiction was 'forced' on him by Freely's critical diagnosis 
78 Philip Roth, The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1989) 6. 
79 Roth 7. 
so Roth 162. 
81 Roth 162. 
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and yet he keeps the last word for himself. 'The 
interpretation is incomplete' he concludes, and adds to the 
list of unwittingly transcribed 'missings' the mother of 
his daughter, who hanged herself in 1978: '1 find I have 
82 written a great deal about and around suicide' . Although 
Roth and Amis each acknowledge the possibility that their 
fictions had contained autobiographical slips, --and that 
sometimes it takes someone else to recognise this--both of 
their autobiographies function in part as a response to and 
a correction of biographical readings of their fictions. 
Roth, in particular, is at haste to point out the 
difference between 'the autobiographical writer that I am 
thought to be and the autobiographical writer that I am'. 83 
"What does a woman want? ' was a question Freud posed 
to Marie Bonaparte, and one for which he was unable, 
throughout his career, to provide an answer. Felman states 
that her aim in What Does A Woman Want? is to 'reclaim 
(reread, rewrite, reappropriate), this question for women, 
which suggests an agenda of empowerment. Yet as a 
commentary on or a response to questions about women and 
about autobiography, her study seems potentially 
disempowering, perpetuating the idea that autobiographical 
84 
acts can only be authorised by an analytic other. By 
82 Amis 280. 
83 Roth 3. 
84 And that women's autobiographical acts can only be authorised by a 
male analytic figure, or located between the lines of men's writing. 
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traversing genre boundaries Felman purports also to subvert 
gender boundaries, but her study fails to account for the 
ways in which genre may function as an indicator of desire- 
-, the desire to be read according to the expectations of 
autobiography as a "true story", --the fulfilment of which 
may serve both political and therapeutic ends. For the 
personal to be political, autobiography has to retain at 
85 least "a degree of referential productivity' . 
The 'missings, of contemporary memoirs are at the 
heart of autobiography's problematic referential 
productivity,: they are at once the raison d'etre of the 
autobiographical engagement and the source of its deepest 
impossibility. Although recent critics of autobiography 
have emphasised the reconstructive nature of contemporary 
memoirs over the 'recovery' model, the tension between the 
two is far greater than these studies suggest. The 
detective memoirist's desire to solve the 'crime' functions 
as a metaphor for the desire to recover the past and 
signals the memoir's truth claim, the desire to be read as 
a "true story' even though the recovery quest is often 
Although she discusses women's writing at the end of What Does a Woman 
Want? this is in order to pose the question of address'. 
as Miller cites de Man here on the 'referential productivity, of 
autobiography in order to suggest that de Man and Lejeune may not be 
as opposed on the question of referentiality as is commonly supposed. 
And yet for de Man, the referentiality of autobiography is based on 
his suggestion that the illusion of reference, is a 'fiction' which 
, then, however, in its own turn, acquires a degree of referential 
productivity': although it may function referentially, autobiography 
remains, in this view, a fiction. Paul de Man, 'Autobiography as De- 
Facement', MLN 94.5 (1979): 920-21. 
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thwarted. 86 By adopting the roles of detective and s-spect, 
these memoirs offer an alternative to Felman's approach, 
which seems to deny the autobiographer the option of acting 
87 as agent of his or her own epistemological discovery . 
And yet as the following section explores, the 
ostensibly naive recovery model might well serve as a means 
of challenging the very concepts of recovery and 
reconstruction. Quests may be undertaken with a view to 
recovering a true story, but detective and archaeological 
metaphors allow the memoirist to reflect on the very 
sources of autobiography--on the status of the evidence 
unearthed--as well as on the paradoxical position of the 
auto lographer as both the seeker and the sought. 
Exploring the parallel between family secrets, or 
', missings', ' and repression, the following section will show 
how, by focussing on the hidden histories at the heart of 
family narrative, detective memoirs Join in the 
conversation on the recovered memory debate. They do so 
with greater or lesser degrees of knowingness. 
86 This may explain why so many memoirs are structured as detective 
stories when for the most part we might assume that the detective work 
had been completed before the writing began. This is obvious in some 
memoirs, which have a distinctly deterministic timbre. In her memoir 
In this Dark House Louise Kehoe, for example, only reveals her 
father's hidden Jewishness at the end of the memoir, but 'clues' are 
provided throughout the narrative. In the light of the finally- 
revealed information, previously inexplicable events such as Kehoe's 
reaction to the sight of cattle trucks (43-44), 
finally slot into 
place. 
87 In a conscious sense, that is. Felman does suggest that women can 
%awaken, to the %birth, precisely, of our own autobiography, (ý51) and 
yet she conceives of %autobiography' throughout as 
%indvertent', or, 
when consciously driven, in writing that purports 
to be about 
something, or someone, else. 
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A V-% &Pignanesils memoir, for example, followed her 
collaborative study Freud's Women, to which she and John 
Forrester added a new afterword to this 1992 study in 2000 
in order to take the implications of the RMT debate into 
account. Mary Gordon acknowledges that in searching the 
archive for her family history in 1994, she is 
participating in the Zeitgeist on two counts. Not only was 
an interest in genealogy at an all-time high, but she also 
finds that: 
Everyone's talking about memory: French 
intellectuals, historians of the Holocaust, 
victims of child abuse, alleged abusers. It's a 
subject of conversation in the academy and on 
morning chat shows--even on A. M. radio. As I 
began to explore my memories I was caught up in 
the impossibility of memory as a reliable 
source. 88 
Detective memoirists, as well as the combatants in the 
memory wars, are deeply concerned with this question of 
reliability and sources. Can memory be a source of 
evidence? And indeed, how might family secrets, 
repressions, 'missings', disrupt the referential production 
of memory? As Annette Kuhn asks: 'What happens if we take 
absences, silences, as evidence? f. The memoirs discussed in 
the following section employ different metaphors in the 
as Gordon xx-xxi. 
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service of the archaeology/ detective motif. I explore t-he 
extent to which these metaphors reveal a tension between 
the models of recovery and reconstruction that were so 
marked in the recovered memory debate. 
3. Evidence: Recovery and Reconstruction in the He ry Wars 
and Contemporary Me irs 
crime had been committed. I was looking for 
evidence. 
89 
At the heart of the recovered memory debate was a 
heated dispute over the scientific validity of the concept 
of repression. Those seeking to discredit recovered memory 
therapists attempted to provide evidence of the 
untenability of the concept of ', robust repression, on which 
recovered memory therapy was supposedly based. As stated in 
the introduction to this thesis, there was on both sides of 
the RMT debate an apparent desire to move away from the 
ambiguities and ambivalences of Freudian psychoanalysis and 
into the certainties of more polemical positions. Nowhere 
is this more startling than in debates over repression. 
In their anti-RMT study, Making Monsters (1995) 
Richard Ofshe and Ethan Watters attack the RMT therapy 
proposal by making a distinction between the Freudian 
74 
concept of repression and that of the recovered memory 
therapist. On the one hand they continue to defend a 
polemical true/false position: 'either the mind has the 
ability to repress vast numbers of events (. I or it 
does not'; on the other they attempt to distinguish between 
degrees and varieties of repression. " Proof of the mind's 
inability to repress such 'vast numbers of events' would 
make recovered memory therapy unambiguously untenable. 
Ofshe and Watters argue that the recovered memory concept 
of repression is a distorted version of the Freudian 
concept. According to Ofshe and Watters, the RMT notion of 
repression is: 
wholly new--a more powerful mechanism then ever 
imagined by Freud. While psychotherapy has long 
put forward the idea that we can consciously 
avoid thoughts of unpleasant experiences and 
thereby minimize the impact of those memories-- 
in most references, this is how Freud initially 
used the term--the robust repression mechanism 
supposedly allows the subconscious to wilfully 
steal away from our conscious mind virtually 
any traumatic memory. With this mechanism, our 
mind not only avoids unpleasant ideas and 
memories, it blocks them completely from 
consciousness. Not only are memories of trauma 
hidden, but they lie frozen in pristine form, 
awaiting a time when the person is emotionally 
89 Gordon 162. 
90 Richard Ofshe and Ethan Watters, Making monsters: False Nemor. ýes, 
Psychotherapy, and Sexual Hysteria (London: Andr6 Deutsch, 1995) 5. 
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prepared to remember. The final magic of this 
new robust repression mechanism is the belief 
among recovered memory therapists that these 
traumatic events can be "relivedff during 
therapy. So real are these repressed memories 
said to be that therapists claim clients 
reexperience the event as if it were happening 
at the moment. 91 
Borrowing Ofshe's and Watters's term, Frederick Crews 
remarks that robust repression (. I went unremarked in 
the entire human record before the 1980s', yet he agrees 
that it is a 'souped up, version of a recognisably Freudian 
concept. 
92 
Ofshe's and Watters's observation that Freud 
originally used the term 'repression' to refer to a 
conscious denial of painful memories is unsubstantiated by 
Freud's actual first reference to repression. 93 In fact 
Strachey points out in an editorial footnote that Freud and 
Breuer's concept of repression carries no implication of 
conscious intention'. 94 Freud and Breuer's first reference 
to repression is arguably much closer to the 'robust new 
91 Ofshe and Watters 25. 
92 Crews 26 and 123. 
93 The 4original' reference to repression to which they are pres--imably 
alluding is in Joseph Breuer and Sigmund Freud, 'Preliminary 
Communication: Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena' 1893, Studies on 
Hysteria, PFL 3, trans. and ed. James and Alix Strachey (London: 
Penguin, 1991) 61. Here can be found both an observation of the 
phenomenon of repression and the first use of the word in a 
psychoanalytic context. Hereafter referred to as 'Preliminary 
Communication'. 
94 Breuer and Freud, ', Preliminary Communicaton' 61. 
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mechanism, allegedly invented by the recovered memory 
therapists than Ofshe and Watters acknowledge: 
Our observations have shown [. I that the 
memories which have become the determinants of 
hysterical phenomena persist for a long time 
with astonishing freshness and with the whole 
of their affective colouring. [. I these 
memories, unlike other memories of their past 
lives, are not at the patients' disposal. On 
the contrary, these experiences are completely 
absent from the patients, memory when they are 
in a normal psychical state, or are only 
present in highly summary form. Not until they 
have been questioned under hypnosis do these 
memories emerge with the undiminished vividness 
of a recent event. 95 
"Moreover', they continue--alluding to a patient that we 
later discover to be 'Anna 0. ': 
certain memories of aetiological importance 
which dated back from fifteen to twenty-five 
years were found to be astonishingly intact and 
to possess remarkable sensory force, and when 
they returned they acted with all the affective 
96 
strength of new experiences . 
Ofshe and Watters argue against recovered memory 
therapists, claims on the grounds that their 'robust 
95 Breuer and Freud, 'Preliminary Communication' 60. 
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repression' bears little resemblance to the original 
Freudian concept. While they may be right in suggesting 
that Freud did not deal with repression of 'vast numbers of 
events', they overlook important similarities between the 
two concepts of repression. 97 By focussing on quantities of 
repressed material, rather than on the quality of recovered 
memories, Ofshe and Watters may well have missed the 
information that would prove most beneficial to their 
argument. RMT is based on Freud's and Breuer's early theory 
that repressed memories can be retrieved intact, that, to 
borrow Ofshe's and Watter's term, repressed traumatic 
memories 'lie frozen in pristine form'. But it was on the 
question of the intactness' of repressed memories that 
Freud was later to vacillate. 
Crews rightly indicates another Freudian impasse that 
is overlooked by RMT proponents: 
they are unrestrained by certain ambiguities 
and outright contradictions implicit in the 
Freudian theory of repression. Freud's 
uncertainty, for example, whether events or 
fantasies make up the typical content of the 
repressed gets resolved in favour of events. 
98 
96 Breuer and Freud, 'Preliminary Communication' 60. 
97 By -vast numbers of events, Ofshe and Watters refer to some 
analysands, claims that they 
had recovered repressed memories of 
prolonged abuse occurring over a number of years. 
98 Frederick Crews, The Memory Wars: Freud's Legacy 
in Dispute (London: 
Granta, 1997) 162. 
18 
He attacks Ellen Bass's and Laura Davies's conviction that 
it is possible to extract %repressed truths from the 
unconscious like so many bills from an automatic teller'. ý'-' 
The problem with RMT, he contends, %is that it rests on 
Freud's 'stubborn faith (. . .) that messages from the 
unconscious are by and large incorruptible,. 100 
Malcolm Bowie points out that Freud's detective and 
archaeology metaphors operate largely as rhetorical devices 
designed to support Freud's image as a discoverer and 
chronicler of facts existing in spite of him. '01 ""There I 
go, discovering something again! ",, jokes Janet Malcolm, 
too, in parody of Freud's 'insistent depiction of himself 
as a sort of irrepressible stumbler upon solid scientific 
fact'. 102 The archaeology metaphor is explicitly entwined 
with the theory of repression: repressed memories lodged 
beneath 'psychic rubble' can, through the process of 
psychoanalysis, be excavated. And yet although the 
archaeology metaphor remained a constant throughout Freud's 
work, the relics proved mutable. 
While in the 1901 'Dora' case the work of analysis was 
figured as a process of reconstruction--akin to the 
reparation of 'priceless though mutilated relics of 
antiquity'--in the 1909 'Rat Man' case, the process was 
99 Crews 215. 
'00 Crews 14. 
'01 Malcolm Bowie, Freud, Proust: and Lacan: Theory as Fiction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 13-45. 
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reversed. 103 Freud pointed to the antiques in his room in 
order to emphasise to the 'Rat Man' that 'everything 
conscious was subject to a process of wearing-away, while 
what was unconscious was relatively unchangeable'. 'They 
were, in fact', Freud recounts, 'only objects found in a 
tomb, and their burial had been their preservation: the 
destruction of Pompeii was only beginning now that it had 
been dug up'. 104 The purpose of the analysis, as it became 
clear, was to excavate the preserved relics in order to 
initiate their destruction, whereas the purpose of 'Dorals' 
analysis was to reconstruct the broken relics in order to 
create a coherent whole. Freud held varying positions on 
the question of the intactness of repressed memories and it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to trace the development 
of Freud's thinking on the question of the retrieval of 
repressed memory. 
105 
Much seemed to depend, for Freud, on the 
particularities of each individual case (and on each 
particular theory he was attempting to prove). In 'Leonardo 
da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood, (1910), Freud 
102 Janet Malcolm, The Purloined Clinic: Selected Writings (London: 
Papermac, 1992) 9 and 20. 
103 Sigmund Freud, 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria 
("Dora') 1 1905 (1901), Case Histories I, PFL 8, trans. Alix and James 
Strachey, ed. James Strachey (London: Penguin, 1990) 41. Hereafter 
referred to in the text and notes as 'Dora'. Sigmund Freud, 'Noýes 
Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis (The "Rat Mana)' 1909, Case 
Histories II, PFL 9, trans. James Strachey, ed. Angela Richards 
(London: Penguin, 1991). Hereafter referred to in the text and no-ýes 
as 'Rat Man'. 
104 ' Rat Man' 57. 
10' See Bowie 13-45 for a thorough discussion of Freud's vacillation on 
the concept of repression. 
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emphasises the inevitable distortions of childhood memory, 
but also maintains that even a distorted memory of 
childhood (which is almost indistinguishable, he writes, 
from 'phantasy') can yield significant truths when 
interpreted. 106 In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) he 
gives an example of an astonishingly intact memory 
retrieved in literal form after many years in a dream. 'O- 
And in a note to the case of 'Lucy R. ' he gives the example 
of a hysterical woman in whom Freud managed, without 
hypnosis, to 're-awaken, after an interval of twenty-one 
years, [. ] details of a forgotten experience in a 
sceptical person who was, in fact, in a waking state'. 108 
Crews writes of how traditional psychoanalysis was in 
no danger of causing 'social harm, as long as it remained 
content with abandoning truth claims and recasting the 
therapeutic goal as mere reconciliation of the client to a 
less self-punitive myth about his or her identity,. 109 The 
RMT debate highlighted a tension that already existed in 
psychoanalysis: that between the therapeutic narrative and 
106 Freud, "Leonardo de Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood, 1910, Art 
and Literature, PFL 14, trans. James Strachey, ed. Albert Dickson 
(London: Penguin, 1990) 173. 
107 'The Scientific Literature Dealing with Problems in Dreams', The 
Intex-pretation of Dreams, PFL 4, trans. James Strachey, ed. Angela 
Richards (London: Penguin, 1991) 70-71. He goes on to cite several 
authors who have emphasised the potential of astonishing recall i-n 
dreams 74-76. 
108 Freud, "Case Histories', Studies on Hysteria (1893-1895), trans. 
James and Alix Strachey, ed. Angela Richards (London: Pencpjin, ! 99! ) 
178n. 
'09 Crews 20. 
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the biographical narrative, between 'myth, and "truth'. "-O 
Psychoanalysis was not originally intended to produce legal 
or historical truths, although for therapeutic narratives 
to be 'less self-punitive, they had to carry explanatory 
weight--they had to be considered more than mere 'myths' 
even if they were somewhat less than objectively 
ascertainable 'histories'. For recovered memory therapists 
"psychic relics' functioned explicitly as 'evidence' and 
were essential not just for the recovery or healing process 
but also for the legal proceedings that often followed 
this. Thus the contested nature of repression was brought 
to bear on the most crucial issue of the RMT debate: the 
truth-status of psychoanalytically recovered life stories. 
It is not only recovered memory detractors who find 
the RMT notion of 'recovery' untenable. In his carefully 
unbiased and unpolemical study of memory, Daniel Schacter 
writes that: 
The idea of an unchanging imprint of exactly 
what happened at the time of a trauma brings us 
perilously close to the dubious notion that 
memory (or at least traumatic memory) is like a 
camcorder, preserving all aspects of an 
episode. We have seen that this idea is 
fundamentally misguided when applied to 
ordinary experiences and [- . .1 it does not 
110 Freud himself was keen to point out that he was a scientist rather 
than 'a man of letters', that is, that he was more concerned with 
scientific evidence than with stories, 'Dora, 
94. 
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work well for traumatic experiences that people 
always remember. It would be surprising, even 
extraordinary, if it were to apply to traumatic 
experiences that are buried and then recovered 
years later. There is currently no 
scientifically credible evidence to support the 
idea. 111 
Technological metaphors, like Schacter, s camcorder image, 
are often used in order both to describe and discredit the 
112 claims of recovered memory therapists . Crews contests the 
RMT proposal by emphasising the ease with which accurate 
but long-repressed memories can be retrieved. Roger 
Luckhurst, drawing on the work of Pierre Nora, suggests 
that "The construction of national, regional or local sites 
of memory becomes vital once computers and videotapes store 
vast, undifferentiated quantities of 'memory' outside us, 
untouched by the investiture of human meaning'. 113 And yet 
RMT detractors are keen to emphasise the scientific 
impossibility of such memory storage inside, the ways in 
which memory will always be damaged by 'the investiture of 
human meaning,: 
ill Daniel L. Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and 
the Past (New York: Basic Books, 1996) 266. 
See for example Elizabeth Loftus and Katherine Ketcham, The of 
Repressed Memory: False Memories and Allegations of Se-xual Abuse (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) 85. Sometimes recovered memory 
proponents use the same metaphor, see Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and 
Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (New York: Basic 
Books, 1992) 175 where traumatic memory is compared to 'a series of 
still snapshots or a silent movie'. 
113 Luckhurst 83. 
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RMT speaks of lost and retrieved files and 
replaying the memory 'movie' with its 
flashbacks, close-ups and zooms; detractors 
speak of the 1virusl of therapy, corrupted 
files and data manipulation. Both wish to 
stabilise memories as true or false by the very 
thing which, elsewhere, is seen as radically 
de-stabilising memory. 114 
Luckhurst concludes with a gesture towards the 
impossibility of stabilising memories as true or false', 
by arguing that an attempt to do so is borne of an anxiety 
induced by a forgetfulness that the history of memory 
itself twists and turns, is subject to constant mutations 
and revisions'. 115 It is not only the histor_y of memory, but 
memory itself that is subject to such constant revision, as 
both RMT detractors and theorists of autobiography, such as 
Nicola King, argue. 
New technologies, as Derrida has written, may put a 
different slant on psychoanalytic theories. Freud's 'mystic 
writing-pad' metaphor of memory, for example, could hardly 
be more low-tech, and Derrida wonders whether 
psychoanalysis would have been a different creature 
altogether had Freud had access to more technologically 
advanced models for data (or memory) storage and 
114 Luckhurst 91-92. 
115 Luckhurst 92. 
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retrieval. 116 Reading Freud's theory of the archive via 
Derrida's reading, Carolyn Steedman suggests that not only 
does Freud challenge the very notion of recovery, but also 
that he may be held partially responsible for the desire 
for it: 
Perhaps, says Derrida, Freud's contribution to 
any theory of the archive is that there isn't 
one: that no storehouse, especially not the 
psychoanalytic archive of the human psyche, 
holds the records of an original experience to 
which we may return. Yet psycho-analysis has 
been responsible for some of this trouble with 
archives, for it wants to get back: it 
manifests a desire for origins, to find the 
place where things started before the regime of 
repetition and representation was 
inaugurated. 117 
Psychoanalysis, then, might always be located at this point 
of tension, between a desire for and a recognition of the 
impossibility of recovering origins, origins which, 
Steedman writes 'in a deluded way--we think might be some 
kind of truth, . 
118 1 suggest that it is on precisely this 
same tension that contemporary memoirs seek to locate a 
discourse of truth-telling, seek to identify the ways in 
116 Derrida 17. See also Sigmund Freud, 'A Note Upon the -Mystic 
Writing Pado' 1925 (1924), On Metapsychology, PFL 11, trans. Alix and 
James Strachey, ed. Angela Richards (London: Penguin, 1990) 427-35. 
117 Steedman, Dust 7. 
"a Steedman, Dust 3. 
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which memory (and the archive) is able to provide 
"evidence' about the origins upon which identities are 
founded. 
Annette Kuhn, for example, explains the terms of what 
she refers to as her 'memory work': 
The past is like the scene of a crime: if the 
deed itself is irrecoverable, its traces may 
still remain. From these traces, markers that 
point towards a past presence, to something 
that has happened in this place, a 
(re)construction, if not a simulacrum, of the 
event can be pieced together. Memory work has a 
great deal in common with forms of inquiry 
which--like detective work and archaeology, 
say--involve working backwards--searching for 
clues, deciphering signs and traces, making 
deductions, patching together reconstructions 
out of fragments of evidence. " 9 
Kuhn embraces the reconstruction model of memory, identity, 
and narrative. Although a reconstruction may be the result 
of archaeological or detective memory work, this 
reconstruction may always be provisional: there is no 
"true, self to be 'recovered', only scraps or fragments of 
evidence open to a continuous process of interpretation. 
Kuhn's tentative reference to the lsimulacrum, may 
suggest the possibility of an accurate reproduction even 
119 Kuhn 4. 
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where recovery is not possible, yet she makes it clear that 
the aim of her memory work is not to recover %intact' 
relics. I[Als an aid to radicalized remembering', she 
writes, 'memory work can create new understandings of both 
past and present, while yet refusing a nostalgia that 
.0 embalms the past in a perfect, irretrievable moment'. '2 
Kuhn's memory work began when, aged eight, she 
', edited, the family album. This work was, in part, an 
expression of ambivalence towards a mother who sought to 
censor the family history, casting herself, as Kuhn writes, 
as the daughter's 'only begetter' by excluding the father 
from the narrative. 121 Writing of her mother's tendency to 
edit the family album in order to create a coherent, yet 
deceptive, version of the family history, Kuhn explains how 
she objects to her mother's 'tampering with evidence': 
Family secrets are the other side of the 
family's public face, of the stories families 
tell themselves about the world, about 
themselves. Characters and happenings that do 
not slot neatly into the flow of the family 
narrative are ruthlessly edited OUt. 122 
Although Kuhn's metaphor of editing appears to suggest the 
existence, somewhere, of an 'original, life-story, a kind 
of Ur-text obscured through years of censorship, she makes 
120 Kuhn 8. 
121 Kuhn 18. 
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explicit the fact that there is no such relic to be located 
during the investigative or archaeological memory-work. And 
although her use of photographs as evidence might also 
indicate the possibility of referentiality, Kuhn makes it 
clear that photographs are as tainted, as unreliable, as 
memory: they are only scraps of evidence, traces of the 
past that can, nonetheless, be 'pressed into service in a 
never-ending process of making, remaking, making sense of, 
our selves--now,. 
123 
Salman Rushdie suggests that for displaced persons 
recovery of the past is impossible in an even more literal 
sense. Not only is the past lost forever, but the very 
'site of memory, is gone. He writes of how 'our physical 
alienation from India almost inevitably means that we will 
not be capable of reclaiming precisely the thing that was 
lost; that we will, in short, create fictions, not actual 
cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary 
homelands, Indias of the mind'. 
124 
For Rushdie, the fact 
122 Ku hn 2. 
123 Kuhn 16. Such censorship operates, of course, on micro- and 
macrocosmic levels. An interesting international take on the 'editing' 
of family albums is discussed in Trauma and Life Stories: 
International Perspectives, Kim Lacy Rogers, Selma Leysdorff, and 
Graham Dawson, eds. (London: Routledge, 1999). In their introduction 
to the edition they write of the six decades of 'traumatic 
deprivation, of society in Soviet Russia. 'Informing became so 
widespread that Soviet Russia was a society in which even intimate 
family members concealed basic experiences from each other. [. ) 
Sometimes even a husband or a wife did not know that their spouse had 
formerly been named as an "enemy of the peopleff. Family stories had 
mysterious gaps; in family photograph albums pages were torn out, or a 
single face, or even just a tell-tale medal, scissored from a group 
scene' 16. 
124 Salman Rushdie, imginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991 
(London: Granta, 1992) 10. 
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that he is not gifted with total recall' provides 
something of a consolation. Employing a metaphor of 
archaeology, he writes of the reconstruction process which, 
although provisional and incapable of raising the past from 
the ashes, may still be an exciting and invigorating 
125 
process . For Rushdie the impossibility of recovery leads 
to the writing of fiction and yet he also admits that 
Midnight's Children (1995) was born of a desire 'to restore 
the past to (himself], not in the faded greys of family- 
album snapshots, but whole, in CinemaScope and glorious 
Technicolor'. 126 
Pierre Nora's 'sites of memory' refer to the external 
memory constructions erected in the absence of a sustained 
community or collective memory, but these sites are as 
unreliable and as malleable as internal memory itself, as 
memoirists searching the archive and revisiting lost 
homelands discover. 127 Returning to her birthplace in 
Poland, visiting what she explicitly refers to as her 
'sites of memory,, Appignanesi notes the vast difference 
between pre- and post-war Poland, 'If it ever had been, 
Grodzisk was no longer the shtetl of imaginary homelands', 
she concludes. 128 Likewise, her parents' past %is a 
125 Rushdie 11-12. 
126 Rushdie 10. 
127 See also Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de 
Memoirel, trans. Marc Roudebush, Representations 0.26 (spring 1989): 
7-24. 
128 Appignanesi 102. This appears to be a knowing reference to 
Rushdie's essay of that title; Appignanesi collaboratively edited a 
collection of essays on Rushdie's fatwa and so is clearly aware of his 
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narrative in a foreign and forgotten language' . 
129 At the 
end of Appignanesi's memoir, when the final document 
arrives from the -od- Registry of Residents, informing her 
of the absence of her family from their records, 
A,, Ir, %pignanesi concludes that 'The slate is clean. Official 
history refuses to coincide with family memory. Everything 
is open to invention'. 130 
And yet these reconstructions may be closer to 
auto lography than the word 'invention, seems to allow, at 
least in a psychoanalytic sense. RMT detractors often 
placed the reconstruction, model of memory and narrative, 
as King points out, in opposition to the model of recovery 
on which RMT was supposedly based. Referring to a 
conference paper by psychiatry specialist George Ganaway, 
Elizabeth Loftus and Katherine Ketcham write: 
Serious problems arise, Ganaway warned, when 
therapists get caught up in their patients, 
emerging I"memoriesff and accept them as 
historically accurate. He listed a whole string 
of clinical entities that are incorporated into 
reconstructed memories, including fantasy, 
distortion, displacement, condensation, 
symbolization, and confabulation (a process by 
which a person unknowingly fills gaps and holes 
in memory with inferences, plausibilities, and 
work. See Lisa Appignanesi and Sara Maitland, eds., The Rushdie File 
(London: Fourth Estate, 1989). 
129 Appignanesi 81. 
130 Appignanesi 231. 
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guesswork). Mix into that mystifying stew a 
patient's suggestibility, high hypnotizability, 
and fantasy-proneness and you end up with, in 
Ganaway's words, "a potpourri of facts, 
fantasy, distortion and confabulationn capable 
of confounding even the most experienced 
131 therapists . 
Aside from the issue of suggestive or too-credible 
therapists, the focus here seems to be on the ways in which 
', reconstructions' lead not to historically verifiable 
memories, but to 'confabulations' or Ipseudomemories'. And 
yet elsewhere Loftus and Ketcham use this as an example of 
the way in which normal (or non-traumatic) remembering 
operates and argue against recovered memories on the 
grounds that memory itself is inherently unreliable. 132 
Reconstruction, in other words, might simply be synonymous 
with remembering. 
Other commentators do not distinguish between recovery 
and reconstruction so readily. In her study of traumatic 
memory Trauma and Recovery (1992) Judith Lewis Herman, for 
example, emphasises that 'reconstructing the trauma story' 
131 Loftus and Ketcham 85. Ganaway, they explain, is a professor of 
psychiatry at Emory University and the director of a dissociative- 
disorders unit at a psychiatric hospital, 84. They refer to Ganaway, s 
paper 'Alternative Hypotheses Regarding Satanic Ritual Abuse Memories' 
given at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association 
in August 1991. 
13.2 See for example Loftus's chapter 'The Truth That Never Happened, 
where she draws on a distinction between 'story truth, and *happening 
truth, for which she uses her own memory as an example. She draws this 
distinction from Tim O'Brien's fictional account of Vietnam The Things 
They Carried (London: Harper Collins, 1991), which might suggest that 
91 
is an essential part of the healing process: 'Survivors 
challenge us to reconnect fragments, to reconstruct 
history, to make meaning of their present symptoms in the 
133 light of past events, . But Herman, who conflates recovery 
and reconstruction, makes a truth claim for these 
constructions. 
For Freud recovery and reconstruction were also not 
diametrically opposed, at least not in the papers he wrote 
towards the end of his career. Although he vacillated on 
the question of the intactness of repressed memories 
throughout his career, in his 1937 paper 'Constructions in 
Analysis, he maintained that psychical structures can be 
recovered intact, and that it seems unlikely that 'any 
psychical structure can really be the victim of total 
destruction'. 134 Moreover, in this paper, Freud makes 
explicit his theory that recovery is something which 
follows as a result of the reconstructive 'archaeological, 
work and maintains that because the psychic relics are 
intact, the end result of reconstruction will be recovery. 
The belief in the possibility of recovery is not understood 
here as a naive belief in the possibility of resurrecting 
the past itself, as it really was, but rather signals the 
possibility of an end result, an explanation, a resolution, 
the distinction he draws there refers to traumatic memory rather than, 
as Loftus suggests, to non-traumatic memory. 
133 Herman 3. 
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a cure. And yet Freud also makes a truth claim for these 
reconstructions/ recoveries and explicitly connects their 
value as historical truth to their corresponding 
therapeutic value. 
King gives a brief reading of this paper in Memory, 
Narrative, Identity. 135 She reads Freud's comments on 
reconstruction as a gesture towards the impossibility of 
recovery and as a confirmation of her theory that memory is 
always subject to a continuous process of revision and 
retranslation'. Although when Freud writes that 'We do not 
pretend that an individual construction is anything other 
than a conjecture, he is not concluding his argument, as 
King suggests, but is referring to 'individual' parts of 
the construction. 136 He goes on to suggest that the 
reconstruction as a whole can be completed and not that it 
is left open to continuous revision. King's reading of 
Beloved suggests that "cure' might be located in the 
continuous process of therapeutic talk, in what Morrison 
refers to as 'rememory': 
134 Sigmund Freud, 'Constructions in Analysis, 1937, The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 
XXIII, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001) 260. 
135 King 16 * 136 Freud, 'Constructions in Analysis, 265. In fact at this point in 
the essay he is attempting to deal with the question of a patient's 
acceptance or otherwise of his suggested construction. Even if a 
patient disagrees with a part of the construction, Freud maintains, 
they may well agree with it once it has been connected to other parts 
of the construction and begins to make sense as a whole. An 
, individual construction, is, he says, a 'conjecture,, but the process 
of analysis is not, as King seems to suggest, to heap conjecture upon 
93 
Sethe's story becomes bearable when she is able 
to share it with Paul D--"to tell, to refine, 
and tell again"--,, although here it is the fact 
of being heard, returning to the same event 
again and again that is therapeutic, rather 
than the construction of a logical story. 137 
However, it is not clear whether the concept of 
Nacht: rclglichkeit that King invokes lends itself 
unproblematically to a reconstruction model of memory and 
narrative that leads to a 'continuous process' of revision. 
In Freud's concept of belatedness, afterwardsness, or 
Nachtrýiglichkeit, an originary traumatic event might only 
be brought to light or understood once a second traumatic 
event serves as a catalyst for its realisation-hence the 
event's belated impact--but it is not at all clear that 
Freud advocates the continuous return to the same event as 
a therapeutic method, or a continuous process of 
reconstruction in favour of recovery. 138 To maintain a 
conjecture, but to allow for some speculation on the way to achieving 
an end result. 
137 King 24, citing Toni Morrison, Beloved (1987; London: Vintage, 
1997) 99. And yet in the extract King cites, it is not just the 
retelling that proves therapeutic, or in Morrison's words that makes 
the story 'bearable,, but the fact of telling it to Paul D 'because it 
was his (story] aswell'. 
138 There are lots of examples of lafterwardness, in this sense in 
contemporary memoirs. Discussing Susan Cheever's Home Before Dark 
Miller identifies an instance of this, but does not refer to it in 
psychoanalytic terms. Cheever describes reading her father's notebooks 
as a child, but not registering the evidence of his (otherwise 
concealed) homosexuality until she reads them as an adult years later, 
Miller 141. Likewise, Mary Gordon misses the impact of her father's 
published writings until beginning her investigation into his life 
during her forties. These are examples of afterwardsness or of belated 
knowledge, in keeping with King's notion of NachtrAglichkeit, but the 
corresponding notion that life stories are always provisional, that 
there will always be a crucial aspect of the past that is not yet 
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dichotomous position on the question of recovery versus 
reconstruction is only to perpetuate an unworkable impasse. 
As Tina Papoulias writes: 'if it is a fallacy to suggest 
that the past can be apprehended "as it really waso, it may 
be equally fallacious to suppose that an imaginative 
reconstruction of the past to serve one's ends is a 
139 satisfactory, or indeed a feasible alternative' . 
What Crews refers to as Freud's 'stubborn conviction' 
that historically accurate memories can be recovered intact 
was subject to intense debate during the 1990s. During the 
memory wars, the recovery model of memory was attacked on 
its dubious, unscientific grounds while the model of 
reconstruction which was seen as the only alternative 
proved no more reliable as a form of 'access to' past 
experience. 
Mary Gordon is ambivalent about these two memory 
models, and her memoir sits uneasily between them. While 
for Rushdie and Appignanesi it was the lack of reliable 
evidence about the past, the instability of memory sites, 
that added to a sense of displacement, for Gordon it is the 
discover_v of her father's hidden history that leads to such 
dislocation. Her memory work (carried out in the archives 
known, is worthy of scrutiny. By inscribing the 'unknown known, into 
their texts, Gordon and Cheever describe a kind of resolution, or a 
sense of coming into knowledge. King's emphasis on the therapeutic 
benefits of reconstruction may run the risk of abrogating the need for 
closure in life-narrative. Especially in accounts of trauma and 
oppression, as the RMT debate made explicit, there needs to be a point 
where the rememberer or the autobiographer can say: I didn't know that 
then, but I know it now. 
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and in the 'cave of memory') reveals that her father, who 
died when she was a child, had concealed his 'true' 
identity for her, and most of his, life. She learns that 
her father's life 'had been made up of lies, some tragic, 
some pathetic, all of them leaving (her] with the feeling 
that (she'd] been stolen from' . 
14 0 David Gordon had never 
been to Harvard, or Paris, or Oxford, as she had been led 
to believe. He never graduated from high school. And David 
was not his given name: his name was Israel and he was not 
born in America, but in Vilna, a Yiddish-speaking Jew who 
immigrated to the United States in 1910. Discovering this, 
Gordon feels that she has 'lost her place in America,. 141 
Gordon knew that her father had converted from Judaism 
to Catholicism in the 1930s. She also knew that he edited 
and wrote for the pornographic magazine 'Hot Dog', but even 
though she'd read his writing, she had always failed to see 
that amongst his articles were anti-Semitic diatribes 
against Jewish writers written, she says, 'ten years after 
six million of his blood were murdered'. 
142 
"As I began to explore my memories', Gordon recalls, 
was caught up in the impossibility of memory as a 
143 
reliable source' . Her memory proves 
fallible in the face 
of even the most basic and accessible of documentary 
139 Tina Papoulias in Lacy Rogers et al, eds. 
140 Gordon xxi-)ocii. 
141 Gordon xxii. 
142 Gordon xvi. 
143 Gordon xx-xxi. 
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evidence. Photographs reveal not the Fred Astaire of 
Gordon's memory, but a grimacing, toothless figure with a 
pot belly. She keeps trying to rid herself of the false', 
but at the same time wonders if perhaps 'there is no such 
144 thing as the truth' . 
Gordon is at once a mourner, a rememberer, a 
chronicler' and The Shadow Man a belated act of memory, 
mourning, and memorialisation. 145 In her memoir she suggests 
not only that the work of mourning may be something to 
which one must return until it is 'completed', but also 
that successful mourning is contingent on the ability both 
to remember and to recount as well as on a necessary belief 
that there is 'such a thing as the truth,. Realising that 
she had been complicit in the deception, Gordon casts 
herself in the paradoxical roles of detective and suspect, 
146 both ', the perpetrator and the victim of a crime' . She 
becomes an archaeologist, lundigging the bones held buried 
so thoroughly, so imaginatively, for so long'. 147 Miller's 
notion of the 'family plot, is given a more literal edge in 
Gordon's memoir because, literalising the archaeology 
metaphor, Gordon has her father's body exhumed and reburied 
in a plot of her choosing. 
148 
144 Gordon 38. 
145 Gordon 39-40. 
146 Gordon 162. 
147 Gordon 160. 
'48 See Miller, Bequest and Betrayal 1-21. 
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In The Shadow Man Gordon describes the ways in which 
she was motivated by a quest for the intact relic: 'Which 
is the real father, the real daughter? The ones that can't 
be changed or lost?,. 149 The quest is for enough reliable 
evidence to re-create this real father, although she 
recognises the impossibility of the task. on both a 
symbolic and a literal level she is concerned with what 
remains of her father. Will he emerge as he once was, she 
wonders, rub the earth from his eyes and thank her for 
rescuing him? 
In her quest for the intact relic that she knows she 
will not find, Gordon uses the metaphor of a sea rescue. 
Paul Auster, too, uses this analogy in The invention of 
Solitude, where, drawing on Collodils Pinocchio, he wonders 
if ', one really has to rescue one's father from the bottom 
150 
of the sea in order to become a real boy'. Recovery of 
the past, and the undertaking of a quest, are in these 
cases explicitly linked to authenticity. 151 There are shades 
of Plath in these two memoirists' use of the 'beneath the 
sea' metaphor of recovery: 'I used to pray to recover you' 
24 9 Gordon 39. 
150 Auster 79. 
151 A similar metaphor is also used in Georges Perec's W or the Memory 
of Childhood, trans. David Bellos (1974; London: The Harvill Press, 
1996) 22-25. Perec's autobiography begins with a fictional story about 
a man--Gaspard Winkler--setting off on a quest to recover the 
potentially ship-wrecked body of a child, also named Winkler, whose 
false papers the adult Winkler uses as a fake identity. The suggestion 
is that if the adult Winkler can rescue the traumatised child bearing 
the same name, he can earn his own authenticity. This story serves as 
a parallel for Perec's own autobiographical quest. 
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152 says the poet-narrator of 'Daddy' . And as Gordon prepares 
to exhume her father's body she, like Plath, wonders if 
'even the bones would do' . 
153 
These watery fathers are, in both senses of the word, 
unfathomable. Gordon cites an extract from The Tempest as 
an epigraph, the extract from which Plath took the title 
for one of her father poems. This is the 'Full Fathom Five' 
passage: 
Full fathom five thy father lies, 
Of his bones are corals made, 
Those are pearls that were his eyes; 
Nothing of him doth fade 
But doth suffer a sea-change 
Into something rich and strange. 154 
Gordon writes that her attempt to recover the past, her 
father, was made difficult by 'New impressions (that] 
drowned the originals; they were covered over by relentless 
and obliterating seas of new experience, new sights and 
sounds'. 155 It might be possible to fathom the father out, 
but what is brought back from the depths might not quite be 
what was expected. His burial might have brought about a 
sea-change. Coming to terms with what might be left of her 
152 Sylvia Plath, Collected Poems, ed. 
Faber, 1990) 222. 
153 Plath 224, my emphasis. 
154 Cited by Gordon 245. 
15's Gordon 40. 
Ted Hughes (London: Faber and 
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father's body, his story, is, for Gordon, an essential part 
of the mourning process. 
What Maria Torok might refer to as Gordon's 'fantasy 
of the exquisite corpse, indicates the way in which 
"recovery' might operate as a trope not just in this 
memoir, but also in other memoirs. ' 56 The autobiographer's 
desire to recover the past 'as it really was' might be 
naive, deluded even, but that does not make it any less 
necessary to maintain as a theoretical possibility. The act 
of disinterring her father's body before reburying it in a 
plot of her choosing is enacted narratively as well as 
literally, but this act is marked by an ambivalence about 
what this might mean: 'Do I believe that if I get him into 
words properly, he can live again? Or is it that by getting 
him properly into words, I can finally allow him to be 
dead? I. 157 Does narrative--getting something 'properly into 
words, --enable forgetting or remembering; is it an act of 
holding on or of letting go? 'The dead are lost', writes 
A V-% 
Appignanesi of her impossible desire to recover them before 
presenting them to her mother as a form of 'reparation', 
'But maybe, none the less, it makes a difference if by 
remembering them, we lose them properly'. 
158 
156 See Maria Torok, 'The Illness of Mourning and the Fantasy of the 
Exquisite Corpse,, Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Shell and the 
Kernel: Renewals of Psychoanalysis, trans. and ed. Nicholas Rand 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) 99-107. 
157 Gordon 261. 
158 Appignanesi 7-8. 
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Moreover, Gordon is speculative about the kind of 
narrative that will enable her to get her father 'properly 
into words, and experiments throughout the text with 
different forms, at times overtly fictionalising her 
father's story and attempting to write it in the first 
person, inhabiting her father's 'I'. Towards the end of her 
memoir, Gordon attempts to reach her father by telling him 
stories. The stories are all titled 'THIS IS WHAT IT IS 
LIKE'. The final story is about a woman who, for a long 
time since her father's death, has been receiving packages, 
all marked 'FROM THE ESTATE OF YOUR FATHER'. The woman 
hopes to make something of all the things contained in the 
packages--, a broken spring from the inside of a silver 
watch,, for example--'She doesn't know what kind of thing 
it will be, only that its name will be THIS IS MY 
FATHER . 
159 She eventually gives up the idea of a coherent 
shape'. Instead, the things must be constantly accessible, 
constantly interchangeable, constantly ready to be in 
different relations to one another'. 160 And yet although 
these stories gesture towards the conciliatory, 
reconstructive process of self-making described by Kuhn and 
King, Gordon ends her memoir with the reburial of her 
father, suggesting a more definite form of closure based on 
a recovery model of memory and identity. Thus her memoir 
sits between both models, acknowledging the unreliability 
159 Gordon 201. 
101 
of the archaeological evidence and the need for a continual 
process of reconstruction, while at the same time seeking 
an end to the ongoing process of the memory work at the 
heart of mourning, and at the heart of autobiography 
itself . 
'Every autobiography requires a coming to terms with 
the past and a revision of family history', writes Miller, 
but none more so than the detective memoir, it would 
seem. 
161 
Eakin uses Art Spiegelman's graphic memoirs Maus I 
and Maus 11 (1986; 1991), based on Spiegelman's protracted 
interviewing and recording of his father's story, as 
examples of the "story of the story' . 
162 He claims that 'the 
stress is on the performance of the collaboration and 
therefore on the relation of the two individuals 
163 involved' 
. Miller also takes up this point and emphasises 
the ways in which Spiegelman's memoir emphasises the 
process of relational autobiography: 'getting the story was 
the relationship'. 164 In memoirs like Appignanesi's, Lott's, 
Kuhn's, and Gordon's, however, 'getting the story' is 
subordinate to revising the story. The story of the story 
is the story of the revision of a family narrative that is 
seen as dominant, censored, edited and abridged. The 
160 Gordon 201. 
261 
Miller 2. 
162 Eakin 58. See also Art Spiegelman, Maus: A Survivor's Tale: My 
Father Bleeds History (1986; London: Penguin, 1987) and Maus: A 
Survivor's Tale: And Here My Troubles Began (1991; London: Penguin, 
1992). 
163 Eakin 59. 
164 Miller 19. 
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auto/biographical quest, in these cases, is for a narrative 
with which to replace these dominant and restrictive family 
histories. 
The following section explores psychoanalytic 
revisions of life narrative, and focuses on the ways in 
which concepts of recovery and reconstruction are entwined 
in Freud's notion of therapeutic narratives. The difference 
between therapeutic narratives and historical narratives 
may not be as great, I argue, as recovered memory opponents 
have suggested. In section five, I discuss the ways in 
which the revision of family narrative that occurs in a 
selection of detective memoirs may highlight the 
problematic tension between recovery and reconstruction in 
contemporary life writing. 
4. Therapeutic Histories 
Of course, the stories must attempt the best 
connection with reality. 165 
revision of life-narrative is at the heart of the 
psychoanalytic exchange. Psychoanalysis traditionally 
begins with the telling of a life story and yet the 
analysand might expect to leave with quite a different (and 
implicitly more 'truthful, ) narrative from the one with 
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which s/he began. In Phillip's parodic and hyperbolic 
description of the gulf between the analysand and the 
autobiographer, psychoanalysis proposes to do what 
autobiography cannot: to replace an unhealthy narrative 
with a healthy one. This begs the question of what a 
healthy or an unhealthy narrative might look like. In what 
follows I discuss the ways in which Freud's changing 
concept of therapeutic narrative may be born of the tension 
between concepts of recovery and reconstruction. Despite 
the firm distinction set up during the memory wars between 
therapeutic narratives and historical narratives I argue in 
this section that the divide between them might not be as 
great as this seems to suggest. 
'I begin the treatment', Freud explains at the start 
of the "Dora' case, 'by asking the patient to give me the 
whole story of his life and illness'. He goes on to compare 
166 this first account to an 'unnavigable river' . Hysterics 
are unable, Freud claims, to give a 'smooth and precise' 
report about themselves . 
167 Their accounts are full of 'gaps 
unfilled, and riddles unanswered', connections are 
, incoherent, and the order of events is 'uncertain'. 
168 
The 
patient's inability to 'give an ordered history of their 
life insofar as it coincides with a history of their 
illness, is seen as a symptom; it is 'characteristic of the 
165 Lott 255. 
166 , Dora' 45. 
167 % Dora, 45. 
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neurosis, and the gaps and incoherences of memory, 
specifically in relation to the history of the illness, are 
"a necessary correlate of the Symp tomS, . 
169 At this point in 
his explanation, Freud takes a detour and describes the 
case of a woman referred to him after years of unsuccessful 
treatment for hysteria. After hearing her story, 'which 
came out perfectly clearly and connectedly in spite of the 
remarkable events it dealt with', Freud deduced that hers 
was not a case of hysteria. She was later diagnosed with 
170 
'tabes I. 
The purpose of analysis, Freud writes in the 'Dora' 
case is not just to remove all symptoms 'and to replace 
them with conscious thoughts', but also to 'repair the 
damage to the patient's memory'. 'These two aims are 
coincident', writes Freud, 'When one is reached, so is the 
other; and the same path leads to them both' . 
17 1 
Freud does 
not declare his intention to repair 'Dora's' narrative, but 
the metaphor of restoration invites the analogy of an 
incoherent narrative made to cohere, of fragments that are 
stuck back together to form a whole. 
Contemporary psychotherapies place the same marked 
emphasis on patients' abilities to 'give an ordered history 
of their lives, and, as in Freud's case histories, an 
inability to do so often leads to a diagnosis. In Sybil 
168 'Dora, 45. 
169 Dora, 46. 
170 Dora 146. 
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(1974), an account of multiple personality disorder (a 
'multobiographyl), it is Sybil's gap-filled life-story 
which leads to the analyst's suspicion that 'alter' 
personalities had been leading parts of Sybil's life 
without her knowledge or memory. 172 And contemporary trauma 
theorist Bessel A. van der Kolk makes a connection between 
life and life narrative in cases of traumatic memory: 
In the case of complete recovery, the person 
does not suffer anymore from the reappearance 
of traumatic memories in the form of 
flashbacks, behavioural re-enactments, and so 
on. Instead the story can be told, the person 
can look back at what has happened; he has 
given it a place in his life history, his 
autobiography, and thereby in the whole of his 
personality. 173 
While the 'talking cure' of Breuer's 'Anna 0. ' case 
performs--or proposes--a cure by catharsis or purgation, it 
is Freud's 'Dora' case that has led some commentators to 
conclude that psychoanalysis is 'a sort of cure by 
narrativel. 
174 
Steven Marcus, drawing on an earlier paper by 
Philip Rieff, compares Freud's case histories, in their 
"" ', Dora, 45-47. 
172 Flora Rheta Schreiber, Sybil: The True Story of a Woman Possessed 
by Sixteen Separate Personalities (London: Penguin, 1974). 
173 Bessel A. van der Kolk, "The Intrusive Past: The Flexibility of 
memory and the Engraving of Trauma,, Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 
ed. Caruth 176. 
174 Janet Malcolm uses this term cure by narrative' in 'Reflections: 
J'appelle un chat un chat', In Dora's Case: Freud- -Hysteria --Feminism, 
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'singular and mysterious complexity', to certain works of 
modernist fiction. 175 After pointing out the lack of 
differentiation in the case between story, history and 
report--and thus the inherent incoherence and 
fragmentariness of the case history itself--he goes on to 
point out that the problem with the patient's life-story 
comes down in the first instance to formal shortcomings of 
narrative'. 
176 
Freud's implication here, he deduces, is that 
'a coherent story is in some manner connected with mental 
health (at the very least with the absence of hysteria)'. 177 
Marcus concludes: 
On this reading, human life is, ideally, a 
connected and coherent story, with all the 
details in explanatory place, and with 
everything (or as close to everything as is 
practically possible) accounted for, in its 
proper causal or other sequence. Inversely, 
illness amounts at least in part to suffering 
from an incoherent story or an inadequate 
178 
narrative account of oneself . 
'The patient does not merely provide the text', writes 
Marcus, commenting on Freud's statement on the ease of 
eds. Charles Bernheimer and Claire Kahane (1985; New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990) 323. She disagrees with this view. 
175 Steven Marcus, 'Freud and Dora: Story, History, Case History,, In 
Dora's Case 56. Kahane and Malcolm point out Marcus's 
%(unacknowledged) literary debt to Philip Rieff' 308. 
176 Marcus 70. 
177 Marcus 71. 
178 Marcus 71. 
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interpreting dreams; %he also is the text, the writing to 
be read, the language to be interpreted'. 179 
Marcus extends this implication into a discussion of 
reality and truth that renders the whole question of 
illness and narrative a good deal more problematic: 
in the course of psychoanalytic treatment, 
nothing less than "reality" itself is made, 
constructed or reconstructed. A complete story- 
-"intelligible, consistent, unbrokenn--is the 
theoretical, created end story. It is a story 
or a fiction, not only because it has a 
narrative structure but also because the 
narrative account has been rendered in 
language, in conscious speech, and no longer 
exists in the deformed language of symptoms, 
the untranslated speech of the body. 180 
Which, then, is the 'true' story: the one spoken by the 
body in symptoms or the 'fiction' created by analysis? 
Marcus continues: 
At the end--at the successful end--one has come 
into possession of one's own story. It is a 
final act of self-appropriation, the 
appropriation by oneself of one's own history 
[. ]. What we end with, then, is a fictional 
construction that is at the same time 
179 Marcus 81. 
'so Marcus 71. 
108 
satisfactory to us in the form of the truth, 
and as the form of the truth. 8* 
The final constructed 'reality' that 'Dora' must accept as 
her own truth, in order to 'appropriate, herself and her 
history is, as Marcus concedes 'Freud's more than 
Dorals'. 182 The failure of the case history, for Marcus, is 
that it "belongs progressively less to her than it does to 
him,. 183 
In his essay 'Fictions of the Wolf-Man, (1998) Peter 
Brooks raises a question that Marcus leaves unanswered: 
what is the relationship of the patient's original story to 
the truth? And how can psychoanalysis posit a fictional 
story constructed by the analyst as the history that the 
patient must come to appropriate, without the collaborative 
enterprise of the analysis turning into the combative--even 
abusive--situation that was so marked in the 'Dora, case? 184 
'With the case history of the Wolf Man', Brooks 
writes, "Freud has advanced to a more subtle presentation 
of complex narrative plots and a more subtle understanding 
of what the "'healthy narrative,, of life may be,. 
185 He 
continues: 
181 Marcus 71-72. 
182 Marcus 79. 
183 Marcus 85. 
184 Crews, for example, states that the 'Dora' case is 'one of the 
worst instances on record of sexual 
hectoring by a reputed healer' 53. 
185 Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in 
Narrative (London: Harvard University Press, 1998) 282. 
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It is notable that Freud more than once during 
the course of his analysis proposes to the Wolf 
Man a more straightforward, logical, 
"reasonable" narrative of events, only to have 
his patient refuse recognition and credence to 
these standardised plots. Freud and his patient 
together demonstrate that it is not so much 
simple coherence and mere plausibility that 
make our narratives persuasive. Narrative 
sequences and scenarios must accord with the 
complex, twisting, subversive patternings of 
desire. [. . .1 The powerful fiction is that 
which is able to restage the complex and buried 
past history of desire as it covertly 
reconstitutes itself in the present language. 186 
The key, for Brooks, is transference: the phenomenon that 
Freud did not recognise at work in his analysis of 'Dora'. 
Invoking Bakhtin's conception of the 'dialogic', Brooks 
concludes that 'the ""true" narrative lies in-between, in 
the process of exchange; it is the product of two 
187 
discourses playing against one another' . Brooks writes 
that 'the patient comes to the analyst with a story that is 
not so much false--since it does in some manner signify the 
truth--as it is incomplete and untherapeutic'. 188 
Whereas for Marcus the therapeutic narrative is a 
coherent fiction, for Brooks it is, too, a 'necessary 
fiction', but one that emerges out of the 'centreless and 
186 Brooks 283. 
187 Brooks 285. 
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reversible structure, of dialogue. '89 'Truth', Brooks 
argues, "arises from a dialogue among a number of fabula 
and a number of sjuzet, stories and their possible 
organisations, and also between two narrators, analyst and 
, 190 analysand . 
If for Marcus the therapeutic narrative is what Brooks 
here refers to as a Istandardised plot', a coherent story, 
for Brooks it entails the exploration of different possible 
relationships between story and plot, between the order of 
events referred to by the narrative' and "the order of 
events presented in the narrative discourse' . 
191 While for 
Marcus, the therapeutic narrative functions as such only 
insofar as it adheres to a prescribed sense of order, for 
Brooks it relies on the possibility of multiple orderings, 
on a shift away from what he earlier refers to as 'the 
nineteenth century's obsession with questions of origin, 
evolution, progress, genealogy, its foregrounding of the 
historical narrative as par excellence the necessary mode 
of explanation and understanding'. 
192 
Janet Malcolm takes issue with both Brooks and Marcus 
in their assumption that psychoanalysis is primarily a kind 
of "cure by narrative,. '[T1his "underlying assumptionff is 
nowhere to be found in Freud's work,, she argues; %Quite 
188 Brooks 285. 
189 Brooks 284. 
190 Brooks 284. 
191 Brooks 12. 
192 Brooks 7. 
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the contrary, Freud distinguishes between narrative closure 
and therapeutic benefit'. 193 , Closure, here is crucial, as 
it highlights a point of dispute between Marcus's and 
Brooks's theories and raises questions about the form of 
the 'therapeutic narrative' and its relation to the 
'recovery, model of memory and narrative. Malcolm is 
sceptical, too, about the collaborative nature of the so- 
called narrative cure. She writes of the necessary 
, epistemological inequality' between analyst and analysand, 
and argues that 'what the analyst is "selling" is precisely 
the difference of his psychoanalytic discourse from the 
discourses of ordinary, conscious life and common sense'. 194 
Bowie points out the difference between the 'Dora' 
case and the other case histories: 'whereas elsewhere 
psychoanalysis is a lacunary mode of interpretation--one 
which collects gaps, interrogates and systematises them--it 
here ['Dora'] presses towards plenitude with impatient 
speed. Lacunae are not to be allowed their lack I. 195 
Likewise Toril Moi comments on Freud's symbolic filling of 
196 
Dora's 'epistemological hole,. There is a gender issue 
here, of course, which has been discussed at great 
length. 197 Jacqueline Rose, for example, claims that the 
failure of the case is due to the repression of 'Dora's, 
193 Malcolm, 'Reflections' 323. 
194 Malcolm, 'Reflections' 310. 
195 Malcolm Bowie, Freud, Proust, Lacan: Theory as Fiction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987) 20. 
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femininity through the removal of hysterical SYMPtOMS. 
198 In 
Rose's view the 'therapeutic narrative,, should one exist, 
occurs not in-between' patient and analyst, but rather 
consists of an exchange of one discourse for another, one 
kind of knowledge for another. It entails, in Rose's view, 
the enforced standardisation of a history which fails to 
cohere with the normative patriarchal plot. 
Although Malcolm disputes the claim that 
psychoanalysis proposes a 'cure by narrative', the theory 
has gained great credence in contemporary trauma studies. 199 
In Holocaust Testimonies (1991), for example, Lawrence 
Langer stresses the importance not only of narrative, but 
also of the kind of collaboration of which Brooks writes. 
'The subtle urging of an interviewer', writes Langer, 'who 
after all is no more than an emissary of the outsider's 
point of view, can lead a witness to shift from one form of 
memory to another, and indeed control and shape the content 
of each'. 200 And yet although the process of testifying is 
seen by Langer, Felman and Laub as therapeutic (on both 
individual and sociological/historical levels), the aim is 
not to achieve 'narrative closure,,, but to accept that 
196 Toril Moi, 'Representation of Patriarchy: sexuality and 
Epistemology in Freud's Dora', In Dora's Case 197. 
197 See, for example, In Dora's Case for examples and bibliographies. 
198 Jacqueline Rose, 'Fragment of an Analysis', In Dora's Case 129. 
199 Even if critics agree that Freud does propose a 'cure by narrative, 
there can be no real consensus on the kinds of narrative thaý- are 
decidedly therapeutic. Neither 'Dora' nor the 'Wolf Man', arguably, 
were 'cured' by Freud's therapeutic methods. 
200 Lawrence L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory 
(London: Yale University Press, 1991) 9. 
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'Remembering and recording what happened operate on several 
levels, leaving atrocity and order in a permanently 
201 disrupted suspension' . 
Elaine Showalter's controversial book Hystories: 
Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture (1997) reverses the 
terms of the therapeutic narrative. By hystories, Showalter 
means "cultural narratives of hysteria'. 202 Showalter 
adheres, in part, to the traditional conception of hysteria 
as a means of communicating the unspeakable--'In the words 
of Robert M. Woolsey, hysteria is a "', protolanguage", and 
its symptoms are '"a code used by a patient to communicate 
a message which, for various reasons, cannot be 
verbalised"'. 203 Yet for Showalter, bodily expressions of 
the unspeakable are not the only symptoms of contemporary 
hysteria. The symptoms she concerns herself with in 
Hystories are not the life-narratives with which the 
patient enters analysis, but more often those with which 
s/he leaves. Claims of ritual satanic abuse, Gulf War 
Syndrome, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, Multiple Personality 
Disorder, for example, are all seen by Showalter as 
symptoms in themselves; these are the 'cultural narratives 
of hysteria,, the 'hystories'. These symptomatic narratives 
are quite the opposite to the 'therapeutic narratives, of 
which Brooks and Marcus write. Showalter concludes: 
201 Langer 9. 
202 Elaine Showalter, Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern 
Culture (1997; London: Picador, 1998) 5. 
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And we can lead the way in making distinctions 
between metaphors and realities, between 
therapeutic narratives and destructive 
hystories. If hysteria is a protolanguage 
rather than a disease, we must pay attention to 
what it is telling US . 
204 
But what is the difference between therapeutic narrative' 
and 'destructive hystory'? This question became more 
pressing during the RMT debate, where legal proceedings 
often followed in the wake of therapy and purportedly 
'therapeutic narratives' were tested in a court of law. The 
very fact that Showalter's book was so controversial 
reveals the ways in which no firm decision on the 
difference between histories and hystories has yet been 
reached. 205 It also illustrates the extent to which these 
issues are not merely theoretical, the impasse not a 
concern only for mental health practitioners or academics, 
but was rather a fierce battle, played out on much more 
public fronts, over authority. 
203 Showalter 7. 
204 Showalter 13. 
205 Showalter writes in her preface to the paperback edition of 
Hystories that she was surprised by the response to her book: 'I 
didn't predict that I would become the subject of conspiracy theories 
myself (. I that people would bombard me with hate mail, offer me 
blood transfusions, advise me to get a bodyguard, threaten to rip me 
apart, or warn me of assassination unless I recanted, x. Her response, 
probably no less controversial than the book itself, is reminiscen-- of 
Freud's response to his detractors: 'the inflammatory reaction to the 
book from some quarters has only confirmed my analysis of hysterical 
epidemics of denial, projection, accusation, and blame, x. 
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Brooks's claim that Freud's therapeutic methodology in 
the "Dora' case might be based on dominant historical 
discourses of the time is telling: does the therapeutic 
efficiency of narrative depend on its conformity to 
'Istandardised plots"> Do narratives become therapeutic only 
when they have become historical? And does history, in this 
case, simply refer to currently dominant discourses of 
truth-telling? This is interesting to consider in the light 
of RMT, which revived Freud's early models of repression 
and recovery and sought to create coherent recovery 
narratives that could withstand legal verification tests. 
In this sense contemporary therapies revived not only a 
nineteenth-century model of therapy, but also a nineteenth- 
century model of truth-telling discourse. 
Freud distinguished between 'psychic reality' and 
"material reality,, and maintained--at least after Studies 
on Hysteria--that it was 'psychic reality' that concerned 
him the most. 206 And yet although his later work places a 
greater emphasis on psychic reality, there is, arguably, no 
hierarchy of realities here. Psychical reality, Freud 
suggests, is just as 'real, as material reality. Freud, s 
distinction between these two realities, however, does not 
carry over into the RMT debate, where we are more likely to 
206 See 'General Theory of the Neuroses' 1917 (1916-1917), Introductory 
Lectures on Psychoanalysis, PFL 1, trans. James Strachey, eds. James 
Strachey and Angela Richards (London: Penguin, 1991) 415. 
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encounter increasingly hierarchical conceptions of truth or 
reality. 
Showalter, as we have seen, distinguishes between 
"therapeutic narratives' and destructive hystories', 
suggesting that some narratives may cure while some merely 
perpetuate illness. Elsewhere, the notion of 'historical' 
or biographical' truth seems to have taken the place of 
Freud's 'material reality' and invests it with a greater 
authenticity. According to Loftus and Ketcham, for example, 
', narrative' or 'story, truth is always in conflict with the 
'happening truth' that is indistinguishable from 
'historical truth,. 
207 
And yet this division between the narrative and the 
historical elides the fact that history itself may be no 
more than a narrative, that the historical may be 'true' 
only insofar as it is narratively persuasive. The true 
story, it seems, for Loftus and Ketcham is one that 
conforms to a more legalistic definition, one that can 
provide evidence which can then be weighed, measured and 
tested in a court of law. And indeed, even RMT proponents 
would seem to confirm this view by promoting the idea that 
the "therapeutic narrative' achieved through analysis can, 
and even should, be validated by judge and jury. 208 
207 See Loftus and Ketcham 38-73. 
208 And yet as Loftus and Ketcham's accounts of such trials illustrate, 
the judgement often depends on the ability of various memory-experts 
to provide a persuasive narrative. See for example Loftus and Ketcham 
38-73. 
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There are refractions of these issues, if not explicit 
references to them, in contemporary life writing. The 
revision of 'dominant, family narratives in family memoirs, 
as I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, mirrors 
a simultaneous disavowal of 'traditional, autobiographical 
narrative. Yet these revisions are not unmarked by 
ambivalence. By seeking to replace family myths--or 
', conventional autobiographies, --with a more 'truthful' 
account, these memoirists beg the question of what a 
'truthful, autobiography might look like. 
Historical Recoveries 
My mother's story is devoid of history. 
209 
And yet those feelings are history. "O 
Annette Kuhn, as we have seen, distinguished between 
'conventional, autobiography and her own "memory work,. By 
'conventional', Kuhn seemed to be alluding to a vague 
notion of traditional autobiography as a narrative which is 
linear, chronological, and coherent. In her 'editing, of 
the family album, too, Kuhn seeks to find an alternative to 
the traditional deployment of family photographs in what 
209 Appignanesi 83. 
210 Miller, Bequest and Betrayal 17. 
118 
she compares to a %classical narrative: linear, 
chronological', %a mode of sequencing that is culturally 
speaking, rather circumscribed' . 
21 ' Appignanesi revises her 
mother's story which, told too many times, had 'congealed 
into a series of tableaux' which 'took on brighter and 
brighter colours, painted over the horrors of the War from 
212 
which they had emerged' . Lott, likewise, makes his aim 
the revision of his family's 'coherent' story. 
Each of these examples suggests that the revision of 
the family narrative is marked by a desire to find a 
narrative with which to replace a 'conventional', 
"traditional, model of autobiography based on a nineteenth- 
century model of historical writing. And yet these 
revisions are often marked with ambivalence, because such a 
model offers certain 'consolations'. As Carolyn Steedman 
points out, the 'recovery' model of memory and narrative 
maintains the possibility that: 
life-stories can be told, that the inchoate 
feeling of living and feeling can be marshalled 
into a chronology, and that central and unified 
subjects reach the conclusion of a life and 
come into possession of their own story. [. . 
.] the hope that that which 
is gone, that which 
is irretrievably lost, which is past time, can 
be brought back, and conjured before the eyes 
4111 Kuhn 17. 
212 Appignanesi 81. 
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"as it really waso; and that it can be 
possessed. 213 
Autobiographies and their theorists have long challenged 
this model of autobiographical writing and have emphasised 
the plurality of stories, selves, and histories as well as 
the reconstructive model of memory, narrative, and 
identity. And yet these memoirs seem to suggest that the 
nineteenth-century model of historical autobiography still 
holds sway over the previous generation and, because of 
this, was the dominant mode in the domestic realms of these 
authors, childhoods. 
The family photograph album, as Kuhn illustrates, 
serves as an emblem for the dominant family narrative. In 
its coherence and ostensibly objective referentiality, it 
can, like the dominant family myth--and like the 
'conventional' autobiography--mislead. As Marianne Hirsch 
writes in Family Frames (1997): 
photography's social functions are integrally 
tied to the ideology of the modern family. The 
family photo both displays the cohesion of the 
family and is an instrument of its 
togetherness. (. ] Because the photograph 
gives the illusion of being a simple 
transcription of the real, a trace touched 
directly by the events it records, it has the 
213 Carolyn Steedman, Past Tenses: Essays on Writing, Autobiography, 
and History (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1992) 163. 
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effect of neutralizing cultural practices and 
of disguising their stereotyped and coded 
characteristics. As photography immobilizes the 
flow of family life into a series of snapshots, 
it perpetuates familial myths while seeming 
merely to record actual moments in family 
history. (. ] Looking at them we both 
construct a fantastic past and set out on a 
detective trail to find other versions of a 
"real" one. 214 
The family photograph, she continues, 'sustains an 
imaginary cohesion', and yet she indicates the ways in 
which photographs are now being used by 'memory workers' 
like Kuhn and Jo Spence to 'disrupt' this coherent visual 
narrative, 'breaking hold of a conventional and monolithic 
familial gaze,. 
215 
There is a marked ambivalence in memoirs such as 
Lott's, Appignanesils, and Gordon's over such a radical 
revisioning of family narratives and an anxiety over the 
question of which kinds of narratives may serve as vehicles 
for truth-telling in the absence of 'conventional, modes. 
216 
Lott's memoir addresses these questions from both a 
historical and a therapeutic perspective. He explicitly 
endows the ability to tell the truth about the past with a 
214 Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and 
Postmemory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) 7-14. 
215 Hirsch 8. See also Jo Spence, Putting Myself in the Picture: A 
Political, Personal and Photographic Autobiography (Seattle: Real 
Comet Press, 1988). 
216 There are also ethical implications of these revisions too, which 
discuss at greater length in Chapter Two. 
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therapeutic function, but also explores the difficulties of 
such truth-telling for the contemporary personal historian. 
Lott's memoir addresses the double-edged quality of 
story-making and the problematic relationship between 
identity and narrative, between stories and selves. 
Beginning with a novelistic report of his mother's suicide 
and Lott's subsequent declaration of intent--to 'find out' 
what led her to it--The Scent of Dried Roses continues in 
the detective story vein that characterises other 
217 
contemporary memoirs . Lott had himself suffered from a 
suicidal depression through which his mother nursed him, 
but until beginning his detective work into his mother's 
past following her suicide, he was unaware that she had 
also suffered from depression. In order to discover what 
led to the suicide, as well as to locate his own potential 
complicity in it, he describes the ways in which '[he] had 
to examine the traces of her life, the products and the 
waste products, like a forensic scientist, inferring, 
deducing, blind-guessing'. 218 The biographical quest becomes 
indistinguishable from the autobiographical one, the one in 
which Lott attempts to make sense not only of his own 
depression in relation to his mother's, but also the role 
he played in her suicide. As Blake Morrison points out, the 
narrator-author is both 'detective and chief suspect,. 
2" 
217 
Lott 22-23. 
218 Lott 22-23. 
219 Blake Morrison, 'England Unmade Me', TLS 11 October 1996: 35. 
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The available literature on organic and hereditary 
depression does not serve, for Lott, as an adequate 
explanation. Nor does psychoanalytic treatment offer Lott 
the explanation he seeks. Of his consulting-room 
experiences, he quips: 'I chain-smoke, and wait for him to 
tell me the secret of my life,. 220 He comes away 
unsatisfied. The therapist asks him about his parents and 
he writes that 'Although I knew them not to be perfect, I 
am unaware of having been abandoned, under-loved, 
overloved, untouched or abused. It is clear that he 
believes me to be in denial ,. 
221 
The therapeutic agenda behind The Scent of Dried Roses 
is clear from Lott's title. The eponymous scent, Lott 
explains in his chapter on the historical treatment of 
depression, was once prescribed as a 'sentimental' cure for 
, melancholy, . 
222 By borrowing this "cure' for his title, 
Lott suggests that the writing of the book may likewise 
function as a cure, but by borrowing from the historical 
archive of treatments the most ludicrous, nostalgic, and 
sentimental treatment Lott places a question-mark over this 
supposed function. 
223 
Other memoirs express a similar disinclination to 
adhere to the objectifying diagnosis of psychiatrists or 
220 Lott 245. 
221 Lott 245-46. 
222 2. Lott 71. 
223 He did not, for example, include the word 'Prozac' in his title as 
others have done. See, for example, Elizabeth Wurtzel, Prozac Nation: 
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psychoanalysts and often the life-narrative is written 
against the grain of medical narratives which fail to 
contain or account for complexity of experience or feeling. 
Reading the psychiatric literature on post-natal 
depression, Fiona Shaw writes of how: 
in a space of a page, I found myself 
categorized: definition, frequency, 
predisposing factors, causes, clinical 
features, treatment and prognosis, all given 
relatively clearly, for "puerperal psychosis". 
[. 
. .) it was dismaying to find my experience 
boxed in like this, reduced to an implausible 
scientific jargon. As though by imposing their 
"scientific" language on someone, they could 
make sense of and contain all the fever and the 
224 fret . 
Likewise Anne Karpf, in her second-generation Holocaust 
testimony The War After (1996), objects to psychoanalytic 
and psychiatric theorisations of Holocaust survivors on the 
grounds of the therapeutic assumptions that govern them: 
I am not a case-history: no one wants to be a 
case, especially one with a history, or to be 
reduced to a cluster of symptoms. In 
professional literature, the case-history sets 
out to prove the professional's diagnosis: it 
Young and Depressed in America: A Memoir (1996; London: Quartet, 1998) 
and Lauren Slater, Prozac Diary (1998; London: Penguin, 2000). 
224 Shaw 157. 
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-' 
retrospectively shapes the patient's history, 
which seems to move inexorably towards a 
therapeutically "worked through" resolution, 
free of any recurring messes and 
225 imperfections 
. 
'My own path is far more bumpy and circuitous', she writes, 
'and this story doesn't end with all problems neatly 
solved, although in the process of revising my parents' 
[interview] tapes I do feel some kind of resolution'. 226 
This echoes Appignanesi's disavowal of 'discourses of 
traumatic illness, even as she takes such discourses into 
account and claims to have achieved a kind of "resolution' 
through the writing of the memoir. 
Although memoirists such as Shaw, Karpf, and 
Appignanesi oppose the notion of a 'writing cure', such 
memoirs are often placed in dialogue with 'professional 
diagnoses, and offer alternative means of achieving 
'resolution'. The rejection of diagnostic narratives serves 
a similar purpose to the disavowal of dominant family myths 
and 'conventional, models of life narrative: these 
revisions are in the service of more complex, more 
circuitous negotiations between past and present. 
This is more specifically the case in transsexual 
autobiographical narratives, for example, where the life 
story told to the doctor may by necessity be a fiction 
225 Karpf 313. 
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designed to ensure that the desired diagnosis is reached. 
As Jay Prosser writes, the inability to plot a coherent and 
recognisable transsexual narrative for the doctor may lead 
to a misdiagnosis and a refusal of treatment: 
the diagnosis of "true" or "primary" or "'core" 
transsexualism is surely derived not merely 
from a certain plot codifiable as transsexual 
but from an account that renders up this plot 
clearly and coherently. (. I In effect, to 
be transsexual, the subject must be a skilled 
narrator of his or her own life. Tell the story 
persuasively, and you're likely to get your 
hormones and surgery; falter, repeat, disorder, 
omit, digress, and you've pretty much had it, 
227 however "'authentic" a transsexual you are . 
It is not enough, Prosser suggests, for a story to be true; 
in order to convince the listening professional of its 
authenticity it has to conform to a predetermined 
"acceptable' transsexual narrative. 
The previous section explored the ways in which 
therapeutic narratives and historical narratives may not be 
as easily distinguishable from each other as the RMT 
debate, with its rigid polarisation of narrative truth and 
historical truth, seems to suggest. Indeed, the efficacy of 
therapeutic narrative may well depend on its relationship 
226 Karpf 313. 
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to the dominant cultural mode of truth-telling, the 
dominant mode of 'historical' discourse. By questioning and 
challenging the relationship of their personal histories to 
the 'Istandardised plots, of therapeutic narratives, these 
memoirists may simultaneously challenge their narratives' 
relationship to other ostensibly objective historical 
orms. 
Carolyn Steedman, whose memoir Landscape for a Good 
Woman (1986) is an early paradigm for the family memoirs 
which followed it, is deeply ambivalent about the status of 
her text as 'history'. At the beginning of her text she is 
'very eager to tell readers [. I that what they are 
about to read is not history'. 228 But 'At the end, I want 
those readers to say that what I have produced is history; 
229 
which would please me more than anything else' . Steedman 
distinguishes her auto/biography from conventional forms of 
history and from memoir which, she writes, traditionally 
insist on the primacy of external events rather than inner 
experiences in the shaping of narrative. 230 
In her experimentation with a blend of forms and 
disciplines, she explicitly addresses the problem of 
writing an account of a working-class childhood from a 
point of exclusion from literary and historical forms: 
227 Jay Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 108. 
228 Steedman, Past Tenses 45. 
229 Steedman, Past Tenses 45. 
230 Steedman, Past Tenses 43. 
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I have to refuse the label history to what I 
say about Burnley in the 1920s, about the 
possible way my mother was brought up, about 
the certain descriptions of my own childhood- 
not because I don't present perfectly true and 
useful historical information here, but rather 
because my rhetorical framework would collapse 
if I said this was history: the central 
story. 
231 
For Steedman, the status of her text as history does not 
depend on its truth-status, but on its relationship to the 
'central story'. In her exploration of the conflict between 
personal history and history, between marginal stories and 
central stories, Steedman selects a genre which promises to 
bring into sharper focus the tensions between them. This 
genre is the psychoanalytic case-study: 
The written case-study allows the writer to 
enter the present into the past, allows the 
dream, the wish or the fantasy of the past to 
shape current time, and treats them as evidence 
in their own right. In this way, the narrative 
form of case-study shows what went in to its 
writing, shows the bits and pieces from which 
it is made up, in the way that history refuses 
to do and fiction can't. "' 
231 Steedman, Past Tenses 46. 
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Steedman's interest in the 'Dora' case, in particular, does 
not centre on 'Dorals, hysteria, nor, as she says, on 
"Freud's failure to cure it,. 233 It centres instead on 'the 
questions raised by the presentation of personal stories, 
234 the relationship of these narratives to history, . The 
choice of the case-study form does not, in Steedman's case, 
imply pathology. It is rather a means of exploring the ways 
in which personal stories and history fit (or fail to fit) 
together either because of an oppressive patriarchy that 
seeks to pathologise that which does not conform, as in 
'Dora's' case, or because there exists a narrative and 
cultural tradition that does something very similar to life 
narratives that inhabit the 'borderlands ,. 235 
Steedman's choice of genre does not, either, suggest 
an unproblematic embracing of psychoanalysis. Indeed, 
Steedman discusses in some depth the ways in which 
psychoanalysis, as an 'interpretative device' excludes 
working-class experience. Steedman uses the dream, the 
wish, the vague memory, like Freud as evidence, but by 
becoming agent of her own epistemological discovery she 
resists perpetuating the analytic objectifying stance. The 
case history form, for Steedman, offers a way to resist 
forcing into coherence a narrative that does not fit. It 
232 Steedman, Landscape for a Good Woman (1986; London: Virago, 1996) 
20-21. 
'33 Steedman, Landscape 130. 
234 Steedman, Landscape 130. 
23'3 Steedman, Landscape 22. 
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offers a way to tell more than one story, and in more than 
one genre. Steedman's memoir shares with later contemporary 
memoirs an emphasis on what Eakin refers to as the story 
of the story,, which also characterises the case history. 236 
Likewise, Kuhn rejects the label 'autobiography' for 
her own memory work and claims that 'Each of these essays 
is a case history in its own right'. 237 And, like Steedman, 
Kuhn seeks to 'explore connections between "public" 
historical events and "personal" memory'; in her case 
histories 'outer and inner, social and personal, historical 
and psychical, coalesce' . 
23 8 This coalescence or cohesion 
differs, however, from Marcus's notion of a therapeutic 
narrative which forces into coherence an incoherent 
narrative by turning it into a 'standardised [historical) 
plot' . 
The "coherent narrative' which Kuhn seeks to instate 
is a means of counteracting her mother's tendency to 
, tamper with evidence', to cut down photographs and to 
impose her own interpretation of them by inscribing 
messages on the back . 
23 9 Kuhn describes these incidents as 
examples of obsessive (and usually "badff) remembering, on 
her mother's part against which her own memory work is an 
attempt to introduce the possibility of 'good' remembering: 
236 Eakin 58. 
237 Kuhn 4. 
238 Kuhn 4. 
239 Kuhn 55. 
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"good, because it allows for different possible 
interpretations. 240 
If Lott is ambivalent about the therapeutic function 
of writing, he is no more so about the status of his memoir 
as autobiography, biography, or confession. He describes 
his mother's suicide as 'a confessional act'. 241 Placing his 
own complicity in this act at the centre of his 
autobiographical quest, he declares that he too must now 
"confess' to the crime. 242 And yet he acknowledges at the 
end of The Scent that it is not clear whether his memoir 
should be taken as autobiography, biography, confession or 
'expiation', suggesting either that the verdict is still 
out on his guilty involvement, that it may be up to the 
reader to decide, or even that in the final analysis the 
'explanation, for his mother's suicide might go above and 
243 beyond his own culpability . Although this began as a 
detective quest, Lott suggests that the crime in question 
is one that cannot be solved. 
In fact in Lott's memoir it is finally narrative that 
emerges both as prime suspect and potential vehicle for 
cure: stories can be lunsustaining, cruel, self-defeating', 
or they can be provisional explanations, 'sustaining 
lies'. 244 By exploring the therapeutic and historical 
240 
Kuhn 15. 
241 
Lott 21. 
242 Lott 10. 
243 
Lott 262. 
244 
Lott 132; Kuhn 3. 
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efficiency of the different kinds of 'stories' or 'lies' 
available, Lott makes a firm distinction between his own 
narrative capabilities and those of his parents. He 
simultaneously desires and disavows his parents' stories, 
longing nostalgically for a time when narrative and 
identity were simple, uncomplicated affairs and yet unable 
himself to tell a true story' within these confines. Lott 
bemoans the fact that he is unable to tell the kind of 
story his parents could tell--'a common story with a 
beginning, middle and an end in the right places', which 
echoes Kuhn's assertion that Family Secrets is not a 
'conventional' autobiography because 'I offer no life story 
organised as a linear narrative with a beginning, a middle 
and an end, in that order'. 245 Although he finds himself 
crippled by a postmodern distrust of the coherent narrative 
he claims: 'I wish I could tell a story, a single 
narrative, like my father has, instead of this snakepit of 
narratives that compete, eclipse each other, then sli e 
mutely back into darkness'. 
246 
There is a certain degree of disingenuousness in 
Lott's simultaneous desire for and repudiation of such 
"traditional, models of autobiographical narrative. While 
Lott could not, perhaps, ever restore the past 'as it 
really was', he surely could have 'marshalled, his evidence 
into chronology. He could have written something resembling 
245 Lott 132. 
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a 'traditional, autobiography. But what his, and other 
memoirs seem to insist upon is the fact that this model no 
longer serves to convince, no longer functions as 
persuasive truth-telling mode. 
Although he claims to long for the possibility of a 
coherent unifying story like his parents', Lott refers to 
their stories as 'lies'. Interestingly, parents in 
contemporary family memoirs are almost unanimously 
characterised as Iliars'. 247 Appignanesi, for example, 
explains that 'Every family has its division of 
psychological labour. In mine, my mother was the liar, my 
father the silent, inscrutable one, while I was the 
truthteller'. 248 Parents' lies may justify the revision of 
their stories, and by placing these lies at the centre of 
these revisions, detective memoirists implicitly--and 
sometimes explicitly--make a greater claim for the truth- 
status of their own stories. 
And yet truth does not always emerge as an unambiguous 
panacea, as the parents' reasons for deception are often 
complex and necessary. In Appignanesi's memoir, for 
example, Appignanesils mother's lies take a more insidious 
form: not willed forgetting or concealment, but instances 
of internalised oppression. Lying, Appignanesi discovers, 
may have been the only way in which to survive the war, and 
246 
Lott 132. 
'447 See, for example, Grant 31; Morrison 13-14; Shaw 141; and Kehoe 190 
for an example of parents' 'lies, 
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to keep painful memories out of reach. 'My mother's ideal 
interlocutor,, she reveals, %is always and ever the Gestapo 
officer,. 
249 Lying about her name, her nationality, her 
religion, even about more mundane matters was for her 
mother, Appignanesi concedes, both a means of survival and 
an internalisation of 'the discourse of the master, the 
coloniser, the aggressor'; the message was that 'Jewishness 
(I carried a shameful taint, one which had on too many 
250 
occasions proved mortal' . 
Appignanesi describes watching, over and over again, a 
videotape of her mother's oral Holocaust testimony. Her 
mother 'weaves her web of story' in which she is 'a bold 
young woman who outwitted dreaded foes' . 
251 'Yet when I look 
at my transcript of the video,, Appignanesi writes: 
I am startled by how fragmentary her narrative 
is. Each fragment makes sense on its own, but 
nothing coheres--as if the only point of 
cohesion were her own speaking body. Without 
it, dislocation rules. There is an occasional 
winter or spring, but there are no dates. 
Everything floats in a limbo crowded with 
detail which evades sense. The burning of the 
Warsaw Ghetto is an aside--a smoke-filled view 
from a new flat. My mother's story is devoid of 
252 history . 
248 Appignanesi 30. 
249 
Appignanesi 34. 
250 Appignanesi 35. 
25 1 Appignanesi 82. 
252 Appignanesi 82-83. 
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What does Appignanesi mean when she says that this, a life- 
story, a testimony, is 'devoid of history'? Whether it is 
the incoherence of her mother's story or the subjective 
nature of it--the disproportionate meaning assigned to the 
new flat in relation to what is witnessed from the window-- 
is not clear. Was the story still devoid of history when 
the visible presence of her mother on screen conferred a 
'point of cohesion, on it? What is a story lacking when it 
is lacking history? And what, precisely, is this story if 
not history? She continues: 
I rush to the history books. I read and read. 
History makes sense of memory. It gives one a 
grid for individual experience. It provides a 
panorama of troop movements and official 
decrees. It offers up statistics and above all 
pattern. History, after all, is written with 
hindsight. Ends are already known [. . . 
1. 
While my parents lived the War, it was a 
frenzied rush of days and nights [. . . ]. 
Confusion ruled. The unstructured moments of my 
253 
mother's memory echo that confusion . 
'Nonetheless', she continues, 'I still need to rid myself 
of some of my own'. The history books, despite their 
pattern and statistics fail to 'make sense' of her mother's 
story. Elsewhere she writes that her parents' and their 
2S3 Appignanesi 83. 
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friends, stories 'wore the jagged marks of individual 
memory which often won't fit neatly into the grand 
historical narrative,. 
254 
In order to make sense of [her] parents' war and 
[her) own sudden interest in it', Appignanesi decides to 
%visit the sites of memory' in Poland .2 
55 This knowing trope 
on the title of Nora's influential books on memory leads 
her onto the next sub-chapter 'On Site', explicitly linking 
the individual and the historical archaeological quests she 
is about to undertake. It is only in the archives, as 
fragments of documentary evidence--Appignanesi calls them 
'historical proof'--gradually emerge that 'narrative and 
recorded fact coalesce'. 256 Finding the address of her own 
first home she feels 'a tingle of investigator's triumph, 
the kind I imagine Maigret must have felt when a case began 
to come together'. 
257 
A v-% Appignanesi suggests here that personal history can be 
"made sense of, through a discovery of documentary evidence 
to support it, that personal history can become history 
through a coalescence of narrative and recorded fact, 
subjective and objective truths, although the brief 
consolation this offers is denied towards the end of her 
memoir. When the final document arrives from the -Od- 
Registry of Residents, informing her of the absence of her 
254 Appignanesi 60. 
255 Appignanesi 83. 
256 Appignanesi 96-97. 
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family from their records, Appignanesi concludes that 'The 
slate is clean. Official history refuses to coincide with 
family memory. Everything is open to invention' . 
258 The lack 
of documentary evidence thus creates a gap between personal 
history and history which the mother's story alone cannot 
i 11 . 
Lott makes the somewhat grand claim that before the 
great flood of 1956, all parents had a monumental 
narrative, a coherent narrative that served as a sufficient 
explanation for their place in the world . 
259 
Lott and his 
brother belonged, so the newspapers seemed to declare, to 
', a unique generation in history'; they were 'the New 
Elizabethans [. . .] vital, creative, original, sexy! '. 
260 
They could own things land they would be different shapes, 
made of different materials than what had gone before, and 
they would have the ambiguous luxury of choice born of 
capitalism . 
26 1 The differences between this new generation 
and the last are many, but the defining one for Lott is 
that they each entail very different ways not just of 
knowing about, but also of narrating the past. He writes: 
257 
Appignanesi 97. 
258 
Appignanesi 231. 
259 Grand not just in the sense that this is clearly a sweeping and 
unsubstantiated assertion, but also because 1956 is Lott's own year of 
birth. 
260 Lott 130. 
261 Lott 130. Lott (229) defines one of his symptoms as the inability 
to make a choice among all the possible choices in the supermarket. 
See Oliver James, Britain on the Couch (London: Century, 1997) for a 
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I wish I could tell a story, a single 
narrative, like my father has, instead of this 
snakepit of narratives that compete, eclipse 
each other, then slide mutely back into 
darkness. For my father, like all fathers and 
mothers before the Great Flood that began 
around 1956, seemed to have a common story, 
with a beginning a middle and an end in the 
right places. 262 
Lott's dubious distinction between old or traditional forms 
of memory and narrative and contemporary forms is 
reminiscent of Pierre Nora's work on history, which 
likewise distinguishes between old forms of memory and 
narrative, and between 'true' and 'false' memory on this 
basis. 
Bemoaning the decline of 'spontaneous', collective, 
and community memory, Nora claims that 'prosthetic' memory 
has taken its place, that archives and monuments, for 
example, have been created in the service of a willed 
anamnesis: 'when memory is no longer everywhere, it will no 
longer be anywhere unless one takes the responsibility to 
263 
recapture it through individual means'. For Nora the 
faith in history as a means of 'recovering' the past is a 
characteristic of 'the history memory of old', which 
assumed 'that the past could always be resuscitated by an 
study of the ways in which advanced capitalism may have contribu-ýed to 
the increasing prevalence of depression in Britain. 
262 
Lott 132. 
263 Nora: 16. 
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effort of rememoration'. 
264 
Since the passing of 
'spontaneous' memory, history and memory are marked by 
anxiety: ', Since no one knows what the past will be made of 
next, anxiety turns everything into a trace, a possible 
indication, a hint of history that contaminates the 
innocence of all things'. 265 This is the problem confronting 
detective memoirists who, like Lott, seek to make 'traces' 
of the past into 'evidence' and to construct a true story 
from fragments while resisting the impulse to erect a 
monumental story which although it may offer the illusion 
of a recovery of the past will only ever be a 'lie,. 
Lott holds firm to the conviction that his parents 
were more adept than he at 'sticking to, their stories, of 
figuring out 'what it all boils down to,. 266 His parents, 
past and his own childhood belong to pre-history, an 
Arcadian state that can be longed for but not restored, 
leaving behind only watery relics, causes like 1vapour, and 
facts which are not hard but "as soft as loam'. 
267 
The 
, flood, separates not only his life from his parents' 
lives, but also two very different Englands. The England of 
his childhood and of his parents, lives is 'an England that 
has gone now, even as an idea, a dream. There is nothing we 
have thought of to put in its place. There is, in fact, no 
place to put it; the cohering forces themselves have 
264 Nora: 16. 
265 Nora: 17. 
266 Lott 196. 
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, 268 collapsed . Lott suggests that it was his mother's 
inability to change her story of self in the face of so 
many external changes that contributed to her suicidal 
despair. 
Lott specifically links his mother's coherent story, 
her "bad lie' to her illness: 'depression is a very 
particular type of illness, in that it seems to hinge on 
your interpretation of the world, the story you tell 
yourself, . 
269 '[P]hysical depression', he continues, "can be 
caused by culture, by a way of seeing and imagining the 
world, and yet end up as a physical illness' . 
27 0 
Narrative, 
in its relation to lived experience and identity, emerges 
in Lott's memoir as both suspect and potential cure: 
Depression is about anger, it is about anxiety, 
it is about character and heredity. But it is 
also about something that is in its way quite 
unique. It is the illness of identity, it is 
the illness of those who do not know where they 
fit, who lose faith in the myths they have so 
painstakingly created for themselves. 
Once I realise this, the reasons for 
undertaking this book, which, I can now admit, 
has sometimes seemed obscure while writing, 
begin to become clear to me. For in finding a 
267 
Lott 34-35. 
268 
Lott 34. 
269 
Lott 263. 
270 Lott 265. 
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solution to identity, you begin to find a 
solution to depression. 27 1 
Lott claims that his mother's illness was partly due to her 
coherent narrative which refused to yield to change, to the 
monumental explanation which had 'congealed' into an 
inexorable solidity. He claims that his mother 'hanged 
herself because her story, her idea of herself as a 
successful wife and mother--the only real test of worth 
that she knew--was no longer sustainable in her shocked 
mind, . 
272 
And yet he is ambivalent about the kinds of 
narrative which may prove therapeutic, or true. 
His father's story is, according to Lott, also a lie, 
but it was one which enabled survival, it was 'a good lie, 
a sustaining lie, and, above all, a single and 
comprehensible lief. 273 Lott's parents have in place the 
same story, the same kind of coherent narrative, 'a common 
story with a beginning, middle and an end in the right 
places I. 274 But for Lott's mother the necessary fiction is 
unsustaining: it is a bad lie'. 
Lott's stated desire to recover the 'true story' of 
his mother is marked by this ambivalence. The inability to 
relinquish coherence and nostalgia can, Lott acknowledges, 
be politically dangerous: 
271 
Lott 265. 
272 
Lott 266. 
273 Lott 132. 
274 
Lott 132. 
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If you want to get historical about it, you can 
talk about nationalism, Nazism, holocausts, 
ethnic cleansing; they are all merely ways of 
holding fast to your story, of avoiding the 
awesome responsibility that accepting 
275 
uncertainty and insignificance entails . 
In Lott's memoir, the burden of guilt and the consolation 
of explanation can fall equally under any of these 
headings: 'England, history, family, love, regret, 
identity, meaning'. 276 But the multitude of possible 
"stories and their possible organisations', in Brooks' 
words, proves to be more stultifying than enabling. 'My 
story, my story', Lott laments, "It doesn't add up, it 
doesn't cut a swathe that is clear'. 
277 
At university, Lott 
makes a discovery: there are no answers, only stories that 
278 
one must make up before 'sticking to, them . The writing 
of essays presents the same problem as the writing of the 
memoir: 
References, sources, quotes, evidence. Will 
they help the making of sense? Why can I never 
reach any conclusions, as you are clearly 
supposed to? All the different explanations and 
275 Lott 267. King, also, writes of the ways in which romantic 
arcadianisml--the desire to recapture an earlier state of 
innocence- 
has been turned to both liberatory and deeply conservative ends' 30. 
276 Lott 196. 
277 Lott 196. 
278 Lott 204-05. 
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interpretations, I cannot escape the impression 
that each is exactly as convincing as the 
279 
other . 
Confronted with masses of contradictory evidence about his 
parents' past and his mother's illness, Lott grapples with 
what seems to be the impossibility of coherence and with a 
proliferation of stories--or anecdotes--all equally 
convincing, but none of them quite managing to explain: 
I've never claimed there was just one story. 
There are dozens of them, some of them this 
much true, some of them that much true. [. I 
Perhaps there's a middle course, though its 
confusing to think so. Surely each explanation 
cancels the other. There are more clues to 
select and examine. Perhaps they will add up. I 
doubt it somehow, but I cannot shake off the 
idea that, in a blink, I will achieve some 
revelation, arrive at some place, which will 
explain everything to me, where everything will 
slot into place. (. II will have arrived. I 
will know what is what, what it all boils down 
to. 280 
All that remains of the past, for Lott, are 'scraps', 
gripping in their status as ', remains', their ability to 
evoke: 
279 Lott 205. See also Auster, who makes a similar point 61. 
280 Lott 196-97. 
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These scraps are like random out-takes from a 
very, very long film. I hold them up to the 
light, I examine them. What they tell me is 
infinitely open to interpretation, but holds my 
attention nevertheless, because these scraps 
are the last relics of a time when I imagined 
myself holy, master of my fate, fitting tightly 
into a larger story. 281 
Drawing on the videorecorder image of memory, Lott gestures 
towards the possibility of referentiality, even of 
recovery, but he also suggests that even if traces of the 
past remain they are still dependent on a degree of 
interpretation: they do not speak for themselves. 
Lott writes, towards the end of the memoir, that he 
has confidence in his completed manuscript, 'confidence in 
it as a document and a record, . 
282 '1 am slowly, inevitably 
falling into the myth,, he confesses, 'that I have secured 
the True Story of my mother. That I am a Historian. It is 
over', he continues, 'I have a story now, written down, 
fixed in time and space, something to hold to that is mine. 
For I have finished my book now and, although I do not see 
it as therapy, I have used it to work through some 
283 
conclusions that I consider to be firm, to be final,. 
This accomplishment Lott specifically endows with a 
therapeutic potential, claiming that since the completion 
281 
Lott 133. 
282 
Lott 269. 
283 Lott 269. 
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of his story, his dependence on Prozac has decreased. The 
belief that he has secured' a true story, a piece of 
history, is, though, another myth. His memoir ends with the 
discovery of a new piece of evidence--he reads Jean's 
medical files which reveal that her illness had been more 
protracted than he had suspected--one with the power to at 
least hint at an entirely different explanation, a 
different true story'. 
6. Conclusion 
What happens, I asked at the beginning of this 
chapter, when the autobiographer adopts the roles of 
detective and archaeologist, roles upon which some of the 
most important tenets of psychoanalytic authority are 
founded? What happens when the autobiographer enters into a 
discourse which traditionally conceives of the personal 
historian as the patient, the object of analysis, the 
'crime, to be solved, and becomes the agent of his or her 
own epistemological discovery? I offer no clear answers to 
these questions here, but I suggest that by posing 
questions like these it becomes possible to identify the 
ways in which contemporary autobiography is currently 
responding to the challenges of the historical crises I 
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outlined at the beginning, currently testing its own limits 
against other discourses of truth-telling. 
The detective memoirs I have discussed in this chapter 
differ from their fictional counterparts in their 
resistance to a final verdict. Just as the biographical 
quest with which they often begin is derailed as the 
biographical and the autobiographical merge, the detective 
quests, too, are thwarted on the grounds of inadmissible 
evidence, evidence that fails to lead to a reconstruction 
of the "true story', or of "what really happened'. And yet 
it is in this sense that these memoirs pose a challenge to 
the very sources upon which authoritative, 'objective, 
histories are based. These are texts that continually 
confront their own impossibilities and paradoxes. 
Although the conclusion of many of these memoirs is 
consistent with the psychoanalytic and poststructuralist 
approach of those who, like Felman and Caruth, insist on 
the impossibility of direct historical representation, 
there is a sense that autobiography can still be sustained 
by the myth of recovery, of referentiality, even if it is 
acknowledged to be this genre's most fictional of premises. 
In contrast to Felman's preferred method of 
negotiating the 'missings, of autobiography, the detective 
memoir persistently refuses to relinquish the unique and 
paradoxical agency of autobiography, the role of the 
autobiographer as both seeker and sought. And in contrast 
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to recent theories which have emphasised the pervasiveness 
of reconstructive models of memory, narrative, and identity 
in contemporary life writing, I argue that detective 
memoirs carve out a space where 'recovery' and 
"reconstruction, can co-exist in their projects of self- 
making. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Ventriloquist 
1. Introduction 
How is one to tell a tale that cannot be--but 
must be--told? ' 
Here Elie Wiesel expresses what has become a defining 
paradox of Holocaust representation and asks a question of 
crucial importance for witnesses, historians, and artists 
seeking to transmit the truth of an event which many 
believe lies outside of the limits of representation'. 2 In 
spite of the continuing efforts at historical 
representation, commentators like Wiesel often emphasise 
that the Holocaust is essentially unrepresentable, a 
position that is based on corresponding claims about the 
%uniqueness' or incommensurability of this historical 
event. 3 Theodore Adorno's often-misrepresented and much- 
modified statement in the late 1940s that 'to write poetry 
1 Elie Wiesel, "Trivializing the Holocaust: Semi-Fact and Semi- 
Fiction', rev. of Holocaust, New York Times 16 April 1978, Section 2: 
1,29. 
2 For several challenging accounts about what this now commonplace 
phrase might mean, see Saul FriedlAnder, ed., Probing the Limits of 
Representation: Nazism and the 'Final Solution' (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992). 
3 See, for example, FriedlAnder's introduction to Probing the Limits, 
where he suggests that 'What turns the 'Final Solutiona into an event 
at the limits is the very fact that it is the most radical form of 
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after-Auschwitz is barbaric' is partly responsible, Michael 
Rothberg suggests, for the ensuing 'Bilderverbot' or ban 
,4 on representation . Rothberg roughly divides commentators 
on the issue into two groups: the realist and the 
antirealist. 'The realist approach has characterized the 
dominant scholarly methodology', he writes, that of 
historians and others who assert the necessity of 
considering the Holocaust according to "'scientific" 
procedures and inscribing the events within continuous 
historical narratives'. 5 Antirealists--and proponents of 
the "Bilderverbotl--like Wiesel, on the other hand, 
emphasise the need for 'radically new regimes of knowledge' 
in order to approach the subject, as well as a discourse 
which 'seeks to disable established modes of representation 
and understanding'. 6 And yet Wiesel's position, as Rothberg 
and Norman Finkelstein both point out, often results only 
in 'calls for silence'. Finkelstein--not a fan of Wiesel-- 
writes that 'for his standard fee of $25,000 (plus 
chauffered limosine), Wiesel lectures that the "secret" of 
Auschwitz's ""truth lies in silence". Rationally 
comprehending the Holocaust amounts, in (Wiesel's] view, to 
,7 denying it . In spite of such debates over the limits of 
genocide encountered in history, 3. He goes on to cite JUrgen Habermas 
in order to support this point. 
4 Michael Rothberg, Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust 
Representation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 19. 
5 Rothberg 4. 
6 Rothberg 4-5. 
7 Norman Finkelstein, The Holocaust industry: Reflections on the 
Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (London: Verso, 2000) 45. 
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Holocaust representation, the eyewitness testimony of 
survivors is today considered to be more important than 
ever before, and yet first-person witness accounts of the 
Holocaust are by no means uninflected by the issues at the 
heart of these debates. 
The two primary US repositories for Holocaust 
testimony reflect some of these tensions. The Survivors of 
the Visual History Foundation in Los Angeles was founded by 
Steven Spielberg in 1994, partly because remaining 
Holocaust survivors were beginning to dwindle in number and 
partly because the threat of Holocaust denial appeared to 
be on the increase. 8 Spielberg's goal was to collect and 
prepare for transmission 50,000 survivor-interviews in just 
three years. 9 The Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust 
Testimonies at Yale, which began as a grassroots 
organisation in 1979, currently houses 4200 oral Holocaust 
testimonies. 'O The emphasis at the Shoah Foundation, as I 
discovered when I visited the archive in 1998, is on the 
historical importance of eyewitness testimony rather than 
on the literary and psychoanalytic implications of 
8 See Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on 
Truth and Memory (New York: Plume, 1994) for a thorough overview of 
revisionism or Holocaust denial. See also D. D. Guttenplan, The 
Holocaust on Trial: History, Justice, and the David Irving Libel Case 
(London: Granta, 2001) for an account of the 2000 case David Irving 
vs. Penguin Books Ltd. 
9, [T1he weekly quota was 320 interviews in 30 languages in more than 
40 countries, wrote Marc Fisher, 'Tough Questions 
for Spielberg 
Holocaust Project', International Herald Tribune 14 April 1998: 15. 
10 See <http: //www. library. yale. edu/testimonies/>. 
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testimony which has increasingly become the focus of the 
Yale archive. 
The Shoah Foundation received some unfavourable 
critical attention from the press when its methods of 
interviewing and cataloguing came to light. Although the 
Foundation benefitted from an initial injection of funding 
from Spielberg, the association with this founder and the 
Hollywood setting carried negative connotations. " The 
historian Sid Bolkosky, who aided in the training process 
for Shoah Foundation employees 'came away distressed that 
the project was fixated on speed and a Hollywood approach 
to storytelling' and Yehuda Bauer commented that 'a portion 
of these interviews will not be useful' because they 'are 
being done without any possibility of checking 
information'. 12 The 'usefulness, of the Yale testimonies is 
already well-established: whereas in 1998 1 was the first 
academic researcher to make use of the Shoah Foundation 
archive, the testimonies at Yale have been the subject of 
several important and ground-breaking studies of Holocaust 
testimony. 13 Charges of "Hollywoodisation' of the Holocaust 
11 In 'Spielberg's Shoah Project, Remembering the Past', Washington 
Post 7 April 1998: D01, Marc Fisher writes that Spielberg is reported 
to have donated 60 million dollars to the Foundation. 
12 Fisher, "Tough Questions,: 15. 
13 Studies that I will be discussing in this chapter. For example 
Lawrence L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, 
Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and 
History (London: Routledge, 1992); and James E. Young, Writing and 
Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of 
interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). The 
Shoah Foundation has, however, produced a series of educational films 
and CD-ROMs designed for educational purposes, see <http: //www. vhf. 
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were levelled at the Shoah Foundation not only on account 
of the speed of the process, but also because of the 
supposed imposition of Hollywood-style 'happy endings, on 
testimonies. 14 Whereas the Shoah Foundation encourages 
witnesses to spend no longer than two hours on their 
videotaped testimonies, Yale testimonies range in length 
from half an hour to 26 hours. 15 A former employee of the 
Foundation stated that 'we don't have time for the pace of 
academia' which may be an implicit reference to the much 
16 smaller but more respected Yale archive of testimonies . 
While the primary focus at the Shoah Foundation is on 
the quantity of testimony and the historical imperative to 
counteract the claims of Holocaust deniers, at Yale the 
impetus behind the interviewing process is not only 
historical but also literary and psychoanalytic. As 
Shoshana Felman writes, the testimonies at Yale are given 
by Holocaust witnesses to 'professionally trained 
interviewers, most of whom are psychoanalysts or 
, 17 psychotherapists . Also referring to the Yale archive 
James E. Young suggests that 'Of all possible kinds of 
interviewers, trained psychoanalysts and therapists may 
well be the best qualified to elicit testimony'. "[Tlhe 
org/>. 
14 One commentator compared the project to making a movie, where you 
just do it and disband' and others have criticised the emphasis on 
post-liberation life in testimonies, where witnesses are encouraged to 
invite their families into the inter-viewing room. Fisher, 'Spielberg's 
Shoah Project': D01. 
Is See <http: //www. library. yale. edu/testimonies/about/index. htm>. 
16 Jim Banister cited in Fisher, 'Spielberg's Shoah Project': D01. 
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psychiatrists who interview at Yale, are, he writes, 
'Trained to encourage narrative telling and interpretation, 
and through them insight into traumatic events, with a 
18 minimum of new psychic damage or further trauma' . 
The difference in approach at these two archives 
suggests that the input of the interviewer might be 
responsible for determining the 'validity' or 'usefulness' 
of certain eyewitness testimonies. In its emphasis on 
quantity over, some have suggested, 'quality', the Shoah 
Foundation seems to assign a less important role to the 
interviewer, and assumes that the witness will be able to 
testify without any specialised forms of questioning. The 
Yale methodology, however, seems to imply that questions of 
representation and narrative may pose problems for the 
witness, and their use of trained psychoanalysts or 
therapists as interviewers suggests that both history and 
pathology are at stake in oral Holocaust testimony. 
While Young suggests that Yale's choice of 
psychoanalytic interviewers may be an attempt at damage- 
limitation, Shoshana Felman's description of Yale 
testimonies indicates that the choice of interviewing 
techniques there may function as an implicit endorsement of 
the antirealist, anti-representation position. Felman 
suggests that it is 'within the context of these dialogic 
interviews, that witnesses come to narrate their story 'in 
17 Felman, Felman and Laub 41. 
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its entirety' for the first time; 'enabled' by the 
interviewer, the witness is able to address 'the suffering, 
the truth, and the necessity of this impossible 
narration'. 19 While the historical framework of oral 
Holocaust testimony is self-evident, it is less obvious why 
psychoanalysis should play a part in the eliciting of 
testimony from witnesses. Is the purpose of the testimony 
not just to provide a historical account but also to 
approach something resembling a 'cure'? And indeed, what 
might 'cure' entail for a witness to historical atrocity? 
Felman suggests that testimony can only be given 
effectively in the context of an analytic encounter, that 
prior to the interview, witnesses have been unable to tell 
their story ', in its entiret_yl, that testimony must be 
enabled by a specific kind of dialogic interview. In the 
previous chapter I used Felman's work on the 'missings, of 
autobiography and Felman and Cathy Caruth's notion of 
indirect reference as a starting point for my discussion of 
the Imissings, of contemporary life writing. This chapter 
begins once more with Felman and Caruth, exploring the ways 
in which their psychoanalytic and poststructuralist 
approaches to oral Holocaust testimony implicate an 
antirealist position that suggests the impossibility of 
historically valuable testimony without the 'enabling, 
analytic encounter. 
Is Young 166. 
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Caruth's and Felman's work on trauma narratives is 
dependent, in both cases, on a theory that prior to the 
interview situation witnesses are 'possessed by, the 
traumatic event, a theory based on readings of Freud. In 
the following section I discuss the implications of this 
pathological model for their accompanying theories of 
historical transmission, discussing the ways in which 
pathology might be a necessary precondition for antirealist 
"transmissions'. I then discuss the implications of 
theories like this for second generation testimony, 
exploring the parallels between theories of possession and 
Nicholas Abraham's and Maria Torok's theories of 
transgenerational haunting. In the final two sections I 
discuss the ways in which theories of possession and 
haunting might usefully highlight ethical problems in other 
relational accounts. 
2. "A Privileged Witness': Truth, Pathology, and Historical 
Transmission 
What: Does A Woman Want? (1993) was influenced by 
Felman's previous, collaborative work Testimony: Crises of 
Witnessing In Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History 
(1992). Just as Felman dismisses women's 'confessional, 
19 Felman, Felman and Laub 41. 
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literature in her 1993 study and endorses instead a process 
of indirect representation' based on a dialogic encounter, 
in Testimony she confines her discussion to oral testimony, 
to the pedagogical issues surrounding histories of the 
Holocaust, and to the 'inadvertent' testimonies of male 
writers. Indeed, Felman employs the very same terminology 
in both books, despite the questionable analogy between the 
oral testimony of Holocaust survivors and women who, she 
claims, have led 'a traumatized existence'. Referring to 
Freud's 'Irma' dream as the site of the 'birth' of 
psychoanalysis, she sets the terms for a theory that will 
underpin her readings of impossible witnessing in these 
radically different contexts: 
Psychoanalysis [. . .1 profoundly rethinks and 
radically renews the very concept of testimony, 
by submitting, and by recognizing for the first 
time in the history of culture, that one does 
not have to possess or own the truth, in order 
to effectively bear witness to it; that speech 
as such is unwittingly testimonial; and that 
the speaking subject constantly bears witness 
to a truth that nonetheless continues to escape 
him, a truth that is, essentially, not 
available to its own speaker. 20 
am not in possession of my own autobiography,, Felman 
wrote in What Does A Woman Want?. What does it mean not 1ýo 
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be in possession of one's own life story ? 21 This section 
explores the ways in which the figure of the witness 
"possessed by' a traumatic event in Felman's work serves 
not only to endorse her corresponding theory of indirect 
representation and historical transmission in place of 
historical representation, but also forges what I read as a 
problematic connection between pathology and truth. 
Caruth's almost identical theory of possession makes 
this connection even more explicit. By exploring the ways 
in which the 'possessed' serves as 'privileged witness' in 
Caruth's and Felman's work I question the implications of a 
theory which makes pathology a precondition for historical 
transmission and ask what might become of the privileged 
witness once she is, in psychoanalytic terms, 'cured'. 22 
In What Does A Woman Want? Felman qualifies her 
assertion that she is not, and can not be, in 'possession, 
of her life story by referring to questions of origins 
(models upon which women's stories can be founded) and 
20 Felman, Felman and Laub 15. 
21 Responding to Felman's work, as well as to other women writers, 
Linda Anderson suggests that a concept of 'remembered futures, is 
applicable to women's autobiography: 'it might still be possible to 
rescue memory from nostalgia and to think about home as a destination- 
-something yet to be constructed--and not as an origin we can only 
ever desire in retrospect' Women and Autobiography in the Twentieth 
Century: Remembered Futures (London: Prentice Hall, 1997) 10. In this 
sense, women's life stories can be perceived as having a potential for 
future meaning that was not necessarily accessible at the time of 
writing, and criticism as an act, as Anderson writes, of attempting 
to read into the future what was "not yetff in the past, 6. Here, 
however, I focus on the psychoanalytic implications of Felman's model 
of %possession' and on what I see as the alarming implications of the 
connections she forges between truth and pathology. 
22 %Privileged witness, is a term used by Rosette C. Lamont, the 
translator of Charlotte Delbo's trilogy Auschwitz and After, introd. 
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destinations (finding an appropriate 'address'). But in 
Testimony the haunting of the Holocaust witness is figured 
more specifically as a symptom of trauma, is given a more 
thorough theoretical framework, and a more explicitly 
psychoanalytic and poststructuralist context. Caruth's work 
places the haunted witness firmly in the context of post- 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and makes explicit the 
connection between 'history' and 'symptom'. 
The theories of possession in both Caruth's and 
Felman's work are closely related to some neurobiologists' 
23 
concept of dissociation . Felman and her collaborator on 
the project, the psychoanalyst Dori Laub, agree that 
traumatic memories are 'unavailable' to the Holocaust 
witness because the event was never properly experienced as 
it occurred, in keeping with the theory of a 'split 
consciousness' in cases of dissociation. Laub refers to the 
Lawrence Langer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). 1 discuss 
this point later in the chapter. 
23 Although Felman and Caruth usually express it in less clinical 
terms, their work has clear connections to both Freud's early work on 
trauma and Pierre Janet's preceding work. For a thorough explanation 
of the similarities and differences between Janet's and Freud's 
theories, see Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality 
and the Sciences of Memory (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1995). Caruth is notably influenced by the work of neuroscientist 
Bessel A. van der Kolk and Ruth Leys makes the point that the theory 
that victims of trauma are 'possessed by, the past rather than being 
in 'possession of, that past is common to both modern neurobiology and 
, certain versions of poststructuralism'. Ruth Leys, Trauma: A 
Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 229. 
Dissociation is distinguished from repression in that dissociated 
material is inaccessible to the victim's consciousness and is frozen 
intact, whereas repressed material can be subject to distortion and 
made available to consciousness. The distinction between dissociation 
and repression was one of the issues discussed during the recovered 
memory debate. See Frederick Crews, The Memory Wars: Freud's Legacy in 
Dispute (London: Granta, 1997) 15 and Daniel L. Schacter, Searching 
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Holocaust as 'an event without a witness' . 
24 'The Holocaust 
created a world', he writes, 'in which one could not bear 
witness to oneself', because it was also a world in which 
the 'other, became an inconceivable concept. 25 Without the 
possibility of 'address', without the ability to turn to a 
%you', 'one cannot say "thouff even to oneself'. In addition 
to this, Laub attributes some of the impossibility of 
witnessing to internalised oppression, to some survivors' 
belief that they are "sworn to silence': 'Because of their 
participation in the Holocaust they have become the 
"bearers of a secret" (Geheimnistraeger) never to be 
divulged' and this 'emphasises even more the delusional 
quality of the Holocaust' . 
26 This "delusional quality' is 
further exacerbated by the euphemistic deceptions employed 
by the Nazis in order to conceal from their victims the 
truth of the occurrence: 
The perpetrators, in their attempt to 
rationalize the unprecedented scope of the 
destructiveness, brutally imposed upon their 
victims a delusional ideology whose grandiose 
coercive pressure totally excluded and 
eliminated the possibility of an unviolated, 
for Memory: the Brain, the Mind, and the Past (London: Basic Books, 
1996) 263. 
24 See Laub, Felman and Laub 75-93. 
25 Laub, Felman and Laub 82. 
26 Laub, Felman and Laub 82. 
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unencumbered, and thus sane, point of reference 
27 in the witness . 
Felman considers the impossibility of witnessing from a 
particularly scopic perspective, and suggests that Nazi- 
imposed euphemisms even prevented the events from being 
seen, let alone experienced, or witnessed. Felman refers to 
the Nazi euphemism for 'corpses, --'figuren, or 'figures, -- 
as 'a disembodied verbal substitute which signifies 
abstractly the linguistic law of infinite exchangeability 
and substitutability,. 28 
On a different level Primo Levi also describes a 
similar detachment of signifier from referent, likewise 
explaining the ways in which witnessing was precluded by 
distortions of language which prevented witnesses from 
seeing the reality unfolding before them. In order to 
testify truthfully to the events witnessed, Levi suggests, 
a new language would need to be created: 
Just as our hunger is not that of missing a 
meal, so our way of being cold has need of a 
new word. We say "hunger", we say "tirednessv, 
"fear", "pain", we say "'winter" and they are 
different things. They are free words, crested 
and used by free men who lived in comfort and 
suffering in their homes. If the Lager had 
lasted longer a new, harsh language would have 
27 Laub, Felman and Laub 81. 
28 Felman, Felman and Laub 210. 
1910 
been born: and only this language could express 
what it means to toil the whole day in the wind 
(. I hunger and knowledge of the end drawing 
nearer. 
29 
Here can be identified the stirrings of an antirealist 
project, albeit from within a narrative that does attempt a 
representation of history. It is an interesting paradox 
that the antirealist branch of Holocaust commentators may 
well have developed the rationale for their ban on 
representation' from the information gleaned from 'realist' 
representations of the Holocaust such as Levi's, or from 
the attempts at realism and direct historical and 
autobiographical representation in oral Holocaust 
testimony. This appears to be most specifically the case 
for Lawrence Langer, who emphatically rejects the 
normalising codes of traditional historical frameworks of 
understanding in the study of oral Holocaust testimony. 
Langer insists that "we must learn to suspect the 
effect as well as the intent of bracing pieties like 
"redeeming" and "salvationo when they are used to shape our 
understanding of the ordeal of former victims of Nazi 
oppression'. 30 By inventing new forms of memory and 
grouping his chosen testimonies under these headings, 
Langer hopes to unsettle, if not shatter, the notion that 
29 Primo Levi, If This is a Man, trans. Stuart Woolf (1958; London: 
Abacus 1998) 129. 
30 Langer, Holocaust Testimonies 2. 
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survivor testimonies can be understood by a listener who 
employs established modes of listening and narrative 
expectation and 'traditional assumptions about moral 
conduct I. 
31 
Although Langer's work is not explicitly informed by 
psychoanalysis, his rejection of the view that realist or 
traditional frameworks of understanding can make sense of 
Holocaust testimonies parallels the antirealist thrust of 
Felman's and Caruth's avowedly psychoanalytic work. They 
too: 
underscore the question of the witness, and of 
witnessing, as nonhabitual, estranged 
conceptual prisms through which we attempt to 
apprehend--and to make tangible to the 
imagination--the ways in which our cultural 
frames of reference and our preexisting 
categories which delimit and determine our 
perception of reality have failed, essentially, 
both to contain, and to account for, the scale 
32 
of what has happened in contemporary history . 
And like Felman and Caruth, Langer seems to move swiftly 
from a realisation that Holocaust testimonies do not sound 
31 Langer xii. Langer's chapter headings include, for example, 
'Unheroic Memory,, 'Humiliated Memory,, "Deep Memory'. They each 
suggest not only that the former victims, of the Holocaust remember 
in a different way, but also that suffering emerges in spite of 
attempts to mitigate it through consolatory moral frames such as 
redemption or even liberation. 
32 Felman, Felman and Laub xv. See also Mary Jacobus, 'Border 
Crossings: Traumatic Reading and Holocaust Memory', Psychoanalysis and 
the Scene of Reading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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true in the way we might expect, to an insistence that in 
order to be authentic or historically viable, they break 
apart traditional frameworks and 'remain disrupted 
narratives'. 
33 
Caruth also emphasises the impossibility of witnessing 
traumatic events and supports her theory with an appeal to 
Freud's work on traumatic neuroses. 34 Stressing the 
belatedness of trauma and Freud's analogy of the accident 
victim who gets away apparently unharmed' from the scene 
of the trauma, Caruth supports the claim that the traumatic 
event is 'not registered at the time of its occurrence' but 
35 
only belatedly . Although Freud vacillated, as I discussed 
in the previous chapter, on the question of the intactness 
of repressed traumatic memories, in his work on the 
'returning traumatic dream, he is startled', writes 
33 
Langer xi. 
34 And to van der Kolk, see Leys 228. Freud made several references to 
the conceptual relationship between demonical possession in the Middle 
Ages and hysteria in the nineteenth century, but Caruth focuses more 
on the literality of the trauma by which the traumatised are possessed 
and it is perhaps for this reason that she steers clear of the other 
links between possession and psychoanalysis. See Freud, 'A 
Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis, 1923 (1922), Art and 
Literature, PFL 14, trans. James Strachey., ed. Albert Dickson 
(London: Penguin, 1990) for a discussion of the relationship between 
demonical possession and hysteria. In this essay Freud writes of how 
'The states of possession correspond to our neuroses. [. I In our 
eyes the demons are bad and reprehensible wishes, derivatives of 
instinctual impulses that have been repudiated and repressed. We 
merely eliminate the projection of these mental entities into the 
external world which the Middle Ages carried out; instead, we regard 
them as having arisen in the patient's internal life, where they have 
their abode, 383-84. Freud's focus in this essay is on sexuality, but 
it is clear how repressed traumas might be seen to function 
analogously to repressed ', reprehensible wishes, or unarticulable 
desires. 
35 Sigmund Freud, 'Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays' 1939 (1934-38), 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud XXIII, trans. James Strachey and Anna Freud, ed. James Strachey 
(1964; London: Vintage, 2001) 67. 
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Caruth, because the dream cannot be understood in terms of 
any wish or unconscious meaning, but it, purely and 
inexplicably, the literal return of the event against the 
will of the one it inhabits'. 36 
The impossibility of witnessing, for Caruth, is a 
precondition of possession: '[Tlhe event is not assimilated 
or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly, in 
its repeated possession of the one who experiences it. To 
be traumatized is precisely to be possessed by an image or 
event I. 37 Because the event was not assimilated at the time 
of its occurrence, Caruth theorises, it never attained the 
status of narrative memory'. 38 The pathology of PTSD 
depends on this particular form of possession, on the 
theory that unable to narrate, forget, or remember the 
traumatic experience, the witness is fixed in a painful and 
often debilitating cycle of repetition. The event 
insistently returns, but not through a conscious act of 
memory on the part of the witness, but rather unconsciously 
in the form of flashbacks, terrifying nightmares and what 
36 Cathy Caruth, ed. 'Introduction', Trauma: Explorations in Memory 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) 5. In her 
fascinating chapter on Caruth's work, Ruth Leys questions whether 
Caruth's interpretation of Freud is 'justified'. She writes 'For 
(Caruth's) project to succeed it is crucial for her to make the case 
for the literal in Freud, because the de Manian theory of the 
performative demands it, 274-75. For Freud's brief account of the 
returning traumatic dream, see 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' 1920, 
On Metapsychology, PFL 11, trans. Alix and James Strachey, ed. Angela 
Richards (London: Penguin, 1990) 281-83. 
37 Caruth, 'Introduction', Trauma 4-5. 
38 See van der Kolk and van der Hart in Caruth, Trauma 158-83 for an 
account of Janet's work in this area. 
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Freud would refer to as 'symptomatic acts'. 39 Because the 
traumatic memory is encoded differently from normal memory, 
Caruth maintains, it remains untainted by the normal 
distortions of memory. Not only does the traumatic memory 
remain 'absolutely true to the event', but this truth 
, forms the centre of its pathology or symptoms,: %while the 
images of traumatic reenactment remain absolutely accurate 
and precise, they are largely inaccessible to conscious 
recall and control,. 
40 
This investigation into the relationship 
between pathology and truth is ethically and politically 
crucial. PTSD poses problems for legal testimony because 
the prime symptom (the proof of pathology) is the inability 
to narrate the traumatic events in the coherent, persuasive 
narrative that may be necessary to conform to legalistic 
concepts of truth-telling .41 Felman and Caruth negotiate 
the impossibility of witnessing by appealing to the 
possibility of a historical transmission in place of 
representation: this is the essence of their antirealist 
39 The term 'symptomatic acts' refers to the unconscious acting-out of 
a traumatic experience. See Sigmund Freud, 'Fragments of an Analysis 
of a Case of Hysteria ("Dora, ), 1905 (1901), Case Histories I, PFL 8, 
trans. Alix and James Strachey, ed. James Strachey (London: Penguin, 
1990) 113-16 for an example. 
40 Caruth, Trauma 5,151. 
41 Ruth Leys points out that, equally, the connection between 
suggestibility and PTSD may also invalidate a witness's testimony: in 
the first legal test of the movement to make rape an indictable war 
crime, lawyers for the accused were able to exploit the fact that a 
Muslim victim of repeated rape was diagnosed with PTSD by demanding a 
halt to the trial on the grounds that the traumatized woman's 
suggestibility made her testimony and memories suspect' 307. 
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approach. 42 For them the act of bearing witness to trauma 
is tied up with the paradox expressed by Wiesel in my 
epigraph to this section: the imperative to testify is 
inextricably bound to a 'crisis of witnessing'. The demand 
for testimony of the Holocaust is commensurate with the 
impossibility of adequately representing the event. As Dori 
Laub writes 'the imperative to tell the story of the 
Holocaust is inhabited by the impossibility of telling'. 43 
And yet this approach is validated by an appeal to 
literality and mimesis, to a direct historical encounter 
that takes place at the point at which language breaks 
down. 
Although the witness's experiences cannot be narrated- 
-they have never attained the 'status of narrative memory, - 
-the process of the interview enables the unmediated truth 
of the experience to pass from the witness to the 
interviewer. As Felman writes, the interview is the place 
where the story is told in its entiret_v' for the first 
time, not because the witness has been silently withholding 
the story until then, but because the dialogic encounter 
with the analytic other enables a different kind of 
42 Nicola King discusses Toni Morrison's assertion in Beloved that 
'This is not a story to pass on' as an intentionally ambiguous 
statement about transmission, meaning at once that the story cannot, 
or should not be transmitted, but also cannot be ignored. She writes 
that both Beloved and Georges Perec's W ou le souvenir dlenfance 
(which I discuss briefly in the following chapter) Irecognise that 
some events cannot be fully reconstructed or integrated into a 
coherent story, that something in them will always resist recovery or 
"Passing on", Memory, Narrative, rdentitY: Remembering the Self 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 24. 
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testimony 
. 
44 The analyst-interviewer is in effect the first 
listener. Just as Langer insists that the voice of 'deep 
memory, can only be heard through a specific kind of 
listening which is attuned to discord, Felman too insists 
that 'it takes two to witness the unconscious ,. 45 
Theories like Caruth's and Felman's have a crucial 
role in the understanding of trauma. They urge listeners of 
traumatic accounts to recognise the truth behind the 
fractured narrative and, like Langer, insist on the 
deployment of new frameworks of understanding in order to 
access the truth. And yet the relationship they forge 
between truth and pathology is problematic because it 
presupposes that without symptoms, without pathology, there 
can be no historical transmission at all: 
The attempt to gain access to a traumatic 
history, then, is also the project of listening 
beyond the pathology of individual suffering, 
to the reality of a history that in its crises 
can only be perceived in unassimilable forms. 
(my emphasis ) 46 
43 Laub, Felman and Laub 79. 
44 Felman, Felman and Laub 41. 
4S Felman, Felman and Laub 15. And yet this depends on a very specific 
kind of listening and Caruth, in particular, is vague about what this 
might entail: 'And by carrying that impossibility of knowing out of 
the empirical event itself, trauma opens up and challenges us to a new 
kind of listening, the witnessing, precisely, of impossibility. How 
does one listen to what is impossible? [. I the challenge of the 
therapeutic listener (. ] is how to listen to departure, 10. 
46 Caruth, 'Recapturing the Past: Introduction', Trauma 156. 
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Both Caruth and Felman come close to suggesting not only 
that history is dependent on trauma but also that its 
transmission depends on the continued suffering of the 
witness. Not only does the theory of possession and 
transmission positively rely on the symptoms of PTSD-- 
%unassimilable' memory--but the methods of transmission are 
based on a one-sided concept of transference where the act 
of testifying is seen as a contaminating factor, infecting 
the witness to the act of witnessing with the 'literal' 
core of traumatic experience. James E. Young traces this 
concept of contagious witnessing to the Talmud: 
not only is a witness described as someone who 
both knows and sees an event, but, as 
elaborated in Talmud (Sanhedrin 30a), once an 
unjust event is known, it must by law be 
reported. And if one can become a witness 
merely by knowing of an event, then implicit in 
the testimonial act seems to be the possibility 
for making more witnesses by the informing of 
others of event s. 47 
And yet while this appears to be an endorsement of 
representation--'the informing of others, --in Felman's and 
Caruth's accounts, the 'making of more witnesses' is 
crucially dependent on their antirealist agenda. Felman 
emphasises this process in her account of testimony and 
47 Young 18. 
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pedagogy, exploring the ways in which traumatic historical 
truths were transmitted to her class with unpredictable 
results. The distrust of historical representation and the 
increasing tendency of commentators to encourage 
transmission is also identifiable in certain US Holocaust 
museums where the stress is on a vicarious experiencing of 
the event rather than on a 'mere, understanding, knowing, 
or learning. 
48 
If historical transmission relies on the opening up of 
a dialogic space between witness and listener then this 
theory ought to preclude the possibility of a successful 
written testimony. Felman and Caruth are tacit on this 
point, but Langer makes it explicit, stating that 'Oral 
testimony is distinguished by the absence of literary 
mediation [. . . ]. Oral testimony (as opposed to written 
testimony] violates our need for conclusions (. . .1 
wrenching us from familiar assumptions that govern our 
response to normal narrative'. 49 
There seem to be several reasons for the emphasis on 
oral testimony as privileged mode of historical 
transmission. For Felman and Caruth, specifically, oral 
testimony is more applicable and amenable to the 
psychoanalytic model of analyst/ analysand, replicated 
48 See Edward Norton, 'Yes and No to the Holocaust Museums', Commentary 
96 (1993): 23-32 and Edward T. Linenthal, 'The Boundaries of memory: 
The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum', American Quarterly 46 
(1994): 406-33. 
49 Langer 57. 
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(ostensibly unproblematically) in the figures of witness 
and interviewer (or even of witness and viewer of the 
videotaped testimony). It is not at all clear what 
witnesses--testifying in order to bear witness, not to 
receive treatment--would make of such theorising, what they 
might make of the pathologisation of their testimonies, 
even if it is a profoundly privileged pathologisation. Oral 
testimony, as Young points out, is 'ontologically 
privileged' and Felman emphasises this in her reading of 
Lanzmann's Shoah: 'Why is it that the witness's speech is 
so uniquely, literally irreplaceable?, she asks, 'What does 
it mean that a story--or a history--cannot be told by 
50 
someone else? '. She offers no direct answers to these 
questions, but offers Shoah itself as a form of response. 
It becomes clear, however, through the course of her 
reading, that the witness's account is irreplaceable 
because of the pathology which makes of him or her a 
privileged witness, because s/he is the 'bearer of a 
secret' truth, because, in this case, ontology becomes 
51 
almost indistinguishable from epistemology. 
But it is at the point of Caruth's and Felman's 
insistence on the privileged relationship between pathology 
and the truth that the psychoanalytic thrust behind their 
theories begins to break down. Implicit in the theory that 
so Shoshana Felman, 'In an Era of Testimony: Claude Lanzmann's Shoah', 
Yale French Studies 78-79 (1990): 40. 
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witnesses are 'possessed by' the truth of an event, by a 
literal registration of that event, is the possibility of 
transmission which will always be more privileged than 
representation because it bypasses the distortions of 
language. To represent is, ultimately in this view, to 
misrepresent or to distort. And so this antirealist 
psychoanalytic theory of testimony offers no viable 
alternative to the painful repetitions and relivings of 
trauma and no promise of assimilation, resolution, or 
recovery. The theory is grounded in psychoanalysis and it 
seems that although Caruth and Felman accept the diagnosis- 
-the witness is possessed by an unassimilable trauma--they 
reject the cure. The witness is not encouraged or enabled 
to come into 'possession of, the traumatic memory because 
this would entail the narrativising of the event, which 
would in turn dilute the impact of the trauma and prevent 
it from being transmitted. In Caruth's view in particular, 
symptom is turned to advantage. Indeed, Caruth makes 
explicit that we are to understand that the symptoms of 
PTSD are history. 52 
Dominick LaCapra suggests that Caruth's and Felman's 
theories rely too heavily on a theory of 'acting out' as 
opposed to 'working through', on a theory that the 
historical truth of traumatic occurrences can only be 
51 Leys also makes the point that Caruth's and Felman's theories 
conflate epistemological claims with ontological ones 229. 
52 Caruth, 'Introduction', Trauma 5. 
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transmitted through a painful reliving or repetition of the 
53 
event. While it may be wrong to refer to 'cure' in the 
case of witnesses to trauma (what, indeed, might this 
entail? ) it is clear that from a psychoanalytic perspective 
symptoms may be alleviated by a process of 'working 
through'. 'Acting out, is in fact seen as a symptom in 
itself of an unresolved psychic trauma. LaCapra draws 
parallels between 'working through' and 'acting out' and 
Freud's conception of the 'work of mourning'; seen this way 
'working through, would parallel the lliberatory, act of 
mourning as opposed to the pathological variant which 
entails a melancholic identification. 54 
Caruth could be seen to dismiss the issue of 'cure' or 
of therapy at the very beginning of her edition Trauma, 
where she refers to 'the problem of how to help relieve 
suffering, and how to understand the nature of the 
suffering, without eliminating the force and truth of the 
reality that trauma survivors face and quite often try to 
transmit to us'. She continues: 
S3 See History and Memory After Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998) 185 where LaCapra criticises the antirealist approach in 
general on these grounds and Writing History, Writing Trauma 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) 186-87 where he 
specifically aims his criticism at Felman and Caruth. 
54 See LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma 66, in particular, and 
also Sigmund Freud, ', Mourning and Melancholia' 1917 (1915), On 
Metapsychology, PFL 11, trans. Alix and James Strachey, ed. Angela 
Richards (London: Penguin, 1990) and Sigmund Freud, 'Recollection, 
Repetition and Working Through' 1914, Collected Papers II, The 
International Psycho-Analytical Library No. 8, trans. Joan Riviere, 
ed. Masud R. Khan (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of 
Psycho-Analysis, 1924). 
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To cure oneself--whether by drugs or the 
telling of one's story or both--seems to many 
survivors to imply the giving-up of an 
important reality, or the dilution of a special 
truth into the reassuring terms of therapy. 
Indeed, in Freud's own early writings on 
trauma, the possibility of integrating the lost 
event into a series of associative memories, as 
part of the cure, was seen precisely as a way 
to permit the event to be forgotten. 55 
And yet elsewhere Caruth refers to 'the special truth, of 
the survivors in terms of the symptoms of trauma, which 
involve terrifying nightmares, flashbacks, and unintended 
'relivings, of the trauma. By dichotomising *forgetting, 
with remembering', as she does here, Caruth not only 
simplifies Freud's early work on trauma, but also resists 
the idea that the alternative to forgetting, might not be 
simple remembering, but reliving, or repetition. 
Paradoxically, this kind of traumatic memory is the 
cornerstone of her theory. Seen in the light of LaCapra, s 
distinction between mourning and melancholia, or working 
through and acting out, the issue of memory versus 
forgetting becomes a good deal more complex. The working- 
through of memories of a lost loved one in 'Mourning and 
Melancholia', for example, is seen as a precondition not 
for forgetting what has been lost, but for finding a new 
outlet for libidinal energy. Unable to 'work through, such 
55 Caruth, 'Preface', Trauma vii. 
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memories may ultimately lead to such energy being turned 
upon the mourner him or herself, resulting in 
melancholia. 
56 
Later in Trauma Caruth returns to the same point, but 
here she makes more explicit the ways in which 'cure, would 
ultimately contravene the historical imperative to testify 
by distorting the literality of trauma. Drawing on Janet, 
via van der Kolk, Caruth writes that: 
The trauma thus requires integration, both for 
the sake of testimony and for the sake of cure. 
But on the other hand, the transformation of 
the trauma into a narrative memory that allows 
the story to be verbalized and communicated, to 
be integrated into one's own, and other's, 
knowledge of the past, may lose both the 
precision and the force that characterizes 
traumatic recall. (. ] The possibility of 
integration into memory and the consciousness 
of history thus raises the question, van der 
Kolk and van der Hart ultimately observe, 
"whether it is not a sacrilege of the traumatic 
experience to play with the reality of the 
past7". 57 
56 In 'Mourning and Melancholia' Freud remarks that when the 
melancholic mourner chastises himself for being 'petty, egoistic, 
dishonest, etc. 'he has come pretty near to understanding himself'. 
I[Wle only wonder,, Freud continues, 'why a man has to be ill before 
he can be accessible to a truth of this kind, 255. Although the 
subject-matter is quite different, Freud hints here (albeit 
flippantly) at a connection between pathology and truth (or self- 
knowledge) that emerges more forcefully in Caruth's and Felman's 
theories of possession. 
57 Caruth, "Recapturing the Past: Introduction', Trauma 153-54. 
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This view may ultimately lead to a refusal to allow or 
enable the witness to integrate traumatic memories into 
'the reassuring terms of therapy, because those 
conciliatory frames are precisely what the antirealist 
approach opposes. If the symptoms of PTSD can be relieved 
by a process of working through which would allow them to 
become part of 'narrative memory', then Caruth seems to 
suggest here that it is 'cure' that will ultimately prove 
sacrilegious. This is one of Ruth Leys's primary objections 
to Caruth's and van der Kolk's theories: 'if, as van der 
Kolk sometimes appears to propose, the narration of the 
traumatic memory is essential to cure PTSD, the narrative 
treatment is carried out at the cost of falsifying the 
traumatic origin'. 58 Summarising Caruth's position, Leys 
indicates the resistance to cure that her theories 
presuppose: 'if history is a symptom of trauma it is a 
symptom which must not, indeed cannot, be cured but simply 
transmitted, passed on. "[T]he traumatic nature of 
history", Caruth sweepingly writes, "'means that events are 
only historical to the extent that they implicate 
othersm'. 59 And they implicate others, we might add, only 
to the extent that the pathology at the heart of trauma is 
maintained. 
In his essays in Testimony Dori Laub's approach 
differs slightly from Felman's in that he places a much 
se Leys 251. 
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greater emphasis on the therapeutic efficacy of testimony 
in the quasi-analytic setting of the interviewing 
situation. He also refers more specifically to the witness, 
whereas when Felman writes of 'liberating testimony' and 
the 'bursting of the secret', she significantly omits to 
allude to the speaking subject . 
60 Laub appears to be more 
concerned with the process of testimony as the coming into 
possession of the story by which the witness has previously 
been possessed: 'One has to know one's buried truth in 
order to be able to live one's life', he writes, 
"repossessing one's life story through giving testimony is 
itself a form of action, of change, which has to actually 
pass through, in order to complete the process of survival 
after liberation'. 
61 
Refusing to distinguish between testimony as history 
and testimony as therapy, Laub clearly regards the two aims 
as equally important: 'The survivors did not only need to 
survive so that they could tell their story; they also 
needed to tell their story in order to survive,. 62 But 
perhaps the most important theoretical distinction between 
Laub's and Felman's theories is that Laub appears to 
conceive of traumatic memories sometimes in terms of 
repression as opposed to dissociation. This is a crucial 
59 
Leys 273. 
60 Felman, Felman and Laub xix. 
61 Laub, Felman and Laub 78,85. 
62 Laub, Felman and Laub 78. See also Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and 
Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (London: Pandora, 
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distinction because it is the very 'literalness, of 
traumatic memories characterised by dissociation that 
permits the process of historical transmission. Memories 
untold for long periods of time can, Laub suggests here, 
lead to a distortion of the truth of the event: 'The events 
become more and more distorted in their silent retention 
and pervasively invade and contaminate the survivor's daily 
life. The longer the story remains untold, the more 
distorted it becomes in the survivor's conception of it, so 
much so that the survivor doubts the reality of actual 
events'. 63 Whereas when Caruth maintains that it may be a 
, sacrilege, to distort traumatic memories through narrative 
consolation it is not clear whether what is at stake is the 
well-being of the witness or the integrity of the 
historical 'event' which they bear within, for the 
psychoanalyst (and Holocaust survivor) Laub, historical 
transmission is secondary to the survivor's health. 
One of the risks of the psychoanalytically-informed 
antirealist approach is that it may potentially invalidate 
those survivor testimonies that do not 'make us encounter 
strangeness, or that employ traditional narrative (or 
redemptive) devices. Rothberg makes this point in Traumatic 
Realism, where he suggests that Langer's strictly 
antirealist project: 
1992) 175-95, where Herman discusses the therapeutic benefits of 
storytelling. 
61 Laub, Felman and Laub 79. 
177 
ultimately leads (him] to exclude [. I all 
experiential evidence that does not fit his 
thesis. Any testimony that might support the 
idea of a continuity between the experience of 
the concentrationary universe and the values of 
the outside world is dismissed, as are any 
accounts that deny the ultimate contamination 
of the survivor's post-Holocaust world by the 
death-world of mass murder. 64 
LaCapra attests that both Lanzmann's Shoah and Langer's 
Holocaust Testimonies 'are concerned with victims as 
victims, not as survivors or agents'. 65 
variation on this problem was also at the root of 
criticism about the Survivors of the Shoah Visual History 
Foundation. The Foundation was charged with 
'Hollywoodising, the Holocaust on the grounds that 
interviewees were being encouraged to close with an account 
of their lives since liberation, and to invite family 
66 
members to appear on screen with them. Spielberg's 
Schindler's List (1993) was also charged with 
misrepresenting the Holocaust by attempting to represent it 
at all, as well as with imposing a redemptive ending in the 
form of a narrative 'resolution'. The distinction between 
the Shoah Foundation and the Yale archive is, to an extent, 
64 
Rothberg 121-22. 
65 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma 98. 
66 Fisher, 'Spielberg's Shoah Project,: D01. 
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emblematised by the distinction between the critical 
receptions of Schindler's List and Lanzmann's Shoah, albeit 
67 less polarised . 
In their readings of Claude Lanzmann's acclaimed 1985 
film Shoah both Caruth and Felman identify the 
cinematographic model for their theories of historical 
transmission. 'Shoah is a film made exclusively of 
testimonies', writes Felman in what LaCapra has referred to 
as the authorized reading of Shoah' on account of 
Lanzmann's (rare) favourable reception to it. 68 Shoah is an 
astonishing accomplishment: it took over ten years to make 
and lasts for nine and a half hours. It consists of 
interviews with former victims of the Holocaust, 
perpetrators, and bystanders and contains no archival 
footage or documentation. Lanzmann insists that Shoah is 
not a documentary for this reason and that it absolutely 
refuses to attempt any kind of historical representation. 
Lanzmann is vehement on this point because for him the very 
project of representation, the project of 'understanding, 
is "obscene'. Lanzmann made this clear in a talk he gave to 
the Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis at 
67 Miriam Bratu Hansen, for example, writes of the persuasive 
polarization of critical argument into the opposition between (the two 
films] as two mutually exclusive paradigms of cinematically 
representing or not-representing the Holocaust'. %Schindler's List is 
not Shoah: The Second Commandment, Popular Modernism, and Public 
Memory#, Critical Inquiry 22 (1996): 294. 
68 Felman, %In an Era of Testimony': 40. Dominick LaCapra, %Lanzmann's 
Shoah: "Here There Is No Why"', Critical Inquiry 23 (1997): 245. 
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Yale University in 1990.69 The purpose of the talk was 
originally to present a screening of a film about the Nazi 
doctor Eduard Wirths followed by a discussion. After 
viewing the film privately, however, Lanzmann decided not 
to screen the film and the discussion which ensued was 
focussed on this refusal. 
In a brief preface Caruth explains that Lanzmann's 
objection to the film was based on what he felt to be the 
film's 'attempt to gain understanding of the Holocaust' 
through a psychological exploration of Wirth's later 
ambivalence towards his previous 'Nazi activities'. 70 
Lanzmann felt that the film was 'an attempt to rehabilitate 
the image of a Nazi'. 71 His refusal to screen the film is 
typical of the antirealist, antirepresentational approach; 
it parallels Langer's dismissal of redemptive narratives 
and Caruth's dismissal of the 'reassuring terms of 
therapy'. For Lanzmann the refusal to attempt to understand 
the question, for example, 'Why have the Jews been killed,, 
', is the only possible ethical and at the same time the only 
possible operative attitude'. 
72 Instead Lanzmann insists on 
69 A transcript of the talk, entitled 'The Obscenity of Understanding: 
An Evening with Claude Lanzmann, can be found, along with its 
introduction by Felman and preface by Caruth, in Caruth, Trauma 200- 
20. 
70 Caruth, 'Preface,, 'The Obscenity of Understanding', Trauma 200-01. 
71 Lanzmann, 'The Obscenity of Understanding', Trauma 209. 
72 Claude Lanzmann, '"Hier ist kein Warum-, Au Sujet de Shoah--Le Film 
de Claude Lanzmann, ed. Bernard Cuau et al. (Paris: Berlin, 1990), 
cited in Caruth, *Recapturing the 
Past: Introduction', Trauma 155. 
Lanzmann is particularly vehement in his opposition to Schindler's 
List too, see Lanzmann, 'Why Spielberg Has Distorted the Truth,, 
Guardian Weekly 3 April 1994: 14. See also Yosefa Loshitzky, ed., 
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the necessity of transmission over representation and, as 
the closest possible enactment of Caruth's and Felman's 
theories, Shoah is open to some of the same problems as 
their theories. 
For Caruth, Lanzmann's refusal to understand 'is not a 
denial of a knowledge of the past, but rather a way of 
gaining access to a knowledge that has not yet attained the 
form of "narrative memory"'. 73 Felman emphasises the ways 
in which 'psychoanalysis is crucially relevant to the film, 
(and vice versa) and comments on 'the amazing 
psychoanalytic presence of Claude Lanzmann on the 
screen'. 74 And yet other commentators have criticised 
Lanzmann's approach, focussing in particular on his 
insistence that witnesses relive traumatic events for the 
sake of the historical transmission. LaCapra makes the 
appropriate psychoanalytic analogy again by pointing out 
that 'by transmission Lanzmann means not only testimony but 
also--and more insistently--incarnation, actual reliving, 
or what would in psychoanalytic terminology be called 
acting-out'. 75 Others have contested Lanzmann's absolute 
refusal of representation and have indicated the ways in 
Spielberg's Holocaust: Critical Perspectives on Schindler's List 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
73 Caruth, 'Recapturing the Past: Introduction, Trauma 155. 
74 Felman, 'Introduction', 'The Obscenity of Understanding', Trauma 
202. 
7S Dominick LaCapra, 'Lanzmann's Shoah: "Here There is No Whyal: 237. 
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which, with its careful editing and staging of 'reality', 
76 Shoah does not entirely enact this refusal . 
The prime focus of criticism has been on the scene in 
Shoah where Lanzmann encourages the survivor-witness 
'Abraham Bomba to relive his experiences in a concentration 
77 
camp. A barber by profession, Bombals task in Treblinka 
was to cut women's hair before they entered the gas 
chamber. Lanzmann, had interviewed Bomba prior to the 
filming and claims that although he did not know what 
would happen' he 'knew what [he] wanted him to say'. 78 
Lanzmann rented a barbershop in Tel Aviv for the interview 
and pushed Bomba to answer his questions despite the 
intervieweels protestations and to a crisis-point. 
Lanzmann considers this one of his most successful 
interviews, but viewers have found the scene--which amounts 
to a reliving or a reenactment--profoundly disturbing. Not 
only was the scene staged in a highly self-conscious way 
(giving lie perhaps to the strictly antirepresentational 
76 See for example Rothberg 127. Rothberg also points out that Lanzmann 
goes so far as to edit a witness's stammer out of the film 241. Langer 
also comments on this: in an endnote he uses the Shoah witness Filip 
MUller's written testimony as an example of the ways in which the 
editing of written accounts means that there is no guarantee, as there 
is in oral testimony, that 'every word spoken falls directly from the 
lips of the witness'. But the following note adds that in the Shoah 
interview Lanzmann had edited out (MUller's) speech impediments with 
a technological dexterity that must have been nothing short of 
Herculean' Langer 210. 
77 Not all commentary on this scene has been negative. Felman writes 
admiringly of it and Ewa Kuryluk describes Lanzmann's interview with 
Bomba as 'particularly moving', 'Memory and Responsibility: Claude 
Lanzmann's Shoahl, The New Criterion 4: 3 (1985): 18. See also Nora 
Levin 'Some Reservations about Lanzmann's Shoah, Sh'ma: A Journal of 
Jewish Responsibility 18 April 1986: 89-93. 
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project), but the retraumatisation of Abraham Bomba as he 
relives the experience of cutting the hair of women from 
his village prior to their deaths throws into question 
Lanzmann's insistence on accessing the truth at the cost of 
the witness's 'comfort'. Indeed, Felman writes approvingly 
that what Lanzmann avoids above all' 'is an alliance with 
the silence of the witness, the kind of empathic and 
benevolent alliance through which interviewer and 
interviewee often implicitly concur, and work together, for 
79 the mutual comfort of an avoidance of the truth, . When in 
Shoah Simon Srebnik is taken back to the village in Chelmno 
through which he had passed as a boy incarcerated in the 
camp there and there erupts a startling anti-Semitic 
outburst among the villagers, Felman states that at this 
point in the film 'we are made to witness this reenactment 
of the murder of the witness'. 80 Lanzmann has explicitly 
stated that one of his aims in Shoah was to 'resuscitate' 
those who died alone during the Holocaust, 'to kill them a 
81 second time, with me; by accompanying them, . 
In Lanzmann's insistence that the suffering of 
witnesses can be transmitted to himself and to viewers of 
the film LaCapra. sees the signs of a troubling empathic 
identification with the victims of the Holocaust that comes 
78 Claude Lanzmann, 'Seminar with Claude Lanzmann 11 April 1990,, ed. 
Claire Nouvet, spec. issue of Yale French Studies 79 (1991): 95. 
79 Felman, 'In an Era of Testimony,: 53. 
80 Felman, 'In an Era of Testimony,: 68. 
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close to the pathological in itself. Not only would 
Lanzmann's "full identification' with the victim allow him 
'to act out trauma vicariously in the self as surrogate 
victim, but also, by insisting 'on having the victim relive 
traumatizing events' Lanzmann may be 'concealing [his] own 
intrusiveness in asking questions that prod the victim to 
the point of breakdown,. 82 Referring to Nicholas Abraham's 
and Maria Torok's theories of incorporation (to which I 
will return later), LaCapra suggests that Lanzmann may be 
incorporating the painful experiences of witnesses rather 
than merely identifying with them: 'Fully empathic 
identification with people and places enabled Lanzmann to 
feel that he was reliving--indeed suffering through--a past 
he had never in fact lived. He would even be phantasmically 
able to die other's deaths with them'. 83 
Also problematic in Lanzmann's concept of transmission 
is the assumption that this theory can be applied to former 
84 
victims, bystanders and perpetrators alike . Although 
Lanzmann varies his technique slightly in each case (he 
81 Claude Lanzmann, 'Les Non-lieux de la M6moire', Au Sujet de Shoah 
cited by LaCapra 'Lanzmann's Shoah: 291 
82 LaCapra, "Lanzmann's Shoahl: 245. 
83 LaCapra, 'Lanzmann's Shoahl: 250,255,264. For a different view see 
Michael S. Roth, 'Shoah as Shivah', The Ironist's Cage: Memory, 
Trauma, and the Construction of History (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995) 226, where Roth sees Lanzmann's desire to accompany the 
victims through their deaths as a 'highly meritorious act'. 
84 Ruth Leys suggests this is also a problem with Caruth's reading of 
the story of Tancred and Clorinda. in Tassols Ger-usaleme Liberata. By 
making of Tancred--the inadvertent murderer--an example of traumatic 
memory, Caruth seems to imply that perpetrators are subject to the 
same post-traumatic effects as victims, a suggestion that Leys 
considers to have grave implications when these theories are applied 
to an understanding of Holocaust witnesses, Leys 292-97. 
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interviews victims beforehand, for example, but does not do 
this with perpetrators), the theory that an irreducible 
'secret' truth can be accessed using quasi-psychoanalytic 
techniques applies to all of the interviewees. And yet this 
theory is based on an understanding of the ways in which 
memory functions in cases of PTSD and so ought not 
necessarily apply to all of Lanzmann's interviewees, 
arguably not even to all former victims of the Holocaust. 
Ewa Kuryluk writes that watching Shoah demonstrates 
how 'memory (. I goes with assuming responsibility, and 
forgetting goes with avoiding it'. 85 Lanzmann's intrusive 
(even deceptive) interviewing techniques with perpetrators 
confirm this view and lend it the status of justice and 
truth-seeking at the cost of the comfort of secrecy or 
forgetting. But while this works very well with the 
perpetrators, who "forget, crucial instances of their 
complicity, and with bystanders who saw only what they 
wanted to see, it is less justifiable in the case of former 
victims who may have different reasons for secrecy or 
forgetting. The ethics of this antirealist project appear 
questionable when the extent of its dependence on pathology 
and continued suffering becomes clear. 
In Chapter One I raised the question of agency in 
relation to Felman's and Caruth's theories of 'indirect, 
historical representation. Shoah also poses such questions, 
as Kuryluk: 15. 
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particularly in its emphasis on the "inadvertent' or 
'unwitting' testimonies that Lanzmann manages to elicit. As 
Lanzmann himself says, despite the fact that Shoah is 
composed almost entirely of oral testimony: 
There is no personal story in (Shoahl. (. I 
None of the survivors in Shoah speaks in the 
first person singular, none tells his or her 
own story. The hairdresser does not say how he 
escaped from Treblinka after spending three 
months in the camp. I was not interested in 
that, and neither was he. He says "we". He 
86 speaks for the dead. He is their spokesman . 
The implications of the transmission theory for written 
testimony are clear, especially for those testimonies which 
do attempt a realist' representation of first person 
experiences or which attempt at least some form of 
narrative resolution. The theory of transmission seems not 
only to depend on pathology, but also, and crucially, on 
the lack of agency caused by this pathology. Ruth Leys 
points out that in Caruth's reading of the literal return 
of the event in Freud's work on recurring nightmares in 
cases of traumatic neuroses: 
traumatic dreams are not autobiographically or 
subjectively mediated or owned by the 
86 Claude Lanzmann, 'Why Spielberg has Distorted the Truth,, Guardian 
Weekly 3 April 1994. 
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individual; rather the "selfff--which can hardly 
be characterized as a self any longer--is 
possessed by the traumatic dream, which thus 
bypasses all representation by impersonally 
memorializing and chronicling the historical 
truth of the traumatic origin. 87 
Although in Holocaust Testimonies Langer is wary of written 
testimonies, and sceptical about the extent to which they 
may avoid the narrative trappings designed to console or 
redeem, in Charlotte Delbo's trilogy Auschwitz and After he 
finds a model written testimony. In his preface to Delbo's 
memoir Langer frames the text with his insistence that this 
is no mere first-person account of the Holocaust, but that 
instead readers are to understand this memoir as unmediated 
reference, untainted by either the agency of the witness or 
by the distortions of 'normal' memory. 
In her introduction to Auschwitz and After, the 
translator Rosette C. Lamont discusses Delbo's impassioned 
desire to bear witness to the atrocities she witnessed at 
Auschwitz and the narrative mode through which she strives 
to "raise the past from its ashes'. 88 Delbo, Lamont writes, 
is a , privileged witness'. 89 Langer's preface outlines the 
metaphors that Delbo uses to convey her experience of 
Auschwitz. The metaphors revolve around a theory of 
87 
Leys 273. 
88 Charlotte Delbo, Auschwitz and After, trans. Rosette C. Lamont, 
introd. Lawrence Langer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) vii. 
89 Lamont in Auschwitz and After vii. 
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d6doublement or doubling of selves past and present, and of 
memory "ordinaire, and 'profonde, or external and 
internal. 90 "Auschwitz is there, unalterable, precise,, 
Delbo writes, 'but enveloped in the skin of memory, an 
impermeable skin that isolates it from my present self. 
Unlike the snake's skin, the skin of memory does not renew 
itself' 
. 
91 M6moire ordinaire, or as Langer calls it "common 
memory,, is the memory of everyday life: 'It frees us from 
the pain of remembering the unthinkable,. M6moire profonde 
(deep memory), however, lies beneath the thick 'skin of 
memory,, reminding us that the Auschwitz past is not 
really past and never will be'. 92 When Delbo speaks of 
Auschwitz, she says, she is drawing on 'external' or 
, thinking' memory. 93 But the first volume of Auschwitz and 
After, according to Langer, is written in such a way that 
it provides access to--indeed speaks from--the memoire 
profonde which lies preserved beneath the skin of memory. 
94 
Delbols distinction between common and deep memory-- 
which Langer takes up in more detail in Holocaust 
Testimonies--is to an extent analogous with the 
psychoanalytic distinction between the conscious and the 
unconscious: it is a metaphor of dissociation. In Delbo's 
account the skin of memory, although tough and usually 
90 Langer in Auschwitz and After xi. 
91 Delbo, cited by Langer in Auschwitz and After xi. 
9., Langer in Auschwitz and After xi. 
93 Delbo, cited by Langer in Auschwitz and After xiii. 
94 Langer in Auschwitz and After xiii-xiv. 
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concealed by the quotidian common memory, %gives way' in 
dreams and nightmares, in keeping with Freud's concept of 
the 'returning traumatic dream' which thwarts his theory of 
the pleasure principle and wish-fulfilment: 
Over dreams the conscious will has no power. 
And in those dreams I see myself, yes, my own 
self such as I know I was: hardly able to stand 
on my feet [. . .1 the suffering I feel is so 
unbearable, so identical to the pain I endured, 
that I feel it physically. 95 
For Langer, however, this no mere description of a 
terrifyingly realistic nightmare of the past: 'In spite of 
her insistence that she is describing a nightmare, Delbo 
has found a genre of discourse to pierce the skin of 
memory#. 96 The piercing of this skin is not in Langer's 
view just a psychical or even a physical effect, but a 
narrative one. And yet this 'genre of discourse', which 
refigures the conscious/ unconscious distinction as a 
95 Delbo xiii. 
96 Langer in Auschwitz and After xiii. Langer's use of the word 
'pierce, recalls Roland Barthes's work on photography. Barthes 
distinguishes between two different ways of experiencing a photograph: 
by Istudium, (to appreciate, but 'without special acuity' 26) and by 
%punctum, (to be wounded, pricked, pierced by an image: it is this 
element which rises from the scene, shoots out like an arrow, and 
pierces me, 26). To some extent this could be refigured as the 
difference between representation and transmission, in terms of 
effect. Langer seems to suggest that Delbo has written in such a way 
that the studium is subordinate to the punctum, creating an effect 
where the actuality of the referent leaps out and wounds the reader in 
the way that Barthes's photograph of his mother in the Winter Garden 
', pricks, him 67-73. Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on 
photogz-aphy, trans, Richard Howard (London: Vintage, 1993). 
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physical boundary which can be breached entails, according 
to Langer, an eschewal of narrative: 
The first volume of Auschwitz and After shuns 
the narrative impulse, with its dependence on 
reflection, and forges instead a remarkable 
style of direct confrontation that lures us 
into the maelstrom of atrocity while 
simultaneously drowning all intellectual 
97 defenses . 
The translator's preface to Auschwitz and After makes it 
clear that it is not just the narrative impulse which is 
"shunned' or strangely absent in Delbo's text, but also the 
author. She writes: 
In order to bear and bare the unbearable, 
Charlotte struggled to render her style 
unobtrusive, almost transparent. Because she 
wrote from the extreme edge of being, she 
sought never to attract attention to the manner 
in which she expressed herself. How she said 
was only important because of what she had to 
say. The Holocaust experience, which she 
described as ""the greatest tragedy of the 
twentieth century", spoke through her as its 
messenger. 98 
97 Langer in Auschwitz and After xiv. 
98 Lamont in Auschwitz and After vii. 
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Delbo's style is sparse and raw and, as Langer suggests, 
confronts the atrocity with a startling directness, but 
does this amount, as Langer claims, to a 'shunning' of the 
narrative impulse? 99 Langer's suggestion that she writes 
directly from deep memory--in spite of her insistence that 
she is simply describing a nightmare--sits oddly with the 
simultaneous claim that she has 'forged' a 'remarkable 
style of direct confrontation' and with Lamont's 
description of the ways in which Delbo 'struggled' to 
render her prose unobtrusive. Is Delbo, then, to be seen as 
a %medium, for events which speak through her by way of her 
'transparent' prose, or is she instead to be seen as an 
author forging, a narrative that would create this 
impression? In other words is Delbo, as author, present or 
not? Although Delbo's agency is implied, both Langer and 
Lamont appear to be arguing for her absence. There is a 
clear relationship here between Delbo's status as, on the 
one hand, privileged witness and on the other, as medium 
for historical truth, between this claim to a greater 
authority and the simultaneously implied lack of authorial 
agency. 
Recent theories of trauma, informed by 
poststructuralism and psychoanalysis pose pressing 
99 Michael Rothberg suggests that Delbols 'poetic prose, is a striking 
example of what he calls traumatic realism', that is 'a realism in 
which the scars that mark the relationship of discourse to the real 
are not fetishistically denied, but exposed; a realism in which the 
questions of equal relevance to genre theorists and 
historiographers as to clinicians or trauma theorists, 
especially since for Caruth and Felman the traumatic has 
become less and less localised and specific and extends to 
an understanding of history more generally. These theories 
presuppose that the pervasiveness of models of trauma and 
recovery leads to a renewed emphasis on psychoanalysis in 
literary theory, but how, we might ask, does psychoanalysis 
unsettle the autobiographical project? How might the 
alliance of psychoanalysis and poststructuralism lead to a 
privileging of the pathological, making of traumatic memory 
an ineluctable paradigm of historical transmission? 
Paradoxically, the shift away from realism in theories 
like Felman's and Caruth's depends on a strictly mimetic, 
literal account of historical transmission--one that 
bypasses language, subjectivity, and agency and yet 
nevertheless depends on first-person eyewitness accounts of 
trauma. This extreme privileging of the ontology of 
survivor testimony is at odds with the attendant aversion 
to subjectively mediated narrative. 
It is interesting to consider the consequences of the 
pathology-truth connection for autobiography both as a 
genre of truth-telling and as a potential medium for 
testimonies of trauma. Psychoanalysis, in Caruth's and 
Felman's work on trauma almost seems to serve as a tool for 
claims of reference live on, but so does the traumatic extremiýýy that 
19--l 
the perpetuation of the poststructuralist declaration of 
autobiography's impossibility. And yet although LaCapra 
and, in different ways, Rothberg seek a way around or out 
of such impasses of trauma theory, their suggested 
approaches do not quite have the impact of Felman and 
Caruth's claims for the ultimate, ineffable truth, 
literality, or mimesis of testimony. 
A further consideration here is the question of 
transgenerational accounts of trauma. There are several 
parallels between theories like Abraham and Torok's 1970s 
revisioning of psychoanalysis in The Shell and the Kernel 
and Caruth's and Felman's theories of possession and 
transmission. In the following section I explore the 
parallels between the theories of possession that have been 
the focus of this section and those of transgenerational 
haunting, and consider the ways in which second generation 
Holocaust testimony, in particular, may shed some light 
from a literary perspective on the complicated ethics of 
appropriation and the problematic connection between truth 
and pathology that I have discussed here. 
Transgenerational Haunting: A Relational Symptomatology 
disables realist representation as usual' 106. 
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I sign twice, under my father's name. Once next 
to the word "OwnerO, and then next to the word 
"Daughter". loo 
'Legacies', the first chapter of Lisa Appignanesi's 
Losing the Dead, begins at her father's deathbed and with a 
lesson on memory. The 'diabetic delirium, her father enters 
in the final throes of death effects a temporal and 
geographical shift as the hospital becomes, for him, the SS 
camp where he was interned during the Holocaust, and his 
daughter the potential aid to his escape. 101 This is less a 
memory than it is a kind of time-travel, a psychical but 
virtual return to the past: 'He hadn't talked of the war 
years since my childhood. Yet at the end, they were there 
intact--like some wilfully obscured and venomous secret, 
which all his later experience couldn't obliterate'. 102 
The ease of the return, the meticulous preservation of not 
just the memory, but of the 'war years' themselves, and 
their stubborn refusal to erode, provides both a poignant 
reminder of the tenacity of traumatic events and an 
optimistic, if not impossible, paradigm of memory. 'I am 
all too aware that my parents, past is a narrative in a 
foreign and forgotten language,, writes Appignanesi. 
103 Yet 
if the exile from that (here both literal and metaphorical) 
100 Mary Gordon, The Shadow Man: A Daughter's Search for her Father 
(London: Bloomsbury, 1996) 272. 
101 Lisa Appignanesi, Losing the Dead: A Family memoir (1999; 7-ondon: 
Vintage, 2000) 4. 
102 Appignanesi 4. 
1911, 
foreign country of the past is to be bemoaned, the virtual 
time and space-defeating memory of her father offers no 
alternative. His is not the romantic and sentimental brand 
of involuntary memory evoked by the Proustian madeleine, 
where the vast structure of recollection' springs 
104 miraculously out of a mere cup of tea . The traumatic 
memory is quite literally involuntary, unbidden, unwelcome 
and Appignanesils father is possessed by its force. 
In Chapter One I discussed the implications of 
A V-% jppignanesils revision of her mother's wartime history, 
exploring the ways in which Losing the Dead, and certain 
other contemporary memoirs, seem to be caught intractably 
between personal history and 'history'. Appignanesi 
considered her mother's story to be "devoid of history' and 
sought to replace it with an account which balanced the 
subjective experience with the official historical record, 
the 'congealed' memories and stories told too often with a 
more "truthful, narrative that would allow for different 
interpretations of events. As well as being a relational 
auto/biography and an exploration of the limits of history 
and personal narrative, Losing the Dead is also an account 
of what Appignanesi explicitly refers to as 
Itransgenerational haunting'. 
103 Appignanesi 81. 
104 Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past: 1, trans. C. K. Scott 
Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (1954; London: Penguin, 1989) 51. 
1 
The deathbed scene with which Appignanesi introduces 
her memoir introduces a memory-model which bears no 
resemblance to either the recovery model or the 
reconstruction model which I discussed in the previous 
chapter. Instead Appignanesi's father's 'diabetic delirium' 
initiates a process of memory that could more accurately 
fit into descriptions of PTSD discussed in the previous 
section. Despite his silence on the subject of his wartime 
experiences for most of Appignanesi's life, her father's 
dying words reveal him to have been possessed by a 
traumatic experience that was never fully resolved or 
worked-through and that returned to haunt him. It is 
interesting that Appignanesi chose to begin her memoir 
here: juxtaposed with her ensuing quest for memory, her 
father's ventriloquism--the war years speak through him--is 
an ideal type of autobiographical recall that her own 
endeavours could never match. And yet this brief 
introduction to Appignanesils memoir illustrates more 
effectively than the theories of Caruth and Felman the 
personal cost that the status of privileged witnessing may 
exact - 
Paul John Eakin writes of relational autobiography 
that "the story of the self, the is subordinated to 
the story of some other for whom the self serves as 
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privileged witness'. 105 Although Eakin does not refer to 
Caruth's and Felman's theories of possession, or to Delbo's 
position as 'privileged witness' to the Holocaust, in what 
follows I explore the ways in which theories of possession 
might inform a reading of certain second generation 
Holocaust testimonies and even some less theoretically 
informed relational auto/biographies. In this section, by 
exploring the parallels between transgenerational haunting 
and possession, I seek to unsettle notions of privilege and 
pathology and to investigate the ways in which problems of 
authority and agency in accounts of an other's life might 
be both mitigated and problematised by these theories. 
Although the term transgenerational haunting has 
become almost common currency in discussions of second 
generation Holocaust survivors, this metapsychological 
theory was first developed by Nicholas Abraham and Maria 
Torok in the 1970s. As a concept, transgenerational 
haunting extends across their work, featuring in their 
discussions of mourning and melancholia, of identifications 
both normative and pathological, and also of their readings 
of certain key works of literature. 106 It has its roots in 
105 Paul John Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) 58. 
106 See for example The Wolf Man's Magic Word: A Cryptonymy, trans. 
Nicholas Rand, Theory and History of Literature 37 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986). They also provide an interesting 
reading of Hamlet in The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of 
psychoanalysis (1978), ed. trans. and introd. Nicholas Rand, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994) and in Abraham, 'The Phantom of 
Hamlet or the Sixth Act: Preceded by the Intermission of OTruth-, 
diacritics 18: 4 (winter 1988): 2-19. Esther Rashkin has developed the 
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Freud's metapsychology, but seeks to extend Freud's 
concepts of the return of the repressed, of mourning and 
melancholia, and of the unconscious more generally, by 
focussing on the transgenerational aspect of psychic 
trauma--an aspect which was hinted at, but never extended 
into a full theory, by Freud. 107 Whereas Freud coherently 
theorised the ways in which the unconscious functions as an 
'other' in the psychic system, Abraham and Torok conceive 
of a more literal way in which to theorise the unconscious 
as other. In their concept of transgenerational haunting 
the unconscious psychic relics of a parent can be 
transmitted to the unconscious of the child without ever 
having passed through consciousness. They refer to such 
relics as secrets', but these are not secrets wilfully 
withheld, but rather unarticulable traumas unknowingly 
theories of Abraham and Torok as 'tools, for literary criticism, 
applying their theories of haunting, phantoms, and cryptonymy to 
several works of Gothic literature. See Family Secrets and the 
Psychoanalysis of Narrative (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992) and 'Tools for a New Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism: The Work 
of Abraham and Torok,, Diacritics 18 (1988): 31-52. See also Allan 
Lloyd Smith, 'The Phantoms of Drood and Rebecca: The Uncanny 
Reencountered through Abraham and Torok's "Cryptonymyml, Poetics Today 
13: 2 (summer 1992): 285-308, and Christopher Lane, 'The Testament of 
the Other: Abraham and Torok's Failed Expiation of Ghosts', diacritics 
27: 4 (winter 1997): 3-29.1 give just a brief overview of Abraham's 
and Torok's substantial theories here, focussing on similar aspects 
throughout their work in order to concisely summarise their position 
and to focus on the parallels between theories of possession discussed 
in the previous section and the theory of transgenerational haunting. 
107 Freud commented that the Ucs. of one human being can react upon 
that of another, without passing through the Cs. [. I the fact is 
incontestable,, 'The Unconscious' (1915), On Metapsychology, PFL 11, 
trans. Alix and James Strachey, ed. Angela Richards (London: Penguin, 
1990) 198-99. In 'The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis: A 
Contribution to the Problem of Choice of Neurosis, 1913, On 
Psychopathology, PFL 10, trans. James Strachey, ed. Angela Richards 
(London: Penguin, 1993) 137-38, Freud remarks on the ways in which the 
unconscious of one person can affect the unconscious of another, but 
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transmitted. The trauma may then activate symptoms in the 
child to whom it is transmitted. As Abraham and Torok 
write: 
Should a child have a parent "with secretsff, 
parents whose speech is not exactly 
complementary to their unstated repressions, 
the child will receive from them a gap in the 
unconscious, an unknown, unrecognized 
knowledge--a nescience--subjected to a form of 
"repression" before the fact. The buried speech 
of the parent will be (a) dead (gap) without a 
burial place in the child. This unknown phantom 
returns from the unconscious to haunt its host 
and may led to phobias, madness, and 
obsessions. It effect can persist through 
several generations and determine the fate of 
an entire family line. ' 08 
Although instead of privileged mediumistic witnesses or 
Geheimnistriger, Abraham and Torok focus on the 
"cryptophorel--a bearer of someone else's secrets--there 
are some striking similarities between the theories of 
possession I discussed in the previous section and 
Abraham's and Torok's concept of transgenerational 
haunting. 109 Indeed, the emphasis on transmission in 
Felman's and Caruth's theories appears to be an endorsement 
not specifically on the kind of unconscious transmission of which 
Abraham and Torok refer. 
108 Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel 140n. 
109 Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel 158. 
mi 
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of the situation described as so pathological and damaging 
in Abraham's and Torok's account. 
The distinction between repression and dissociation 
discussed earlier in relation to theories of PTSD is also 
found in Abraham's and Torok's work, although they refer 
not to dissociation but to 'preservative repression'. Like 
dissociation and in contrast to 'dynamic, repression 
'Preservative repression seals off access to part of one's 
own life in order to shelter from view the traumatic 
monument of an obliterated event'. 110 The secrets are 
"encrypted' and are not locatable within narrative memory-- 
of which, as in the theory of possession, they have never 
been a part: 'It is memory entombed in a fast and secure 
place, awaiting ressurrection'. ill As in Caruth's and 
Felman's theories, the secret has a privileged relationship 
to truth and is considered unassimilable to knowledge prior 
to the analytic encounter. 112 Abraham and Torok also 
emphasise the necessity for a reliving of the event or 
secret, as opposed to a mere telling and yet they differ 
from Caruth and Felman in that they place particular 
emphasis on the possibility of cure through the analytic 
work. 113 In Caruth's view, which is influenced by van der 
Kolk, the narrativising of the dissociated traumatic 
material would result in an alleviation of symptoms at the 
110 Rand in The Shell and the Kernel 18. 
111 Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel 141. 
112 Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel 157. 
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cost of the truth of the literal registration of the even-, -. 
But although Abraham and Torok refer to dissociated 
material as 'encrypted' (which may parallel the idea of a 
literal registration taking place outside of language) they 
reject the Lacanian theory of a complete separation between 
signifier and referent and work towards the possibility of 
what they refer to as 'decrypting' or 
Idemetaphorisation'. 
114 
Distinguishing also between the 
'crypt' (where one's own encrypted secrets are held) and 
the phantom' (the return of someone else's 'repressed'), 
they attempt to theorise both a process of 'decrypting' and 
also one which would allow the 'weakening' of the phantom. 
The aim is to 'restore to speech' that which has been 
115 
encrypted or that which silently haunts. 
For Abraham and Torok the phantom, or the secret, is 
an "obstacle to self-making', a barrier to the normative 
process of identification. 116 They distinguish between 
introjection and incorporation, making it clear that 
incorporation--which is to introjection what melancholia is 
to 'normal' mourning--is the pathological variant of 
identification. 117 And as incorporation is synonymous, for 
Abraham and Torok, with 'preservative repression', then to 
113 Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel 158-59. 
114 Rand, Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel 17,22,105. 
115 Torok, The Shell and the Kernel 108. 
116 1 discuss this in more detail in the following section. 
117 Torok, The Shell and the Kernel 102. 
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be possessed by someone else's secrets is a barrier to 
self-knowledge and to the construction of a life history. "-' 
Some second generation Holocaust testimonies, like 
Appignanesils, reveal an explicit awareness of and interest 
in issues of transgenerational haunting. Memoirs such as 
Anne Karpf's The War After: Living with the Holocaust 
(1996) and Helen Fremont's After Long Silence: A Woman's 
Search for her Family's Secret Identity (1999) involve a 
confrontation with the traumatic pasts of the authors' 
parents as well as with the effect of these persisting 
traumas within themselves. These memoirs also quite 
explicitly figure the disclosure of parental secrets and 
the revision of their histories as therapeutic necessities. 
Appignanesi and Karpf, in particular, are aware that their 
family histories are inextricably entwined with pathologies 
connected to unresolved traumas. Anne Karpf refers to PTSD 
as "the second generation syndrome' and Lisa Appignanesi 
refers specifically to Itransgenerational haunting,: 
The psychological tropes, the ways of 
confronting and filtering experience, which 
structured (my parents'] lives grew largely out 
of the war and subsequent immigration. I 
suspect they passed these patterns on to my 
brother and me, as surely as they passed on 
their genes and with as little choosing. 119 
118 Rand in The Shell and the Kernel 102. 
119 Appignanesi 8. 
20-- 
"Memory, like history, is uncontrollable', writes 
A r-% : kepignanesi, 'It manifests itself in unruly ways. It 
cascades through the generations in a series of misplaced 
fears, mysterious wounds, odd habits. The child inhabits 
the texture of these fears and habits, without knowing they 
are memory'. 120 During prayers for the victims of the 
Holocaust at the Yad Vashem, Karpf recalls the way in 
which: 
I began to sob in a way which made me feel 
uncomfortable. I was crying so personally over 
something which hadn't happened to me. It 
seemed then as if I hadn't lived the central 
experience of my life--at its heart, at mine, 
was an absence. ' 21 
Her life, she writes, 'seemed to shape itself inexorably 
around duress and escape, around imminent catastrophe (. . 
.]I made an 
internal concentration camp of my own and 
acted as both commandant and inmate. With an awful 
involuntary mimetic obsession, I constantly replayed the 
act of surviving'. 122 Helen Fremont, in her family history 
project, describes a similar phenomenon. 123 When Karpf's 
120 Appignanesi 8. 
121 Anne Karpf, The War After: Living with the Holocaust (1996; London: 
Minerva, 1997) 146. See also Henry Raczymow, 'Memory Shot Through with 
Holes', trans. Alan Astro, Yale French Studies 0: 85 (1994): 98-105. 
122 Karpf 253. 
123 Helen Fremont, After Long Silence: A Woman's Search for her 
Family's Secret Identity (London: Piatkus, 1999) 119. 
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parents object to her relationship with a gentile man--her 
mother claiming that in refusing to propagate Jewish 
children she was completing the task Hitler set out to 
accomplish--Karpf suffers a debilitating outbreak of excema 
on her hands and arms. She relates these recurring 
outbreaks to the expression of unspeakable emotions, 
124 
referring to 'That elegant spokesperson, my body'. 
My rage towards my parents, interned for 
decades, began to venture out, and it felt 
utterly consuming and murderous [. - .1 but if 
my unconscious self was trying to articulate 
its distress, it spoke in a language my 
conscious self couldn't comprehend, much less 
converse in. 
125 
Her symptomatic 'eruptions' appear to have no place in 
language: the trauma bypasses her conscious mind in its 
haste to articulate itself across her body as in 
traditional concepts of hysteria (a term which Karpf 
vehemently rejects when finding her situation described in 
psychological journals). And yet at other times, the 
unconscious appears so utterly readable that it cannot be 
taken seriously: 
After years of my scratching, a close friend 
asked whether the place on my inside forearm 
124 Karpf 101 - 
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that I was repeatedly injuring wasn't on the 
same place, indeed the very same arm, where my 
mother's concentration camp number was inked. I 
was astonished. It had never occurred to me 
that the unconscious could go in for such crude 
symbolism [. I it seemed like a base attempt 
to endow my own flimsy desolation with 
historical gravitas and dignify it by reference 
to my mother's. (I remain unconvinced. )126 
Here Karpf rejects the simplicity of the connection between 
pathology and truth, and the psychoanalytic explanation 
that might dignify' her symptoms with history. The very 
literalness of the symbolism, which appears to need no 
'decrypting' or 'demetaphorisation, gives rise to doubts, 
even though the connection is not something that she 
herself had been able to make. Karpf employs several 
metaphors of incorporation and appropriation, metaphors 
which recall Abraham's and Torok's work on 
transgenerational haunting--at one point she refers to 
Helen Epstein's analogy of an ', iron box' of preserved 
memories buried inside the children of survivors that needs 
to be excavated. Referring to the lawful, involuntary 
mimetic obsessions' from which she suffered, she also 
gestures towards the loss of agency which, as I discussed 
earlier, appears to be unavoidably connected to both the 
125 Karpf 103. 
126 Karpf 106. 
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symptoms of trauma and to the transmission of traumatic 
truths. 
In such accounts history, as in Caruth's formulation, 
is seen to occur as 'symptom'. Karpf describes herself as 
the bearer of her parents' secrets, of their stories: 
for us those stories--through their power, 
repetition, and the sheer vehemence of the 
telling--took on the power of myth and fable: 
you knew them by heart, even able to prompt and 
remind, you internalised them--they became 
yours. The parents left the stories to the safe 
keeping of their children'. 127 
'Is it any surprise', she asks, that some of us longed to 
appropriate their narratives for our own lives? 128 
In Abraham's and Torok's work such 'safe-keeping, is 
referred to in less positive terms. The transmission of 
secrets from parents to children creates a 'crypt, in the 
child's psyche, which in turn becomes an 'illegal burial 
place, --which might add a new twist to Nancy K. Miller's 
idea of the 'family plot . 
129 These second-generation 
Holocaust testimonies articulate an ambivalence over 
processes of holding on and letting go, working through and 
acting out, that is to an extent lost in theorisations of 
127 Karpf 252. 
128 Karpf 252. 
129 Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel 141. See also Nancy K. 
Miller, Bequest and Betrayal: Memoirs of a Parent's Death 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996) xi. 
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transgenerational haunting or of traumatic possession. 
Karpf gestures towards a sense of obligation in her 
reference to 'safe-keeping', to a conception of family 
secrets or unresolved transmitted traumas as heirlooms or 
treasured mementos which it would be unseemly to give away. 
And by writing of her 'longing to appropriate' her parents, 
traumatic histories she highlights a point of tension 
between possession by her parents' past and possession of 
it. If an outbreak of excema on a part of her body 
corresponding to her mother's Holocaust tattoo is a symptom 
of the appropriation of her body by her mother's trauma, it 
seems that the only alleviation of the symptom would 
involve another kind of appropriation: the appropriation of 
her mother's story through the body of her text. And yet 
this process is marked by a profound ambivalence and a 
scepticism towards the simplicity of pathologising terms of 
symptom and cure that fail to account for the complexities 
of family relationships and their histories. 
As in Felman's theory of transmission these second 
generation testimonies place a marked emphasis on oral 
testimony, even though these are written accounts of trauma 
and family history. Appignanesi, Karpf, and Fremont each 
conduct interviews with their parents, but in contrast to 
the theories of transmission discussed in the previous 
section, these interviews do not function as invitations to 
contamination by trauma; here, instead, the contamination 
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has already taken place and the interview is seen as a 
means of making sense of family history, getting t %-s -he fact 
straight, or perhaps of purging the offending 'secrets'. 
And yet in another important sense these authors do not 
just write their parents' lives in order to let go, but 
simultaneously enact another process of possession by 
incorporating the parent's story into their own text. 
Appignanesi, and Karpf incorporate their parent's 
(oral) histories into their texts to varying degrees, and 
with varying degrees of ambivalence over the process. 
Appignanesi both watches her mother's videotaped oral 
testimony and attempts to elicit a version of her own. In 
response to what seems to be her mother's growing insanity 
due to Alzheimer's disease--she describes her wryly as the 
Lady Macbeth of Highgate'--and not wanting this image of 
her to usurp all others', Appignanesi 'set(s] out to elicit 
her stories from her in a systematic way, pen at the 
ready', but finds that her mother's memories 'elude 
system'. 130 The videotaped testimony appears coherent, but 
when transcribed is notable for its lack of 'history,, for 
its overly subjective nature. Karpf interviews and records 
her parents' testimonies herself and includes the 
transcribed recordings in her text, giving her parents a 
voice. Fremont, on the other hand, rewrites her father's 
story %imaginatively, before telling us (towards the end of 
130 Appignanesi 80-81. 
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the memoir) that he had actually written his own memoirs 
and without designating where her own version correlates or 
fails to correlate with his. 
Art Spiegelman's graphic auto/biography Maus is 
comprised almost exclusively of the interview process 
between father and son. The father's language is at the 
centre of Spiegelman's text, notable for the meticulous 
transcriptions of Vladek's linguistic idiosyncrasies and 
Yiddishisms. And yet, with the exception of Spiegelman's 
memoir, these second generation meditations all involve the 
revision of the parents' narratives, the suggestion that 
oral testimony is somehow, and in different ways, not 
enough. Spiegelman seems so intent on allowing his father's 
words to speak for themselves that the CD ROM of the Maus 
volumes now includes the recorded voice of Vladek 
131 himself. 
The inclusion of oral testimony in these memoirs is 
always marked by ambivalence: by the tension between 
unethical exposure and the imperative to tell a more 
truthful story than the parents'. By including grammatical 
or factual inaccuracies in their parents' spoken accounts, 
these adult children assert their own authority over the 
family history, leaving their accounts open to some of the 
problems that have traditionally been associated with the 
131 See LaCapra, History and Memory After Auschwitz 146-48. 
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practice of oral history. 132 Similarly, in other 
contemporary family memoirs, the inclusion of 
transcriptions of parents, (often badly written and 
misspelt) letters and even sometimes photocopies of their 
degenerated handwriting, might suggest that the author is 
asserting his or her right as author at the cost of 
exposing their parents' eHDarrassing lack of literacy. 133 
And yet the ethical questions posed by such exposures 
are mitigated in the case of second generation testimonies, 
where what might be seen as unethical biographical exposure 
is legitimated by therapeutic necessity. Indeed, what are 
we to make of Abraham's and Torok's theories of 'haunting' 
in the light of such breaches of privacy? Seen through the 
132 Paul Thompson takes this problem into account in his study of oral 
history The Voice of the Past: Oral History (1978; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). He writes of the ethical problems that arise 
when a middle-class professional determines who is to be interviewed 
and what is to be discussed and then disappears with a tape of 
somebody's life which they never hear about again--and if they did 
might be indignant at the unintended meanings imposed on their words, 
21-22. Elsewhere Thompson appears confident that the perpetuation of 
class-discrimination in the practice of oral history is a thing of the 
past and yet his admiration for the oxbridge history students who 'sit 
at the feet, of oral historians suggests a problematic reversal of 
authority that is not fully substantiated 10-12. See Penny 
Summerfield, 'Dis/composing the Subject', Feminism and Autobiography: 
Texts, Theories, Methods, Tess Cosslett, Celia Lury, and Penny 
Summerfield, eds. (London: Routledge, 2000) 91-105 for a discussion of 
some of these issues and Eakin 169-81 for a discussion of related 
issues. A recent initiative by the BBC in the UK is designed precisely 
to avoid the kinds of problems that collecting and editing oral 
testimony can entail. The Digital Storytelling Project gives people in 
small communities (pilot schemes have been set up in Cardiff, and two 
are about to be launched in Blackburn and Hull) training in order for 
them to master the skills to enable them to create mini-movies of 
their life stories (or parts of them). Contributors write scripts, 
make the movies using scanners and digital cameras, and are 
responsible for all of the editing. See <http: //www. bbc. co. uk/wales/ 
capturewales>. The project is based both on the Mass Observation 
project in Sussex and a similar project based in Berkeley, California: 
<http: //www. sussex. ac. uk/library/massobs>; 
<http: //www. storycenter. org>. 
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lens of psychoanalysis--and memoirs like Appignanesi's and 
Karpf's specifically position themselves in relation t-o 
this--the ethical questions raised by the appropriation and 
revision of an other's life story answer to a therapeutic 
necessity as much as to a historical imperative. The 
theories of Abraham and Torok allow for the possibility 
that we can 'confess, the secrets and the stories of an 
other, in the name of healing. 
Miller both problematises and attempts to mitigate the 
question of ethics by relating the ethics of exposure in 
memoirs of a parent's death to the 'liberatory work of 
mourning' in Freudian psychoanalysis. Such memoirs, caught 
', between the poles of resentment and forgiveness' allow a 
space for interpretation which she refers to as 
, realization,: ', Realization entails understanding our 
parents, own unfinished business with their mothers and 
fathers: seeing it as theirs, finding the language in which 
to name it, and moving on'. 134 The 'realization, can be 
seen, Miller suggests, as analogous to the working through 
of (sometimes ambivalent) memories in the work of mourning. 
By implication, the withholding of parent's secrets, the 
refusal to acknowledge ambivalence, might result in the 
pathological type of mourning that is melancholia. 35 Thus 
133 Miller has some interesting insights into this question, Bequest 
and Betrayal 32-33. 
134 Miller, Bequest and Betrayal 6. 
13S Freud makes this point about ambivalence very clear in smourning 
and Melancholia': 'The loss of a love-object is an excellent 
lbi.. 
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the ethical implications of biographical exposure are 
mitigated by a recourse to psychoanalytic frames of 
understanding. And yet the process of 'naming' may, as 
A. braham and Torok might see it, entail in itself a form of 
appropriation. 
But whereas Lanzmann, for example, endorses the 
reliving of trauma for the sake of historical transmission- 
-and arguably refuses to problematise this endorsement-- 
memoirists like Spiegelman and Appignanesi unsettle their 
textual appropriations even as they enact them. Appignanesi 
acknowledges that she is more interested in her mother's 
past than her present, even that by focussing on the family 
history she is managing to avoid confronting the daily 
needs of 'the Lady Macbeth of Highgatel. This is evident in 
Maus too, where Spiegelman also depicts several instances 
of his remorse over the relentless questioning of his 
father which sometimes results in his father's physical 
exhaustion. And yet, again, the ambivalence is marked by 
Vladek's joy at the renewed relationship between himself 
and Artie as they join together on a project in which they 
can both participate--and through which he can give 
something valuable to his independent, intellectual son. 
The family memoirist may be a burgling biographer but 
when the jewels they snatch are a part of their own 
opportunity for the ambivalence in love-relationships to make itself 
effective and come into the open. Where there is a disposition to 
IN. - : 
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inheritance the crime is less easily defined or solved. 
Psychoanalysis unsettles this ethics of appropriation 
because here representation--however flawed--is occurring 
in place of a painful transgenerational or transhistorical 
transmission. The alternative is a reliving of the parent's 
life: you write your parent's life to avoid having to live 
it, literally. 
On one level Appignanesi's and Karpf's memoirs could 
be seen as tentative attempts at 'cure', or at least as an 
alleviation of symptoms, although this reading would 
oversimplify by far the nature of these projects. Their 
very recourse to psychoanalytic frames of understanding is 
worthy in itself of scrutiny, however. Karpf, in 
particular, ultimately rejects psychoanalytic theories of 
transgenerational. haunting as adequate explanations of--or 
solutions to--her inherited anxieties. But how might the 
very inclusion of these theories serve to legitimate her 
textual appropriation of her parents' stories, sanctioning 
what could be seen as a breach of privacy? And if these are 
to be understood as attempted representations of another's 
traumatic past, how might Losing the Dead and The War After 
be located in relation to the antirealist ban on 
representation', to the theory which makes of historical 
transmission a privileged mode of understanding the past? 
obsessional neuroses the conflict due to ambivalence gives a 
pathological cast to mourning, 260. 
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In some sense they mount a challenge to the strictlý- 
antirealist approach: they resist the ltotalising' account 
that antirealists consider the mark of the realist 
approach, and insist on conveying the representational 
difficulties at the heart of their auto/biographical 
endeavours. Indeed, in Karpf's memoir, psychoanalysis 
itself is seen as a Itotalising' theory that fails to 
account for the disruptiveness of 'real' history. Thus 
while Karpf and Appignanesi write of the need to refuse a 
continued transgenerational transmission of trauma, they 
offer no clear answers about the kind of writing that might 
turn symptom into narrative. 
4. "So That was the Patrimony": Philip Roth and the Ethics 
of Relationality 
Over the past twenty years, criticism of autobiography 
has undergone several notable shifts of emphasis. The 
influential On Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and 
Critical (1980) edited by James Olney represents for some 
critics a watershed in critical thinking on the genre. The 
collection includes essays on previously unremarked 
autobiographical engagements and maps out new territory for 
thinking and writing about the genre. Arguing that there 
was virtually no critical and theoretical literature on 
14 
autobiography before 1956, Olney wonders in 1980 about the 
rapid growth of the genre, asking 'Why was it not proper to 
produce literary studies of autobiography twenty-five years 
ago? Why is nothing else as proper, as vital, today'),. 136 
Olney offers up several potential reasons for the 
proliferation of criticism, but for him it was the shift in 
emphasis from 'bios' (life) to 'autos' (self) that was 
, largely responsible for opening things up and turning them 
in a philosophical, psychological, and literary 
direction'. 137 
Since the publication of Georges Gusdorf's 1956 essay 
'The Conditions and Limits of Autobiography', he argues, 
critics have increasingly concerned themselves with 'the 
dawning self-consciousness of Western man that found 
literary expression in the early moments of modern 
autobiography--those moments where secular autobiography 
was slowly developing out of spiritual autobiography and 
when autobiography as a literary mode was emerging out of 
autobiography as a confessional act'. 138 With the emphasis 
on lbios, came what now seem to be naive assumptions about 
the possibility of adequately narrating a life and a sense 
that the only point of contention was the question of 
whether or not the autobiographer was telling the truth. 139 
136 James Olney, ed., on Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical 
(Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1980) 8. 
137 Olney 19. 
138 Olney 13. 
139 Olney 19-20. 
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The post-1956 emphasis on 'autos', however, led to more 
varied discussion of autobiography as a literary ac-%-. The 
shift also accompanied, if not enabled, the increasing 
democratisation of autobiography: the move away from the 
"great man' tradition of life writing and towards a less 
canonical notion of the genre. Olney noted in 1980 the 
increased publication and critical recognition of women's 
autobiographies, African-American autobiographies and 
African autobiographies, a development which he attributes 
to the importance of autobiographical texts to emergent 
Women's Studies, African-American Studies and African 
Studies in university departments as well as to the 
feminist commitment to the 'personal, emblematised by the 
1970s slogan 'the personal is political'. Olney proposes 
Georges Gusdorf as an exemplary critic of the genre, and 
his 1956 essay 'The Conditions and Limits of Autobiography' 
as the pioneering instigator of the shift from lbios, to 
'autos'. "In the beginning, then', he writes, 'was Georges 
140 Gusdorf' . Yet even as Olney's 
introduction asserts 
Gusdorf's pre-eminence in the field, (his collection is 
dedicated to Gusdorf and also includes the first appearance 
of Gusdorf's essay in English translation) other essays in 
the collection already represent a shift away from what is 
seen as the androcentric Gusdorfian paradigm. 
Olney 8. 
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Mary G. Mason's (1980) essay 'The Other Voice: 
Autobiographies of Women Writers', for example, illustrates 
the ways in which such androcentric and canonical paradigms 
fail to account for gender differences in life writing. 
Drawing on four early 'prototypes' of women's autobiography 
Mason argues that the self-discovery of female identity 
seems to acknowledge the real presence and recognition of 
another consciousness, and the disclosure of female self is 
linked to the identification of some "other"'. She writes 
of the "grounding of identity' that takes place in women's 
autobiographies 'through relation to the chosen other'. 141 
These models stand in stark contrast to 'the two 
prototypical male autobiographers, Augustine and Rousseau' 
on whom both Gusdorf and Olney draw for their discussion of 
142 
autobiographical paradigms . If Gusdorf is to an extent 
responsible for the shift from Ibios, to 'autos, that led 
to more rounded discussion of autobiography as a literary 
act, feminist revisions of his model such as Mary Mason's 
helped to shift the emphasis away from 'the self, and 
towards a concept of relational selves. 
141 Mary Mason, 'The Other Voice: Autobiographies of Women Writers', 
Olney 210. The essay is also included in LifelLines: Theorizing 
Women's Autobiography, Bella Brodski and Celeste Schenck, eds. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). 
142 Mason, 'The Other Voice, in Olney 210. See also Georges Gusdorf, 
'The Conditions and Limits of Autobiography, in Olney, and James 
Olney, 'Transmogrifications of Life-Writing', The Southern Review 33 
(summer 1997): 554-73 in which Olney makes the startling claim that we 
can learn all we need to know about the development of autobiography 
by looking at Augustine, Rousseau, and Beckett. 
217 
Feminist revisions of the androcentric model of 
autobiography also led to a consideration of the many 
different forms of autobiography normally excluded from the 
canon. In her 1997 book Women and Autobiography in the 
Twentieth Century: Remembered Futures, for example, Linda 
Anderson refuses to be constrained by 'definitions of 
autobiography as a genre' and resists any literary 
' '3 hierarchy of autobiographical forms. " Instead, Anderson 
includes in her discussion diaries, letters, fiction and 
theoretical writing--under the general umbrella of 
autobiography,. 144 Her inclusion marks this important shift 
in critical approaches to autobiography, away from 
"definitions of autobiography as a genre' which, Anderson 
observes, 'tend to perpetuate a masculine genealogy of the 
subject' and towards a more democratic, less circumscribed, 
approach. 14 5 Definitions of the 'conditions and limits of 
autobiography, might, as Olney suggests, have put 
autobiography on the critical map, but more recently 
critics have sought to avoid the delimiting effects of such 
attempts. By defining what autobiography is or should be, 
theorists are always at risk of pathologising or 
marginalising those accounts which fall outside of the 
, limits, - 
143 Linda Anderson, Women and Autobiography in the Twentieth Century: 
Remembered Futures (London: Prentice Hall, 1997) 12. 
144 Anderson 12. 
145 Anderson 12. 
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Taking Mason's work on gender and relational-ity as a 
starting point, in How Our Lives Become Stories:: ýfaking 
Selves (1999), Paul John Eakin suggests that the relational 
model of identity might not be the mark of autogynography 
that Mason and other feminist critics have supposed. , 4, 
Instead he posits that 'all identity is relational despite 
147 differences that fall out along gender lines' . Eakin also 
discusses the Gusdorf model, which stresses 'the separate, 
autonomous individual' and argues that although this 
paradigm has long held sway in criticism of autobiography, 
it fails to withhold closer scrutiny. 148 Although he 
suggests that critics ought to review earlier life writing 
in order to discover the traces of relationality that 
undoubtedly exist there, it is in the wealth of recent 
autobiographical writing by both men and women that Eakin's 
thesis is most convincingly confirmed. Memoirs such as 
Germaine Greer's Daddy, We Hardly Knew You (1989), Philip 
Roth's Patrimony: A True Story (1991), Blake Morrison's And 
When Did You Last See Your Father? (1993), and Martin 
Amis, s Experience (2000) to name but a few, exemplify the 
prevalence of the relational model in life writing of the 
last ten years, while anthologies such as Fathers: 
Reflections by Daughters (1994) and Our Fathers: 
146 The term "autogynography, was coined by Domna C. Stanton in order 
to differentiate between men's and women's autobiographical writing. 
See "Autogynography: Is the Subject Different?,, The Female Auý-Ograph: 
Theory and Practice of Autobiography from the Tenth to the Twentieth 
Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
Reflections by Sons (2001) likewise reveal that the 
relational other need not always be mother. 
Relationality, for Eakin, is based on a developmental 
paradigm which takes into account the work of, among 
others, the psychologist John Shotter and the sociologist 
Ian Burkitt, both of which stress %the child's 
intersubjective instruction in personhood'. 149 When applied 
to Eakin's corpus of auto/biographies and memoirs, 
relationality exposes the permeability of the boundary 
between autobiography and biography. He writes: 
in the relational lives in my corpus, the story 
of the self is not ancillary to the story of 
the other, although its primacy may be partly 
concealed by the fact that it is constructed 
through the story told of and b_y someone else. 
Because identity is conceived as relational in 
these cases, these narratives defy the 
boundaries we try to establish between genres, 
for they are autobiographies that offer not 
only the autobiography of the self but the 
biography and the autobiography of the other. 150 
Although Eakin does not describe it in such terms, it seems 
clear that relational accounts are construed as normative 
147 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 50. 
148 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 49. 
149 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 62. See Ian Burkitt, Social 
Selves: Theories of the Social Formation of Personality (London: Sage, 
1991) and John Shotter and Kenneth J. Gergen, eds. Texts of Identity 
(London: Sage, 1989). 
150 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 58. 
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in his view: because identity and narrative always spring 
from a child's 'intersubjective instruction in personhood' 
it follows that life narratives will likewise be 
intersubjective, always written of and on the boundary 
between self and other. Eakin claims that 'autobiographical 
memory is socially and culturally constructed', a claim 
which he supports by turning to the work of developmental 
psychology: 
Analyzing parent-child conversations about the 
past, they stress the interpersonal context in 
which the extended self emerges, they highlight 
the role of rules and conventions in the 
formation of autobiographical memories and they 
show how the young child gradually assimilates 
151 these narrative practices . 
Relationality does not exclusively relate to the parent- 
child relationship, however, and Eakin's corpus includes 
examples of life writing which veer from this model. Henry 
Louis Gates's Colored People: A Memoir (1994), for example, 
is in Eakin's view an account of the construction of 
subjectivity in relation to a cormnunity. 152 Yet the focus of 
Eakin's study is the most preponderant form of relational 
life narrative: the self's story viewed through the lens 
of its relation with some key other person, sometimes a 
151 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 110. 
152 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 75-76. 
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sibling, friend or lover, but most often a parent--we might 
call such an individual the proximate other to signify the 
i53 intimate tie to the relational autobiographer' . 
In the previous section I discussed the ways in which 
transgenerational haunting provides a model for what might 
be seen as the ultimate relational bond. Here I consider 
whether a psychoanalytic approach to relationality might 
further complicate the ethical issues involved in the 
telling of an other's life. I focus on Philip Roth's memoir 
Pat: rimony, beginning with one line in particular that Eakin 
cites as an example of the necessary 'relationality' of 
Roth's story. '[RIecalling his relation with his father', 
Eakin writes, 'Philip Roth evokes a period when their lives 
were "intermeshed and spookily interchangeable"': "[I)n 
contrast to the supposedly self-determining model of 
identity that autonomy predicates, a relational concept of 
selfhood stresses the extent to which the self is defined 
by--and lives in terms of--its relations with others'. 154 
Although Roth's memoir could be seen to confirm the model 
of relationality as it is loosely defined here (in the 
sense that we all, always, live and write our lives "in 
relation, to others) the extract Eakin cites from Patrimony 
points to something altogether more complex. Something, in 
Roth's words, altogether more %spooky,. 
153 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 86. 
154 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 161. 
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"When a writer is born into the family', Philip Roth 
famously wrote, the family is finished'. Roth has always 
had to defend himself against biographical readings of his 
fiction, much of which focuses on family relationships in 
fictional Jewish households much like the one in which he 
was raised. He is aware of the ethical implications of 
writing about oneself when this writing involves the 
revelation of another's life in the process and yet he has 
long defended himself against charges of unethical 
biographical exposure on the grounds that he is a writer of 
fiction and not biography or autobiography, even when, as 
in the case of Deception (1990), he toys with the 
boundaries by naming his principal character--a novelist-- 
Philip and his wife Claire. 155 Roth's generic trickery 
extended into his first foray into nonfiction, titled, in a 
deceptively unambiguous fashion, The Facts, as I discussed 
in Chapter One. How is Patrimony, in the light of the 
author's history of generic playfulness, to be read 
unproblematically as a 'true story''> As one commentator 
writes, in The Facts 'Roth [. . .] manages to make the 
standoff between fiction and autobiography emblematic of 
the impossibility of extricating the literary from the 
155 Hanif Kureishi did something very similar in his 'novel, that has 
since been made into a film, Intimacy (1998), but he also defends 
himself by claiming the book is a work of fiction. Claire Bloom 
actually wrote her own memoir after the publication of Deception and 
responded to some of these issues. See Claire Bloom, Leaving a Doll's 
House (London: Virago, 1996). 
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'56 actual, the fictional from The Facts' . Patrimony sits 
uneasily alongside Roth's fiction and even his novelist's 
autobiography, appearing to be more at home in the growing 
corpus of 'memoirs of a parent's death,, and emerging as an 
exemplary model of the genre. Yet as Miller suggests, this 
may depend on how it is read: 'Patrimony is an amazingly 
straight book for a writer like Roth, depending, of course, 
157 how you read the shit literally placed at its heart' . 
In an early review of Patrimony Jeffrey Rubin-Dorsky 
wonders why critics have almost unanimously referred to the 
memoir as 'moving, 'charming' and , touching' when it is so 
obviously a father-son battleground, when the mark of the 
memoir's candour is evident most explicitly in the 
recounting of the ambivalence of Roth's feelings towards 
his father. Moreover, Rubin-Dorsky argues that although the 
memoir "insists on its literalness; it relies heavily on 
metaphor in order to convey the relationship between father 
and son, and he reads 'Philip' in Patrimony as a fictional 
character, much like the 'Philip, in Deception. 158 
It is important to consider Patrimony in the light of 
Roth's earlier fiction, because the earlier work begs 
questions about this 'touching' account of Roth's father's 
death. And yet it seems almost 'unseemly, --to use one of 
156 Peter J. Bailey, 'Why Not Tell the Truth? The Autobiographies of 
Three Fiction Writers', Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 32: 
4 (1991): 219. 
IS7 Miller, Bequest and Betrayal 33. 
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Roth's terms--to read Patrimony as a self-conscious 
narrative, to focus on his use of metaphor and 'trickery' 
at the cost, it seems, of the 'human' aspect of his 
memoir. 159 And yet Roth makes it clear throughout Patrimony 
that he is not only the son, but also, ineluctably, the 
writer. Writers are born into families', and his 
%unseemly' conduct is dictated by the demands of his 
profession. 
160 
Focussing less on the memoir as a whole and more on 
certain key scenes in the book, here I consider what 
happens if we read Patrimony in the light of the 
psychoanalytic theory Roth himself evokes briefly, rather 
161 than in the light of 'normative' relational models . 
Before considering Patrimony in more detail, I consider the 
question of relationality as a normative model of identity 
and narrative, discussing the ways in which relationality 
could be seen as analogous to identification in both a 
psychoanalytic and a literary context. 
Diana Fuss makes explicit the connection between a 
psychoanalytic concept of identification and relationality, 
although in identification Papers she discusses no 
relational auto/biographies. A reading of Roth's Patrimony, 
Ise Jeffrey Rubin-Dorsky, 'Honor thy Father', rev. of Patrimony: A True 
Story, by Philip Roth, Raritan 11: 4 (1992): 137-38. 
159 This may in itself be a topic worthy of further discussion. 
160 See Miller, Bequest and Betrayal 33. 
161 1 do not hope to provide a definitive reading of Patrimony on this 
model, but I suggest that by reading it in this way we may come to 
some quite different conclusions about his treatment of the ethics of 
relational auto/biography. 
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however, which focuses on identificatory issues rather than 
relational ones, yields some interesting results. 
'Identification,,, writes Fuss, 'is, from the beginning, a 
question of relation, of self to other, subject to object, 
inside to outside,. 162 Identification is the process whereby 
a person substitutes a lost love-object with an image of 
that object which can be kept inside. In 'The Ego and the 
Id, (1928) Freud maintains that such substitutions make "an 
essential contribution towards building up what is called 
its [the ego's] ""character"'. 163 There is something 'silly' 
and obvious', observes Fuss, about identification--this 
'routine, habitual compensation for the everyday loss of 
our love-objects.. 164 Like Eakin's model of relationality, 
theories of identification revolve around the ways in which 
identity is necessarily constructed through self-other 
relations. '-Subjectivity', writes Fuss, drawing on a 
Freudian concept of identification, 'can be most concisely 
understood as the history of one's identifications I. 
165 
Freud uses the terms introjection, incorporation and 
identification interchangeably. 166 Laplanche and Pontalis 
162 Diana Fuss, Identification Papers (London: Routledge, 1995) 3. 
163 Freud, 'The Ego and the Id, 1923, On Metapsychology, PFL 11, trans. 
James Strachey, ed. Angela Richards (London: Penguin, 1991) 368. 
164 Fuss 1. 
16S Fuss 34. See also 'The Ego and the Idl, 368 where Freud makes a 
very similar comment. 
166 The term introjection is actually Sandor Ferenczils- See Ferenczils 
1909 essay 'Introjection and Transference' in New Contributions to 
Psychoanalysis, trans. Ernest Jones (London: Maresfield Reprints, 
1952). Fuss points out that Freud uses the words lintrojection, and 
, incorporation, interchangeably (Fuss 55), but in 'The Ego and the Id, 
Freud also uses the terms lintrojection' and %identification, 
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succinctly explain the slight difference between 
introjection and incorporation. Incorporation, they write, 
is: 
the process whereby the subject, more or less 
on the level of phantasy, has an object 
penetrate his body and keeps it "inside" his 
body. [. I Incorporation provides the 
corporal model for introjection and 
identification. 167 
Introjection, on the other hand, is a 'process revealed by 
analytic investigation: in phantasy, the subject transposes 
objects and their inherent qualities from the "outside" to 
the "'inside" of himself'. The difference between the two 
comes down to a question of physical boundaries. 
'Introjection is close in meaning to incorporation, which 
indeed provides it with its bodily model, but it does not 
necessarily imply any reference to the body's real 
boundaries (introjection into the ego, into the ego-ideal 
etc. )I. 
168 
Introjection, in Abraham's and Torok's work emerges as 
a psychoanalytic counterpart to Eakin's theory of 
relationality: 
interchangeably, sometimes when (as in his discussion of melancholia) 
the term incorporation' would seem more fitting. 
167 J. Laplanche and J. -B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, 
trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Karnac, 1973; rpt. 1988) 211. 
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Introjection is in fact the psychic counterpart 
of the child's biological development and its 
dependence on others as it travels through the 
various stages of maturation before reaching 
autonomy or adulthood. On one level, then, 
introjection is the psychic equivalent of 
growth, of the passage from sucking to chewing, 
from crawling to walking and running, from baby 
talk to words and full-fledged speech. 169 
Torok identifies the fantasy of incorporation thus: 
Introducing all or part of a love object or 
thing into one's own body, possessing, 
expelling, or alternatively acquiring, keeping, 
losing it--here are varieties of fantasy 
indicating, in the typical forms of possession 
or feigned dispossession, a basic intrapsychic 
situation. 170 
Here we find once again the 'possession' metaphor that I 
discussed earlier. To be possessed, in other words, is to 
incorporate. Emphasising the mediumistic aspect of 
incorporation Fuss remarks on the 'previous models (of 
incorporation] that seek to conceptualize the influence of 
other on self--demonic or ecstatic possession, contagious 
passion, animal magnetism, mesmerism, hypnosis', models 
which all rely on the 'absence' of the subject's agency as 
168 Laplanche and Pontalis, 229. 
169 Rand in The Shell and the Kernel 9. 
170 Torok in The Shell and the Kernel 126. 
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in Caruth's and Felman's theories of possession. '7 The 
difference between introjection and incorporation might 
then be seen as analogous to the difference between 
possession of (the other and the other's story) and 
possession by these things. 
Eakin addresses our more literal understanding of 
possession in relation to the privacy laws determining what 
it is legally permissible for one person to say or write 
about another. These laws centre on the concept of 'the 
right to an inviolate personality,, a concept which, Eakin 
argues is complicated by a relational model of identity. 172 
"How', Eakin asks, 'can the practice of life writing be 
said to infringe on the individual's "right to an inviolate 
personality"? ' 173 But how might the concepts of 
incorporation, of possession, and of haunting complicate 
this issue yet further? What, for example, are we to make 
of a theory which turns the disclosure of someone else's 
secrets into a therapeutic imperative? 
The privacy laws Eakin discusses are based on a 
conflation of personhood and property and are thus 
concerned with the transgression of private spaces. From a 
relational point of view, the boundary between self and 
other is less discernible than that between, to use his 
171 Fuss 4. 
172 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories citing Samuel D. Warren a,. d 
Louis D. Brandeis's celebrated 1890 article 'The Right to Privacy, 
162. 
173 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 165. 
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example, the inside of a building and the outside. Eakin 
tests the Warren and Brandeis model of privacy on a 
selection of relational autobiographies beginning with the 
much-quoted extract from Ted Hughes's 1989 letter to the 
Independent: 'I hope each of us owns the facts of her or 
his own life,. 174 Arguing that the facts of his life were 
his exclusive property, Hughes came close to arguing that 
the life of his relational other were also his own. His 
words carry particular significance in relation to 
Abraham's and Torok's theory of transgenerational haunting 
where, as we have seen, the focus is on the possibility of 
"owning, --or of being owned by--the facts of someone else's 
life. Wary that he might have appeared to be Imount[ing] a 
case against the propriety of writing lives', Eakin turns 
again to Roth's Patrimony, this time in order to praise the 
respect that Roth affords to the 'integrity' of his 
father's person even as he simultaneously Itransgresses his 
privacy I. 
175 
The extract from Patrimony which Eakin cites is framed 
by a series of often-quoted, crucial scenes: the taxi scene 
where Roth muses on the Freudian theory of parricide and 
cannibalism; the college scene where Roth first describes 
his sense of 'merging, with his father; the bathroom scene 
174 Included and discussed in Janet Malcolm, The Silent Woman: Sylvia 
Plath and Ted Hughes (London: Papermac, 1994) 8. For interest see also 
Ted Hughes, 'The Place Where Sylvia Plath Should Rest in Peace', 
Gua. rdian 20 April 1989; 'Sylvia Plath: the Facts of her Life and the 
m- 30 2 
where Roth cleans his father's shit; and the hospital scene 
where, after heart-bypass surgery, Roth describes feeling 
'at once reborn and as though I had given birth'. The order 
of these scenes, although often overlooked, is crucial. 
Rather than reading these scenes as examples of a 
normative relationality and identification, how might they 
be read instead as examples of something approaching 
incorporation, an exploration of the permeability of the 
psychical and physical boundaries between father and son. 
Eakin takes note of the transgression of boundaries in 
these scenes and acknowledges Nancy K. Miller as the one 
176 
who writes most thoroughly about this . But the curious 
thing is that even as Eakin cites Roth as an example of the 
most relentless transgressor of privacy (of both psychical 
and physical boundaries), Patrimon_y emerges as a model 
relational autobiography, as a memoir which somehow fails, 
in the end, to violate the 'integrity' of its subject. 
A reading of Patrimony which takes into account 
theories of identification--both normative and 
pathological--suggests that it may not be in spite of 
Roth's breaching of boundaries between father and son but 
by virtue of them that he authorises the telling of his 
Desecration of her Gravel, Independent 20 April 1989; and ".. 1here 
Research Becomes Intrusion', Observer 29 October 1989. 
175 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 182. 
176 See Miller, Bequest and Betrayal 23-55. 
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father's story, not, as Eakin suggests, the son's 'profound 
respect for the integrity' of his father's person. 17" 
The first taboo-breaking episode is the taxi scene in 
which Roth makes a direct reference to Freud's 'Totem and 
Taboo'. After recounting an amusing anecdote about a 
parricidal taxi driver who had knocked out his father's 
teeth--Roth posing as a psychiatrist and wryly remarking 
that on his 'first professional outing, a positive 
transference had been effected, --he goes on to make the 
following connection: 
He actually did it, I realized, annihilated the 
father. He is of the primal horde of sons who, 
as Freud liked to surmise, have it in them to 
nullify the father by force--who hate and fear 
him and, after overcoming him, honor him by 
devouring him. 178 
And although Roth claims to belong to the 'horde that can't 
throw a punch', he concludes that, 1[wle have teeth as the 
cannibals do, but they are there, embedded in our jaws, the 
better to help us articulate'. 'When we lay waste', he 
continues, 'when we efface, it isn't with raging fists or 
ruthless schemes [. I but with our words, our brains, 
179 
with mentality'. Words, we are led to conclude, are for 
177 
Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 182. 
178 Philip Roth, Patrimony: A True Story (1991; London: Vintage, 1992) 
159. 
179 
Roth 159. 
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killing and consuming fathers as well as for 'recreating' 
them, indeed, the consumption may have to occur before re- 
creation can begin. 
Miller describes Patrimony as a kind of substitute 
child for the childless Roth, a 'posthumous grandchild', 
she says, referring to the episode where Roth muses on his 
father's penis, memorises it even: 'I must remember 
accurately', he tells himself, 'so that when he's gone I 
can re-create the father who created me'. 180 The self- 
confessed 'unseemliness, of Patrimony relates not, as it 
may seem, to the disclosure of secrets but to the fact 
that, as Roth admits, 'I had been writing all the while he 
was ill and dying, --the fact that the Ire-creation' began 
before the original was gone. 181 
Many contemporary memoirs, Miller writes, are 
"meditations on the author's authority to tell the story' 
182 
and Patrimony is no exception to this . Towards the end of 
the memoir Roth employs several metaphors of incorporation 
and of appropriation; he persistently describes scenes 
where father and son are called upon to speak for and even 
sometimes through each other. The vernacular for which Roth 
is so famous, 'is his,: it belongs to Herman. And the 
jokes, too, he tells the woman in the nursing home 
, originate with him'. Roth speaks up for his father on at 
180 Miller 28. Roth 177. 
181 Roth 237. 
182 Miller 3. 
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least two occasions. He writes to the Metropolitan Life 
insurance company to complain about their anti-Semitic 
promotion policies on behalf of his father, and berates the 
anti-Semitic telephone abuser of his father from the phone 
in his father's house. 'You must not forget anything': the 
imperative which runs throughout Patrimony, is at no point 
in the memoir spoken by Herman. 
In the scene which follows the taxi incident, Roth 
recalls his college education and the gulf which he felt 
widening between himself and his father during these years. 
He recalls that he felt at this time: 
as though I were something like his double or 
his medium, emotionally to imagine that I was 
there at college in his behalf and that it 
wasn't just I who was being educated but he 
whom I was delivering from ignorance as well. 
Just the opposite was happening, of course: 
every book I underlined and marginally notated, 
every course I took and paper I wrote was 
expanding the mental divide. (. I Yet for 
many months there was nothing my reasonable 
self could do to shake off the sense of merging 
with him that overcame me in the library (. . 
.] the 
impassioned, if crazy, conviction that I 
was somehow inhabited by him and quickening his 
intellect right along with mine. 183 (My 
emphasis) 
183 Roth 160. 
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Roth symbolically ingests the father in the taxi scene 
before describing the ways in which he once felt he had 
been 'inhabited by him,, had been his 'medium' and his 
"double,. This is a metaphor not of relationality but of 
incorporation. After cannibalising and then merging with 
the father, Roth is both reborn and gives birth. The blood- 
sucking heart-baby which, in spite of the metaphor, remains 
resolutely inside leads Roth to indulge in two simultaneous 
and contradictory identifications as he finds himself: 
androgynously partaking of the most delirious 
maternal joy. (. II was as near to being 
the double of my own nurturing mother as, 
during the anxious, uncertain hours on the eve 
of the bypass, I had come to feeling myself 
transposed, interchangeable with--even a 
sacrificial proxy for--my failing father. 
.]I was never a 
heart patient alone in that 
bed: I was a family of four. 184 
'Philip is like a mother to me', says Herman Roth at one 
point, in a telephone conversation overheard by the adult 
son. And indeed, Roth bears his father before bathing, 
cleaning, changing him and, finally, giving birth to his 
re-creation. The pregnant woman, in Fuss's view, is: 
the perfect figure for a psychoanalytic model 
of identification based on incorporation. 
184 Roth 226. 
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As Otto Fenichel comments, pregnancy represents 
the ""full realization of identificatory 
strivings to incorporate an external object 
bodily into the ego and to enable that object 
to carry on an independent existence there". . 85 
In the pregnancy metaphor, Roth finds a counterpart to the 
image of himself as 'medium' for his father. By making 
Herman speak through him--'You must not forget anything'--I 
would argue, he endows his memoir with a legitimacy and an 
authority that exceeds what Miller refers to as the other, 
contradictory injunction: 'not to tell'. 186 And just as 
Delbo is seen as a medium not just for her own experiences, 
but for the Holocaust itself, Roth is under the command 
here not just of his own father, but of the father, he acts 
on the orders of the ultimate paternal directive. 187 
In the first book-length monograph of Roth (1982), 
Hermione Lee discusses the themes that were apparent in 
Roth's work before Patrimony was ever conceived: 
Eating and excreting provide analogues not only 
for sexual taboo-breaking but also for the 
process of analysis and narrative. Mrs. 
Portnoy's intention to "get to the bottom of 
this diarrhoeaff might as well be Spielvogel's, 
when faced with Portnoy's frantic logorrhoea. 
Tarnopol's and Portnoy's narrative outpourings 
'as Fuss 23. 
186 Miller 28. 
187 See Miller 28. 
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are a painful ""letting go". (. I We are what 
we eat, and all our lives we never finish 
getting hold of stuff to turn into ourselves, 
and then getting rid of it: so with the 
relation between experience, memory and 
selfhood. 188 
You eat the father and turn him into yourself. Then you can 
speak on his behalf. Writing--getting to the bottom of the 
shit your father gives you--may even be a therapeutic 
necessity. About to embark on the mammoth bathroom-cleaning 
operation at the centre of his book, Roth makes an analogy 
which is in some sense a non-sequitur: 'It's like writing a 
book', he muses, 'I have no idea where to begin'. How many 
other ways, Roth makes us wonder here, is dealing with your 
father's shit just like writing a book? 
Roth's earlier autobiographical project The Facts 
concludes with an attack on Roth by his fictional alter-ego 
Nathan Zuckerman: 'Don't publish', Zuckerman advises, 'you 
are far better writing about me than "accurately" reporting 
your own life. [. . .11 am [. ] the key to disclosure 
(. . . ]. Your gift is not to personalize your experience 
but to personify it, to embody it in the representation of 
a person who is not yourself. You are not an 
autobiographer, you're a personificator'. 189 
M Hermione Lee, Philip Roth: Methuen Contemporary Writers Series 
(London: Methuen, 1982) 16-17. 
189 Philip Roth, The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1989) 161-62. 
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The metaphors of incorporation that Roth employs to 
such great effect in Patrimony are not so far removed from 
those which he uses to describe precisely what it is that a 
nove ist does--he allows voices to speak through him: 
to go around in disguise. To act a character. 
To pass oneself off as what one is not. To 
pretend. The sly and cunning masquerade. Think 
of the ventriloquist. He speaks so that his 
voice appears to proceed from someone at a 
distance from himself. But if he weren't in 
your line of vision you'd get no pleasure from 
his art at all. His art consists of being 
present and absent. 190 
Would it be too cynical to conclude that Roth has 
authorised his right to disclose his father's secrets by 
couching his transgression in a series of well-executed 
metaphors of incorporation, thus turning possession by his 
father almost imperceptibly into a case of possession of 
him? As Eakin amusedly points out, after citing Roth's 
final use of Patrimony's refrain 'You must not forget 
anything': 'By repeating here the command he formulated 
earlier in the episode in which he observes his father's 
190 Hermione Lee, 'The Art of Fiction LXXXIVI (1986), George J. 
Searles, ed. Conversations with Philip Roth (Jackson: University Press 
of mississippi, 1992) 167. This is close to de Man's idea of 
autobiography as personification or prosopopoeia. 
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penis, Roth enhances its phallic authority: the son is 
under his father's orders to write this "unseemly'w book! -g- 
"Don't tell Claire', pleads Herman when his son finds 
him in the bathroom, surrounded by and covered in shit. 
Roth transcribes the conversation in which he promises not 
to tell. And then he has to justify the telling: 'So that 
was the patrimony', he concludes. The shit--not the 
considerably less explosive tefillin or shaving mug--is the 
patrimony, that which is handed down from father to son. 
Roth can only tell about the shit by making it his 
inheritance, by making it his own. The shit becomes 
something which comes through him. 
Eakin comments on the 'transgressive' nature of 
Patrimony, and applauds Miller's work on Roth's exploration 
of the 'permeable borders' between father and son. 
Commenting on the shit episode, he writes: 
Roth is never closer to his father's body; 
mapping every inch of the interpersonal space 
they share, he works his way through to a 
stance of acceptance, coming into his own 
through the body of another. 
192 
'Isn't there a sense', Eakin wonders, 'in which the episode 
of the shit is inextricably relational, belonging at once 
191 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 185. 
192 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 183. See also Ml-, 11er 26. 
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to father and son alike? , 193 Yet isn't there also a sense i. -L 
which Roth legitimates the telling of the story by first of 
all appropriating it as his patrimony? A sense in which he 
does indeed 'come into his own through the body of 
another,, through metaphorical appropriations of the 
father's body and narrative? 'Or', writes Eakin, viewing 
the scene from an alternative perspective, 'does the 
episode merely confirm our misgivings about life writing of 
any kind, prompting us to recognize that the confessional 
drive behind life writing that draws us to it--our desire 
to penetrate the mystery of another person--may also 
constitute its primary ethical flaw,. 194 Eakin rejects this 
conclusion and instead 'takes heart [. I in Roth's brave 
negotiation of the difficulties posed by relational 
identity, in the seemliness of his practice of the 
195 "unseemly" profession, . 
Familial relational bonds complicate the ethics of 
privacy, of appropriation, and of exposure and this is 
particularly notable in certain family memoirs where the 
desire is not only to 'penetrate the mystery of another 
person, but perhaps rather to discover the self--or aspects 
of it--by discovering the mysteries of another: the desire 
to discover the boundary between self and other precisely 
by exploring the extent to which it can be breached. 
193 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 185. 
194 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 185. 
195 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories 186. 
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5. "A Willed Possession' 
This section focuses on another account of textual 
possession legitimated by a theory of a more spooky' type 
of appropriation, but here the ethical issues are 
complicated yet further because in this case the phantom is 
an other, of the less 'proximate, kind. In what follows I 
discuss the collaborative nonfiction work Rodinsky's Room 
(1999) by Iain Sinclair and Rachel Lichtenstein. Rodinksy's 
Room is emblematic of the contemporary family memoir and 
its vicissitudes on several counts. It is a biography which 
', becomes' an autobiography. It is, on the surface at least, 
a 'relational' auto/biography and, in a different sense, it 
196 is also a collaborative project . Sinclair and 
Lichtenstein adopt the archaeological model of recovery so 
marked in some of the earlier contemporary memoirs. 
Sinclair recounts a conversation with Lichtenstein in which 
the project is described as an 'excavation' of her family 
heritage, 'collecting fragments of evidence and 
reassembling them. 197 She uses the bits and pieces of 
evidence from the room to construct her own history. 'She 
improvised with all the required roles,, writes Sinclair, 
196 Iain Sinclair and Rachel Lichtenstein tell their stories in 
alternating chapters. 
"1 
%private detective, archaeologist, curator, ghost writer, 
ventriloquial deliverer of Rodinsky's voice and art'. 98 
And yet Rodinsky's Room is difficult to categorise 
generica ly as it is also a ghost story, a Gothic novel of 
sorts, and a family memoir which takes a complete stranger 
to the author as its 'proximate other,. It is also an 
uncanny tale of possession and my reading of it here 
focuses on this aspect, as I investigate the metaphors of 
appropriation throughout which justify the appropriation of 
Rodinsky's story. In the light of the theories I have 
discussed in this chapter Rodinsky's Room can be read, I 
suggest, as an example of the ways in which metaphors of 
possession and haunting help to mitigate the ethical 
problems confronted by relational life writing. 
In 1991 the artist Rachel Lichtenstein visited the 
Princelet Street synagogue in Spitalfields as part of a 
family history project. She began the project after the 
death of her grandfather who had owned a watchmaking shop 
in Princelet Street and she had been advised to visit this 
'museum' as a potential resource. When she entered the 
synagogue, Lichtenstein cried at what struck her as a 
poignant reminder of a lost time and place. 'It appeared to 
me now as if the Princelet Street synagogue had been 
197 Sinclair in Iain Sinclair and Rachel Lichtenstein, Rcdinsky's Room 
(1995; London: Granta, 2000) 81. 
198 Sinclair, Rcdinsky's Room 4. 
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transported directly from Eastern Europe'. '" It had: ', The 
ark had been hand-carved in Poland and brought over, along 
with the brass chandeliers and other religious items, by 
Polish and Russian refugees intent on resurrecting their 
community in London. (. ] The cobwebs had been sprayed 
on for cinematic effect'. 200 She had walked onto a film-set 
where students from the National Film School were in the 
process of filming a production called The Golem of 
Princelet Street, a film about an Orthodox scholar, a 
Polish Jew named David Rodinsky, who had worked as the 
synagogue's caretaker and had lived in an attic room above 
the synagogue. 
Rodinsky had mysteriously disappeared in 1969. His 
room had been locked, unseen, until 1980 when it was 
discovered by workmen sent in to refurbish the building. 
The room was left intact--a time-capsule--but by the time 
Lichtenstein entered it in 1991, things had already been 
thrown away or disrupted. She salvages several items on 
their way to the skip, already fiercely invested in the 
preservation of these artefacts. Lichtenstein takes it upon 
herself to uncover the secrets of the room, of Rodinsky and 
in so doing, to discover her own heritage, her own self. 
There is, in Rodinsky's Room, the now familiar 
preoccupation with the (im)possibility of restoring the 
past, incongruent with the quest to find Rodinsky's--and 
199 Lichtenstein, Rodinsky's Room 22. 
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her own--true story. When she stumbles upon photographs 
taken at the time of the room's opening, Lichtenstein 
initially believes that she is witnessing the 'original' 
state of the room. But it becomes clear that the 
photographer, Danny Gralton, had already disrupted the 
scene in order to create his own narrative: 
Gralton foregrounded newspapers that acted like 
subtitles: ISRAEL REBORN. Sorry shards of 
scholarship were heaped on the table. The 
photographer's gift for documentation was at 
odds with an expressionistic impulse towards 
direction, arrangement, presentation. The room 
provoked this very natural response. It was a 
dim interior, untouched for years, in which a 
correct display of objects would expose some 
201 terrible narrative secret . 
This acknowledgement of the fictionality of the 'real' is 
paralleled by the film-set onto which Lichtenstein first 
stumbles. By contrast, Lichtenstein's account is an attempt 
to discover the true story and the metaphors employed 
throughout this increasingly gothic tale make it clear that 
such truth is dependent on a process of mutual 
appropriation rather than on a self-conscious staging of 
reality or an attempt at direct representation. 
200 Lichtenstein, Rodinsky's Room 22. 
201 Sinclair, Rodinsky's Room 173. 
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Much of what remains of Rodinsky is quite literally 
unreadable: notebooks written in ancient languages, in 
crabbed script, informing the detective only of Rodinsky's 
, 202 cabalistic 'obsession with language as code . There is no 
correct order in which the objects can be placed, for the 
secret to be revealed. The code cannot be cracked. Any 
attempt to create coherence from the incoherent 
accumulation of evidence would result in the cancellation 
of all the possible other versions that could be 
constructed. The re-creation of Rodinsky's story is 
invited, legitimated, by his absence. His absence allows 
Lichtenstein free licence: 'There is nothing [Rodinsky) 
could say', writes Sinclair, 'He is an absence. He doesn't 
belong in his own story'. 
203 
Sinclair's narrative nominates Lichtenstein as the 
sole proprietor of Rodinsky's life and story. Unlike Roth's 
Patrimon. y, Mary Gordon's The Shadow Man, and Lisa 
Appignanesils Losing the Dead, Rodinskyls Room is not, 
strictly speaking, a 'family memoir,. Lichtenstein seeks to 
discover the key to her family heritage not, as in the 
family memoirs, by exploring the lives of her parents but 
by attempting to dis-cover the life story of a complete 
I 
stranger who nobody seemed to 'know . She takes possession 
of Rodinsky's story in order to come into possession of her 
own. 
202 Rodinsky's Room, rear cover. 
--, 1, 
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Arguably, the authors of family memoirs have a greater 
claim on the archaeological terrain of their parents' 
pasts, a greater stake in the detective work which is so 
intimately connected with a quest that is, at its core, 
genealogical. And psychical: the archaeological metaphor 
works on two levels, describing both archival searches and 
revelations of buried memories and secrets. Paul Auster, as 
I discussed in Chapter One, reads the articles detailing 
his grandmother's murder of his grandfather as history. 
But also as a cave drawing discovered on the inner walls of 
(his] own skull ,. 
204 
Whereas the ethics of appropriating a parents' story 
are surmountable, negotiable, in memoirs like Karpf's--the 
stories simply 'became yours'--it is less immediately 
obvious in Rodinsk_y's Room why it is Rachel Lichtenstein 
that emerges as the sole nominee for the telling of 
Rodinsky's story. In what follows I discuss not only the 
metaphorical appropriations of Rodinsky that occur in this 
unusual memoir but also the metaphors of appropriation that 
legitimate the telling. 
Rodinsky's Room begins in the office of a New York 
literary agent, and with the question not of Lichtenstein's 
right to tell the story, but of the reason why anyone would 
ever want to read it: 
203 Sinclair, Rodinsky's Room 174. 
204 Paul Auster, The Invention of Solitude (1982; London: Faber & 
Faber, 1989) 37. 
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"So you got twenty minutes. A frummer in the 
attic, he disappears. Who should care? Where's 
the story? " She laughs, delivers her pitch. 
She's told it before, often, but it always has 
the same effect. Rachel becomes the thing she 
is talking about. He listens. (In the film 
version you could freeze-frame the cigar 
smoke. ) It's a performance and it's true. 
"Rachel Lichtenstein', he continues, 'is the story'. 205 As 
biographical trail, this story is not marketable; if it 
takes an autobiographical detour, that may be another 
matter. Rodinsky's Room continues in the same spirit in 
which it begins. For this story to work, we have to believe 
that it belongs to two people. Not only that, but we also 
have to believe that Lichtenstein has very good reason to 
take this particular route--above all others--into her own 
past. When she follows the detective trail to Poland, 
Sinclair explains that, 1[1]eaving the Princelet Street 
synagogue was the best way of understanding the essence of 
the teasing narrative that was hers, and hers alone, to 
complete'. 206 It is not enough, it seems, to suggest that 
Lichtenstein chose this story and that it therefore belongs 
to her. Instead, we have to believe that the story chose 
her. 
205 Sinclair, Rodinsky's Room 4. 
206 Sinclair, Rodinsky's Room 200. 
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There are several suggested reasons why this story is 
seen as 'hers, and hers alone'. For one thing, Lichtenstein 
appears to be the only one qualified to do the job, which 
is seen as a mere adjunct to her vocation as 'truth- 
seeker'. The search for Rodinsky is connected to the 
unending work of the Talmudic scholar, with the promise of 
an alchemical transformation at the end of the line: the 
promise that the right code will resurrect the missing 
biographical subject . 
207 The 'curated objects' of Rodinsky's 
room--if correctly displayed should--'meld to form the 
narrative body of the missing, the ardently desired 
other'. 208 "1 wasn't qualified to hunt down the human 
story', admits Sinclair, it would have to be someone who 
belonged here by birthright. Someone who could read the 
history of the room as an analogue of their own undisclosed 
heritage' .2 
09 Lichtenstein, as artist, as truth-seeker, as 
scholar is well-equipped for the task. 
During a period of doubt, Lichtenstein takes a trip to 
Israel to consider whether or not she should continue with 
the Rodinsky project. Whilst there she visits a rabbi, 
well-known for his mysterious cabalistic feats. 
Lichtenstein explains the nature of her quest and asks 
whether she should continue. She tells the rabbi the date 
of her birth and what she knows of the dates of Rodinsky, s 
207 Sinclair, Rodinksy's Room 189. 
'08 Sinclair, Rodinsky's Room 81. 
209 Sinclair, Rodinsky's Room 256. 
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birth and death (not insignificantly, he died the year she 
was born). After making a 'strange chart, and appearing to 
be deep in concentration, the rabbi finally tells her: 
You are always searching for disappearing 
things: most of the time you do not find them, 
sometimes you do. You are connected to the olam 
hasod, the secrets of the earth, you are the 
one that peels back the layers of the earth, 
like an onion, to find the meaning. This man, 
Rodinsky, his neshama, his soul, is connected 
to yours, you must continue your search, it is 
this search that will lead you to the right 
210 
path . 
Lichtenstein immediately returns to London to complete the 
search. 
Miller addresses the question of authority in relation 
to memoirs about a dead or dying parent, suggesting that 
the death of the parent legitimates the telling of the 
adult child's story: 
In these narratives, the parent's death seems 
to authorize--or at least provide a cover 
story--for a writer's autobiography. If not 
explicitly, the memoirs devoted to a dead 
parent are almost always meditations on a 
210 Lichtenstein, Rodinsky's Room 129. 
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writer's authority, her right to tell this 
story, the path she followed to telling it. 
211 
And yet "children's right to produce these representations 
of their parents raises an ethical problem': 'The dead 
212 instantly lose their entitlement to privacy' . 
Lichtenstein's appropriation of Rodinsky's story is yet 
more difficult to justify for not only is Rodinksy not her 
father, when Lichtenstein begins her story he is not yet 
even certifiably dead . 
213 '1 had intruded into Rodinsky's 
personal life, rummaged through his belongings, discussed 
his personality and possible whereabouts with many people', 
confesses Lichtenstein, 'but the truth is I did not know if 
he was dead or alive'. 
214 
After 20 years of inoccupancy, 
though, his room is literally declared public property: 
"The synagogue, complete with dark secret, passed rapidly 
into the hands of the Spitalfields Heritage Centre--where 
it is now possible, with the aid of a good torch, to climb 
the damaged staircase and by confronting the room, discover 
the man'. 215 In his absence, Rodinsky's story, too, was up 
for grabs. 
The dead--even the merely absent--have perhaps, as 
Miller suggests, lost their 'entitlement to privacy'; they 
cannot answer back, they have lost their 'rights, to the 
211 Miller, Bequest and Betrayal 3. 
212 Miller, Bequest and Betrayal 13. 
213 Although she discovers quite early on the evidence which suggests 
that he ended his life in a Surrey mental hospital. 
214 Lichtenstein, Rodinsky's Room 101. 
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story. There is another sense, though, in which the death 
of the auto/biographical subject might legitimate the 
appropriation of their story: the dead can haunt. 
Lichtenstein and Sinclair go on to justify their 
appropriation of Rodinsky's story by advancing a theory of 
possession that cuts both ways: as Lichtenstein takes 
possession of the story, so Rodinsky takes possession of 
her. The boundary between subject and object, autobiography 
and biography, self and other becomes in this way, too, 
permeable: Lichtenstein writes Rodinsky's biography in 
order to discover her own story, while Rodinsky writes his 
own autobiography through her biography of him. He is her 
medium Just as she is his. 
"There was something mesmeric, possessed, in the way 
216 
Rachel told her tale', Sinclair begins . The telling of 
this tale is imperative. Lichtenstein has been selected for 
the task by something beyond her control. She has been 
mesmerised and thus has no choice: the story speaks through 
her. Sinclair's narrative becomes more and more hyperbolic 
and Gothically charged as the metaphorical appropriations- 
and the metaphors of appropriation--begin to gather 
momentum: 
"s Sinclair, Rodinsky's Room 34. 
216 Sinclair also refers to his own narrative as 'part exercise in 
false memory, part mediumistic rant', Rodinsky's Room 255. 
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Rachel Lichtenstein, in pursuit of the mystery 
of David Rodinsky, the haunting properties of 
the Princelet Street attic, kept breaking away, 
withdrawing, resuming other projects. But it 
was no good. Rodinsky, the idea of Rodinsky, 
had become a dybbuk. The soul of a dead person 
who enters the body of a living human and 
217 directs their conduct . 
Lichtenstein would put it slightly differently, but their 
alternating texts tell the same tale: Lichtenstein was 
driven to discover Rodinsky by forces outside of her 
control. She not only has the authority to pass on the 
story; she has the sole authority to do so. Lichtenstein is 
among other things, Sinclair writes, 'ventriloquial 
deliverer of [Rodinsky's] life and art', but this bizarre 
theory of a two-way possession would complicate the 
metaphor. Who is the puppet, the dummy? And who is working 
the strings? 
similar case of mutual possession occurs in 
Sinclair's follow-up to Rodinsky's Room, Rodinsky's A-Z of 
London: Walked over by lain Sinclair. This very brief 
account finds Sinclair exhuming Rodinsky's tattered old-- 
and annotated--A-Z of London from one of Lichtenstein's 
iron boxes before following in Rodinsky's footsteps with a 
video camera. Rodinsky, Sinclair declares, was a 
Ipsychogeographer', the annotated A-Z a 'displaced 
217 Lichtenstein, Radinsky's Room 83. 
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autobiography'. 218 The quest is similar to that of 
Lichtenstein's; Sinclair wonders if the annotations were 
'his way of uncovering an occulted pattern', if the lines 
were 'the record of a magical act' .2 
19 But the journey 
neither resurrects the man nor uncovers his secrets. And 
yet as Sinclair and his camera-toting companion follow the 
trail, they are struck by various 'coincidences'. When the 
appointed cameraman is unable to attend, Sinclair asks a 
friend, Petit, to come along instead. They walk a while 
and: 
Then I noticed the street name: Pettits Place. 
Followed by Robinson Road. This was uncanny, 
Robinson being the name of Chris Petit's most 
autobiographical novel. It was almost as if 
Rodinsky had set the walk up, as if he had 
anticipated the particular pair of brogues that 
would tiptoe across his grave. 220 
Later, 'almost as if' acquires more certainty as Sinclair 
writes of 'Rodinsky's playful anticipation of a film that 
would be made more than thirty years after his death,. 221 
Just as they think they are beginning to come into 
possession of Rodinskyos secrets, they understand that they 
are, to recall the denouement of Patrimony, under 
218 Iain Sinclair, Rodinsky's A-Z of London: Walked over by Iain 
Sinclair (Uppingham: Goldmark, 1999) 29. 
219 Sinclair, A-Z 12. 
220 Sinclair, A-Z 31. 
221 Sinclair, A-Z 33. 
253 
Rodinsky's orders to undertake this %unseemly' quest. The 
quest is indeed "uncanny,: they are Rodinsky's puppets, his 
automata, blindly driven by invisible mechanisms. The 
biographical quest always, it seems, takes them somewhere 
that is too close to home. Lichtenstein writes of how 
Sinclair's discovery of Rodinsky's A-Z entailed a role- 
reversal between the two of them: 'Suddenly Iain was the 
, 222 one possessed . 
'The soul of a dead person who enters the body of a 
living human and directs their conduct': this would make of 
Lichtenstein an authorised biographer, a ghost-writer of 
the highest order. And yet, again, the possession cuts both 
ways because this is, in Sinclair's words, 'a willed 
possession': 
Rachel Lichtenstein nominates her own "father'w, 
in the shape of Rodinsky. Her investigations 
force him to speak. She ingests this dybbuk, 
the elective ancestor. It's a form of willed 
possession. She wants to complete some 
unfinished business. (. ] The dybbuk is 
.]a more 
benevolent form of incubus: an entity 
selective about its host body. Possession by a 
dybbuk is frequently a kind of blessing: but 
there is no shirking the responsibility of the 
task for which the recipient has been 
nominated. Something was absent in such lives, 
222 Lichtenstein, Rodinsky's Room 335. 
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there was an emptiness, until this contact was 
223 recognized . 
Did Lichtenstein wilfully ingest this dybbuk or did it 
nominate her as its host? The passage is unclear because 
Sinclair is suggesting, I think, that both are true. 
In a striking parallel with Abraham's and Torok's 
theories of phantomic haunting--with its emphasis on 
'illegal burial places' and the 'cryptophorel--Rodinsky's 
room is described as 'a tomb without a body'; 
Lichtenstein's task is to 'exhume [Rodinskyl, bone by 
bone I. 224 "A tomb without a body', an empty coffin or, as 
Sinclair suggests--linking the myth of Rodinsky with the 
age-old Jewish myth of the Golem--la room with no doors'. 225 
If the room is, as Sinclair suggests, Rodinksy's 
autobiography and also an empty tomb, and if Lichtenstein 
is, as Sinclair tells us 'the story', is the suggestion 
here that Lichtenstein has become, as in Abraham's and 
Torok's theory, Rodinsky's 'illegal' burial place? That she 
has invited a case of transgenerational haunting so that in 
the process of exhuming Rodinsky's remains, she might also 
exorcise her own demons? That she has 'incorporated' her 
own father along with Rodinksy in order to perform a double 
process of holding on in order to let go? Has Lichtenstein 
223 Sinclair, Rodinsky, s Room 196. 
224 Lichtenstein, Rodinsky's Room 219,221-22. 
225 Sinclair, Rodinsky's Room 184. See also Gustav Meyrink, The Golem 
(1915), trans, Mike Mitchell (Cambs: Dedalus, 2000) 17. 
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become a cryptophore? It seems that Rodinsky's Room would 
invite such a reading. 
Their use of the Golem myth would also support this 
rea ing. Although there are several such myths in 
circulation, Gustav Meyrink's novel The Golem is the one 
which inspires Sinclair. The symmetries with Rodinsky's 
myth were perhaps too tempting to pass over: 'And like the 
Golem of Prague [Rodinsky] eventually turns to dust in the 
forgotten attic of a synagogue,. 226 In Meyrink's version, 
the Golem is Athanasius Pernath, the amnesiac narrator's, 
doppelginger and it manifests itself in a room with no 
doors--that is, in an area of the mind inaccessible to 
normal consciousness'. 
The Golem is, above all, an uncanny tale of 
possession. Pernath, the amnesiac hero of Meyrink's tale, 
is apt to disappear into trance-like states while the 
mysterious stranger who is also his double--and the Golem-- 
takes over his body. When Pernath awakens from these 
trances he knows only that ghostly fingers had been poking 
round the crevices of (his] brain'. 
227 
In his introduction 
the translator, Mike Mitchell, writes: 
In Old Testament Hebrew the word [Golem] seems 
to have meant the unformed embryo. In medieval 
Jewish philosophy the term designated hyle or 
226 Sinclair, Rodinsky's Room 225. 
227 Meyrink, Rodinsky's Room 39. 
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matter which had not been shaped by form. More 
curiously Hassidic mystics in twelfth- 
thirteenth century Germany are known to have 
practised an obscure ritual which aimed to use 
the cabalistic power of the Hebrew alphabet and 
manipulate the material form of the universe to 
create a "golem". 228 
It appears that such hyperbolically Gothic metaphors might 
be in danger of leading the narrators away from the 
auto/biographical quest. But it is, in fact, by virtue of 
such metaphors that the link between autobiography and 
biography is forged. There are parallels between Mitchell's 
explanation of the Golem meaning and the theories of 
possession I discussed earlier. The pregnancy metaphor that 
is also a metaphor of pathological incorporation finds its 
parallel in the Golem, which is ', an unformed embryo,. The 
memoir ends with a birth and a funeral: with the birth of 
Lichtenstein's son--named David--and with the laying of a 
new headstone for Rodinsky's finally-found grave, '[t]he 
day had come,, writes Lichtenstein, 'for David Rodinsky and 
I to free each other,. 
229 
The unassimilable, unarticulated knowledge--'unformed 
matter'--at the heart of contemporary theorists' conception 
of literal traumatic truths--encrypted, in Abraham's and 
Torok's formulation--finds its gothic counterpart in this 
228 Mitchell in Meyrink 16. 
229 Lichtenstein, Rodinsky's Room 336. 
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tale of the Golem. Indeed, in Freud's concept, the effect 
of the uncanny is something which reminds us of an unknown 
knowledge and it is this unknown known that is at the heart 
of the heimlichl unheimlich conundrum. And in this way, 
too, Lichtenstein's authority over Rodinksy's story becomes 
almost self-evident. Rodinsky, via the Golem analogy, 
becomes Lichtenstein's uncanny doppelgAnger. 
Richard Holmes, a biographer who, too, has followed in 
the footsteps of his numerous biographical subjects, writes 
of a mutual haunting that occurred during his first foray 
into the tracks left by another--his pursuit of the 
'footsteps' of Robert Louis Stevenson through the Cevennes 
during Holmes' early adulthood. Although the trip did not 
begin as a biographical quest, it became one once Holmes 
recognised that he had initiated 'the growth of an 
imaginary relationship with a non-existent person, or at 
least a dead one,. 
230 
In this sense, what I experienced [. I was 
a haunting. Nothing of course that would make a 
Gothic story, or interest the Society for 
Psychical Research; but an act of deliberate 
psychological trespass, an invasion or 
encroachment of the present upon the past, and 
in some sense the past upon the present. And in 
this experience of haunting I first 
encountered--without then realising it--what I 
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now think of as the essential process of 
biography. 231 
But although Holmes goes on to insist that a 'more or less 
conscious identification with the subject' is a 
prerequisite for biography, he conceives of this as a kind 
of 'pre-biographic, enterprise, something you have to do in 
232 order to be interested enough to write . The true 
biographical work begins, according to Holmes, 'at the 
moment, at the places, where this naive form of love and 
identification breaks down'. This is where the work of 
233 "impersonal, objective re-creation' begins . But what, we 
might ask, about autobiography that must by necessity--of 
whatever form--take a detour through biography? If, for 
Holmes, biography begins once the subjective element has 
been purged, might not the auto/biographical project begin 
at that very point of 'naive, identification, at the very 
moment of 'haunting"? 
Conclusion 
A new emphasis on relationality in both autobiography 
and the study of autobiography has instigated a renewed 
focus on the ethics of disclosure. In this chapter I have 
230 Richard Holmes, Footsteps: Adventures of a Romantic Biographer 
(1985; London: Flamingo, 1995) 66. 
231 Holmes 66. 
232 Holmes 66. 
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explored the ways in which psychoanalysis and its 
relational symptomatologies unsettle yet further the 
already complicated relational issues connected to some 
contemporary memoirs. Abraham's and Torok's theories of 
transgenerational haunting are interesting to consider in 
this context because they make of the disclosure of someone 
else's secrets into a therapeutic necessity, based on a 
theory of possession that has proved so problematic to 
issues of historical representation and trauma. 
Although it has not been a focus of this chapter, the 
question of publication of course complicates these issues 
yet further. Ethical questions may only come to the fore 
once relational accounts are published. And in the same 
way, as Gillie Bolton and Celia Hunt in their work on 
writing and therapy suggest, the truth-status of 
autobiographical writing is less necessary to ascertain 
234 
when writing is for private purposes . Both Bolton and 
Hunt emphasise the role of fiction in autobiographical 
therapeutic writing as a necessary means of reworking 
235 
painful experiences . Although I do not suggest that the 
writers I discuss in this thesis are engaging in writing 
therapy of the kind with which Bolton and Hunt are 
concerned, the consideration of therapeutic issues in 
233 Holmes 67. 
234 Gillie Bolton, The Therapeutic Potential of Creative Writing: 
Writing Myself (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2000) and Celia 
Hunt, Therapeutic Dimensions of Autobiography in Creative Writing 
(London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2000). 
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autobiography--the reading of autobiography in relation to 
certain psychoanalytic tenets--highlights the problematic 
tensions in life writing between the personal and the 
political. 
This is most specifically the case when we consider the 
ways in which Felman's and Caruth's psychoanalytically 
informed theories might inadvertently, to use one of their 
favourite words, devalue certain legitimate attempts to 
tell the truth for political or historical purposes (such 
as women's 'confessional, writing or the written accounts 
of Holocaust survivors which might be seen as 'totalising' 
or reliant on frames of 'redemption'). Rothberg suggests 
that traumatic realism might serve as an effective bridge 
between strictly realist and strictly antirealist 
approaches to Holocaust representation, but it is notable 
that his prime example of traumatic realism, Spiegelman's 
Maus is precariously suspended between the fiction and the 
nonfiction generic categories. 
While Maus, in Rothberg's view, achieves a kind of 
realist representation without being distortive or 
redemptive or totalising or mispresentative (all of the 
arguments which antirealists use in order to support a 
theory of transmission over representation), one historian 
claimed that he ""wouldn't touch it with a ten-foot pole- 
235 van der Kolk, drawing on Janet, shares this view to an extent. See 
van der Kolk and van der Hart in Caruth 158-179. 
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because it contains no historical evidence'. - 'ý Miller 
suggests that it may be through therapy that the 'postwar 
generation "'has learned to understand history"'. `37 
Contemporary trauma theory would certainly support this 
claim, and yet this curious collision of history and 
therapy brings anxieties about the status of personal 
history--which, arguably, increasingly combines both 
therapeutic and historical aspects--as a discourse of 
truth-telling. I argued in Chapter One that the difference 
between what are traditionally thought of as historical 
narratives and therapeutic narratives is not as great as 
one might imagine. But it is also the case that when 
therapeutic narratives are too close to historical ones (as 
in the "Dora' case) they might not prove therapeutic at 
all. On a free-association model, on the other hand, the 
therapeutic narrative might not even be a narrative. In the 
context of traumatic history Langer might put forward an 
argument that is nothing if not postmodern, claiming that 
what is conceived of as a traditional historical narrative 
is a fiction in itself: the imposition of a 'normalf 
framework of understanding onto a narrative that 
persistently resists it. And yet oral Holocaust testimonies 
are still not comfortably accepted as 'history' in the way 
that something like Maus cannot even neatly fit into the 
nonfiction category. 
236 Rothberg 
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The following chapter focuses on a memoir that brings 
these issues into particularly sharp focus. The revelation 
of Binjamin Wilkomirskils memoir as a 'fake, was 
strengthened by suggestions that it was the result of 
recovered memory therapy. And yet although many believed 
Wilkomirski to be delusional rather than fraudulent-- 
believing that the memoir represented his, truth--its 
genre-category was subject to intense debate. The 
Wilkomirski case revealed the ways in which, despite the 
apparently unproblematic collision of psychoanalysis and 
history in theory, when subjective truth is at odds with 
biographical truth, it becomes synonymous with fiction. 
237 Miller, citing Alice Kaplan 104. 
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Chapter Three 
The Liar 
Autobiography does not include degrees: it is 
all or nothing. ' 
1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on one of the most controversial 
memoirs of the 1990s: Binjamin Wilkomirskils Fragments: 
Memories of a Childhood 1939-1948 (1995). Fragments enjoyed 
a brief period of critical acclaim before being exposed as 
a 'hoax, in 1998. But the case was not straightforward: 
in 
spite of mounting evidence against the authenticity of 
Fragments, Wilkomirski persistently refused to renounce the 
story he told there. The Wilkomirski controversy was 
heightened by the fact that this was a Holocaust memoir in 
dispute; it was published and denounced at a time when the 
fear of Holocaust denial was augmenting and debates over 
the implications of what has become known as 'the Holocaust 
industry, were becoming increasingly fraught. 
2 The stakes 
1 Phillipe Lejeune, 'The Autobiographical Pact', On Autobiography, 
Theory and History of Literature 52, trans. Katherine Leary, ed. Paul 
John Eakin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) 13. 
2 See, for example, Norman Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: 
Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (London: Verso, 
2000); Peter Novick, The Holocaust and Collective memory: The American 
Experience (1999; London: Bloomsbury, 2001); Deborah Lipstadt, Denying 
the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (New York: 
Plume, 1994); and D. D. Guttenplan, The Holocaust on Trial: History, 
Justice, and the David Irving Libel Case (London: Granta, 2001). See 
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were high and the implications of the Wilkomirski case far- 
reaching. Because of this, I argue, certain aspects of the 
Wilkomirski case were swamped by the historical 
implications of this contested memoir. 
As a response to increasing doubts over the 
authenticity of Fragments Suhrkamp commissioned a historian 
to investigate the case. In his report Stefan Maechler 
concluded that Fragments may have been the result of actual 
but misremembered and seriously decontextualised childhood 
trauma, that it still in some sense told the story of the 
child who had become Binjamin Wilkomirski. At the centre of 
the case, then, was a traumatised child with a fictional, 
identity, whose life story was contravened by the 
historical record at every turn. This conclusion would 
appear to be at odds with the simultaneous claim that 
Fragments is a fiction', a 'fake', or even a 'hoax'. Yet 
this was often overlooked because Fragments was considered 
a danger to the status of other survivor testimonies--a 
danger, perhaps, even to the historical record itself. Even 
if Fragments were the result of pathology, even if it was a 
trauma narrative in some crucial sense, the ethical breach 
Wilkomirski had committed in appropriating an experience 
that was not his own was the focus of most of the 
commentary on the case. One commentator even claimed that 
also Stefan Maechler, The Wilkomirski Affair: A Study 
in Biographical 
Truth, trans. John E. Wood (New York: Schocken Books, 2001) 302-03. 
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'A Wilkomirski is in many ways as dangerous, if not more 
3 
so, than a Holocaust-denier like David Irving, . 
The implications and consequences of the Wilkomirski 
case have been discussed at length. Some commentators 
expressed a desire for the case to be closed once the facts 
4 
are known, yet this outcome seems unlikely . 
As Maechler 
writes, the Wilkomirski case %is a battle over who occupies 
and owns what memories and with what right', a question 
with which Holocaust commentators and historians have 
5 become increasingly concerned . 
Norman Finkelstein 
attributes the entire Wilkomirski phenomenon and 
controversy to a rapidly burgeoning culture of 
victimhood', indicating a further topic for future 
6 discussion 
. 
Other relevancies and readings have been 
proposed. Renata Salecl provides a Lacanian reading of the 
case, claiming that when traumatic memories are invented 
it 
is due to the necessary inconsistency of the symbolic 
order and [. ] because of the inherent powerlessness of 
3 Calev Ben-David, 'A Holocaust Fraud', Jerusalem Post Newspaper 1 
August 2001,4 July 2002 <http: //Www. jpost. com/Editions/2001/08/09/ 
Books/>. 
a Philip Gourevitch, 'The Memory Thief,, New Yorker 14 June 1999: 48- 
62, and Blake Eskin, A Life in Pieces (London: Aurum Press, 2002). 
s Maechler 304. 
6 RMT accounts are replete with examples of people walking away from 
therapy with entirely different life-stories--different identities-- 
from the ones with which they entered. The theory that people accept 
fantastical alternative life-stories of abuse and horror to gain 
recognition, attention, or sympathy does not sit easily with some of 
these accounts which are just as incomprehensible as Wilkomirskils. 
See for example Elizabeth Loftus and Katherine Ketcham, The myth of 
Repressed Memories: False Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse 
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1994) 227-64 for a full account of one 
such case. 
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the authorities'. 7 For Maechler the Wilkomirski affair 
partly reveals the mechanisms that are now part of the 
Shoah and its remembrance', and he claims that Fragments 
%reflects the very core structures of the Shoah itself'. 8 
Linda Anderson writes: 
In the future it may be possible to understand 
Wilkomirski's obsession with the Holocaust and 
absorption of the historical archive of trauma 
as telling us something, beyond individual 
pathology, about the pathology of history whose 
traumatic effects spread uncontrollably and 
implicate us in ways we do not as yet 
understand. This might also allow us to see 
through the fiction to history again. 9 
The Wilkomirski case, it is clear, will continue to 
initiate ively and contentious discussion in the future. 
In this chapter I concentrate on an aspect of the 
Wilkomirski case that has been largely overlooked. I focus 
on the generic implications of Wilkomirski's contested 
memoir, rather than on the historical implications of his 
transgression. So much seemed to depend on what was an 
ostensibly simple generic conundrum: should Fragments be 
relabelled fiction? Should the publishers withdraw it 
altogether? Should it be repackaged as a kind of 'memoir 
7 Renata Salecl, 'Why One Would Pretend to be a Victim of the 
Holocaust? ', Other Voices 2.1 (February 2000), 17 August 2001 <http: // 
www. othervoices. org/2.1/salecl/wilkomirski. html>. 
a Maechler 308. 
1111i 
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with lies'? 10 One thing was for certain: although 
Wilkomirski continued to defend the story he told there as 
'his truth' Fragments could no longer be marketed as a work 
of non-fiction. In this sense the Wilkomirski case may 
reveal the parameters of autobiography and highlight the 
tensions between subjective and objective truth in this 
genre. 
The following section outlines the background to the 
Wilkomirski affair, and in the third section I argue that 
Wilkomirski's memoir was in fact subtly repackaged as a 
story of yet another case of recovered memory therapy gone 
awry. I problematise this reclassification, which, as I 
show, was based on a partial redefinition of RMT, and 
against Wilkomirski's vehement protestation. 
Wilkomirski's staunchest defenders were those in the 
mental health professions, or those who had worked with 
child survivors of trauma. Most of his critics brought to 
the case the perspective of the historian who insists that 
what is not fact must be fiction. The most substantial 
study of the case so far was written by Stefan Maechler, 
who claims that bad therapy was responsible for the tragic 
aberration, and yet brings the case to a strangely 
psychoanalytic conclusion. " 
9 Linda Anderson, Autobiography, The New Critical idiom (London: 
Routledge, 2001) 133. 
10 This is the subtitle of a memoir I discuss later in the chapter, 
Lauren Slater, Spasm: A Memoir with Lies (London: Methuen, 2000). 
11 Maechler 272. 
2 06 
The tensions between psychoanalysis and history ran so 
high in this case that at the heart of the controversy, I 
argue, were the beginnings of a much broader debate about a 
growing divide between psychoanalytically legitimated truth 
and historically legitimated truth: a debate about 
authority. If this really is a case of delusion rather than 
deception, if Wilkomirski has really told his true story 
the only way he can, then this raises questions about the 
limits of autobiography or testimony. In the last three 
sections of this chapter I turn more specifically to 
questions of genre raised by the Wilkomirski case and 
consider the implications of the psychoanalysis/ history 
tension to other exercises in 'truth-telling'. Does this 
tension only become problematic in cases of testimony in 
dispute? Is it a problem only of relevance to testimony-- 
where historical imperatives are more pressing--or might it 
equally implicate other forms of life writing? If, as 
Maechler's 'study in biographical truth, suggests, the 
Wilkomirski case could only be explained through a 
psychoanalytic intervention, then what might this tell us 
about the uncertain balance of the 'psychoanalytic' and the 
historical in life writing more generally? 
2. A Genuine Fake 
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Fragments was first published in German in 1995 by the 
JUdischer Verlag, a division of the Suhrkamp press. It was 
a Holocaust memoir written entirely from a child's 
perspective, a slim volume composed of fragmentary memories 
of violence and terror in the Nazi extermination camps and 
an account of a child's attempt to comprehend them. The 
author, Binjamin Wilkomirski, a Swiss clarinetist of some 
repute, claimed at the beginning of the memoir that he was 
', not a poet or a writer', that he was only trying to use 
words to draw exactly as possible what happened, what I 
saw'. 12 Nevertheless, Fragments was soon translated into 9 
languages and hailed as a classic of Holocaust literature. 
Wilkomirski was compared to Primo Levi, Paul Celan, and 
Jean Am6ry and won such prestigious prizes as the Jewish 
Quarterly Literary Prize, the Prix de M6moire de la Shoah 
and a National Jewish Book Award in London, Paris and New 
York respectively. 13 In Fragments Wilkomirski told the 
story of how as a small Latvian Jewish child he was 
separated from his parents during a massacre of Jews in the 
Riga ghetto, how he escaped to Poland by boat before being 
taken to Majdanek concentration camp and then to another 
camp (possibly Auschwitz). After years of cruelty and 
torture, Wilkomirski recounts, he was sent to a Krakow 
12 Binjamin Wilkomirski, Fragments: Memories of a Childhood, 1939-1948 
(1995; London: Picador, 1996) 4. 
13 Elena Lappin, 'The Man with Two Heads', Granta 66 (summer 1999): 49 
(reference to comparison with Levi), also Gourevitch: 65 where he 
refers to correspondence from Harvey Peskin in which he compares 
Wilkomirski to Celan, Levi and Amery. 
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orphanage before being adopted by a wealthy Swiss family 
who gave him a false identity and forbade him to speak of 
his past. 
Wilkomirskils story, told in a chaotic jumble, of 
, snapshots, and fragmentary memories was, Philip Gourevitch 
recalls, seized upon as a testimonial that delivered what 
had no longer seemed quite possible: a fresh line of vision 
on the century's defining moment of inhumanity,. 14 The 
children's book illustrator Maurice Sendak concluded that 
, all children (. ] are finally vindicated'. 15 
The success of Fragments gave Wilkomirski the 
opportunity to travel the globe, giving lectures, accepting 
prizes, and speaking to the press across Europe, in the 
16 
United States and in Israel. In 1998, however, an article 
appeared in a German weekly newspaper Weltwoche which would 
begin what Stefan Maechler referred to as an avalanche'. 
17 
Daniel Ganzfried, a Swiss writer, had been 
commissioned by a magazine called Passages to write a piece 
on Wilkomirski as part of a series on 'creative people who 
excelled in an area which was different from their daily 
14 Wilkomirski 4; Gourevitch: 50. 
15 Maurice Sendak, cited in Robert Alter, 'Arbeit Macht Fraud', The New 
Republic online 30 April 2001,18 july 2001 <http: //www. thenewrepublic 
. com/043001/alterO43001-print. 
html>- 
" Gourevitch: 50. Although Fragments was a huge critical success, it 
was not a best-seller, as later commentators have pointed out. Stefan 
Maechler, for example, writes *The most copies, 32,000, were sold of 
the version in English--not really that many when one considers the 
huge market: the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and the rest of 
the British Commonwealth; it was a long way from being a bestseller, 
119. 
17 maechler 145. 
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job, . 
18 Ganzf ried interviewed Wilkomirski and, after having 
doubts about his authenticity 'His story began to turn into 
a piece of detective work, . 
19 Weltwoche funded the research 
into Wilkomirskils past and, in two separate pieces in 
August and September 1998, they published the results. 20 
Ganzfried's attack was explicit and unambiguous. This 
is what he had discovered: 
The author was born not in Riga, but rather as 
the illegitimate child of one Yvonne Grosjean 
in Biel [Switzerland], on 12 February 1941, was 
later placed temporarily in a children's home 
in Adelboden, was put up for adoption in 1945, 
and was finally placed with the Dbssekkers in 
Mrich. Contrary to his claim of having first 
arrived in Switzerland in 1948, he can be seen 
posing for a photo "as early as the summer of 
1946, merry as can be and surrounded by his 
family outside their villa in ZUrichbergm, 
where he entered the primary school in 1947.21 
Ganzfried claims that before becoming Bruno Ddssekker the 
author was not, as he claims, Binjamin Wilkomirski but 
Bruno Grosjean. This evidence would reveal that Wilkomirski 
was not only not Jewish, but also that he had spent the war 
years in relative safety in Switzerland. He goes on to 
conclude his article with a charge that, Maechler states, 
is Michael Guggenheimer, editor of Passages, cited by Lappin: 24. 
19 Lappin: 25. 
20 Lappin: 25. 
21 Maechler 129. 
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"could not have been more explosive': '"Biniamin 
Wilkomirski, alias Bruno D6ssekker (. ) knows Auschwitz 
and Majdanek only as a tourist" ,. 
22 
Although Ganzfried's article was instantly leapt upon 
by numerous commentators as a shocking expose of 
Wilkomirski's deceitl Wilkomirski himself had broached the 
issue of his double identity in an afterword to Fragments. 
This had been added at the request of his German publisher 
in an attempt to avoid the kind of controversy that 
Ganzfried's article initiated. Doubts had been raised even 
before the publication of Fragments in German. But as Elena 
Lappin indicates, until Ganzfried's attack: 
It seemed that no one--no prize judge, 
publisher, critic, scholar or reader--was 
troubled by the author's two-page afterword in 
which he shyly introduced the idea to his 
readers that Binjamin Wilkomirski was not his 
23 only identity . 
This tentative introduction to the shadowy existence 
of Bruno Grosjean/ D6ssekker (although this name, which 
appears on Wilkomirskils birth certificate and passport, is 
nowhere mentioned in Fragments) is prefaced by an allusion 
to the then only recently organised Children of the 
Holocaust societies and to the fact that countless 
%children without identity' are only now able to come 
22 maechler, citinq and translating Ganzfried 129. 
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forward and tell their stories--stories which are 
contradicted by or left out of the historical record. 24 
These children were furnished with false names and often 
false papers too. They grew up with a pseudo-identity which 
in Eastern Europe protected them from discrimination, and 
in Western Europe, from being sent back east as stateless 
persons'. 25 Wilkomirski, making clear that he too was a 
'child without identity', continues: 
As a child, I also received a new identity, 
another name, another date and place of birth. 
The document I hold in my hands--a makeshift 
summary, no actual birth certificate--gives the 
date of my birth as February 12,1941. But this 
date has nothing to do with either the history 
of this century or my personal history. 
26 
Wilkomirski does not give many details in his afterword, 
for example he makes no mention of the Dbssekkers or of 
Bruno Grosjean. He would later vehemently deny that he and 
Bruno Grosjean are one and the same person, despite quite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. But here, in his 
afterword, he simply makes clear an important distinction: 
'Legally accredited truth is one thing--the truth of a life 
23 Lappin: 12-13. 
24 Gourevitch writes that although Bruno DOSsekker is the given name on 
the passport, the document also includes 'an "artist'so name, Binjamin 
Wilkomirski: 'the name he claims as his true identity'. Gourevitch: 
48-49. 
2S wilkomirski 154. 
26 Wilkomirski 154. 
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another'. 27 This distinction would prove crucial to the 
debate that followed. 
It seems that Ganzfried was bemused by the response to 
his inflammatory articles in Weltwoche. 'I thought that I 
would publish all the facts, and that would be that. 
Instead I'm realizing that my article has started a 
strangely philosophical discussion, he told Elena Lappin. 28 
According to Ganzfried, Wilkomirski is a coldly 
29 
calculating man systematically executing a fraud'. Others 
were less convinced. Although it became clear that there 
were serious gaps between Wilkomirskils legally accredited 
truth' and the story he told in Fragments and elsewhere, 
and although the events recounted in the memoir were proven 
to be historically improbable, the question of whether 
Wilkomirski had 'coldly calculated, the deception or 
whether he truly believed his story is still being debated. 
Wilkomirski was stripped of each of his prizes and 
honours, and Fragments was taken off the shelves until the 
publishers could decide what to do with it. Some felt that 
Fragments should be reissued as fiction, others thought it 
should be recalled altogether, like a defective 
automobile, . 
30 Neither of these things actually occurred. 
Instead, after a brief hiatus Fragments was republished 
first in German (2000) and then in English (2001) alongside 
27 wilkomirski 154. 
28 Lappin: 26. 
29 Cited in maechler 269. 
30 Gourevitch: 52. 
27 5 
the results of Stefan Maechler's historical investigation 
into the case. Gourevitch wrote in 1999 that 'Machler's 
[sic] task is to conduct a thoroughgoing and impartial 
assessment of the case, and to produce a report (I 
that, whatever its conclusions, will be made available to 
all the publishers of "Fragments" so that they may include 
it in future editions of the book,. 31 It is not quite the 
case that Maechler's assessment was included in the present 
edition of Fragments, but rather the other way around. The 
text of Wilkomirski's disputed memoir can now only be found 
at the end of Maechler's almost 400 page 'study in 
biographical truth,. The Wilkomirski Affair, as it is now 
called, 'includes' the text of Fragments and the name 
Wilkomirski appears on the title page only in the context 
of the "affair,. 
Maechler provides overwhelming evidence against 
Wilkomirski's account and yet is still unable to prove that 
Wilkomirski lied or that Fragments can be seen 
unambiguously as a fraud. Lappin compares the conundrum to 
the two-head theory attributed to the linguist 
Paul Postal. It is used to describe an utterly 
arbitrary and unverifiable hypothesis, and goes 
something like this: Every person in the world 
has two heads, one of which is permanently 
32 invisible . 
31 Gourevitch: 68. 
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'So what, in this two-headed world', she asks, became of 
the "realO Bruno Grosjean?, Maechler offers a hypothesis of 
his own and although he was commissioned by Suhrkamp as an 
impartial historian, he ends up with a strangely 
psychoanalytic conclusion. His theory is that the young 
Bruno Grosjean suffered traumas that his adult self was 
able to recall and recount only by first shielding himself 
with a different identity, by telling a different story. 
The real traumatic events suffered by Grosjean/ Wilkomirski 
are presumed to be unutterable, inaccessible, unassimilable 
and yet they find expression in the Holocaust story which 
parallels them. 
Although Fx-agments is not historically or 
biographically verifiable, Maechler concludes that it is 
still in some sense Wilkomirskils autobiography, still a 
testament to a traumatic past. After discovering the truth 
about the early life of Bruno Grosjean, Maechler concludes 
that 'Wilkomirski-Grosjean did not have two heads; he had 
not led two lives. Instead, his book tells his own life, 
the life of Bruno Grosjean--but with breathtaking 
alienation'. 33 What began as a historical investigation 
into the referential (im)possibilities of Fragments became 
a wider debate on the gap between psychoanalytically 
legitimated truth and historically legitimated truth. The 
conclusion seems to be that Wilkomirski is not a fraud or 
32 Lappin: 28. 
33 Maechler 229. 
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an impostor, but a 'psychological rarity,, a genuine 
34 fake . 
Despite Maechler's findings Fragments is usually 
described as a 'fake' Holocaust testimony, an unambiguous 
fiction. There is considerable evidence against 
Wilkomirski's account and Maechler's trauma explanation is 
not necessarily mutually exclusive from an accusation of 
deception, from the possibility that in the absence of an 
identity and a history Wilkomirski wilfully and knowingly 
sought out alternative ones. And yet nor does the 
conclusion that Fragments is not true in a historical or a 
biographical sense rule out the possibility that it was 
written in good faith. 
Maechler admirably unearths a great deal of historical 
inconsistency in Wilkomirski's account, but Wilkomirski 
defends these historical inaccuracies by insisting that 
, the SURVIVAL OF EVERY SURVIVOR is linked to many very 
"unlikelyff happenings, ways, tricks, coincidences. Because 
it was not the rule to survive' . 
35 Because no historian can 
know the full story about each individual survivor 
(especially about the relatively undocumented child 
survivors), the fact of historical inaccuracies in 
34 Hanno Helbling wrote a letter to the JUdischer Verlag expressing 
some doubts over Wilkomirskils testimony. She was concerned at how 
Fragments was to be marketed, and suggested it might be best to 
package the book as a psychological rarity, testifying to the 
Holocaust's ability to radiate into new mythic shapes', cited by 
Maechler 94. 
35 Wilkomirskils response to Raul Hilberg's arguments against the 
historical probability of his story in the CBS 60 Minutes broadcast 
about the case (7 February 1999), cited by Maechler 149. 
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Wilkomirskils account does not amount to hard evidence 
against him. Although Saul Friedldnder was sceptical about 
the historical accuracy of Wilkomirskils story, he concedes 
that 'In all this chaos, notwithstanding the organization, 
it's possible that by some wild chance this small grain of 
dust could have blown through untouched'. 36 
More persuasive is the other type of evidence on which 
Maechler relies in his investigation, evidence based on 
inconsistencies and improbabilities in Wilkomirskils own 
account of his story. When faced with the evidence against 
him Wilkomirski offers what appears to be a highly 
implausible counter-argument, claiming that the Doessekers 
did indeed adopt a boy named Bruno Grosjean, but that he 
was later switched with Wilkomirski in a covert operation 
born of his adoptive father's anti-Semi tiSM. 
37 There is no 
evidence to substantiate this plot, yet although its 
spuriousness does not inspire confidence nor can it be 
categorically disproved. One of the most damning pieces of 
evidence against him is the inheritance he accepted from 
the birth-mother with whom he now claims no kinship. If 
Wilkomirski was not, and had never believed himself to be, 
the son of Yvonne Grosjean, then why did he not only accept 
36 Cited by Gourevitch: 55. 
37 Maechler 25-26. The name of Wilkomirski's adoptive parents appears 
in commentary of the case alternately as 'Doesseker, and IDOsseker'. 
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an inheritance from her, but even go so far as to contest 
the will in order to secure his share? 38 
Further evidence against Wilkomirski's account comes 
in the form of his ex-wife who claims that Wilkomirski had 
always had a tendency to deception. Past acquaintances also 
verified that Wilkomirski had long been prone to inventing 
implausible and inconsistent stories about his childhood 
and upbringing and a child survivor of the Holocaust with 
whom Wilkomirski had spoken at length went on to claim that 
Wilkomirski used her memories in his account: 'I was his 
memory; he appropriated it, she told Maechler. 
39 
And indeed, if Wilkomirski truly believes in his 
identity as a Holocaust survivor then why does he continue 
to refuse to submit to the DNA test that could solve the 
matter once and for all? During his investigations Maechler 
located a living Grosjean relative who was prepared to 
submit a DNA sample. Wilkomirski's refusal to offer a 
sample of his own--against which Max Grosjean's sample 
could be matched in order to prove a familial relation-- 
indicates an unwillingness to put himself in a position 
where he might be proved wrong. When Holocaust survivor 
Yakov Maroko came forward as a potential father to 
Wilkomirski, however, Wilkomirski allowed a paternity test 
38 Wilkomirski states in his letter to the testamentary office that he 
wished to claim his legal rights to a portion of the estate, of 
his 
'birth mother', Maechler 234. He had earlier told Lappin that he had 
accepted the inheritance only on the insistence of his lawyer that he 
would not have to accept her as his birth mother, Lappin: 27. 
39 Gourevitch: 57; Maechler 199. See Maechler 196-203 for an account of 
Wilkomirskils relationship with Karola. 
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to go ahead, even though proof of paternity would have 
meant relinquishing the Wilkomirski name and identity to 
which he so ardently clung (it would, however, have proved 
that he was a Holocaust survivor). The test was negative, 
but both Wilkomirski and Maroko agreed that this was of no 
importance. What mattered was the human feeling you 
have,. 40 
Yet more evidence against Wilkomirskils account came 
in the form of his relationship with another child survivor 
of the Holocaust who first corroborated his story but was 
later proved to be a fake of an even greater degree than 
Wilkomirski. Laura Grabowski first contacted Wilkomirski 
after reading Fragments in 1997 because she was moved by 
the memoir which recounted similar stories to her own. 
41 
Serious doubts were later raised about her testimony, but 
not until after she had appeared with Wilkomirski in a 
42 
televised interview. They claimed to recognise each other 
from Birkenau and had by this point struck up a firm 
friendship. In 1998, Laura Grabowski wrote to Leon 
Stabinsky (co-chair of a Los Angeles Holocaust Survivors 
Group of which she was a member) using the name Grabowski- 
Stratford. As Stabinsky told Maechler, he had already begun 
to have doubts about the authenticity of Grabowski's 
40 Haechler 78. 
41 Maechler 124. 
42 Shown in the CBS 60 Minutes broadcast, 7 February 1999. 
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testimony, but an internet search revealed that Laura or 
Lauren (Grabowski) Stratford had been doubted before. 43 
His search unearthed an internet article in the online 
Christian magazine Cornerstone. 'Satan's Sideshow: The True 
Lauren Stratford Story, was the title of the article by Bob 
and Gretchen Passantino and ion Trott which made a 
startling claim. 44 Lauren Stratford (alias Laura Grabowski) 
was the author of Satan's Underground (1988), a memoir 
about her childhood ordeal of sexual abuse, her later 
involvement with Satanic ritual abusers, and her final 
recovery through Christianity. Not only this, but the 
memoir was shown to be a fake, as was her second memoir/ 
self-help manual I Know You're Hurting in which Stratford 
claimed to suffer also from Multiple Personality Disorder. 
Laura Stratford was Laurel Willson, born in 1941 in 
Tacoma, Washington. She had a long history of fabricated 
life stories. A 1999 Cornerstone article 'Lauren Stratford: 
From Satanic Ritual Abuse to Jewish Holocaust Survivor, 
provided proof (in the form of social security information 
and photographs) of the shared identity of Willson- 
Stratford-Grabowski . 
45 'Although the two [Wilkomirski and 
43 Maechler 205-06. 
44 Bob and Gretchen Passantino and ion Trott, 'Satan's Sideshow: The 
True Lauren Stratford Story,, Cornerstonemag. com 18-90 (1990), 13 June 
2001 <http: //www. cornerstonemag. com/features/issO9O/sideshow. htm>. 
45 Bob and Gretchen Passantino and Jon Trott, 'Lauren Stratford: From 
Satanic Ritual Abuse to Jewish Holocaust Survivor', Cornerstonemag. com 
28.117 (1999), 13 June 2001 <http: //www. cornerstonemag. com/ 
features/iss117/lauren. htm>. The article can also be reached via a 
link from the stop bad therapy, website under the same title. This is 
followed by an article on Grabowski/ Stratford and Wilkomirski, 
subtitled two hoaxes for the price of onell, <http: //stopbadtherapy. 
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Grabowski] support each other's stories', write the 
authors, they don't have even a modicum of corroboration 
or evidence to counter the overwhelming evidence that 
neither story is true,. Grabowski claimed that only the 
46 
individual can decide if he/ she is a survivor,. 
There is something deeply unsettling about this 
proposition when it is combined with the notion of memory 
theft'. Gourevitch, in particular, suspects that 
Wilkomirski appropriated for himself 'second-hand memories, 
borrowed memories, and outright stolen memories'. He 
continues: 
I am thinking of a testimony he gave to the 
Holocaust museum, where he held up a picture of 
a little blond-haired, Jewish boy in a Krakow 
orphanage after the war, and said "I know 
that's meff. Who was that child before 
Wilkomirski clipped his little head and put it 
on his own shoulders ? 47 
Wilkomirski entered the lives of many people during the 
course of his memoir's success, and many were left somehow 
scarred once Ganzfried's doubts about his authenticity 
became more concrete, not least those who initially 
com/experts/experts. html>. 
46 Cited by Passantino, Passantino, and Trott, 'Lauren Stratford'. 
4" Gourevitch: 68. 
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believed in Wilkomirski only to have their own credibili--y 
questioned in the wake of Ganzfried's attack. " 
In A Life in Pieces (2002) Blake Eskin, whose family 
initially 'adopted, Wilkomirski as a cousin due to their 
purportedly shared family name, reflects on the process 
whereby Wilkomirski was stripped of his assumed identity: 
A great effort has gone into convincing people 
that the lost soul on his way to my parents' 
apartment is Binjamin Wilkomirski, child 
survivor of the Holocaust. Later, once he was 
widely accepted as Binjamin, prying that 
identity away from him would become a messy and 
prolonged struggle, conducted on public and 
private fronts, among the many individuals 
around the world whose lives and senses of 
49 history had become entwined in his . 
And yet there is also something deeply poignant in the 
image of a man on such a desperate quest for an identity 
and in the ensuing dissolution of that identity, and some 
of the evidence against Wilkomirski begs certain questions. 
Several of the objections to Wilkomirski, s behaviour 
and to his memoir, for example, seem to be based on a 
paradigmatic model of Holocaust survivors and their 
testimonies. Gourevitch cites Arthur H. Samuelson, 
Wilkomirski's American publisher, stating that 'the one 
48 See, in particular, Maechler's study and Eskin's A Life in Pieces 
for an account of the lives touched by Wilkomirskils. 
49 Eskin. A Life in Pieces 3. 
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thing [survivors] have in common is that they don't cry'. 50 
Wilkomirskils constant tears raised Samuelson's alarm. 
Several commentators have noted the obviously constructed 
nature of Wilkomirskils Jewishness. 'He goes to a 
hairdresser to get his hair curled' complains Ganzfried, 
'He has a phoney Yiddish accent'. 51 Gourevitch describes 
Wilkomirski's appearance on the televised meeting of 
Wilkomirski and Maroko where he 'appears in a flowing 
scarf, draped in a batik scarf, with a yarmulke pinned to 
his curls,. 52 Holocaust survivors, indeed Jews, Gourevitch 
hints, do not look like this. And again, describing 
Wilkomirski on video footage of his trip to Majdanek, 
Gourevitch remarks: 'his meandering movements, wincing 
eyes, and bewildered, groping recitations of his memories 
have a strangely comforting familiarity; this, we know, is 
how a "rememberer" looks in a movie' . 
53 
One of Ganzfried's main objections to Wilkomirskils 
testimony is 'the pornography of violence' in Fragments. 54 
This was also an objection to Jerzy Kosinski's The Painted 
Bird (1965), D. M. Thomas's The White Hotel (1981), and 
Helen Demidenko's The Hand that Signed the Paper (1994). 55 
so Gourevitch: 51. 
51 Cited by Gourevitch: 65. 
52 Gourevitch: 61. 
53 Gourevitch: 61. 
54 So he told Gourevitch: 65. 
55 See Sue Vice Holocaust Fiction (London: Routledge, 2000) 39,69 and 
156. Emphasis has also been placed on Demidenko's 'constructed, 
Ukranian identity: 'dressed in peasant blouses and sporting long 
blonde hair, she appeared on chat shows and was widely interviewed 
about her family history and her writing. I her hair was not 
reallv blonde', writes Vice 143. 
285 
Both Demidenko's and Kosinski's 'novels' were involved in 
similar generic controversies to Wilkomirski and Thomas's 
novel was criticised for its fictionalisation (and 
sexualisation) of historical events. 
Pornographic violence is a feature in these three 
fictionalised or inauthentic Holocaust accounts and, 
according to Ganzfried's blueprint, is never a feature of 
56 
authentic Holocaust testimony at all . His prescription 
suggests that there is such a thing as a paradigmatic 
testimony and presumably that this form can be imitated. 
Wilkomirski's crime, it seems, lies not in his imposture 
alone, but in his failure to impersonate accurately. 
Although Wilkomirski's memoir was initially received as a 
prime example of traumatic narrative, Lappin claimed that 
on first reading Fragments, her feeling was that 'it wasn't 
57 fragmented enough, . And yet as Gourevitch notes, this may 
be one of the best arguments in Wikomirski's favour: 'if 
he'd set out to pull off a hoax he couldn't have done a 
worse job of it'. 
58 
If Wilkomirski is, as Ganzfried claims, 'a coldly 
calculating man, then the treatment of him in Maechler, s 
study and elsewhere has been remarkably temperate. If he is 
in fact--although this seems unlikely--a Holocaust survivor 
56 Questions have been raised over the authenticity of Dave Pelzer's 
highly successful 1990s trilogy of memoirs A Child Called 'It, (1995); 
The Lost Boy (1997); and A Man Named Dave (2000) and for similar 
reasons. See Geraldine Bedell, 'Child Abuse as Entertainment', 
Obsez-ver 2 September 2001, Review: 1-2; and 'Did He Make "Ito All 
qp? *, Mail on Sunday 25 March 2001. 
S7 Lappin: 13. 
- 11-1111111- 1-1, 
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and the victim of a conspiracy to conceal his Jewish 
identity then the withdrawal of his books and prizes, along 
with the intrusion into his life, is far more than he 
should have had to bear. As Eva Koralnik, Wilkomirski's 
agent, told Maechler: 'What an upside-down world, in which 
a victim of the Shoah had to prove his story; what a 
dreadful humiliation for the man'. 59 Wilkomirskils long- 
time supporter, Lea Balint, believed that until enough 
evidence could be provided to confirm his story, 'This 
careless, ugly, and inhuman treatment of him must stop,. 60 
But if he is a 'genuine fake', that is if his memories are 
wrong but he continues to believe in them and to defend 
them, then what are the ethical implications of the attacks 
against him? Can he be condemned for being deluded? 
Wilkomirski himself went so far as to brand the 
interrogative techniques of his accusers 'fascist'. 
Referring to Raul Hilberg's criticism of him during the CBS 
60 Minutes broadcast about the controversy, Wilkomirski 
proclaimed: 
It is the same tactic, used in the fifties and 
sixties, by former Nazi-judges in Nazi wartime 
58 Gourevitch: 56. 
S9 Maechler 95. 
60 Maechler, citing Balint's letter to The New Yorkez- after Ganzfried's 
expos6 152. Balint supported Wilkomirski largely due to her work with 
'Children Without Identity' and to the fact that to deny Wilkomirskils 
memories would be to risk victimising him (and other child survivors) 
further if he really was telling the truth. She remained staunch in 
the face of doubts and maintained that until DNA evidence could refute 
Wilkomirskils story he ought to be given the benefit of the doubt, 
MAW-MAT- IrIA- 
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trials towards Jewish witnesses and victims [. 
. . ], This is a real FASCIST TECHNIQUE OF 
ARGUMENTATION. I can even hear the noise of 
Mr. Goebbells dances and shouts of joy in 
hell ! 61 
In a similar vein, he describes the way in which the 
instant success of his memoir made him feel finally 
62 01 , liberated'. When Ganzfried's expose was first published, 
however, his wife reported that Wilkomirski was 'absolutely 
pushed back to the time from in the camps'. 63 As Gourevitch 
notes: 'when Wilkomirski renounces "the ordering logic of 
grown-ups", he is not only telling his readers, "'You must 
believe me", he is also issuing a warning: "'To disbelieve 
me is to participate in my further victimizationm'. 64 
The "genuine fake' explanation is the only way around 
what has become an impasse. If Wilkomirski is neither a 
Holocaust survivor nor a fake, then what, exactly, is he? 
Norman Finkelstein, with his characteristic frankness, 
describes Wilkomirski as 'Half-fruitcake, half-mountebank, 
and yet if the tension is, as he suggests, between 
pathology and deception it is interesting that the majority 
of commentators come down on the side of pathology. 
'5 'I am 
not a psychologist', Lappin begins her conclusion of the 
Wilkomirski case; %Still, the similarities between 
61 Cited by Maechler 150. 
62 Lappin: 18. 
63 Lappin: 18 and Gourevitch: 51. 
616 Gourevitch: 52. 
65 Finkelstetn 60. 
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Fragments, the early life of Binjamin Wilkomirski, and what 
we know of the early life of the real Bruno Grosjean are 
66 too striking to resist'. Maechler insists that 
Wilkomirski was in fact 'horribly victimized, --without 
therapy 'Wilkomirskils tragic aberration would be 
unthinkable,. 67 
It is almost as though the psychoanalytic explanation 
is necessary here only because Fragments was the result of 
bad therapy, but perhaps the psychoanalytic approach is the 
only way to conceive of this story as both untrue and yet 
in an important sense also true to the teller. Maechler's 
psychoanalytic intervention may have served as an exit 
route from another impasse. It might have been a way in 
which Fragments could be branded a fake and yet Wilkomirski 
excused from the charge of fraudulence, a way of delivering 
a verdict of innocence based on an unsound mind. The 
tensions between psychoanalytic and historical approaches 
to Wilkomirski's disputed testimony and to testimony in 
general is a focus of the following section, which 
discusses Wilkomirski's enforced relationship with the RMT 
debate. might therapy have proved a convenient scapegoat in 
the absence of a clearly definable motive for the %crime,? 
66 Lappin: 65. 
67 Maechler 272. 
`8 -ýý 
"The Controversial Category': The Wilkomirski Case and 
'I grew up and became an adult in a time and in a 
society that didn't want to listen, or perhaps was 
incapable of listening', begins Wilkomirski's afterword to 
Fragment: s, 'So for decades I was silent, but my memory 
could not be wiped clean'. 68 Wilkomirski claims that 
Fragments was an attempt to reclaim this silenced voice and 
describes the process by which this was enabled: 
Years of research, many journeys back to the 
places where I remember things happened, and 
countless conversations with specialists and 
historians have helped me to clarify previously 
inexplicable shreds of memory, to identify 
places and people, to find them again and to 
make a possible, more or less chronology out of 
it 
. 
69 
He makes an important distinction here between silence due 
to oppression and silence due to repression, and thus takes 
a more historically biased view on Holocaust testimony than 
70 
those expressed by theorists of trauma and the Holocaust . 
There has always been a difference of opinion between 
these two factions--psychoanalysis and history. Whereas 
68 Wilkomirski 153. 
69 Wilkomirski 155. 
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Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub and Cathy Caruth, for example, 
would maintain that the silence of survivors after the war 
and until recently was as much a psychological effect of 
trauma as it was an effect of political oppression, some 
more historically biased commentators would claim that 
silence was maintained only in relation to the 'outside 
world'. Laub writes of the 'historical gap, which occurred 
between the event of the Holocaust and its widespread 
disclosure in oral testimony. Drawing on a psychoanalytic 
theory of belatedness he claims that 'It is not by chance 
that these testimonies, even if they were engendered during 
71 the event--become recoverable only today' . 
Saul Friedlander, however, would disagree that the 
'historical gap' was filled with silence, that belatedness 
was due to repression: 
The 15 or 20 years of "latency" that followed 
the war in regard to talking or writing about 
the Shoah, particularly in the United States, 
should not be equated with massive repression 
exclusively, in contradiction to the German 
scene. The silence did not exist within the 
survivor community. It was maintained in 
relation to the outside world, and was often 
imposed by shame, the shame of telling a story 
that must appear unbelievable. [. . .] The 
70 Silence due to oppression and silence due to repression are not, of 
course, mutually exclusive categories, but most commentators seem to 
adhere to one explanation more than the other. 
9ý1 91 
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silence was breached, especially in Israel, by 
the debates from 1951 on concerning the 
reparations agreement in Germany, the Kastner 
trial, and finally Eichmann's capture and 
72 trial . 
The first readers of Fragments may well have wondered why 
Wilkomirski describes his memories as inexplicable', why 
it took 'years of research, before childhood memories could 
be made sense of. Indeed, the first review of Wilkomirski's 
memoir raise some doubts, but Fragments was widely read by 
others as a testament to trauma and memory and an example 
73 
of oppression overcome . For Jonathan Kozol, writing in 
the Nation, the reader of Fragments must participate %in 
the chaos of a child's desperate incomprehension, his 
longing to find reference points that might explain the 
inexplicable'. 74 He adds that Fragments 'is likely to be 
71 Dori Laub, "Truth and Testimony: The Process and the Struggle,, 
Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995) 66. 
72 Saul Friedldnder, 'Trauma, Memory, and Transference', Holocaust 
Remembrance: The Shapes of Memory, ed. Geoffrey H. Hartman (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1994) 259. Finkelstein also maintains that there is no 
evidence to support a theory of repression in this case. He claims 
that 'The real reason for public silence on the Nazi extermination was 
the conformist policies of the American Jewish leadership and the 
political climate of postwar America' 13. 
73 See Maechler 111-119 on the first review of Fragments by Klara 
ObermUller in Weltwoche in August 1995 and on the subsequent, mainly 
unquestioning, reviews. 
74 Jonathan Kozol, 'Children of the Camps', rev. of Fragments, by 
Binjamin Wilkomirski, Nation 28 October 1996,17 August 2001 
<http: //www. english. upenn. edu/-afilreis/Holocaust/children-camps-bk- 
review-html>. As we have seen (Chapter One) the detective memoir which 
emphasises the search for the past had, by the time of Fragments's 
publication, become commonplace and this could be a reason why 
Wilkomirskils afterword was not initially considered odd. Also 
commonplace by this stage was an increasing acknowledgement that 
memoirs (particularly illness memoirs) are as relevant to 
psychologists, medical practitioners, historians, and social 
scientists as thav are tn 11terary critics or the general reader. 1A 
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read as much by child psychologists as it will be by 
historians'. 
Wilkomirski's claim that his memoir is the product of 
research and 'countless conversations with specialists and 
historians, may have served initially as a kind of factual 
rhetoric, designed to deflect attention from historical and 
factual inaccuracies. 75 Yet these avowed attempts to find 
an "access to, his own past were later used as evidence 
against him, the implication being that if his memories 
were real then he should not have had to seek verification 
for them in the history books or elsewhere. What 
Wilkomirski does not mention in his afterword is a course 
of psychotherapy that he undertook while researching the 
book, that his best friend and confidant during this 
process, Elitsur Bernstein, also happens to be a 
psychotherapist, and that his access to' the past relied 
on both psychoanalytic and historical forms of 
investigation. 
Although in his afterword Wilkomirski appears to place 
himself firmly in the historians, camp on the question of 
oppression versus repression, the back cover of the first 
UK and US editions told a different story. Or rather it 
told the same story, but either inadvertently or knowingly, 
75 The childlike perspective Wilkomirski maintains throughout Fragments 
was also seen to serve the same purpose. As Maechler writes: 
'Historical imprecisions or contradictions do not impair credibility; 
on the contrary, they underscore the authenticity of a childlike 
perception, and 'conceal the fact, that the memoir 
is written with 
, the conscious. knowina mýnd of an adult', Maechler 279. 
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it introduced a word that by 1995 had become so 
ideologically loaded that it thrust Wilkomirski into the 
midst of the memory wars. 'Only in adulthood', announced 
that fateful blurb, 'did [Wilkomirski) find a way to 
recover his memories'. Once suspicions about Fragments's 
authenticity began to spread, the publisher's use of the 
word 'recovery' meant that the recovery of Wilkomirski's 
past, regardless of his denials and distinctions, was now 
firmly bound up with the 'controversial category' of 
recovered memory therapy. The most recent book about the 
Wilkomirski case, Blake Eskin's A Life in Pieces, states 
the RMT connection clearly on the inside front cover, 
asserting that Wilkomirski 'claimed to have unearthed his 
repressed Holocaust memories through therapy'. 
Wilkomirski was vehement that his memories were not 
the result of RMT. When asked about his 'recovered 
memories' by Gourevitch he responded: 
RECOVERED MEMORY means to re-discover through 
therapy, lost things of your unconscious 
memory. And that is in my case ABSOLUTELY 
WRONG. Never in my life have I forgotten what I 
wrote in my book. I had NOTHING TO RE-DISCOVER 
76 again . 
Bernstein confirmed that the therapy Wilkomirski underwent 
with Monica Matte was not in 'that controversial 
76 Gourevitch 54. 
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category,. 77 He was alluding to RMT and presumably to the 
most contentious areas of the recovered memory debate: the 
therapists' use of hypnosis and truth serum (sodium amytal) 
in order to recover repressed memories, to the phenomenon 
of 'robust repression, itself along with the notion that 
this can be followed by full recovery of previously 
unsuspected memories which are then unambiguously assumed 
to be historical fact. 
Mark Pendergrast was the first to make the connection 
between Wilkomirski and RMT. Pendergrast wrote his anti-RMT 
book Victims of Memory (1995) in response to false 
accusations of abuse levelled at him by his adult 
daughters .78 He suggests that Wilkomirski may have changed 
his story due to the increasingly controversial nature of 
recovered memories: 
Now that Fragments has been publicly debunked, 
Wilkomirski/Doessekker won't submit to 
interviews, but he apparently claims, via third 
parties, that he has always recalled these 
horrors. Yes, he was in therapy, but only for 
personal problems. Such an assertion is highly 
suspect, probably a rationalization and yet 
another rewriting of the more recent past. If 
he has always remembered all of this, why would 
77 Maechler 89. The name of Wilkomirskils therapist appears alternately 
in commentary as 'Matte, or 'Matta,. 
78 Mark Pendergrast, Victims of Memory: Incest Accusations and 
Shattered Lives (1995; London: Harper Collins, 1997). In The Memory 
Wars: Freud's Legacy in Dispute (1995; London: Granta, 1997) Frederick 
Crews refers to Victim of Memory as 'a 603-page dose of history, 
looic. and exhortation, 204- 
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he allow the publisher to call them recovered 
memories on the book's back cover? Why would he 
stress the fragmentary, chaotic nature of his 
"memoriesff, writing about how "the first 
pictures surface one by one, like upbeatsm? Why 
would he have referred to recovered memories in 
speeches ? 79 
This may be more a problem of terminology than anything; 
apart from scattered references to recovery, there is no 
evidence to prove that Wilkomirski ever admitted to having 
repressed all memory of his childhood traumas prior to his 
therapy with Monica Matte. In fact he strove to make it 
clear that this is not what he meant by 'recovery'. The 
term 'recovery' or even the more controversial recovered 
memory', moreover, need not refer specifically to the 
controversial therapeutic practices of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. As we saw in Chapter One, recovery--both the 
term and the concept--might equally refer to the 
autobiographical act, even when the memories recovered are 
not traumatic in nature. Wilkomirski's therapist was an 
advocate of non-classic psychoanalysis and employed 
techniques such as art therapy and concentration exercises 
in order to elicit memories. Wilkomirski maintained that 
his memories had always been present; therapeutic exercises 
79 Mark Pendergrast, 'Recovered Memories and the Holocaust', 
stopbadtherapy 14 January 1999,14 June 2001 <http: //www. stopbadthe 
rapy. com/experts/fragments/fragments. shtml>. 
21- ý 
only served to provide a context for them, to help him to 
"make sense of' troubling nightmares and body memories. 80 
Much has been made of the fact that Wilkomirski 
changed his story throughout his life and this evidence 
appears to be at odds with his claim that he had always 
remembered his childhood. Maechler interviewed past 
acquaintances of Wilkomirski and found that he had claimed 
to be a refugee from the Baltic States during his high- 
school years . 
81 'Not until the mid-1960s', he adds, 'did he 
begin to manifest a Jewish heritage, wearing a necklace 
with the Star of David, donning a yarmulke at home, and 
mounting a mezuzah on his apartment door'. 82 He first used 
the name Wilkomirski in 1972 and by the early 1980s a 
documentary featuring Wilkomirski revealed that his 
"biography had definitely become a Shoah story'. 83 
Wilkomirski's therapy with Monica Matte did not begin 
until the early 1990S. 
84 This chronology alone should 
preclude the possibility of therapy-induced Holocaust 
, memories'. Wilkomirskils Holocaust-related life stories 
pre-date his therapy by at least a decade. The fact that 
Wilkomirski's stories changed between his high-school years 
and the publication of Fragments may well support an 
accusation of deception (or of a deliberate construction of 
an alternative identity) but it would not support a theory 
80 
Maechler 82,89,251. 
81 Maechler 237. 
82 Maechler 237. 
83 Maechler 239-40. 
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of "robust repression' followed by recovery through therapy 
of previously unsuspected memories. Wilkomirski's changing 
story, in fact, goes some way to confirm his claim that 
therapy was a means of finding a chronology for his story 
and of explaining 'previously inexplicable shreds of 
memory, that had nonetheless always been present. 
It seems that it was interpretation, rather than the 
contested issue of repression that was the problem here, a 
question of reconstruction rather than of recovery. We do 
not need to dispute the existence of repression to see how 
', inexplicable, memories can become 'explanatory fictions'. 
The link between RMT and Wilkomirski might reveal to us the 
ways in which the RMT debate was far broader in scope than 
it seemed to be: implicating not just disreputable therapy, 
the use of drugs or hypnosis to elicit repressed memories, 
but more broadly the issue of whether or not memories 
85 
recovered (in any way) could count as historical truth . 
One aspect of Wilkomirski's story that critics found 
contestable was his claim that he was able to retain 
photographic images from his very early childhood. 
Infantile amnesia should make such a claim untenable. 86 
84 
Maechler 88. 
85 J. P. Roos claims that 'the recovered-memory discussion throws more 
light on the debate concerning reality and construction of life 
stories than on the actual question of repression of memories', 
'Reality or Nothing! False and Repressed Memories and Autobiography,, 
Trauma and Life Stories: International Perspectives, Kim Lacy Rogers, 
Selma Leysdorff, and Graham Dawson, eds. (London: Routledge, 1999) 
213. 
86 Pendergrast uses this as evidence against Wilkomirskils supposed 
rpcnvered memor-v claims. spp 'Recovered Memories and the Holocaust, 
79 8 
When Maechler advanced his theory that Wilkomirski's 
Holocaust story was a rewriting of actual, but very 
different, childhood traumas, however, he found some 
interesting results. maechler found evidence to support his 
theory that many of Wilkomirskils Holocaust memories' were 
actually distorted memories of his time spent in children's 
homes in Switzerland: that they were real, but 
decontextualised memories of his childhood. Maechler found 
parallels between the malevolent female guard in Majdanek 
and an emotionally unstable and violent foster mother, 
between Wilkomirski's account of a happy kite-flying 
incident with his brother Motti and his former foster 
brother's account of an identical incident. There are 
several more examples, but what struck Maechler, in spite 
of the vastly skewed contextualisation, was the accuracy of 
these memories. Wilkomirski accurately sketched details of 
a former foster home and its surroundings and, although he 
claimed them to be sketches of a hiding place in Poland, he 
'had even correctly indicated the position of the rising 
sun' . 
87 
The accuracy of his memories--'the boy was only 
three, four years old at the time, writes Maechler-- 
astounded both Maechler and Wilkomirskils former foster 
brother. 88 Whereas Wilkomirski's claim that he remembered 
events and scenes from very early childhood was used as 
and also Pendergrast's letter to the editor of the New Yorker in the 
wake of Gourevitch's attack: <http: //www. stopbadtherapy. com/experts/fr 
agments/letter. shtml>. 
87 Maechler 230. 
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evidence against his Holocaust story, it now served as 
89 confirmation of Maechler's new theory . 
Pendergrast is insistent on the RMT connection, and 
for him it leads to only one conclusion. In a 1999 article 
on recovered memory and the Holocaust he describes his 
first reaction to Fragments: 
I couldn't help wondering about some passages, 
including the one [. . .] in which the young 
Wilkomirski--apparently only two or three years 
old--survived having his head bashed into a 
wall. Then I read the back cover of the book. 
"'Only in adulthood did [Wilkomirski] find a way 
to recover his memories". oh, no, I thought. 
Recovered memories! I realized that I was 
probably reading a book filled with false 
memories of the Holocaust--not necessarily 
lies, but perhaps delusions, created either 
alone or with the help of psychotherapy. 90 
Wilkomirski persistently attempted to extricate 
himself from the recovered memory connection, but by this 
point it was too late and the recovered memory issue was 
almost unanimously offered as an explanation for his false 
or confabulated memories. 91 The FMS (false memory syndrome) 
Be Maechler 230. 
89 Maechler does not find parallels, however, between the early life of 
Bruno Grosjean and some of Wilkomirskils more horrific memories and so 
his explanation is in some sense incomplete. Where did Wilkomirskils 
memory of the bloody rat emerging from a female corpse come from, for 
example? 
90 Pendergrast, 'Recovered Memories and the Holocaust'. 
91 Confabulation is a term which became commonplace during the memory 
debates of the 1990s. A confabulation is a blend of true and false 
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Foundation even cited the expos6 of Wilkomirski as another 
p triumph against MT. 92 The RMT connection answered a 
troubling question for Wilkomirski's critics, however. If 
Wilkomirskils memoir told 'his truth, then how could it 
also be a 'hoax,? The bad therapy' explanation served to 
shift the blame of deception away from Wilkomirski and onto 
the therapists responsible for the creation of his mistaken 
identity. 
While Pendergrast believes that 'Wilkomirski/ 
Doesseker [. I has truly come to believe his recovered 
"memories", some have argued that Wilkomirski himself may 
have used the RMT connection as a means of evading 
responsibility. Hilberg, for example, agrees with 
Ganzfried, as Pendergrast writes, that this is a case of 
conscious fraud, since Doessekker accepted money from the 
Swiss state when his biological mother died. "I believe he 
is just using the whole recovered memory as a toolm, 
Hilberg told me, "not that he believes it necessarilyol. 93 
Although it is contestable whether Wilkomirski's 
memories were the result of suggestive therapeutic 
techniques, there is one further aspect of the case which 
suggests an affinity between his case and RMT. This is 
Wilkomirski's insistence that his memories--and his story 
memories, some details taken from actual experience with others added 
in order to confabulate a coherent story out of them. 
92 See for example this online FMS newsletter: 
<http: //www. fmsfonline. org/ 
fmsf99. n24. html>. 
93 Pendergrast, 'Recovered Memories and the Holocaust'. 
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as told in Fragments--unquestionably reflect the historical 
truth. Ganzfried's expos6 in Die Weltwoche was followed by 
a long article in Die Zeit, by sceptical journalist Jbrg 
Lau. 94 Lau believed that Wilkomirskils and Bernstein's 
joint therapy proposal was responsible for the beliefs 
which made the writing of Fragments possible. Lau claimed 
that: 'It was written in the spirit of a presumptuous 
psychotherapy that believes it can provide meaning in life, 
indeed as "identitym, by accepting, supporting, and 
authenticating as "historical reality, anything the client 
95 may choose to offer,. 
Maechler believes that Wilkomirskils and Bernstein's 
therapeutic methodology can reveal much about Wilkomirskils 
own recovery techniques since in his speeches on the 
methodology he offers %examples exclusively from his own 
memory'. 96 The method also reveals Bernstein's therapeutic 
inclinations which may have impacted on Wilkomirski, 
although Bernstein claims never to have analysed him. 
Maechler suggests that Wilkomirskils companions throughout 
the writing and the publication of Fragments, Wilkomirskils 
wife and Bernstein both 'held a position that granted 
97 
privileged status to subjective memory' . 
Matte also responded to doubts about Wilkomirskils 
memoir by assuring the publisher that *Fragments described 
94 Maechler 134. 
95 Cited by Maechler 135. 
96 Maechler 247. 
97 Maechler 271. 
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the actual memories of her patient of two and a half 
years'. 98 This might have contributed to the Wilkomirski/ 
RMT connection, but it could be countered that all 
therapies grant privileged status to subjective truth and 
that the problems arise, as was evident from the RMT 
controversy, only when analysands go public with their 
therapeutically retrieved memories and claim that they 
unquestionably represent biographical or historical fact. 
As Charles Hanly wrote in an argument against Jeffrey 
Masson in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis: 'It 
would be painfully humiliating, confusing and profoundly 
detrimental to the progress of an analysis if an analyst 
were to treat even a distorted memory of a real event as 
though it were a phantasy'. 99 And if Wilkomirski had, as he 
claims, entered therapy with his Holocaust narrative 
already in place, if it was not an outcome of the therapy 
itself, then why need Matte have doubted these memories'? 
Peter Brooks, identifying the difference between 
psychoanalytic and legal definitions of truth, wonders what 
would happen if Freud's final analyses of 'Dora' and 'The 
Wolf Man' were tested in a court of law. He writes: 
The point is, of course, that Freud never 
intended them to be subjected to legal 
determinations of truth. If in the earlier 
go Eskin 59. 
99 Cited by Ann Scott in Real Events Revisited: Fantasy, Memory, and 
Psychoanalysis (London: Virago, 1996) 11. 
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case, in Dora, he still seems to believe that 
the psychoanalyst has access to the truth of an 
individual's factual biography, in the later 
example, the Wolf Man, and in much of his 
subsequent writing, he makes it clear that the 
status of truth in psychoanalysis is different. 
It is a truth constructed in a transactional, 
transferential interaction of analyst and 
analysand, a truth whose verifiability finally 
is not at issue, since what counts is its 
explanatory force and its therapeutic value. 100 
In fact Bernstein's and Wilkomirskils therapy method seems 
designed to avoid privileging subjective truth over 
historical reality, as attested by their insistence that 
the method requires the presence of both a psychologist and 
a historian. 
In 1995 Wilkomirski gave a guest lecture at the 
University of Ostrava in the Czech Republic. It focussed on 
two areas of history which he felt had been neglected: oral 
history and the historical experiences of children during 
the Shoah. The lecture was entitled 'The Child's Memory as 
a Historical Source in Contemporary History, as Exemplified 
by Surviving Children of the Shoah'. 101 The therapy proposal 
was based on an interdisciplinary model which suggested the 
collaboration of both psychologists and historians: 'To 
prevent the historian from causing further trauma with his 
100 Peter Brooks, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and 
Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 123-24. 
101 Maechler 80. 
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questions, he himself, along with the witness, requires the 
102 
support of a psychologist versed in the field'. While the 
psychologist's presence was required to prevent further 
trauma, the historian was required in order to corroborate 
memories recovered through the therapeutic procedure. 
It is clear how this therapeutic proposal could be 
interpreted as an attempt to further legitimate 
Wilkomirskils testimony. The presence of the historian 
might counter the claims that memories recovered through 
therapy have no basis in historical fact. Wilkomirski 
suggests four techniques to aid the 'reactivation, of 
traumatic childhood memories: concentration exercises, 
visits to the site of the trauma, drawing exercises, and 
conversations with those with similar memories. 
103 Memories 
'reactivated' in this way may not represent historical 
truth, but the presence of both psychologist and historian 
should ensure that subjective and historical truth 
coalesce. 
Ideally the collaborative efforts of historian and 
psychologist should result in a finely tuned balance 
between the different aspects of testimony: the witness 
recovers a memory which is then verified by the 
listening 
historian. Drawing on transcripts of Wilkomirski's 
speeches, however, Maechler illustrates how this technique 
can go horribly wrong: the therapist attempts to elicit 
102 
Maechler 81. 
103 Maechler 247-48. 
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enough memory-detail to find a historical explanation and 
ends up contributing to his fabrication of 
pseudomemories'. 104 
Pendergrast is scathing about Wilkomirski's 
therapeutic methodology and insists that Wilkomirskils and 
Bernstein's model of recovery is no different from that 
practised by recovered memory therapists: using their 
method, even preverbal memories could be recovered 
105 
accurately fifty years later' . Pendergrast's 
insistence 
on the connection between Wilkomirskils case and RMT is 
puzzling: the link seems to be dependent on Wilkomirskils 
supposed claim that he was able to recover memories 
repressed since childhood (both in himself and in others), 
but nowhere does Wilkomirski make a claim for total 
repression of memory followed by recovery. His claim 
instead seems to be that his therapeutic technique enables 
him to find historical verification for the flimsiest of 
memory traces and thus to verify them as accurate memories 
of past experiences. This is, of course, problematic in 
itself, but it is not the same claim that recovered memory 
therapists were making. The greatest problem with his 
theory is that none of his 'clients, are prepared to agree 
that the therapy worked for them. One in particular claims 
104 Maechler 255. 
105 Pendergrast, 'Recovered Memories and the Holocaust'. 
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that Wilkomirski took credit for memory work she had 
accomplished alone. 106 
The RMT debate, as I have discussed, was rooted in 
polemic and although the debate may have cooled it still 
remains fixed in impasse. Critics of RMT usually share a 
similar strategy of attack. They cite Ellen Bass and Laura 
Davis's RMT 'bible' The Courage to Heal (1988) as an 
example of hyperbolic victim-appointing and Elizabeth 
Loftus's clinical memory trials as an example of the 
untenability of RMT claims. 107 Loftus provides evidence that 
false memories can be implanted in people's minds and 
against the validity of massive repression. 108 Supporters of 
RMT counter this, however, by claiming that Loftus's memory 
experiments do not adequately replicate a traumatic 
situation and so are not applicable to cases of severe 
psychic trauma. 109 
The RMT debate allowed for little ambiguity of memory. 
At its furthest extremes RMT supporters were liable to 
claim that memories recovered in therapy were always true 
106 Maechler 257-62. 
107 See for example, Crews 193; Pendergrast; Elaine Showalter, 
Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture (1997; London: 
Picador, 1998) 60-61; and Richard Ofshe and Ethan Watters, making 
Monsters: False Memory, Psychotherapy, and Sexual Hysteria (London: 
Andr6 Deutsch, 1995) 6. 
108 See Loftus and Ketcham and also Elizabeth F. Loftus Eyewitness 
Testimony (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) on the problem 
of witnessing and memory. 
109 See Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000) 246-47 and Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple 
Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995) 125 for an account of Bessel A. van der Kolk's 
challenge to Loftus. See also Crews 165-67. Crews cites recovered 
memory advocate Lenore Terr claiming that 'Trauma sets up new rules 
for memory,, but he supports Loftus's vehemently anti-RMT position. 
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and RMT critics came close to suggesting they were always 
false. Ambiguities in memory (which there almost certainly 
always are) were used as evidence against the claim that 
therapeutically retrieved memories can be historically 
accurate. And this is the argument that Maechler uses 
against Wilkomirskils insistence that his memories are 
recorded in exact snapshots': 
One cannot help but notice (. I how much 
Wilkomirski has appropriated from the two basic 
principles of recovered-memory therapy. 
Particularly noteworthy is the assumption that 
past experiences leave behind photographic 
traces, so to speak, that can remain unchanged 
up to the present. If there is any consensus in 
the broad field of memory research, it concerns 
the abandonment of a memory model that proceeds 
from a storing of engrams or representations. 110 
And yet Maechler would later discover that Wilkomirski had 
retained photographically exact memories from his early 
childhood, although the story and the identity he had 
constructed around them were founded on a false 
contextualisation. 
It is surprising that Maechler does not engage more 
fully with contemporary trauma theory in his study. Felman, 
Laub, and Caruth are notably absent from The Wilkomirski 
Affair, as are other commentators on traumatic memory, 
110 Maechler 252-53. 
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testimony and the Holocaust such as Dominick LaCapra, James 
E. Young and Michael Roth. "' Perhaps this omission is born 
of an unwillingness to consider Fragments as though it were 
an actual trauma narrative--even though this is Maechler's 
conclusion in the final analysis. Maechler cites van der 
Kolk on confabulation in order to provide extra support for 
his theory that Wilkomirski was the victim of irresponsible 
therapy, but van der Kolk's other work on trauma narrative 
allows for more ambiguity than this would suggest. 
Van der Kolk suggests in 'The Intrusive Past' (written 
in collaboration with van der Hart) that encouraging the 
witness/ patient to exchange traumatic memories for 
alternative stories may even be a therapeutically 
beneficial technique. 'Both Janet and many contemporary 
psychotherapists', he writes, 'have tried to assist their 
patients [. I by suggesting to them an alternative, less 
negative or even positive scenario'. 
112 Janet suggested to a 
patient who was traumatized by the sight of naked corpses 
after a cholera epidemic that she visualise the corpses 
with clothes on, or getting up and walking away. Van der 
Kolk concludes: 'Memory is everything. Once flexibility is 
introduced, the traumatic memory starts losing its power 
over current experience. By imagining these alternative 
"' Some of their reactions to the Wilkomirski affair are recorded in 
Maechler's study, but he does not engage with their theories. 
112 Bessel A. van der Kolk, 'The Intrusive Past', Trauma: Explorations 
of Memozy, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995) 178. 
309 
scenarios, many patients are able to soften the intrusive 
power of the original, unmitigated horror'. "' 
Although we are to assume that Wilkomirski's Holocaust 
story did not function as a 'more positive scenario' than 
his actual childhood traumas, van der Kolk's theories in 
'The Intrusive Past' would suggest that an analysand who 
had been encouraged to accept memories that are not true to 
aid the therapeutic process is not necessarily a victim of 
bad therapy. Whilst in Maechler's study van der Kolk served 
as a kind of expert witness to provide further evidence 
that Wilkomirski's memories are confabulations, if not 
simply false, a more thorough discussion of recent trauma 
theories alongside the Wilkomirski case yields interesting 
results. 
Certain aspects of trauma theory would in fact 
corroborate parts of Wilkomirskils story, such as his 
insistence on the literalness of his memories. It is 
precisely the literalness of traumatic memories and 
114 
recurring nightmares that makes them so problematic . But 
trauma theory would problematise Wilkomirski's claim that 
he was able to render these memories accurately and 
factually in prose. As Felman points out: 
What the testimony does not offer is (Ia 
completed statement, a totalizable account of 
those events. In the testimony, language is in 
113 Van der Kolk 178. 
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process and in trial, it does not possess 
itself as a conclusion, as the constatation of 
a verdict or the self-transParency of 
knowledge. 115 
Maechler problematises Fragments on the grounds that 
Wilkomirski appeared to know too much about the nature of 
traumatic memory; he notes that the fragmentary, gap-filled 
narrative of Fragments reveals that Wilkomirski relied on 
'a manifest understanding of how traumatized memory 
116 functions'. He writes: 
In assuming a child's perspective, Wilkomirski 
is imitating patients who often say that they 
recall a traumatic experience with the same 
intensity as if it were immediately present. 
This fragmentary form also allows the author to 
make use of a hallmark of authentic memories of 
Shoah survivors: they cannot give what happened 
a meaning, cannot put the disparate pieces 
together into a coherent narrative so that what 
they have suffered may loosen its hold over 
their present life and become the past. These 
formal characteristics turn Fragments into what 
is apparently a textbook case of traumatic 
memory. 117 
114 See, for example, Caruth's introduction to Trauma. 
115 Shoshana Felman, Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises 
of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History Mondon: 
Routledge, 1992) 5. 
116 Maechler 279. See Mary Jacobus, 'Border Crossings: Traumatic 
Reading and Holocaust Memory', Psychoanalysis and the Scene of Reading 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) for a discussion of the ways 
in which Wilkomirskils descriptions of memory cohere with both 
Freudian and Lacanian notions of traumatic memory. 
117 Maechler 279-80. 
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Paradoxically the fact that Fragments is a textbook case, 
serves as evidence against its authenticity for Maechler 
because, as he later states 'the only authentic 
autobiographical story of Auschwitz is the one that marks 
the impossibility of its authenticity in the text'. 118 And 
yet Maechler seems to argue that Fragments does just that. 
One of the primary objections to Wilkomirskils anti- 
RMT defence is his description of his memories as %exact 
snapshots of photographic memory'. 119 He began Fragments 
with a declaration that he was not a writer, that his 
memoir was an attempt to draw exactly as possible what 
happened, . 
120 It is written entirely through a child's 
perspective and renounces, as Wilkomirski writes, 'the 
ordering logic of grown-ups' . 
121 He thus makes a claim not 
just for the accuracy of his memories but also for the 
accuracy of their representation in his text, for the 
status of 'words, as a kind of 'transparent medium, of 
experience. This is something that, according to Felman, 
testimony is unable to achieve, because language in 
testimony is in process'; it is a performative speech act 
rather than a constative statement offering a totalizable 
account'. 122 
lie Maechler 293. 
119 Wilkomirski 4. 
120 Wilkomirski 4. 
121 Wilkomirski 4. 
3.22 Felman 5. Felman is referring to oral Holocaust testimony here and 
it is not clear how she would judge the status (as witness) of written 
Holocaust testimonies that were written prior to or without the 
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In Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography 
(1992) Paul John Eakin explains that one of the traditional 
beliefs about autobiography's claims is that language can 
serve as a 'transparent medium of expression, permitting 
unmediated access to the world of reference beyond the 
text'. 123 This may be a traditional belief about the 
referential possibilities of testimony too, but with 
testimony the stakes are higher as testimony not only seeks 
to observe a historical imperative but also claims in some 
sense to be representative, to speak for others with 
similar experiences. The tension between this imperative 
and the therapeutic imperative of testimony is one of the 
central concerns of contemporary trauma theory. 
In Testimony, Felman and Laub write of the often 
uncomfortable tensions between clinical, therapeutic, or 
psychoanalytic approach to testimony and the political or 
historical approach. Laub relates an anecdote which 
illustrates the dichotomy at its polemical extreme. It is 
worth citing in full: 
woman in her late sixties was narrating her 
Auschwitz experience to interviewers from the 
Video archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale 
interview process. Her essays on Camus and de Man, however, make it 
clear that 'witnessing does not provide narrative knowledge' and that 
testimony might need to be sought between the lines of writings 
claiming to be something else, Felman 139. Felman suggests that de 
Man's testimony, for example, can be found in his theoretical writing: 
'History as Holocaust is mutely omnipresent in the theoretical 
endeavour of de Man's work', Felman 140. 
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[. 1. She was relating her memories as an 
eyewitness of the Auschwitz uprising; a sudden 
intensity, passion and color were infused into 
the narrative. She was fully there. "All of a 
sudden,, she said, "we saw four chimneys going 
up in flames, exploding [. . N1. Many months 
later, a conference of historians, 
psychoanalysts, and artists, gathered to 
reflect on the relation of education to the 
Holocaust, watched the videotaped testimony of 
the woman, in an attempt to better understand 
the era. A lively debate ensued. The testimony 
was not accurate, historians claimed (. 1. 
Historically, only one chimney was blown up, 
not all four. Since the memory of the 
testifying woman turned out to be, in this way, 
fallible, one could not accept--nor give 
credence to--her whole account of the events. 
It was utterly important to remain accurate, 
lest the revisionists in history discredit 
everything. 124 
Laub was one of the psychoanalysts present and for him the 
error expressed a significant truth: 
The woman was testifying not to the number of 
chimneys blown up, but to something else, more 
radical, more crucial: the reality of an 
unimaginable occurrence (. 1. The woman 
testified to an event that broke the all 
compelling frame of Auschwitz, where Jewish 
123 Paul John Eakin, Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992) 30 
124 Laub, Testimony 59. 
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armed revolt just did not happen, and had no 
place. She testified to the breakage of a 
framework. That was historical truth. 125 
Laub adds that it was through my listening to her' that 
[. . .1 came to understand not merely her subjective truth, 
but the very historicity of the event, in an entirely new 
dimension'. 126 
This recalls Anderson's hope that one day we may be 
able to look at the Wilkomirski case and 'see through the 
fiction to the history again'. Laub's psychoanalytic 
perspective allows him to see through the errors in this 
witness's story and to find something 'more radical, more 
crucial'. But as his anecdote also illustrates, it takes a 
certain kind of listening in order to understand this 
'historicity' and if the psychoanalyst is willing to 
recognise both the therapeutic and the historical 
reverberations of testimony, the historian is less willing 
or able to see both sides. For the historian an error is an 
error; for the psychoanalyst it is an opening. Yet it is 
not just the difference of opinion that is important here; 
Laub also illustrates the extent to which the status of 
testimony--indeed the very emergence of testimony--is 
dependent on the presence of a listening other. It is a 
flaw of Wilkomirski's therapeutic model that he serves at 
once as client, historian and psychoanalyst. In this case, 
125 Laub, Testimony 60. 
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as Maechler points out only the client [. I has at his 
disposal the criteria by which to judge the truth of 
historical facts', which recalls Grabowski's claim that 
, only the individual can decide if he/ she is a 
survivor,. 127 It is also notable, though, that in order to 
deliver his diagnosis, of Wilkomirski Maechler briefly 
abandons his historian's cap and adopts an 'authoritative' 
psychoanalytic persona. 128 
The emphasis of trauma theory might be more on the 
therapeutic than the historical function of testimony, but 
this does not, in Laub's view, detract from the historical 
imperative to testify. Instead, it finds a way to see 
through the necessary fictions' of testimonial narrative 
to the history again. From the perspective of recent trauma 
theory Fragments emerges as perhaps the model trauma 
testimony, illustrating more strikingly the problem of 
memory and narrative for the traumatised child than perhaps 
any truly verifiable testimony could do. Wilkomirskils 
, true story' is one that cannot be told, his history one 
that cannot be %accessed, directly. From the perspective of 
RMT, however, Fragments can only be seen as a fake, the 
result of irresponsible therapy of which Wilkomirski is 
either the naive victim duped into delusion or the willing 
accomplice in the 'fabrication of pseudomemories'. 
126 Laub, Testimony 62. 
127 Maechler 256. 
128 See Maechler 163-64 and observe the means by which he claims the 
authority to diagnose,. 
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4. RMT and the Holocaust 
Although RMT became a large feature of the Wilkomirski 
controversy, Pendergrast made something of a leap when he 
titled his internet article 'Recovered Memories and the 
Holocaust'. It is unusual to find RMT discussed in any kind 
of detail alongside accounts of the kinds of recovery with 
which Holocaust testimony commentators are concerned. 
Caruth, Felman, and Laub for example, make no mention of 
RMT in their studies of trauma and the Holocaust and in 
Trauma: A Genealogy Ruth Leys alludes only fleetingly to 
RMT. 
The dangers of placing the disreputable RMT beside 
therapeutically motivated Holocaust interviews are obvious. 
RMT began as a %socio-political movement, and enabled 
silenced victims of sexual abuse to recover both their 
individual histories and the historical reality of such 
abuse from repression or political oppression. 129 It went 
on, however, to unearth increasingly bizarre and 
unsubstantiated memories of alien abductions and ritual 
satanic abuse, which is why it was so disastrous for 
Wilkomirskils case when he met--and corroborated the story 
of--Laura Grabowski. 
129 Crews 160. 
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There are of course clear differences between the 
procedures of RMT and those of oral Holocaust testimony. 
Holocaust testimonies are based on verifiable historical 
events at which the witness is always presumed to have been 
present. 'Repression, is rarely mentioned in accounts of 
Holocaust witnessing and certainly not in the context of a 
complete repression of the event followed by a complete 
recovery. Yet both recent trauma theory and RMT share 
certain philosophical implications. Both are concerned with 
the relationship between the recovered past and historical 
reality, and both are founded on an early Freudian model of 
repression and recovery, although the 'recovery methods, 
advocated or employed differ. 
Leys notes that the psychoanalytic approach to 
Holocaust testimony was only consolidated in the wake of 
post-Vietnam PTSD studies, an observation which connects 
these two separate yet interrelated approaches . 
130 RMT, S 
absence in major works on trauma theory is probably 
130 PTSD or post-traumatic stress disorder was only included in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSH-111) in 
1980. See Laura S. Brown 'Not outside the Range: One Feminist 
Perspective on Psychic Trauma,, Trauma 100-112. Leys writes that the 
Holocaust is now not only seen as 'the crucial trauma of the century, 
but also the one that can be fully understood only in the light of our 
knowledge of PTSDI, Leys 15-16. Although PTSD became, as Leys points 
out, less psychoanalytically theorised, studies of Holocaust testimony 
have remained almost exclusively the province of either history or 
psychoanalysis. By the psychoanalytic approach to testimony, I refer 
to the work of Felman, Laub and Caruth rather than the earlier 
attempts by, for example, Viktor Frankl and Bruno Bettelheim to 
psychoanalytically theorise Holocaust survivors. For an example of 
these theories, however, see Bruno Bettelheim, The Informed Heart 
(1960; London: Penguin, 1986), Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for 
Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy, trans. Ilse Lasch (1959; New 
York: Touchstone, 1984). Bettelheim is a Freudian analyst and has been 
accused of a blaming the victim approach,, Frankl1a perspective is 
that of what he calls 'existential analysis,. 
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attributable to its controversial nature and not due to the 
emphasis on sexual abuse in RMT. Theories of PTSD, for 
example, can accommodate traumatic memories of both sexual 
abuse and combat neuroses. At its extreme, the RMT theory 
asserts that a victim can have had absolutely no knowledge 
of sexual abuse and can, through therapy, retrieve a 
photographically accurate memory of such an event long 
repressed. 
As I discussed in Chapter One, however, there are no 
grounds for anti-RMT commentators to distinguish between 
the supposed robust repression' of RMT and Freud's early 
theory of repression and hysteria. Although Holocaust 
interviewing is not based on a theory of repression, at 
times the terminology comes close--memories of Holocaust 
trauma may not be %repressed, but the truth of this 
experience is essentially not available to its own 
speaker,. 131 And, of course, many Holocaust interviews are 
based on the analyst-analysand relationship. Langer speaks 
of 'deep memory, and buried memory' which, through the 
, subtle urging of the interviewer, can come to light, and 
oral Holocaust testimonies are seen to provide access to, 
these buried stories, to put the witness in possession, of 
them again. 132 As Laub's anecdote about the Auschwitz 
uprising illustrates, historically accurate testimony is 
131 
Felman 15. 
132 Langer 9 and Felman 15-16. 
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not the primary aim of such interviews, which are based on 
more therapeutic goals. 133 
It is no surprise that the majority of Wilkomirskils 
defenders were psychoanalysts rather than historians. Raul 
Hilberg, along with Lawrence Langer, and Yehuda Bauer 
'knew' instantly that Fragments was a fiction. On the CBS 
60 Minutes broadcast he attested that Wilkomirskils story 
sat somewhere between %the highly unlikely and the utterly 
impossible,. 134 He was present at a Holocaust symposium at 
Notre Dame where, while the rest of the audience gave 
Wilkomirski a standing ovation, Hilberg 'sat on his 
135 hands'. Wilkomirski felt abused by historians who, he 
claims, have only a meagre understanding of the working of 
trauma and who have not committed themselves sufficiently 
to the history of children during the Holocaust. 'These 
historians', Maechler writes, treated his book as the 
"historical and factual report of an expert adult witnesso, 
whereas the issue here was one of images explicitly 
designated as "those that remained in a young child's 
memory, without the critical and ordering logic of 
136 
adultsm'. 
In 1999 and, as Maechler writes against the maelstrom 
of disbelief,, Harvey Peskin made the controversial 
decision to present Wilkomirski an award on behalf of the 
133 As discussed in Chapter Two. 
134 Cited by Maechler 149. 
135 Pendergrast, 'Recovered Memories and the Holocaust' 
136 Maechler 141-42. 
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American Orthopsychiatric Association (ORTHO). 137 The award 
was the seventh Hayman Award for Holocaust and Genocide 
study and Peskin is both a psychoanalyst and professor 
emeritus at the University of California. Peskin awarded 
the honor partly in support of other child survivors and 
partly in response to Wilkomirski's work with child 
survivors through his historical and psychoanalytic 
therapeutic procedure. He concluded his speech 'The ORTHO 
award honors [. I the memoirist and the healer and his 
, 138 journey from one to the other . 
A further article by Peskin in November/ December 2000 
confirms his continuing belief that Wilkomirski had 
received an unfair trial' and that he should still deserve 
the benefit of the doubt: 
It is only in the capacity to doubt freely that 
we can approach an authentic sense of verified 
truth. Yetl the denial of our special 
ambivalence deprives us of the liberty of 
doubt. Splitting our minds into icons and 
taboos, into true belief and disbelief, is in 
139 
the long run small comfort . 
137 Maechler 156. Maechler titles his sub-chapter 'Against the 
maelstrom of disbelief, after Peskin published his argument against 
Wilkomirski in the Nation and declared that even against this 
maelstrom of disbelief he still intended to support Wilkomirski. 
See 
Harvey Peskin 'Holocaust Denial: A Sequel,, Nation 19 April 1999,31 
January 2002 <http: //past. thenation. com/issue/990419/0419peskin. 
shtml>. The ORTHO association is, Maechler writes, an 
interdisciplinary organization for professionals dedicated to the 
psychological health of children and adults'. 
138 Cited by Maechler 158. 
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Peskin, writes Maechler, was concerned that the debate 
over Wilkomirskils guilt had been dominated by historians, 
and had not involved experts in trauma and traumatic 
memory'. He felt that the publisher would be placed at a 
disadvantage if the historian did not have the input of 
trauma experts' and suggested that Wilkomirskils and 
Bernstein's therapeutic methodology be adapted for use on 
140 its own creator'. 
Likewise, when Wilkomirski proposed to a panel of 
historians that they investigate the case on his behalf, 
they refused to accept his condition that they do so in 
cooperation with Lea Balint who was not only one of his 
staunchest supporters but also an expert in dealing with 
child survivors . 
141 The Suhrkamp press went ahead and 
commissioned the historian, Stefan Maechler, without 
accepting Peskin's suggestion that the research be carried 
out in collaboration with experts in traumatic memory. And 
yet not only did Maechler come up with an oddly 
psychoanalytic conclusion, when he explains the terms of 
his research they do not seem so far removed from Peskin, s 
suggested approach: 
Authentic remembrance of a trauma is a story 
that cannot be told. Presuming that Wilkomirski 
does have traumatic memories (and this will 
139 Harvey Peskin, 'Memory and Media: "Caseso of Rigoberta Menchd and 
Binjamin Wilkomirskil, Society 38: 1 (November/ December 2000): 39-46. 
140 Maechler 163. 
141 Maechler 138-39. 
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become my working hypothesis in my research), I 
can do only one thing as a historian: 
investigate the circumstances that so 
traumatized him that he in fact does not 
understand them and cannot fully relate to them 
even today. In which case a historian's work is 
assisted not only by documents--as Peskin would 
have it in his simple dichotomy of documents 
and memory--but also by both the present and 
the missing memories of contemporary witnesses, 
including those of Wilkomirski himself. 142 
Although Maechler refused to rely on the assistance of 
psychoanalytically biased investigators in his study, he 
still makes a claim for the validity of both historical 
(documentary) and psychoanalytic (memory) sources. 
Psychoanalysis, because of its tendency to value 
subjective truths and because of its epistemological 
relativism might have been seen here as a danger to the 
objective pursuit of historical investigation. Suhrkamp's 
decision to allow only a historian to carry out the 
research on their behalf, though, begs certain questions. 
Who has the authority to determine the historical status of 
testimony? Both Wilkomirski and Grabowski defended the view 
that only the individual, had the authority over the 
status of their memories and identities. Maechler ended his 
study with an allusion to a potentially pending law suit 
brought against Wilkomirski by a Zurich lawyer in response 
142 Maechler 164. 
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to Ganzfried's article, suggesting that only a court of law 
could solve the matter once and for all. 143 The Wilkomirski 
Affair itself had the feel of a legal investigation and 
even Wilkomirskils defender Peskin in his 2000 article on 
Wilkomirski and Rigoberta Menchu declares: 'The 
investigation of fraud against MencMl and Wilkomirski will 
144 be treated here as in a courtroom'. And yet the verdict 
in both cases ends on a non liquet, with Maechler pointing 
the way to further legal investigations and Peskin 
concluding with a reminder of the need for ambiguity and 
doubt. 145 
The only truly objective test of veracity would be the 
DNA test to which Wilkomirski still refuses to submit, but 
even then, the verdict would only be clear if the test 
proved positive; if Wilkomirski's DNA did not match that of 
Max Grosjean this would still not prove that he was 
Binjamin Wilkomirski. Eskin believes, too, that this would 
still not provide sufficient evidence for Wilkomirski and 
his supporters: 
143 Maechler 299,317. Yet Maechler also claims that 'The question 
remains C. ] whether delegating the affair to the public 
prosecutors is not more likely to cover up the countless problems it 
poses, 299. 
144 Peskin, Memory and Media,: 40. 
145 1 have borrowed the legal term non liquet, from Freud, who ends 
his case history of 'The Wolf Man' with this same kind of 
epistemological undecidability. See Sigmund Freud, 'From the Ifistory 
of an infantile Neurosis ('The Wolf Man'),, 1918 (1914). Case 
Histories 11, PFL 9, trans. James Strachey, ed. Angola Richards 
(London: Penguin, 1991) 295. See also Peter Brooks on the tensions 
between the status of truth, in law and in psychoanalysis 123-24. 
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for someone whose faith in Binjamin has not 
been shaken thus far, it is always possible to 
remain faithful: to decide that the Swiss 
governmental conspiracy against him would 
manufacture a false positive result, to 
maintain that DNA testing is less than 100 per 
cent accurate, or to pretend, as the author of 
Fragments himself did (. I that the medical 
experiments to which he was subjected and the 
resulting leukaemia could have altered his 
genetic makeup. 146 
In the search for the most objective methods possible 
through which to investigate the case, it is not surprising 
that Suhrkamp decided against the psychoanalytic approach, 
even though this is perhaps the only way in which to make 
sense of the case. A psychoanalytic investigation might 
well have run the risk not only of validating Wilkomirski's 
testimony as a trauma narrative, but also of weakening the 
historical validity of other survivor testimony too. 
Wilkomirskils critics feared that this 'fake, 
Holocaust memoir would be a hot topic for Holocaust 
deniers, and revisionist websites indicate that these fears 
were not misplaced. The continuing support of Wilkomirski 
by psychoanalysts and specialists in traumatic memory only 
added fuel to this fire. Psychoanalysis, as Peskin's words 
above illustrate, favours the ambiguous, and as Laub's 
anecdote reveals, might find the lie or the error more 
146 Eskin 231-32. 
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revealing than historical 'truth'. Laub in fact supported 
the ORTHO award, while Langer opposed it on the grounds 
that Fragments reminded him of the earlier controversial 
Holocaust testimony, The Painted Bird. 
In an article titled 'Historical Past vs. Political 
Present' posted on the Historical Review website, the 
Holocaust revisionist Arthur Butz uses Wilkomirski's memoir 
147 
as evidence that the revisionists are right' . He attacks 
those who initially supported Wilkomirski's memoir, in 
order to bolster his claims that revisionist history is 
based on sound historical fact rather than on the reports 
of eyewitnesses. Those who continued to support Wilkomirski 
even after the controversy only serve, he claims, to 
further the revisionist cause. 'There is no doubt that 
Wilkomirskils work was "being taken seriously among 
therapists who treat Holocaust survivorsm', he wrote, 
naming Dori Laub as a notable example. 148 
One of the main arguments against the support of 
Wilkomirski is that to defend him is to open the door to 
doubt that would then impact on other survivor testimony. 
Butz turns this argument against Wilkomirski to his favour: 
Wilkomirski's account does indeed sound a lot 
like those of the "survivorsN who have 
testified to atrocious German cruelties in the 
147 Arthur Butz, 'Historical Past vs. Political Present', Journal of 
Historical Review 19.6 (November/ December 2000), 31 January 2002 
<http: //www. ihr. org/jhr/vl9/vl9n6pl2-Butz. html>. 
ids Butz. 
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camps, though I would prefer to turn that 
around: the accounts of those survivors sound a 
lot like Wilkomirskils. Because of the Ortho 
award, you now have that evaluation from a 
group of professional psychiatrists. 149 
David Irving uses a similar line of attack in his 
website writings, using Holocaust specialists, defence of 
Wilkomirski as evidence that they are liable to defend any 
account of the Holocaust, however unverifiable it may be. 
The tone of these articles is gleeful and self- 
congratulatory. Denouncing Wilkomirski and his supporters 
Irving takes the opportunity to announce the honorary 
appointment of another 1ASSHOL1 member: the 'ASSOCIATION of 
SPURIOUS SURVIVORS of the HOLOCAUST and OTHER LIARS', a 
group he invented during %a speech in Canada, to cover 
people like Wilkomirski and Wiesel and Foxmanl. lso 
Fragments was easy pickings for Holocaust deniers and 
the Wilkomirski controversy gave them the opportunity to 
drag other examples of fraudulent testimonies (that were 
initially believed) into the fore as 'proof' not only that 
eyewitness accounts are often unverifiable, but also that 
Holocaust historians and commentators are liable to believe 
them anyway. 151 Experts in Holocaust testimony, from both 
149 Butz. 
150 David Irving, 'Index on Binjamin Wilkomirskil, Znternational 
Campaign for Real History (date not provided), 8 January 2002 
<http: //www. fpp. co. uk/Auschwitz/Wilkomirski. 2html>. 
151 See for example the website of the Znternational Campaign for Real 
History, <http: //www. fpp. co. uk/Auschwitz/atories/Strummerl. html> for 
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the historical and the psychoanalytic camp, may agree that 
survivor accounts can be unreliable, but not that this 
shakes the foundation of the historical truth at the core 
of them. Some Holocaust historians prefer not to rely on 
survivor accounts as historical evidence. 152 Psychoanalytic 
commentators recognise the flawed nature of survivor 
testimony but find ways to see through the errors in 
testimony to a greater 'historicity,. As Roger Boyes wrote, 
however, in the Times: 
The importance of the (Wilkomirskil debate is 
that many on the far Right are contesting the 
details and, therefore, the veracity of the 
Holocaust. Witness accounts are essential. That 
is why Steven Spielberg set up the Shoah 
Foundation to interview survivors. Since many 
are in ill-health, and since the camps 
themselves are decaying, Holocaust biography 
has become more important than ever. Fake 
Holocaust testimony distorts the debate. 153 
While survivor accounts may be susceptible to historical 
errors it is rare to find a trauma narrative as 
historically inaccurate as Wilkomirski's memoir, and 
details of revisionists' reaction to a previous case of 'fake, 
Holocaust testimony, the case of Deli Strummer. 
152 Raul Hilberg is a notable example. And survivor testimonies were 
not used, as I noted in the introduction to this thesis in the David 
Irving libel case, see D. D. Cuttenplan, The Holocaust on Trial: 
History, Justice and the David Zrving Libel Case (London: Granta, 
2001) 96. 
153 Roger Boyes, 'Testimony of Holocaust %Survivorw Denounced as 
Fiction', London Times 8 September 1998,8 January 2002 <http: //www. 
corax. org/revisionism/nonsense/980908testimony. html> 
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Fragments should in no sense be considered typical. This is 
why it could not remain on the bookshelves in its non- 
fiction form and why the question of its generic status was 
so important to resolve. 
S. Genre Troubless From Masterpiece to Kitsch 
When Wilkomirski was first called upon to respond to 
Ganzfried's public attack on the authenticity of Fragments 
he made an interesting distinction between the two 
different ways in which his memoir might be read. He 
claimed that 'The reader was always free to regard my book 
154 
as literature or as personal document'. It is not clear 
what Wilkomirski meant by this, although it may be a 
gesture towards what is perhaps the simplest and yet the 
most problematic aspect of his memoir: the fact that it was 
published. In seeking to allocate blame for the Wilkomirski 
debacle several commentators turned to the therapist 
responsible for Wilkomirskils memories, and ensuing 
'memoir', as I have discussed, but Wilkomirskils agent and 
publishers were also subject to critical scrutiny. 155 Raul 
154 Cited by Maechler 131. 
155 This question was becoming relevant even before Ganzfried's 
disclosure. See, for example, Doreen Carvajal, 'Nowl Read the True 
(More or Less) Storyl; Publishers and authors debate the Boundaries of 
Nonfiction', New York Times 24 February 1998, late ed.: El. See Martin 
Arnold, 'Making Books; Does Nonfiction Mean Factual? ', New rork Times 
20 July 2000, late ed.: E3 for a post-Wilkomirski view. The issue was 
also taken up again with some urgency after the public disclosure of 
the inauthenticity of Tom Carew's Jihad in November 2001. See Owen 
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Hilberg, for example, wondered: 'How could this book make 
its way through several publishing houses as an 
autobiography?,. 156 
It is highly unlikely that Fragments would have 
attracted any attention at all if it had remained a 
'personal document', and this was Wilkomirskils initial 
intention when he began writing. 157 Maechler blames the 
writing of Fragments, in part, on Bernstein, Piller, and 
Matte, who encouraged Wilkomirski as he wrote, but this 
encouragement--and even the credence they gave to his 
account--is not necessarily admonishable in itself. once 
Fragments was published, and published as memoir,, it 
became a part of the historical record and was open to the 
kind of scrutiny it eventually received. The reader could 
not regard Fragments as %personal document, because this is 
no longer what it was. 
Moreover, Wilkomirski makes claims in Fragments for 
its historical and public value, not only maintaining that 
his memories and memoir unquestionably represent historical 
fact but also claiming that his birth certificate has 
, nothing to do with either the history of this century or 
BOWCott, 'Afghan Book Author "was Never in SAS", Guardian Unlimited 
15 November 2001,29 January 2002 <http: //www. guardian. co. uk/Archive/ 
Article/0,4273,4299445,00. html>. 
"' cited by maechler 135. 
IS7 Maechler also acknowledges this, writing that 'His conduct turned 
highly explosive only because he became a public figure and entangled 
publishers, schools, museums, the media, self-help organizations, and 
readers in his game' 302. 
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my personal history, (my emphasis). 158 Maechler also takes 
issue with Wilkomirskils statement of defence: 
In the wake of Ganzfried's vilification, 
Wilkomirski said that no one had to believe 
him. But even my brief analysis of the text 
shows that it is precisely this freedom of 
choice that he denies his readers, forcing them 
to read what he has written as authentic 
autobiography. Moreover, all his public 
appearances were powerful staged performances 
of this ostensible identity between author and 
first-person narrator. 159 
The very term 'memoir' indicates the manner in which a text 
should be read--in Bruss's terms, the contextual material 
determines the illocutionary value' of a text--and 
precludes the matter of choice. 160 Eva Hoffman refers to 
Fragments as a result of 'false memoir syndrome, and points 
out that this 'may sometimes involve genuine pathology; but 
161 
when pathology goes public, it can become culpable,. 
Many were anxious that if Fragments remained in its 
original form as memoir then this would impact on other 
survivor testimonies, would introduce a degree of 
relativism that could potentially undermine the historical 
M Wilkomirski 154. 
159 Maechler 282. 
160 Elizabeth W. Bruss, Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation 
of a Literary Genre (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) 
10. 
161 Eva Hoffman, 'True to Life?,, Time. com 14 June 1999,26 February 
2002 <http: //www. time. com/time/magazine/intl/article/0,9171,110790614- 
27329,00. html>. 
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importance of all eyewitness accounts. Jdrg Lau, who 
reacted strongly to the therapeutic 'presumptions, that led 
to the writing of Fragments is one such critic: 
Those who deny Auschwitz did not need to wait 
for Wilkomirski to nurse their mad ideas, and 
if Fragments should prove to be a mere 
victimization fantasy, then the witness, the 
poems and the novels, of real victims will not 
be discredited by that. Permanent damage can 
arise only if the status of this text remains 
uncertain, which it what its author wants. That 
everyone is free to believe or not to believe 
in the authenticity of reports about the 
Holocaust is precisely the cynically laid-back 
position of the modern revisionists, who have 
taken a lesson from postmodern epistemology. 162 
There were different opinions on the historical 
importance of Fragments, with some, like Lau claiming that 
ambiguity must not be allowed, and with others attesting 
that Fragments might still prove a useful educational tool. 
Deborah Lipstadt, for example, claimed that she would still 
place Fragments on her reading list at Emory University. 163 
Lipstadt felt that the fictionality of Fragments might 
162 Cited by Maechler 135-36. 
163 Lipstadt recently wrote, however, that she would be reluctant to do 
so in the light of all the new evidence against Wilkomirski's account, 
4 June 2002 (private correspondence). 
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complicate matters somewhat. But [the book] is still 
powerful as a novel ,. 
164 
One of the first people to express doubts about 
Fragments was Hanno Helbling, who wrote to Wilkomirski's 
agent to voice her reservations before publication. "5 
"Everything depends', she wrote 'on how such a publication 
, 166 is presented . She suggested that the book be packaged as 
an 'Auschwitz novel', as "'genuineff memoirs that sooner or 
later may be identified as fiction' or as a 'psychological 
rarity' . 
167 The writer and Holocaust survivor Norman Manea 
told Gourevitch that 'if Wilkomirski had called his book 
"fragments from a therapy", he could have avoided the 
current controversy: ""It could still be nonfiction, but 
much more honest, and the book would be the real thing, 
even if it is a delusionff'. 168 Another commentator wrote 
that there are reasons for which Fragments should continue 
to remain 'in our literary landscape--if not as a memoir 
(it is not that), and not as a novel (it is not that 
either, at least not yet), then at least as a "casem'. 1 
6'-o 
Langer felt that Fragments had an impact 'as imagined 
experience, but not as history', and stated that although 
164 Cited by Eskin, 'Wilkomirski's New Identity Crisis', Forward 18 
September 1998,11 June 2001 <http: //www. forward. com/issues/ 
1998/98.09.18/arts. html>. 
165 Maechler 93-94. Maechler believes Helbling may have been %tipped 
off, by acquaintances of Wilkomirskils who had heard that he was about 
to publish a Holocaust memoir and who doubted its authenticity. 
166 Cited by Maechler 94. 
167 Cited by Maechler 94. 
168 Cited by Gourevitch: 54. 
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it was historically inauthentic, Fragments was nonetheless 
170 a good "allegory' of the camps . Wilkomirskils American 
publisher Arthur Samuelson declared that even though 
Fragments might be fiction, it remains a pretty cool 
book,, adding that 'It's only a fraud if you call it non- 
fiction. I would then reissue it, in the fiction category. 
Maybe it's not true--then he's a better writer! 
171 
Wilkomirski's translator Carol Brown Janeway believed that 
if Fragments did turn out to be fiction 'then what's at 
issue are not empirical facts that can be checked, but 
172 
spiritual facts that must be pondered, . 
Both Lappin and Finkelstein cite these two 
commentators and both take issue with their approaches. 
Lappin wrote: 'it seemed to me that non-mystical facts were 
the essence of the matter here and that, if Wilkomirski had 
broken another contract--that between an author and the 
reader's trust--then this book should be reclassified as 
, 173 fiction or withdrawn . Finkelstein adds Israel Gutman, a 
director of Yad Vashem, Holocaust lecturer and survivor, to 
his list: 
According to Gutman, "it's not that importantff 
whether Fragments is a fraud. "Wilkomirski had 
written a story which he has experienced 
169 Susan Rubin Suleiman, %Problems of Memory and Factuality in Recent 
Holocaust Memoirs: Wilkomirski/Wiesel', Poetics Today 21.3 (Fall 
2000): 554. 
170 Cited by Maechler 158,212. 
171 cited by Lappin: 49 and Finkelstein 60. 
1-72 Lappin: 50 and Finkelstein 61. 
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deeply; that's for sure. [. . .) He 
is not a 
fake. He is someone who has lived this story 
very deeply in his soul. The pain is 
authentic'. So it doesn't matter whether he 
spent the war in a concentration camp or a 
Swiss chalet; Wilkomirski is not a fake if his 
"pain is authenticm: thus speaks an Auschwitz 
survivor turned Holocaust expert. The others 
deserve contempt; Gutman, just Pity. 
174 
Although many offered suggestions as to how 
Wilkomirskils memoir might be repackaged nobody, it seems, 
was in favour of allowing Fragments to remain in the 
nonfiction category. Samuelson's claim that the fictional 
status of Fragments makes of Wilkomirski 'a better writer' 
begs certain questions. Are prizes and honours bestowed 
upon the writers of memoirs for the quality of the writing 
or for the memories themselves, for the fact that the 
author lived through the events s/he describes? Kosinskils 
The Painted Bird was embroiled in a similar generic 
controversy to Wilkomirskils memoir' and IKosinski was 
able to awaken the enthusiasm of the woman who would become 
its publisher by suggesting it was autobiographical,, 
writes Maechler, adding that the generic status of 
Kosinskils book also impacted on its critical reception: 
'"I thought it was fictionff, Elie Wiesel says, "and when he 
told me it was autobiography I tore up my review and wrote 
173 Lappin: 50. 
174 Finkelstein 61. 
335 
one a thousand times betterff'. 175 While the text itself 
remains identical, the lillocutionary force, of a book, as 
these examples illustrate, depends on its generic status. 
This was marked in the Wilkomirski controversy, where it 
almost seemed as though Fragments's swift private to public 
trajectory involved several textual transmutations: from 
the unpublished memoir written as an aid to therapy and 
intended for a small audience of family and friends, to the 
'masterpiece' Holocaust memoir, and finally to the 'fake, 
memoir. 
Some felt that it would not do simply to reclassify 
Fragments as fiction and claim it as a great novel, because 
by the time it had been revealed as a fake, it had already 
become a different kind of book altogether. Ruth KlQger, 
for example, maintained: 
The original readers have nothing to feel 
embarrassed about. A few weeks ago they had a 
very different book in their hands from the one 
they have now, even though the text has 
remained the same. We shall continue to have to 
read those books that claim to be history 
differently from those that merely contain 
stories. 176 
Klilger goes a step further and states that Fragments 
becomes nothing more than lkitsch, once it is separated 
175 Maechler 214. 
276 Cited by Maechler 281. 
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from the historical framework. Maechler agrees with 
KlUger's analysis and adds: 
When there are breaks or contradictions between 
the interior and exterior worlds portrayed, we 
find a literary work stimulating, fascinating, 
and rich. As soon as the author tried to make 
these exterior and interior worlds congruent, 
however--as by immediately duplicating an 
internal emotion or threat with an external 
one--we sense it to be a one-dimensional world, 
that is, kitsch. 177 
This is unavoidable in Wilkomirski's case, unless, Maechler 
writes 'we read the text as a description of a different 
reality, as that of the traumatized little Bruno 
Grosjean'. 178 Maechler does read Fragments in this way, and 
yet appears simultaneously to agree with KlUger that 
Fragments is kitsch because not historically or 
biographically true. 179 
This reading further problematises the generic 
confusion surrounding Fragments which, as Maechler also 
claimed, could be read as an alienated, autobiography. 
Some critics found a way around this conundrum, however, by 
pathologising Fragments and by coining a term to describe 
this kind of 'psychological rarity': literary Munchausen 
177 Maechler 282. 
178 Maechler 282. 
179 Maechler 282. 
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Syndrome. 180 Yet even if Fragments is the result of an 
identity-afflicting pathology, even if it is still in some 
crucial sense Wilkomirski's autobiography, it does not 
qualify as non-fiction. As Lappin wrote: 
I thought about Wilkomirski. Either he had been 
born in this country or he hadn't, in which 
case Fragment: s was a lie--his early lives were 
mutually exclusive. But "lieff might be too 
strong a word, meant for courts of law. Writing 
has milder terms. In writing, there is fiction 
and non-fiction. There seem to be clear 
divisions, but as any writer knows the boundary 
can be blurred, and nowhere more so than in 
this literary form "the memoir,. Trying to 
evoke the past the memoirist needs to recreate 
it, and in doing so he may be tempted to 
invent--a detail here and there, a scene, a 
piece of dialogue. In any case, did it matter 
so much whether Fragments was fact or 
f iction? '81 
She concludes by suggesting that the conditions of the 
Wilkomirski affair may be different for those applied to 
other works of non-fiction, that Wilkomirskils 
'public speeches in the name of all child survivors, his 
book's role in the historical record, his claims to be a 
180 Anthony Daniels, 'Literary Victimhood', The New Criterion 18 
September 1999,26 February 2002 <http: //www. newcriterion. com/ 
archive/18/sept99/victim>. 
htm>. Daniels also diagnoses' Helen Demidenko with literary 
Munchausen Syndrome, and claims that Rigoberta MenchdIs editor 
Elisabeth Burgos-Debray may be suffering from %literary Munchausen 
Syndrome by proxy'. 
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witness, would need to be denounced if he was making it 
all up', and perhaps even if he wasn't because 'If care 
with the truth does not matter here, then it can matter 
182 
nowhere,. Wilkomirskils case is an extreme one and 
Fragments a highly atypical *autobiography' yet in 
demanding that its generic status be modified most 
commentators here seem implicitly to be arguing for the 
sanctity of the autobiographical pact. 
In a recent essay 'Breaking Rules: The Consequences of 
Self-Narration' Eakin turns to the cases of Rigoberta 
Mench-d and Wilkomirski in order to explore the implications 
of their 'fictional' or 'fraudulent' testimonies. He 
suggests that the controversies surrounding these two 
authors have less to do with a literary transgression (or 
even with the fact that both dealt with historically and 
politically important events) than with a transgression of 
identity rules': 'You don't make the front page of the New 
York Times as MencMl did for violating a literary 
183 convention'. Yet KlUger makes explicit the fact that 
181 Lappin: 15. 
182 Lappin: 15. 
183 Paul John Eakin, 'Breaking Rules: The Consequences of Self- 
Narration', Biography 24.1 (Winter 2001): 115. Rigoberta Menchd was 
awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 1992. She was later accused of 
falsifying parts of her testimony and of claiming experiences of 
others as her own. See Rigoberta Menchd, 1, Rigoberta Henchd: An 
Indian Woman in Guatemala, ed. and introd. Elisabeth Burgos-Debray, 
trans. Ann Wright (1983; London: Verso 1999); David Stoll, Rigoberta 
Menchd and the Story of all Poor Guatemalans (Oxford: Westview Press, 
1999); and for an overview of the debate see James Poniewozik, 
'Rigoberta Menchd Meets the Press', Salon 12 February 1999,8 November 
2001 <http: //www. salon. com/news/1999/02/12newsa. html>; David Horowitz, 
'I, Rigoberta Menchil, Liar', Salon January 1999,8 November 2001 <http 
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Fragments's failure is in its transgression of the 
autobiographical contract: 'without the guarantee of a 
living first-person narrator identical with the author, 
[Fragments] merely becomes a dramatisation that offers no 
illumination'. 184 KlUger seems to suggest here that 
Fragments is fiction, or even kitsch, not so much because 
it is historically unverifiable but rather because it 
breaches the normative rules of truth-telling discourse. 
But just how normative are these rules? Lejeune 
himself is the first to admit to their slippery nature, to 
the fact that there are more exceptions to the rule than 
there are examples of it. 'Autobiography does not include 
degrees', he wrote in 1973, it is all or nothing'. 185 He 
made similar statements about the inflexibility of 
identity: 'An identity is, or is not. It is impossible to 
speak of degrees, and all doubt leads to a negative 
conclusion, . 
186 But in his return to the 'pact, in 1982 he 
concedes that on re-reading he is struck by the 
contradiction, between these statements and the examples 
that followed them (which were of course exceptions to 
these rules). 187 
: //www. salon. com/col/horo/1999/01/nc-llhoro2. html>; Greg Grandin and 
Francisco Goldman, *Bitter Fruit for Rigobertal, Nation 8 February 
1999,8 November 2001 <http: //www. thenation. com/issue/990208/0208gra 
nding. shtml>; and Peter Canby, 'The Truth about Rigoberta Menchd#, New 
Yo. rk Review of Books 8 April 1999,8 November 2002 <http: //www. nybo 
okB. com/articles/article-preview? article-id=526>. 
194 Cited by Maechler 281. 
ISS Lejeune 13. 
186 Lejeune 5. 
187 Lejeune 125. 
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From a generic perspective, the argument that 
Fragments should be reclassified as fiction begs the 
question of parameters between fact and fiction in 
autobiography. How fictional does an autobiography have to 
be--and in what ways--before it is reclassified as fiction? 
If we accept Maechler's proposition that Fragments tells 
the life story of Bruno Grosjean, albeit with 'breathtaking 
alienation, then what might it mean to refer to the memoir 
as 'fiction'? What is meant by fiction' in this case? 
Theorists of autobiography, as I will show, have been 
concerned with the ways in which the parameters between 
fact and fiction in autobiography have been steadily 
shifting over the past twenty years, the ways in which the 
line that separates fact and fiction in autobiography has 
been blurring to the point where it does seem fair to ask, 
as Lappin does, if it even 'matter[s) so much whether 
Fragments is fact or fiction'. Yet the Wilkomirski case is 
one in which this issue does matter, as Lappin concludes, 
and in this sense may serve as a reminder of the 
'conditions and limits, attached to all autobiographical 
endeavours. 
6. '4Fiction-Making Tricks' 
341 
It has become commonplace to refer to the 'fictions in 
autobiography'. The last twenty years have seen an 
increasing number of critics focussing on precisely this 
problematic aspect of life writing. Eakin's Fictions in 
Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention (1985) 
and Timothy Dow Adams's Telling Lies in Modern American 
Autobiography (1990) are two notable examples, but most 
critical accounts of the genre now recognise the tensions 
between history and fiction that prove so problematic to 
definitions of autobiography. James Olney suggested in 1980 
that it was since Georges Gusdorf's 1956 essay 'The 
Conditions and Limits of Autobiography' that the increased 
emphasis on 'autos, rather than Ibios' has led to a more 
rounded concept of autobiography as a literary rather than 
a historical endeavour. 1 88 Virginia Spencer Karr puts the 
watershed at 1960 with Roy Pascal's Design and Truth in 
Autobiography, but adds that it was poststructuralism that 
ushered the genre away from the referential and the 
historical and towards the literary and the fictional. 189 
Writing of the dark ages, before poststructuralism, 
Eakin recalls: 
lee James Olney, ed., On Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical 
(New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 1980) 8. 
189 Virginia Spencer Karr, ed., introduction, 'OThe Vexingly 
Unverifiableo: Truth in Autobiography,, spec. issue of Studies in the 
Literary imagination 22.2 (Fall 1990): unnumbered pages. John Sturrock 
is one author, in particular, who, writing in the wake of 
poststructuralist revisionings of the genre, argued that chronological 
narrative in autobiography was itself a fiction. See John Sturrock, 
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Those were the days when autobiography was 
ranged along with biography and history as one 
of the artless literatures of fact. Since then, 
in the last twenty years, the pervasive 
initiative has been to establish autobiography 
as an imaginative art, with special emphasis on 
its fictions. This shift in perspective from 
fact to fiction has been accompanied by the 
poststructuralist critique of the concept of 
the self (the principal referent of 
autobiography) and of the referential 
possibilities of language. 190 
Whether deconstructive or not, and whether they are writing 
about Rousseau or Roth, recent critics of autobiography are 
all too aware of the fictions implicit in the 
autobiographical project. '91 
These "fictions, have also been a preoccupation of 
this thesis: in the last two chapters we have seen how the 
tension between documented history and 'the truth of a 
life, has become a focus in contemporary life writing. 
Carolyn Steedman insists that dreams can be used as 
historical evidence in life writing as well as the 
'objective, truths that may or may not always be counted on 
to provide access to marginalised experiences. Searching 
for the truth about her parents, wartime histories, Lisa 
'The New Model Autobiographer', New Literary History 9 (1977-78): 51- 
56. 
190 paul John Eakin, "The Referential Aesthetic of Autobiography', 
'"The Vexingly Unverifiable": 129-30. 
191 Mary Evans's recent book, for example, Missing Persons: The 
impossibility of autolbiography (London: Routledge, 1999) takes the 
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Appignanesi finds that falsified or missing documents mean 
that official history refuses to coincide with family 
memory, and feels that because of this 'Everything is open 
192 to invention, . Lichtenstein and 
Sinclair employ 
imaginative reconstruction in the place of *facts, in their 
quest for the truth about Rodinsky's life. Their quest 
leads them away from documented history and towards not 
just fiction, but perhaps even something approaching 
science fiction in this case. These texts explore the ways 
in which, in the absence of documented history (or in the 
face of its flaws) histories may need to be reconstructed 
from the bits and pieces, of available evidence. 
193 
Annette Kuhn turns her attention to the family 
photograph and, along with Marianne Hirsch, to the 
referential limitations of this ostensibly objective 
medium. She writes: 
Photographs are evidence, after all. Not that 
they are to be taken only at face value, nor 
that they mirror the real, nor even that a 
photograph offers any self-evident relationship 
between itself and what it shows. Simply that a 
photograph can be material for interpretation-- 
evidence in that sense: to be solved, like a 
riddle; read and decoded, like clues left 
fictions in auto/biography as her focus and deals with many early 
examples of biography and autobiography alongside more recent ones. 
192 Lisa Appignanesi, Losing the Dead: A Family Memoir (1999; London: 
Vintage, 2000) 231. 
193 Carolyn Steedman, Landscape for a Good Woman (1986; London: Virago, 
1996) 21. 
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behind at the scene of a crime. Evidence of 
this sort can conceal, even as it purports to 
reveal, what it is evidence of. 194 
These authors identify parallels between archival evidence 
and that discovered in the cave of memory, and thus 
provide an implicit critique of the subjective/ objective, 
psychoanalytic/ historical tensions brought to bear by the 
contradictory imperatives of life writing: tensions which 
were so marked in the Wilkomirski case. 195 And yet the 
Wilkomirski case reveals the parameters between boundaries 
that are, in these other texts, deliberately blurred. 
Fictions in autobiography may have become a 
commonplace, but what do we mean, exactly, when we refer to 
these 'fictions'? In Wilkomirskils case, as Lappin pointed 
out, it is not Wilkomirskils 'lies' that make Fragments a 
fiction, but rather the fact that his story is simply not 
true. This begs the question of whether delusions, are to 
count as fictions too. 196 In Steedman, Appignanesi and 
Kuhns, memoirs, the reconstructive model of identity and 
194 Annette Kuhn, Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and Zmagination 
(London: Verso 1995) 11. See also Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: 
Photography, Narrative and Postmemory (London: Harvard University 
Press, 1997). 
195 Mary Gordon, The Shadow Man: A Daughter's Search for her Father 
(1996; London: Bloomsbury, 1997) xx. 
196 As Ann Scott points out '"Real memorieso can be of thoughts, too, 
and thought may sometimes take the form of fantasy, and fantasy may be 
unconscious'. She is alluding to critics, (in particular to Jeffrey 
Masson's) tendency to oppose 'fantasy' with the event, as though 
fantasy is unambiguously opposed to the real,. This seems to mirror 
the problem with Wilkomirskils delusions, which are considered to be 
'based on, real events and are therefore not necessarily the 'fiction, 
as opposed to the event's 'fact'. Ann Scott, Real Events Revisited: 
Fantasy, Memory and Psychoanalysis (London: virago, 1996) 6. 
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self-narrative leads to a suspicion of all the different 
kinds of evidence, on offer. But are their 
reconstructions, even if based on perhaps unreliable 
'scraps' of evidence, 'fictions'? 
The Wilkomirski case problematises the reconstructive 
model of identity and narrative on which several recent 
theorists of autobiography have based their studies. Eakin, 
for example, writes of the making' of 'selves, in recent 
autobiography, emphasising the constructive nature of 
identity and narrative in these contemporary texts. Nicola 
King, likewise, writes that 'Reading the texts of memory 
shows that "remembering the selfff is not a case of 
restoring an original identity, but a continuous process of 
"re-memberingm, of putting together moment by moment, of 
provisional and partial reconstruction'. 197 As we have seen, 
the Wilkomirski controversy seemed to revolve more around 
the question of reconstruction than it did around the 
contested phenomenon of repression and recovery, and it is 
partly for this reason that the case should be of as much 
interest to theorists of genre as it is to psychoanalysts 
or historians. If Wilkomirski did not recover, his 
repressed childhood memories, as Pendergrast's RMT argument 
insists, but instead reconstructed them from the 'bits and 
pieces, of memory and archival evidence he discovered then 
197 Nicola King, Memozy, Narrative, Xdentity: Remembering the Self 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 175. 
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this introduces the possibility that a memoir based on this 
model can go disastrously wrong. 
The reconstruction model poses problems for makers of 
history too, as Maechler found. His report on the 
Wilkomirski affair, opens itself to the same kinds of 
critique to which he subjected Wilkomirskils self-making. 
Maechler begins his study by alluding to a historical 
debate which is, he says, 'comparable, to the memory 
debates in which Wilkomirskils case was embroiled. This 
, revolves around the question of whether a historian 
registers past events in simple passivity, without 
reflecting his or her own agency, or adds something new to 
the presentation whenever she or he constructs a true story 
out of evidence about the past'. 198 Because the Wilkomirski 
case is concerned with similar questions, Maechler adds, 
these are issues he finds himself unable to dodge,. He 
explains his methodology: his task has been to 'investigate 
all relevant evidence without bias and with the greatest of 
care', to ensure that all descriptions and conclusions are 
based on documents, audiovisual materials, and 
conversations in which [he] took part'. Because oral 
history relies on the interviewing process and because this 
involves the subjective input of the interviewer: 
I have chosen to give this account the form of 
a journalist's report and have attempted to 
`99 Maechler viii. 
achieve a transparency that will allow readers 
to examine my procedures, constructions, and 
results and to keep in mind my position as a 
researcher and writer when forming their own 
opinion. 199 
Here he does not so much 'dodge, the age-old historical 
questions to which he alludes as transcend them, which 
seems all the more odd when he begins his report on the 
following page: 'A gentle breeze passed over the lake that 
extended along the forested lower slopes of the Jura,. He 
is not referring to a recent visit he made to these parts; 
he is writing of early August 1940 and telling the tale of 
Yvonne Grosjean, purportedly the mother of the man who was 
to become Binjamin Wilkomirski. This is not the 
'transparent' style of the investigative journalist (who is 
as much a character in the investigation as the subject). '00 
It is the style of an omniscient observer in a novel. He 
makes clear that this chapter 'A Fateful Excursion' is 
based on the 'rich, atmospheric detail' found in 
transcripts in the State Archives in Bern, but Maechler's 
persistent reminders that what we are reading is based on, 
historical material begs yet more questions about 
Wilkomirskils case. Wasn't Wilkomirski's story also based 
on' archival research and historical material? And wasn't 
this used as evidence against the authenticity of his 
199 Maechler viii-ix. 
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story? Wilkomirski, of course, did not conduct his research 
'without bias', and took from his research only that 
evidence which supported his conviction that he was who he 
thought he was or wanted to be. But the juxtaposition of 
Maechler's investigation and Wilkomirski's research reveals 
the precariousness of this kind of historical authority. As 
Susan Rubin Suleiman points out 'Mr. Maechler's book itself 
presents a contradiction: Although (sic] its stakes are 
historical and factual, the book is structured like a 
detective novel, with important pieces of information 
withheld at crucial points, only to be revealed later'. 
201 
Genre theory seemed irrelevant to the Wilkomirski 
controversy even though at the heart of the debate was the 
question of Fragments's generic status. Suhrkamp employed a 
historian to solve the matter; they did not turn to 
theorists of genre in order to determine the generic re- 
labelling of this contested memoir. As we have seen, the 
tensions between psychoanalytic and historical readings of 
the text (and its author) led to impasse. Can genre theory 
fare any better? Can it account for such an alienated, 
autobiography as Wilkomirskils? 
Lejeune's pact may seem hospitable to Wilkomirski, s 
, alienated, autobiography because, as Eakin writes in his 
200 For an account of the Wilkomirski case based on this model see 
Blake Eskin'B A Life in Pieces. 
201 Susan Rubin Suleiman, 'Charlatan or Madman? What a Study of a 
Literary Hoax Can't Decide,, rev. of The Wilkomirski Affair, by Stefan 
Maechler, Forward 8 June 2001,6 November 2001 <http: //www. forward. 
COM/iBsues/2001/01.06.08/artsl. html>. 
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introduction to On Autobiography, the pact does not require 
the autobiographer to 'commit' him or herself 'to some 
impossible historical exactitude but rather to the sincere 
effort to come to terms with and to understand his or her 
life,. 202 Even if we accept the proposition that Fragments 
was written in good faith, however, it still falls at the 
first hurdle when confronted with the pact itself. 
According to Lejeune's definition autobiography is 
'Retrospective prose narrative written by a real person 
concerning his own existence, where the focus is his 
individual life, in particular the story of his 
personality,. 203 Not only is Fragments not retrospective but 
written from the perspective of a child, it seems that nor 
does Binjamin Wilkomirski fit the profile of a real 
person'. I[F]or Lejeunel, writes Eakin, this phrase (, real 
person'] signifies an individual whose existence is 
verifiable, attested to by the legal record': no verifiable 
204 identity, no autobiography. This may be fair enough in 
relation to Wilkomirskils memoir, but where does it leave 
the other, authentic, %children without identity'? 205 
Bruss's slightly later guidelines are based on a 
performative model of self-narration--the act, of 
202 Eakin, Lejeune ix. 
203 Lejeune 4. 
204 Eakin, Lejeune x. 
205 Or, indeed, others who have identities in conflict with the 
%official record', such as transsexual men and women whose experience 
as gendered subjects conflicts with their legally accredited truth'? 
Interestingly Sarah Burton includes transsexuals in her list of six 
kinds of liar' in Imposters: Six Kinds of Liar: True Tales of 
Deception (London: Viking, 2000). 
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autobiography--but she is more wary of the potential for 
autobiographical lie-telling than is Lejeune. Like him, 
however, she maintains that the individual referred to in 
the text must be identical to the author and that this 
individual is assumed to be susceptible to appropriate 
public verification procedures'. 206 Not only this, but 
because in autobiography a claim is made for the truth- 
value of what the autobiographer reports [. 1. The 
audience is expected to accept these reports as true, and 
is free to "check upff on them or attempt to discredit 
them'. 207 
Perhaps surprisingly, however, audiences rarely do so, 
and the Wilkomirski case revealed the extent to which even 
agents and publishers may also be reluctant to 'check up, 
on the accounts of the authors they represent. There are 
plenty of discernible fictions in autobiography, as recent 
studies have emphasised, but these may not be so much 
'fictions' as narrative techniques. Philip Roth's 
autobiography The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography (1989) 
includes its own checking up, response in the form of a 
letter to the author by his fictional alter-ego Nathan 
Zuckerman. Roth is cunning here, because 'Zuckerman's, 
candid and impassioned attack on the book is likely to 
deflect attention from the autobiography's unmentioned 
weaknesses, to deflect criticism of the checking up, 
206 Bruss 11 - 207 Bruss 12. 
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variety. Aside from Roth's correspondence with Zuckerman 
The Facts is a traditional, unselfconscious, chronological 
autobiography, raising no questions about its own 
facticity, the author's own memory, or the referentiality 
of the account. Zuckerman appears at the end of the book to 
mount his case for Roth's return to fiction and for the 
value of fictional writing as an approach to truth over the 
value of this kind of autobiography. Roth, via Zuckerman, 
thwarts his own autobiographical engagement, and offers a 
case for fiction as the prime truth-telling mode: 
You tell me in your letter that the book feels 
like the first thing you have ever written 
"unconsciouslyff. Do you mean that The Facts is 
an unconscious work of fiction? Are you not 
aware yourself of its fiction-making tricks? 
Think of the exclusions, the selective nature 
of it, the very pose of fact-facer. Is all this 
manipulation truly unconscious or is it 
pretending to be unconscious ? 208 
"With autobiography there's always another text, a 
countertext, if you will, to the one presented', Zuckerman 
continues, 'It's probably the most manipulative of all 
, 209 literary forms . 
These "fiction-making tricks' are, of course, the 
narrative devices on which autobiography relies in order to 
208 Philip Roth, The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1989) 162. 
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maintain an 'illusion of reference,. 210 Wilkomirski also 
employed such fiction-making tricks' in Ftagments, tricks 
designed to pass off his writing as 'a transparent medium 
for experience' . 
211 As Maechler wrote, Wilkomirskils 
sustained and fragmentary childlike perspective 'conceals 
the fact that every word is written in the present and that 
the author surely shapes his memories with the conscious, 
212 knowing mind of an adult'. Wilkomirskils critics were not 
initially drawn to question the authenticity of Fragments 
for this reason, however, even though, as Maechler states, 
the adoption of a child's perspective to reflect the 
incomprehensible nature of the Holocaust is a 'common 
strategy in works of fiction, but extraordinary for an 
allegedly autobiographical work,. 213 
Certain levels of 'fiction-making' are acceptable in 
autobiography, as the huge success of memoirs such as Frank 
McCourt's and Dave Pelzer's attests. Both authors, for 
example, incorporate lengthy verbatim' conversations that 
209 Roth 172. 
210 , Illusion of reference' is Paul de Man's term, see 'Autobiography 
as De-facement', MW 94.5 (December 1979): 920. 
211 Such narrative strategies are not necessarily a sign of 'fiction, 
but are often simply ways in which to make a true story sound true. 
Olney points out that this has traditionally been a problem associated 
with slave narratives too, narratives that tend to conform to a 
specific mode of presentation in order to perform their function as 
%true stories', the imperative to %give a picture of "slavery as it 
is': To give a true picture of slavery as it really is, he must 
maintain that he exercises a clear glass, neutral memory that is 
neither creative nor faulty--indeed, if it were creative it would be 
eo ipso faulty for "creative, would be understood by sceptical readers 
as a synonym for %lyingml, '"I Was BornO: Slave Narratives, Their 
Status as Autobiography and as Literature,, The Slave's Narrative, 
Charles T. Davis and Henry Louis Cates, Jr., eds. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985) 150. 
212 Maechler 279. 
213 Maechler 279. 
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occurred thirty, forty, even fifty years previously, 
sometimes conversations at which they were not even 
present. And yet their popular appeal suggests that readers 
are willing to collude in such 'fiction-making', although 
they would doubtless feel differently if it emerged that 
McCourt, for example, had been to Ireland 'only as a 
tourist' . 
Discussions of the dubious status of Tracey Emin's 
work as 'art' permeated the response to her Turner Prize 
nominated installation My Bed (1999) as well as to her 
other 'confessional' work. Much commentary revolved around 
the question of whether the bed was really her own (in 
which case it was not art) or whether it was constructed 
for the exhibition (in which case it was too artful, even 
deceptive). Kathryn Harrison's The Kiss: A Secret Life 
(1998) provoked similar confusion. In 1997, for example, 
before the publication of her own memoir, Linda Grant wrote 
a strangely negative review of The Kiss which centred on 
the question of veracity in relation to artfulness. Grant 
was, she says 'disturbed, by the sensibility of 
[Harrison's] prose', adding that: 
The Kiss is a memoir which is asking to be 
judged as literature, as if it were a novel. As 
non-fiction, it seems somehow artful rather 
than art, which is the difficulty of much of 
the work in the current school of personal 
memoir. As each incident rises effortlessly 
354 
from the constraining silence of her life to 
illuminate the narrative as metaphor, one 
begins to wonder how truthful are the events we 
are being told about. 214 
Are only novels 'literature'? Does memoir-writing require 
no literary skill? It is not clear whether Grant's problem 
with The Kiss is because it is too 'artful, or too 
'effortless'. Interestingly, while there is a suspicion 
that The Kiss might be a veiled work of fiction, Harrison's 
earlier, fictional, treatment of incest Thicker than Water 
(1991) was attacked on the grounds that it rang 'too true 
215 for its own good' . 
Matthew Collings observed in October 1999 that 'The 
critical storm that blew up during the week over Tracey 
Emin's un-made bed, made into art, was about content not 
formal qualities. It was assumed to have no formal 
, 216 qualities, only cheap shock content . While Harrison's 
memoir was attacked on the grounds that it was too 
'artful,, Emin's installation was pilloried because it was 
not artful enough. Both critiques centre on the myth that 
truth-telling is facile, lacking the necessary engagement 
with art that fiction presupposes. As Rachel Cusk writes in 
114 Linda Grant, 'Little Princess', Guardian 24 April 1997: 12. 
21S Scott Spencer, 'Her Childhood was Doomed', rev. of Thicker than 
Water, New York Times Book Review 21 April 1991: 13. 
216 Matthew Collings, 'You've Made Your Bed... 1, Observer 24 October 
1999, Review: 5. See also Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, 'The Rumpled 
Bed of Autobiography: Extravagant Lives, Extravagant Questions', 
"Autobiography and Changing Identities', eds. Susanna Egan and 
Gabrielle Helms, spec. issue of Biography 24.1 (winter 2001): 1-15 for 
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response to the novelist Jenny Diski's memoir Skating to 
Antarctica (1997): 'Non-fiction: that negative prefix, 
rather like the words off-duty, suggests something casual 
and civilian, a technical reprieve from discipline. [I 
Non-fiction is where novelists go on leave,. 217 If, as in 
Harrison's case, such artistic engagement or discipline 
appears to be present, the suspicion is that the author 
must not be telling the truth. And if, as in Emin's case, 
the work appears too 'artless', the suspicion is that 
anyone could do it. 
218 
These issues have also been at the forefront of 
discussions of confessional discourse as a feminist 
consciousness-raising tool. Rita Felski suggests that 
', these narratives lack the self-consciousness typically 
associated with modernist texts and thus strike critical 
readers as naive,. 219 And Leigh Gilmore counters the claim 
of naivete by suggesting that 'women find in confessional 
discourse a subject position that grants them authority 
from which to make truth claims'. 220 She argues that 'the 
confession, as it persists in women's self-representation, 
may have little tolerance for irony, ' but the extent to 
a discussion of Emin's installation and the problem of veracity and 
artfulness. 
217 Rachel Cusk, 'It Hurt too Much to Carry,, Guardian 5 June 1997: 13. 
218 Although perhaps the discomfort arises not from the truth-claim but 
rather from, in particular, Harrison's visibility due to the pre- 
publication publicity she allowed. It is not insignificant that less 
publicised accounts of incest and abuse such as Sylvia Fraser's In My 
Father's House (1989) and Elly Danicals Don't: A Woman's Word (1989) 
elicited no such negative and personal responses. 
219 Leigh Gilmore, Autobiographics: A Feminist Theory of Women's Self- 
Rep. resentation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) 225. 
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which its subjects police themselves and strive to produce 
a "truthfulff account defines them as highly "self, 
conscious'. 221 Paradoxically, the 'confessional, mode might 
place the autobiographer in a conflictual relationship with 
dominant modes of truth-telling. The critical response to 
Harrison's memoir implies that even feigned Inalvet6l might 
prove more convincing than explicit 'artfulness, and yet as 
the response to Emin's work reveals, nalvet6 might lead to 
a critical emphasis on content as opposed to form. 
The problematic fictionality of Wilkomirskils text may be 
due less to the fictions in autobiography and more to the 
fictions of autobiography: to the very notion that 
autobiography is able to function as a 'transparent medium, 
for the past and that this past 'can be brought back, and 
conjured before the eyes "as it really was". 
222 
Wilkomirskils persistent claim that not only his 
memories but also his text unquestionably represent 
historical truth seems outmoded in the context of recent 
autobiographical writing and recent theories of 
autobiography. As Eakin writes: 'Most autobiographers these 
days certainly know--to one degree or another--that 
autobiography is a fiction. Why, then, do they persist in 
asking us to believe that autobiography is constituted by 
220 Gilmore 225. 
221 Gilmore 225. 
222 Carolyn Steedman, Past Tenses: Essays on Writing, Autobiography, 
and History (London: Rivers Oran Press, 1992) 163. 
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the stuff of biographical reality? 223 And Erica Jong, in a 
similar vein, wrote in 1985 that 'the comforting notion 
that there are definite forms in literature--novel, 
confessional novel, memoir, autobiography--is more of a 
fiction than fiction itself'. 224 The destablisation of the 
very notion of I, also intervenes to unsettle the 
autobiographical project. 'If we do not know who the "IN 
is, how do we know where the "truthff lies since the "IN is 
the very guarantor of truthtelling', asks Sidonie Smith. 225 
Theories of autobiography may appear to be in a state 
of perpetual flux and the guidelines set down by theorists 
such as Lejeune and Bruss are as flexible as they are 
prescriptive. And yet there would exist no such concept as 
a fraudulent or fake autobiography if there were not still 
in place a dominant discourse of truth-telling and 
contracts that, although flexible, can yet be broken. Leigh 
Gilmore suggests that 'autobiography draws its social 
authority from its relation to culturally dominant 
discourses of truth-telling and not, as has previously been 
asserted, from autobiography's privileged relation to real 
life,. 226 She also explores the extent to which 'critical 
language participates in policing truth by criminalizing 
223 Eakin, 'The Referential Aesthetic': 142. 
224 Erica Jong, 'The Life we Live and the Life we Write,, New York 
Times 10 February 1985, section 7: 26. 
225 Sidonie Smith, 'Construing Truths in Lying Mouths: Truthtelling in 
Women's Autobiography,, '"The Vexingly Unverifiable-: 163. 
226 Leigh Gilmore, introduction, Autobiography and Postmodernism, eds. 
Kathleen Ashley, Leigh Gilmore and Gerald Peters (Boston: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1994) 9. 
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certain autobiographers'. 227 Maechler's study may be seen as 
an exercise in such 'policing, too, but as both the RMT 
debate and his own conclusion suggest, the real authority 
over the truth-status of life-narrative may only be found 
in a court of law. 
This is a perplexing proposition for autobiographers 
writing from the margins', especially at a time when the 
boundaries between margin and mainstream are in the process 
of dissolving. Sidonie Smith addresses this problem, and 
explores the function of truth-telling as a normative code, 
demonstrating the extent to which those writing from the 
margins might always be in breach of that code, might not 
be able to tell their own truth within the parameters laid 
down for them. '"Truthtellingo is "truth toff the normative 
cultural function', she writes. 228 Specifically, Smith 
raises the question of what truthtelling might mean to the 
female autobiographer, and asks some pressing questions 
about the nature of this 'truth' that go beyond the 
poststructuralist critique of truth-telling in general. 
She asks: 
"Truth" to what? To facticity? To experience? 
To self? To history? To community? Truth to the 
said, to the unsaid, to other fictions (of man, 
of woman of American, of black, etc. ), to the 
genre? And truth for what and for whom? For the 
227 Gilmore 9. 
228 Smith, '"The Vexingly Unverifiableffl: 158. 
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autobiographer? The reader? Society? At a time 
in the West when the autobiographical seems to 
surround us and yet when the autobiographical 
and novelistic seem to have merged inextricably 
with one another, what does it mean to ask 
about the perplexed relationship of the 
autobiographical to "truthtellingff? 229 
What happens, she asks, when excluded people adopt that 
normative cultural voice, becoming white, male, bourgeois?: 
'In the wrong mouth "truthff can be transformed into the 
230 
Such arguments were brought to bear on the 
controversial Rigoberta Menchu case, but not on 
Wilkomirskils. Menchuls testimonio raises the question of 
what truth-telling might entail in different cultural 
contexts. The controversial nature of 1, Rigoberta Menchd 
may have been exacerbated, like Wilkomirski's case, by the 
fact that it was so highly acclaimed before doubts began to 
surface (Menchi: i was even awarded the Nobel Peace Prize). 
Mench-d was later accused, however, of claiming the 
experiences and stories of others as her own, of bolstering 
the authoritative III with a collection of silent others. 
One reporter noted that, when challenged, Menchu 'tries to 
simultaneously argue that she didn't lie and that if she 
did, it doesn't matter,. 231 Some felt that MencMvs 'lies, 
229 Smith, '"The Vexingly Unverifiableol: 147-48. 
230 Smith, '*The Vexingly Unverifiablew': 159. 
231 Poniewozik. 
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were in the service of a greater truth--a collective truth- 
-and that her only lie was saying ', I, where she ought to 
have said 'we, or even 'they'. 
Similar claims have been made about Richard Wright's 
1945 autobiography Black Bo_v. In an article titled '"I Do 
Believe Him Though I Know He Lies": Lying as Genre and 
Metaphor in Black Boy', Timothy Dow Adams points out the 
generic confusion surrounding Black Boy. Some felt the book 
was sincere, others disagreed, but what Dow Adams argues is 
that "both sides are correct; that the book is an 
especially truthful account of black experience in America, 
even though the protagonist's story often does not ring 
true; and that this inability to tell the truth is Wright's 
major metaphor of self . 
232 He concludes that 'Black Boy 
should not be read as historical truth, which strives to 
report those incontrovertible facts that can somehow be 
corroborated, but as narrative truth' and thus provides a 
quasi-psychoanalytic reading of Wright's text, as he draws 
the distinction between 'historical truth, and 'narrative 
truth, from Donald Spence's psychoanalytic book on that 
subject. 
233 
Wilkomirskils 'lies, are of a different order from all 
of these, but they do also represent, for him if for nobody 
else, a truth, of the subjective or narrative kind. And 
232 Timothy Dow Adams, '"I Do Believe Him Though I Know He Lies&: Lying 
as Genre and metaphor in Black Boy', Richard Wright: Critical 
Perpectives Past and Present, Amistad Literary Series, eds. Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr. and K. A. Appiah (New York: Amistad Press, 1993) 302. 
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yet although dominant discourse can sometimes circumscribe 
legitimate attempts to tell the truth, there do, as the 
Wilkomirski case illustrates, have to be times where it 
'really matters'. 
To conclude this chapter I turn to another 
controversial memoir of the past decade, Lauren Slater's 
Spasm: A Memoir with Lies (2000). In discussing what are 
perhaps the surprising parallels between Slater's memoir 
and Wilkomirski's I explore the question of subjective 
truth in life writing and ask whether autobiography can 
truly serve as a vehicle for it. 
7. Conclusion: IA Metaphorical Memoir, 
Slater declares that her purpose in Spasm is to 
ponder the blurry line between novels and memoirs'. 234 
Spasm--titled Lying: A Metaphorical Memoir in the US--also 
presents a pressing case for the acknowledgement of 
subjective reality or metaphorical rather than historical 
truths in autobiography. In it Slater claims to suffer from 
temporal lobe epilepsy, but she also suggests that she may 
be using the illness as a metaphor for her life. On an 
ethical level there is a parallel between Slater's 
appropriation of a neurological disorder from which she may 
233 Dow Adams 314. 
362 
not suffer and Wilkomirski's appropriation of the Holocaust 
survivor identity. There are parallels, too, in both 
authors, insistence on the higher value of %the truth of a 
life' over biographical fact, and in the controversial 
aspect of both memoirs. Rebecca Mead made her displeasure 
with Spasm explicit when she opened her review: "Sickness 
demands compassion, but even so, one can be forgiven for 
wanting to throttle the narrator of Lauren Slater's latest 
book, ''Lying'' [SiC] . 
235 Mead praises Slater's writing, but 
criticises the 'heavy-handedness' with which she conveys 
her message of metaphorical truth. Likewise, Janet Maslin 
believes that Slater 'flogs, her point until it ceases to 
be important and suggests that there is nothing original in 
Slater's insistence on the slippery nature of truth in 
autobiography. 
236 
Slater is unprecedentedly forceful in making her 
point, as Mead and Maslin point out. She even includes a 
point-by-point memo to her editor at Random House imploring 
that Spasm be marketed as a nonfiction title. She suggests 
234 Lauren Slater, Spasm: A Memoir with Lies (2000; London: Methuen, 
2001) 160. 
235 Rebecca Mead, 'Stranger than Fiction', rev. of Lying: A 
Metaphorical Memoir, by Lauren Slater, New York Times 16 June 2000, 
section 7: 11. 
236 Janet Maslin, 'It Could be Fact or Fiction ... or Something 
Else,, rev. of Lying: A Metaphorical Memoir by Lauren Slater, New York 
Times 22 June 2000, section E: 9. Mary McCarthy's Memoirs of a 
Catholic Girlhood (1957) could be seen as an early example of the 
overt and avowed use of fiction in autobiography, but although there 
is often a blurred line between fiction, and 'fact, in autobiography, 
Slater's memoir is, I would argue, more original than Mead and Maslin 
allow because she addresses this issue directly and tells the truth 
about her lies. Tim O'Brien also uses this strategy in The Things they 
Carried (1991), allowing the reader to be drawn into a story before 
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that it be marketed as a book that takes up residence in 
the murky gap between genres, and by its stubborn self- 
position there, forces us to consider important things ,. 237 
And yet if the blurring of fact and fiction in 
autobiography is so obvious, the concept of 'metaphorical 
truth' so unoriginal, then why would Slater need to flog' 
this point? Both Mead and Maslin rightly question the 
reader's role in this because in refusing to tease apart 
the fabrications from the facts' Slater is in effect asking 
her readers to believe her even though they know she is 
lying, to fulfil their contractual agreement even as she 
admits she is breaking her own. Referring to Wilkomirski, 
Hoffman contends that 'It is perfectly legitimate to mix 
fact and fiction, if the reader is given fair warning'. 238 
The readers of Spasm and Fragments were given no such 
warning and I suggest that this may be the source of their 
deepest generic transgression. 
Maechler suggests that Kosinskils justification for 
his fictionalisation of the Holocaust (and the truth claim 
he makes alongside it) may appropriately describe "the 
process by which Wilkomirskils inner images may have become 
""memories"' . 
239 
'Kosinski', writes Maechler., 'asserts that 
memory is fiction, a subjective reality that one can turn 
into a fairy tale to conquer fear. With that Wilkomirski 
exposing its fictionality, but as his book is a novel (albeit perhaps 
an autobiographical one) the stakes are very different. 
2 37 Slater 161. 
238 Hoffman. 
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would never agree--after all, he still insists that his 
narrative has the quality of photographic Copy,. 240 In 
Wilkomirskils case subjective reality was entirely divorced 
from actuality, but are subjective realities, as Maechler 
seems to suggest always synonymous with fiction? many felt 
Wilkomirskils memoir to be a metaphorical appropriation of 
the Holocaust, but are metaphors also, necessarily, 
'fictions' too? 241 
In the wake of Ganzfried's expos6 Wilkomirski might 
well have asked the same questions as Slater: 'Why is what 
we feel less true than what is?,. She asks: 
Suppose I simply feel like an epileptic (. ] 
supposing I have chosen epilepsy because it is 
the most accurate conduit to convey my psyche 
to you? Would this still not be a memoir, my 
memoi. r? After all, if I were making the whole 
thing up--and I'm not saying I'm making the 
whole thing up--but if I were, I would be doing 
it not to create a character as a novelist 
does, but, instead, to create a metaphor that 
conveys the real person I am. [. I My 
memoix,, please. Sell it as nonfiction, 
242 please . 
Refusing to state whether or not she is telling the truth 
about her epilepsy, Slater also suggests she may be 
339 Maechler 243. 
340 Maechler 243. 
241 See, for example, Maechler 278. 
242 Slater 162-63. 
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suffering from Munchausens (although this too might be a 
lie). 'Munchhausen's', she writes, is a fascinating 
psychiatric disorder, its sufferers makers of myth that are 
still somehow true, the illness a conduit to convey real 
243 
pain' This recalls Maechler's description of Fragments 
as a meaningful story for an inexplicable and inaccessible 
past'. 244 
Georges Perec's 1975 autobiography W or the Memory of 
Childhood also explores fiction as a 'conduit to convey 
real pain, and yet he alternates fiction, with %fact,, 
displaying the fictions, in italicised print and 'fact' in 
roman. The split is also of voluntary memory with 
involuntary: roman print for his attempts to reach the past 
through voluntary memory and research, and italics for an 
ostensibly unrelated story about an island named IWI. The 
truth, he claims, lies not in one or the other but only in 
their 'fragile intersection'. 245 
Sylvia Fraser's in My Father's House: A Memoir of 
incest and Healing (1987) enacts a similar typographical 
fissure. Amnesia had rendered Fraser's memories of abuse 
inaccessible until she entered a course of recovered memory 
therapy: 'For clarity,, she writes, %I have used italics to 
indicate thoughts, feelings and experiences pieced together 
243 Slater 87. 
244 Maechler 272. 
245 Georges Perec, W or the Memo-rY of Childhood, trans. David Bellos 
(1974; London: The Harvill Press, 1996) preface. 
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from recently recovered memories and to indicate dreams'. 246 
Fraser's memoir was published before the recovered memory 
controversy became widespread, but she adds in her foreword 
that the sexual abuse secret 'has been corroborated by 
outside sources, and so while she affirms the material 
reality of her story, she still places a tentative question 
mark over her subjective experience of it. 
Leslie Ritchie takes issue with this recourse to 
italics to represent a subjective experience and accurately 
suggests that: 
The typographical differentiation suggests her 
awareness of the inadequacy of dominant 
discourse to represent the experience of 
incest. [. ] If the dominant fiction is 
found in regular type and regular grammar, and 
the split lies in repressed italics, fractured 
dream narratives, and childlike speech, then 
what mode(s) might represent a diachronic view 
of self for the victim of incest ? 247 
Italics are perhaps the ideal typescript to represent 
subjective truths; they even visually approximate the 
handwritten word suggesting an immediacy of narration and 
yet, as Leslie suggests, they may also represent the 
246 Sylvia Fraser, In My Father's House: A Memoir of Incest and Healing 
(1987; London: Virago, 1999) preface. 
247 Leslie Ritchie, "Words are for Forgetting': Incest and Language in 
Betsy Warland's The Bat Had Blue Eyes', Essays in Canadian Writing 65 
(1998): 206. 
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inadequacy of dominant discourse to consider subjective 
2118 truth as anything other than fiction . 
Susan Wicks's memoir Driving My Father (1995) is 
another example of this. Wicks does not differentiate 
between 'fact, and 'fantasy' in this account of her 
parents, deaths but her memoir is described on the cover as 
'Half memoir, half novel' suggesting that a memoir which 
fails to distinguish between the two ends up generically 
divided. Suleiman suggests that the problem with Fragments 
is that 'Unlike Perec's and Robbe-Grillet's works, 
Wilkomirski's book does not play with categories--it 
obfuscates them, which is not the same thing. The problem 
with Fragments, as a text, is precisely that it does not 
recognize--or at any rate, does not admit--its own 
fictionalityl. 249 
Despite the well-documented 'Freud bashing' that 
occurred during the 1980s and 1990s over Freud's 
unwillingness to believe that his patients' stories of 
abuse were materially or biographically true, there is 
248 David Lynch's television series Twin Peaks (1989) also dealt with 
incest by employing scenes of fantasy where the viewer is left unsure 
of whether or not the events are actually occurring in 'reality, or in 
'fantasy,, hallucination or dream. The father in the father-daughter 
incest story at the centre of the series is represented almost 
throughout in the form of a repellent, elusive man bearing no 
resemblance to Laura Palmer's actual father. This mode could be seen 
as the visual counterpart to the italicised subjectivities discussed 
here. And yet Chris Rodley writes that 'after the release of Twin 
Peaks: Fire Walk with Me, Lynch received many letters from young girls 
who had been abused by their fathers. They were puzzled as to how he 
could have known exactly what it was like. Despite the fact that the 
perpetration of both incest and filicide was represented in the 
"abstractm form of killer Bob, it was recognized as faithful to the 
subjective experience,, Lynch on Lynch, Chris Rodley, ed. (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1997) xii. 
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still a problem, it would seem, with subjective reality, 
outside of the consulting room. We need only to look at the 
havoc caused by Wilkomirski's refusal (or inability) to 
admit his own Ifictionality', not to mention these other 
related examples, to see that the tension between 
psychoanalytically legitimated truth and historically 
legitimated truth poses problems for the genre theorist as 
well as for the historian or psychoanalyst. Assuming that 
Wilkomirski is a 'genuine fake, rather than a knowing 
impostor, his main problem, from a generic point of view 
might well have been an excess of faith in the 
autobiographical project, a failure to recognise the very 
fictions contained within the notion of autobiography 
itself. 
As the above examples, and indeed those discussed 
throughout this thesis, illustrate, if there is a 'rhetoric 
of fact, that can still convince, it may consist merely of 
a recognition of autobiography's necessary Ifictionality'. 
Wilkomirski does call attention, as Eskin indicates, to 
his own uncertainty throughout the book,, with the result 
that 'he gets his readers to accept their confusion rather 
than following up on it,. 250 Wilkomirski may have had some 
idea about the potential of doubt as factual rhetoric, but 
in his defence of the memoir he insisted again and again 
that his memories and the memoir he made of them were 
249 Rubin Suleiman, 'Problems of Memory': 552. 
250 Eskin 57. 
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unquestionably true. As Perec's and Fraser's italicised 
subjectivities reveal, subjective truths are not enough on 
which to base a life story that will also pertain to 
'history'. And as the Wilkomirski case demonstrates, 
psychoanalytically legitimated truth, or even just 
subjective truth., may have a long way to go before it can 
be validated as biographical truth. 
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CONCLUSION 
In 1998 1 visited the Survivors of the Shoah Visual 
History Foundation in Los Angeles in order to gain an 
insight into oral Holocaust testimony for my Masters degree 
on that topic. One day the interviewers at the Foundation 
were discussing their experiences. One recalled an 
intriguing interview with a woman who had survived 
Auschwitz. When the interviewer asked her about the details 
of her survival, the woman replied: 'I had typhoid and I 
was dying. As I was lying in my bunk one night my mother 
came to me and she brought a goat, a blanket, and a pot of 
honey. She milked the goat and gave me the milk to drink, 
she fed me the honey, and she wrapped the blanket around me 
to keep me warm. After this I was much stronger, and this 
is how I survived the experience of Auschwitz,. The 
interviewer, bemused, asked how the woman's mother had 
managed to get hold of such treasures in a concentration 
camp. She was swiftly enlightened, as the woman replied: 
'Oh no, my mother was then already dead, but she came to me 
in the night with a goat, some honey, and a blanket, and 
this is how I survived the experience of Auschwitz,. 
In Holocaust Testimonies, Lawrence Langer addresses 
the problem of accuracy in oral testimony: '[Slince 
testimonies are human documents rather than merely 
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historical ones', he writes, ', the troubled interaction 
between past and present achieves a gravity that surpasses 
the concern with accuracy'. ' Langer's phrase 'human 
document, strikes me as a particularly fitting expression 
for stories such as the one recounted at the Shoah 
Foundation. For Langer it is this kind of unexpected 
response, this challenge to logical conceptions of truth, 
that makes oral testimonies, in their 'humanness' somehow 
more than 'merely' historical documents, and that 
trivialises the comparatively pedestrian concerns of the 
historian. One of the aims of this thesis has been to 
explore the often precarious balance between the 'human, 
and the 'historical, in contemporary life-narratives. 
Felman refers to tensions which pertain to the human and 
the historical, tensions between the clinical, therapeutic, 
or psychoanalytic and the political or historical effects 
of testimony, and she asks how testimony can 'intervene, 
pragmatically and efficaciously, at once historically 
2 
(politically) and clinically' . 
Psychoanalysis offers a unique insight into the 
'humanness' of testimony, or of autobiography: it proposes 
that stories can be considered true in an important sense 
even when they do not sound true in the way that we might 
expect. And yet although Langer claims that the status of 
I Lawrence L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) xv. 
2 Felman, Testimony, 8. 
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oral testimonies as 'human documents' is what puts them 
above history, it may well be the case that 'humanness' can 
place such subjective accounts altogether outside of 
history, that it can invalidate testimony from a 
historical, or a legal, perspective. Indeed, if we recall 
Laub's anecdote about the woman who testified to the 
explosion of four chimneys during the Auschwitz uprising, 
this is precisely what happens. And as this thesis has 
demonstrated, the clinical and the political, or the human 
and the historical aspects of testimony are not easily 
reconciled. 
In its heyday, recovered memory therapy promised such 
reconciliation. 'Recovery' served a dual clinical and 
political function, helping to effect both what Judith 
Lewis Herman referred to as 'the healing of individual 
victims' and "the restoration of social order'. 3 The debate 
that followed was due to a gap that began to widen between 
the clinical and the political when it became clear that 
psychoanalytically retrieved histories could not withstand 
the verification procedures required of juridical 
testimony. Recovered memory therapy emerged from the 1990s 
as an object of the deepest suspicion, despite its 
promising beginnings. RMT initially offered the possibility 
of a privileged kind of autobiographical recall, promising 
that absent memories could be restored in all completeness 
3 713 
and coherence and that they could be validated in a court 
of law and justice restored. And yet even in its most 
idealised form the therapy posed certain problems, 
threatening at times to lead not to integration and 
recovery, but potentially to a kind of dispossession: 'in 
the instant of recovery', as Luckhurst writes, 'we can 
become strangers to ourselves'. 4 In some RMT cases, the 
proposed 'cure' seemed less preferable than the symptoms 
and this posed a challenge to one of the fundamental tenets 
of psychoanalysis: the conviction that remembering is 
preferable to forgetting. As David Krell wrote of Freud's 
faith in the benevolence of memory: 'If the unremembered 
reminiscence is thanatos, remembrance is eros, and eros 
will prevail'. 
The contemporary trauma theory discussed in this 
thesis also throws into question this privileging of memory 
over forgetting. Lanzmann's persistent interrogation of 
Abraham Bomba in Shoah's barbershop scene, for example, 
makes us wonder whether the painful reliving of traumatic 
experience for the sake of historical transmission is truly 
preferable to the alternative. Indeed, theories like 
Caruth's and Felman's present a particular challenge to 
witnesses to historical atrocity. Although they suggest the 
3 Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to 
Political Terror (London: Pandora, 1992) 1. 
4 Roger Luckhurst, 'Recovered memory/ memory recovered', Literature and 
the Contemporary: Fictions and Theories of the Present, Peter Marks 
and Roger Luckhurst, eds. (London: Longman, 1999) 86. 
7 4, 
possibility of a literal resurrection of the past in the 
present for the purpose of historical testimony, they 
simultaneously reject the idea that this can be achieved 
without the help of an analyst figure, an enabling other, 
which may in turn suggest the impossibility of accurate or 
viable testimony outside of this specific theoretical 
framework. Psychoanalysis usefully proposes ways in which 
testimony might be admitted as historical or biographical 
evidence even when it doesn't sound true in the way we 
might expect, but, as I suggested in Chapter Two, theories 
of testimony based on psychoanalysis might come close to 
invalidating testimony that does conform to received 
notions of truth-telling. 
Theories of belatedness or Nachtrýiglichkeit pose 
similar politico-ethical problems. While the concept of 
"deferred action, proves a useful vantage point from which 
to consider the necessity for revision or Iretranslation, 
in autobiography (which in itself, as Nicola King proposes, 
may serve therapeutic ends), in its resistance to closure 
and its emphasis on self-making as a 'continual process' it 
may preclude the possibility of (a final) accurate 
testimony, and although the theory of belatedness allows 
for the fact that a traumatic experience may not be 
, registered, when it occurs but only later, a strict 
application of this theory runs the risk of suggesting that 
Cited by Ann Scott, Real Events Revisited: Fantasy, Memory and 
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(accurate) testimony cannot be given right after the 
occurrence of an event, but only at a significant distance 
from that event. 
And so in this sense psychoanalysis might well serve 
as a delimiting factor in considerations of autobiography 
and testimony, as opposed to a simple validation of the 
"human' aspect of life-narrative. For with the emphasis on 
psychoanalysis also comes a profound distrust of coherent 
stories, which are seen to function as screens for more 
profound truths. Felman's dismissal of women's confessional 
writing illustrates this problem: the stories we have at 
our disposal, the tale that can be told is, from a 
psychoanalytic perspective and as Adam Phillips points out, 
a cover story, a screen for the 'true' story that can only 
be accessed indirectly. Frangoise Meltzer sees this as 'a 
problematic central to psychoanalysis' and illustrates this 
by referring to Freud's famous anecdote where, in 
responding to a suggestion that his cigar-smoking had 
phallic implications, he proclaimed that 'sometimes a good 
cigar is just a good cigar'. Meltzer writes: 
the discipline which insists on transference 
and, perhaps even more significantly, on 
displacement as fundamental principles, 
ultimately must insist in turn on seeing 
everything as being "reallyff something else. 
Psychoanalysis (London: Virago, 1996) xxvii. 
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- .1 psychoanalysis needs at times to remind 
itself (. I that it is possible for a cigar 
6 really to be a cigar . 
Testimony accounts for the need to say this is true and it 
happened to me', and for these words to be taken at face- 
value, but as this thesis has demonstrated, sometimes the 
irreconcilabilitY of the therapeutic and the historical 
demands of testimony throws into question the relationship 
between trauma, language, and truth. 
This thesis was motivated by a desire to investigate 
the ways that psychoanalysis and history implicate one 
another in crucial ways, and in so doing to explore the 
extent to which autobiography might be able to serve as a 
vehicle for the human and the historical aspects of 
testimony, without these aspects cancelling each other out. 
Laub's anecdote illustrates how the 'human' and the 
'historical, might sometimes function dichotomously. And by 
equating the human document with gravity and the historical 
document with accuracy, Langer occupies a problematic 
theoretical position. Is history free from subjectivity and 
is the human document, although grave, unable to achieve 
the degree of objectivity necessary for an accurate version 
of events? If to err is human, does history always get it 
6 Franqoise Meltzer, 'Introduction: Partitive Plays, Pipe Dreams,, The 
Trial(s) of Psychoanalysis, ed. Frangoise Meltzer (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1988) 1. This edition was first published as a 
special issue of Critical Inquiry. 13: 2 (winter 1987). 
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right? Shouldn't autobiography, that most subjective of 
historical genres, operate as a site of reconciliation? 
The memoirs I discussed in Chapter One confronted this 
issue directly, demonstrating that if this genre cannot 
serve a reconciliatory function, it might at least provide 
a forum in which to explore the problematic relationship 
between the human and the historical, the clinical and the 
political. The memoirs discussed in this thesis might be 
understood as testimonies not only because of their 
emphasis on 'access to' the past as opposed to 'statement 
of, the past, but also because of their self-conscious 
positionings in relation to objectifying theories or 
histories. Tim Lott positioned his mother's story in 
relation to the clinical 'explanations, for her depression 
and suicide and for his own depression. Anne Karpf and Lisa 
Appignanesi attempted to locate their personal histories 
and those of their parents in relation both to the 
historical record and to psychoanalytic theories of 
transgenerational haunting. Carolyn Steedman and Annette 
Kuhn question the relationship of their working-class 
histories to dominant middle-class cultural histories. They 
each gesture towards the fictiveness of 'historyl, 
questioning the authority that such dominant modes derive 
from their ostensible objectivity. Lott does this by 
pointing out that the history of depression is as multiple 
and shifting as his own projects of self-making, 
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Appignanesi questions the authority of documentary evidence 
by making clear the inadequacies of archival resources, and 
Steedman explores the extent to which universalising 
theories such as psychoanalysis, cultural studies, and 
feminism often exclude working-class experience. And yet 
the desire for their personal histories to count as history 
is attested to by a preoccupation with referentiality, with 
evidence, and with recovery. As I suggested in Chapter One, 
these texts demonstrate how autobiography can still be 
sustained by the myth of recovery or referentiality, even 
if this is acknowledged to be this genre's most fictional 
of premises. 
Wilkomirski's case brings into particularly sharp 
focus the relationship between autobiography and truth- 
telling. And it is here that perhaps the hazards of a 
psychoanalytic approach to autobiography--the hazards of 
prioritising the 'human, document over the 'historical, -- 
become starkly evident. Wilkomirski's insistence on the 
referential qualities of his text exacerbated the 
problematic Ifictionality, of his text, which suggests that 
in these sceptical times the only autobiographies we can 
truly believe are those that make it clear they don't 
believe in themselves. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson see 
this as the primary strategy in a contemporary memoir very 
different from Wilkomirski's Fragments. In A Heartbreaking 
Work of Staggering Genius (2000) Dave Eggers 'invites his 
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readers to collaborate in reconstructing the authority of 
autobiography as a site of "keeping it real" precisely by 
exposing its contrivances'. 7 Eggers's memoir, for Smith and 
Watson, suggests that 'being suspicious about the ethics of 
autobiographical writing may be the one ethical act 
available to it'. 
Would it have made matters simpler if Wilkomirski had 
been inclined, or able, to 'admit the fictionality, of his 
story? On the one hand it may be unethical to label fiction 
an autobiographical account that, for the author, 
represents fact. But on the other hand, what the 
Wilkomirski case made clear was the fact that the author's 
considerations may well need to be outweighed in the favour 
of a greater good: in this case it seems the alternative to 
validating Wilkomirskils 'truth' was to throw into question 
the truth-status of other survivor accounts. Whereas 
Menchuls transgression may have been in saying 'I' where 
she should have said 'we' or even 'they', Wilkomirskils 'I, 
could not be divorced from its representative force. 
Perhaps above all the Wilkomirski case served to validate 
survivor accounts as history, to recognise their status as 
such by invalidating the one that spectacularly failed to 
withstand historical scrutiny. But Wilkomirski's case, 
7 Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, 'The Rumpled Bed of Autobiography: 
Extravagant Lives, Extravagant Questions', 'Autobiography and Changing 
Identities', eds. Susanna Egan and Gabrielle Helms, spec. issue of 
Biography 24.1 (winter 2001): 12-13. 
a Smith and Watson: 9. 
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extreme as it was, poses questions about the limits of 
autobiography--about parameters between the human and the 
historical--that pertain to the genre more broadly. Where 
do we draw the line? When does a narrative become so 
sub3ective that it exceeds the parameters and becomes a 
work of fiction? What, for example, would a historian make 
of the woman testifying to her survival through the ghostly 
intervention of her dead mother? 
A recently published study of trauma, testimony, and 
the limits of autobiography discusses some of the same 
issues as the ones explored in this thesis, but with a 
notable difference of emphasis. In order to investigate the 
relationship between testimony and truth-telling, Leigh 
Gilmore identifies the recovered memory debate and recent 
trauma theory as emblems of the fraught relationship 
between testimony and truth. She focuses on texts that 
reveal how: 
autobiography's project--to tell the story of 
one's life--appears to constrain self- 
representation through its almost legalistic 
definition of truth telling, its anxiety about 
invention, and its preference for the literal 
and verifiable, even in the presence of some 
ambivalence about these criteria. [. ] The 
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portals are too narrow and the demands too 
restrictive. 9 
Gilmore 'redirects attention away from the most prominent 
contemporary memoirs to texts about trauma that test the 
limits of autobiography' . 
10 But the texts discussed in her 
study are not autobiographies but fictions and Gilmore's 
aim is to demonstrate how 'In their embrace of 
autobiography's impossibility and revision of the 
testimonial imperative, limit-cases reveal how not writing 
an autobiography can be an achievement'. " Gilmore hopes 
that her study of fictional texts will offer an invaluable 
insight into autobiography and its implications, and this 
seems a fitting response to trauma theories and the 
impasses of memory-work: theories that seem to perpetuate 
autobiography's impossibility even as they articulate the 
political and clinical need for flexible modes of truth- 
telling. Gilmore's study does not suggest that fiction is 
the ideal forum for truth-telling, but it may suggest that 
fiction offers a way in which to tell the truth about 
telling the truth, without the burden of judgement that, as 
Gilmore makes clear, inevitably falls upon the avowedly 
non-fiction writer. 
9 Leigh Gilmore, The Limits of Autobiography: Trauma and Testimony 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001) 3. 
10 Gilmore 3. 
11 Gilmore 15. 
382 
'Fiction's dead. That's a fact' proclaimed Linda 
Grant, writing from the midst of the 1990s memoir boom, and 
indeed many were concerned that the hunger for tales of 
true-life threatened to lead to the extinction of the 
novel. 12 And yet what Gilmore's study suggests is that the 
contemporary memoir and the issues surrounding it may have 
served as a call for the reconfiguration of the space 
between 'fact' and 'fiction', between the 'historical' and 
the 'human, and that what they have to tell us is something 
that Lejeune knew all along: 'In spite of the fact that 
autobiography is impossible, this in no way prevents it 
from existing'. 
13 
12 Linda Grant, 'Fiction's Dead. That's a Fact', Guardian 16 June 1998, 
Features: 5. 
13 Phillipe Lejeune, 'The Autobiographical Pact (Bis)', On 
Autobiography, Theory and History of Literature 52, trans. Katherine 
Leary, ed. Paul John Eakin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989) 131-32. 
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